



THE
INSTITUTION
OF A
PRINCE.



VOL. II.



THE
INSTITUTION
OF A
PRINCE.
OR, A
TREATISE
OF THE
Virtues and Duties of a SOVEREIGN,

*Translated from the French of the
Abbe DUGUET.*

VOL. II.



LONDON:

Printed for R. DODSLEY, at *Tully's Head* in
Pall-Mall. MDCCXL.

THE
INSTITUTION
OF A
PRINCIPLE
OF A
TREATISE
OF THE

Principles and Duties of a Christian



LONDON:
Printed by T. DODD, at the New York Office,
No. 1, Nassau Street.



THE
INSTITUTION
OF A
PRINCE, &c.

SECOND PART.

In which the Duties of a Prince relating to Temporal Government, are handled.

THE first Part was intended to shew a Prince what he ought to be: Here we are to consider what he ought to do. We have taken a View of those Qualities and Virtues which fit one for reigning: we are now to examine what his Conduct ought to be when he shall reign. His personal Dispositions have been pointed out: the Question at present is concerning his Duties; but in this second Part the Enquiry is confined precisely to what concerns Temporal Government.

CHAPTER I.

A sure and compendious Way of instituting a Prince in his Duties. The first of which is to love his People. How he ought to love them, and the Content he hath in so doing.

ARTICLE I.

A sure and compendious Way of teaching a Prince his Duties.

IT is a great Obstacle to a Prince's Knowledge of his Duties to have been born one, and never to have proved any other Situation but that alone of a Master or a Sovereign. It would be of great Advantage to him to have been long obliged to Obedience before he commanded, and that to Princes very unworthy of ruling; to have felt in a private and dependent Life the Yoke of absolute Power; to have been exposed to Envy and Calumny; and to have been in danger on account of his Virtue and Merit; to have been under the Necessity of stooping to haughty, violent, insolent Ministers; to have been Witness to the Oppression of the Weak, and to the Cabals and Intrigues of those who were wholly set upon preserving Power in their own Hands; to have seen Merit pass unrecompenced, nay dishonoured; and an uninterrupted Application to raise such Persons only, who being low and mean, could never occasion either Fear or Jealousy.

II. It were to be wish'd one could say to a Prince, mounting the Throne, what was said to

a great Emperôr: (a) “ You have not always
 “ been what you now are. Adversity has pre-
 “ pared you for making a right Use of sovereign
 “ Power. You have lived long with us, and
 “ like us you have been in Peril under wicked
 “ Princes. You have trembled. You have
 “ known in your own Experience how they have
 “ male-treated Innocence and Virtue. You have
 “ seen with what Prodigality, Flattery was la-
 “ vish’d upon Princes without Merit, and how
 “ much the Flatterers themselves, who deceiv’d
 “ them, held them in Abhorrence.”

III. It would not be necessary to point out to a Prince, who had pass’d through these Trials, his Duties when he comes to reign. His Heart must be filled with deep and serious Reflections on the lawful Use of Power, what he had suffer’d, what he had occasion to fear for himself, or for others; the Iniquity and Unreasonableness he had observ’d in the Conduct of his Predecessors, must have open’d his Eyes to see all his Obligations; and if he should yet stand in need of any farther Instruction, no better can be given to him than what the Emperor *Galba* gave to *Piso*, when he adopted him to associate him with himself in the Empire.

(b) “ Remember, said he to him, what you have
 “ condemned or praised in Princes while you was
 “ a Subject. Excite the good Qualities you wish-
 “ ed they had been possess’d of: remove far from
 “ you all the bad ones which then offended you.

S 2

“ You

(a) Quàm utile est, ad usum secundorum per adversa venisse? Vixisti nobiscum, periclitatus es, timuisti. Quæ tunc erat innocentium vita, scis & expertus es: quantopere detestentur malos principes, etiam qui malos faciunt. *Paneg. Traj.* p. 726.

(b) Utilissimus quidem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris. *Tacit. l. 1. Hist.* p. 313.

264 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

“ You need only consult the Judgment you passed upon the one and the other, to know your Duty, and how to reign as you ought.”

IV. This was what a great Man (c) likewise represented to the Senators, when they had chosen *Tacitus* Emperor, in order to induce them to persist in their Choice, notwithstanding his Remonstrances. (d) “ We have no Ground of Fear from so wise and experienced a Person, neither from Rashness and Precipitation, nor from Violence. All his Designs will be maturely weigh’d ; all his Views will be great and noble. He will resolve and act as if the Republick itself deliberated and commanded : for he knows, and he will never forget, what he wish’d a Prince to be while he was a private Person ; and will without doubt shew himself such with regard to us, as he desir’d an Emperor should be with respect to him and us.”

V. But we cannot speak so of a Prince who had never been oblig’d by his Interest and Experience to make Reflections on the Duties of those who are invested with sovereign Power.

VI. We are therefore reduced to the Necessity of advising him to figure to himself in his Imagination what could never have happen’d to him in reality, (e) and to place himself by his Thoughts in a private Station in order to examine what he should desire himself to be. He will clearly perceive the Duties of a Prince when he does not consider

(c) *Il se nommoit Metius Falconius, Sénateur, & autrefois Consul.*

(d) *Nihil ab hoc immaturum, nihil properum, nihil asperum formidandum est : omnia seria, cuncta gravia, & quasi ipsa Republica jubeat, auguranda sunt. Scit enim qualem sibi principem semper optaverit ; nec potest aliud nobis exbiere, quam quod ipse desideravit ac voluit. Vopisc. in Tacit. vit. ex actis publicis, p. 285.*

(e) *Eccl. c. xxxi. v. 18.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 265

sider them as his own, and hath put himself in the Point of View for discovering them, which is by considering himself as a Subject.

VII. But to discover them all it is not enough to descend from the Throne for a Moment, and to consider himself in a general confused Manner, as one of the People. He must successively run over, in his Mind, all Places and Situations, and considering himself in each of them, enquire what he would expect from a good Prince, and look upon to be his Duty if one was really and for ever in that Station. Thus one puts himself in the room of a Man of Birth, of a Magistrate, of an inferior Judge, of a Merchant, of a Husbandman, of a Tradesman, of one without Power to support; and from all these different Conditions of Life he learns different Truths relative to the Administration of a Prince, and by consequence different Duties.

VIII. The Prince does not this once only: if that was all he would discover very little, and soon forget what he discover'd: but he reiterates often this useful Practice, which far excells all Precepts; and the more firmly he is establish'd in his Authority; the greater Tranquillity he enjoys at home, or with respect to other States; the more he is fear'd and respected; the more he is environ'd with Persons capable of making him forget what he owes to all; the more attentive is he to divest himself often of his Grandeur in his inward Thoughts, and to consult his own Heart about the Use he would desire another to make of it, were another in possession of it.

ARTICLE II.

The first Duty of a Prince is to love his People.

I. It is not long before he discovers that the great and principal Duty of a Prince is to love his People:

266 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

ple: for in all the different Points of View he could place himself, he hath seen, and in all the various Situations he could put himself, he hath felt, that all the Wishes and all the Interests of private Persons center'd in that: that all were ready to put unlimited Confidence in a Prince who loved them; that they were willing to surrender into his Hands at that Price their Estates, their Liberties, their Lives; but that he could not by any other Quality be assur'd of their Affection; and that they would all look on themselves as Foreigners with respect to him if he was indifferent about them: that it is Love only that can make a firm Bond between him and them: that all besides is but Dissimulation, Policy, or Interest; and that tho' they know very well they have a Master, yet they would never think they have a King, worthy of being call'd their Father, if he does not unite Love with Power.

II. All these Sentiments are agreeable to Reason; they are founded upon Nature and Truth. A Prince is the first who is perswaded they are so, if he consults the Hearts of his People and his own; for he must have clearly perceived, that without Love to his People all the Cares of a Prince are very superficial, that the publick Good becomes in his Eyes a Chimæra; that he considers himself alone in all that he appears to do for his Kingdom; that he is always disposed to sacrifice every thing to his own Caprice; that he distinguishes his own private Interest from that of his Subjects; nay, that he even comes to look upon them as opposite and incompatible; because it is publick Love only that can inspire into him more noble, more generous Sentiments; it is publick Love only that can discover his Duties to him; render him attentive to them, or make them easy to him, give him a strong Inclination towards publick

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 267

lick Good, preserve him from all Injustice, and form Sentiments in him worthy of his People's Confidence, and suitable to their Expectations.

III. It is chiefly this last Consideration which penetrates the Heart of a great Prince: for he would render himself guilty of vile Perfidy if he should disappoint the Hopes of those who place full Confidence in his Goodness, his Generosity, his tender Affection toward them; if he did not fully answer their Expectations, and if he should refuse to devote himself intirely to their Service when Circumstances of Affairs require it. As he is greater than they, he would reckon himself dishonour'd if he was less sincere, less noble-minded than they; and he would look upon himself as the most dispicable of all Persons, if he should refuse the Love of a numerous People, or if he should hope to make a suitable Return to it by a narrow selfish Heart, unworthy even of a private Person.

IV. He knows, that (f) becoming King he becomes the Father of the People: that it is necessary they should give him that Title by publick Consent, to have a Right to it; that he ought to deserve it from the Moment he began to manage his Family, that is, his Kingdom: that all his Subjects are his Children; that they are all intrusted to his paternal Care by Divine Providence, to whom he must be accountable for them all: that they are oblig'd to prefer him before all that is most dear and reputable in their Sight; not being free under whatsoever Pretence to enter into any Engagements, or practice any other Interests but his alone; and that he, by consequence, contracts an Obligation absolutely indispensable not to divide his Heart between them and other Objects,

S 4

(g) but

(f) *Gratius nomen pietatis, (Pater patriæ) quam potestatis. Tertull. Apol. c. 34.*

268 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

(g) but to preserve himself intirely for them as a Father does himself for his Family.

• V. (b) The *Roman* Emperors were frequently flatter'd with the fastous Titles of Grand, August, Conquerors of Nations, and other such-like Appellations: but they were perswaded it was giving them something far superior to all these to call them Fathers of their Country, or their People; and they had reason to think so when it was due to them, and not given by base Flattery. This Name when it is merited is a glorious Recompence: and when it is not, it becomes a Reproach. The bad Princes hoped it might prove a Covert to their Crimes, and they desir'd it on that Account: the Good (i) fear'd it was above their Desert, and they that might decently accept of it would not receive it, till their Conduct had prov'd them not unworthy of it. Their Modesty is worthy of Imitation, but only in respect of the Glory of the Name: for as to the Thing it self I have already said, that every Prince is by his Station the Father of his People; and that it is not only to renounce a solid Honour but a capital Duty to separate Royal Power from paternal Care.

VI. I say more, it is in a sense to renounce the Character of Head, so essential to a Prince. For of what is he Head if there be no Body? And what

(g) Quod ergo officium ejus est? quod bonorum parentum. . . . Hoc quod parenti, etiam Principi faciendum est, quem appellavimus Patrem patriæ, non adulatione vanâ adducti.

(b) Cætera enim cognomina honori data sunt. Magnos, & felices, & augustos diximus; & ambitiosæ majestati quidquid potuimus titulorum concessimus, illis hoc tribuentes. Patrem quidem patriæ appellavimus, ut sciret datam sibi potestatem patriam: quæ est temperatissima, liberis consulens, suæque post illos ponens. *Senec. l. 1. de Clem. c. 14.*

(i) Patris patriæ nomen delatum à Senatu, quod primò distulerat (Antoninus Pius) cum ingenti gratiarum actione suscepit. *Jad. Capit. in ejus vit. p. 138.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 269

what Body hath he, or can he have, (*k*) if he be only united with it by some external Ties, and if he is not the Source of its Life and all its Motions? It is more to be Head than to be Father. The Body which the Head animates interests him more than a Son does a Father, who may subsist independently. There may be a Distinction between the Interest of a Father and his Children; but none can be imagin'd between the Head and its Members.

VII. There is nothing in the State which ought not to touch the Prince very sensibly; nothing in it ought to be foreign or indifferent to him. The remotest, the weakest Subject is inseparably united to him. (*l*) The Foot however distant from the Head is of consequence to it, and ought not to be neglected; and all that belongs to the Subjects as well as they themselves, (*m*) makes a Part of what is entrusted to the Care, the Concern, the Activity of the Head of the Republick.

ARTICLE III.

How a Prince ought to love his People.

I. His Love to his People is not like that which is affected, and that merely consists in external Professions, and terminates in unactive Wishes.

II. It is not only cordial and sincere, but deeply rooted in his Heart: and the Prince does not satisfy

(*k*) Unus tu, in quo & Respublica & nos sumus. . . Nec magis sine te nos esse felices, quam tu sine nobis potes. *Paneg. Traj. p. 208.*

(*l*) Non potest dicere caput pedibus: non estis mihi necessarii. *1 Corinth. c. v. 21.*

(*n*) Nemo Regi tam vilis sit, ut illum perire non sentiat. *Senec. l. 1. de Clem. c. 16.*

270 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

satisfy himself with making a Shew of it, but nourishes and strengthens it in his Mind; because he knows his Merit depends on it, and that he is only worthy of reigning over Men in proportion as he sincerely loves them, and endeavours to merit their Affection.

III. He is tender, affectionate and sympathizing, sensible of all the Distresses as well as of all the Advantages of his People; heartily concern'd to promote their Interests, full of Care and Attention to their Happiness, looking upon it to be the smallest Part of his Obligation merely to protect and succour them, and considering real, inward Affection towards them as what alone can be call'd discharging his Duty.

IV. So insurmountable is his Generosity, that no Obstacles can stop his Course; Ingratitude cannot extinguish it, want of suitable Merit in the People cannot abate or diminish it. He overcomes Evil by Good. He is animated and invigorated by Resistance: and he has it for his sole End to make Men better, and to be useful every way, and does not suit his Measures to their Disposition with respect to him. He is not satisfy'd unless he has succeeded: His good Intentions do not console him when his Designs have bad Success. He aims at Effects, and does not content himself with Plans and Schemes: nothing weighs with him but good Execution; he places very little Merit in Projectory.

V. He is universal in his Views; He embraces all, and extends himself to all. He provides for the Whole, and overlooks no Part or Member of it. (n) He bears engraved on his Heart every Prin-

(n) Is cui curæ sunt universa, nullam non Reipublicæ partem tanquam sui nutrit. *Senec. l. 1. de Clem.*

Principality, every City, every Family. (o) He interests himself in all their Concerns: all their Affairs not only reach his Ears but his Heart. A Matter even of general Utility does not so engross his Attention as intirely to divert it from every thing else. He knows how to establish such a Correspondence amongst the Members of a State as that among those of the natural Body; and while it is necessary for him to receive full Information about any Affair one would then say, that it is not the only thing he minded.

VI. The Love of his People reigns alone in his Heart. All other Passions are swallow'd up in it. It is the sole Motive and End of all his Desires; and he takes great care not to suffer any other Love distinct from it to enter into his Mind, lest the Love of his People should be weaken'd by it, or his Heart should be turn'd towards some other Object, and his publick Spirit should thus be weaken'd and then totally extinguish'd.

VII. He is steady and perseverant in it, and by consequence his Love of the Publick every day acquires new Force. He does not move by Fits and Sallies; but acts with uniform, uninterrupted Vigilance. He does not rush like a Torrent with great Noise for some Moments, and so run out; His Goodness flows from an exhaustless Source; it glides very gently, but it never diminishes. This is what compleats his Character, and gives Perfection to his other Qualities: for we have no ground to think a Prince sincerely loves his People, unless he loves them always with a real, tender, effective, universal and predominant Love. He may on some Occasions make very zealous Efforts for the publick Good: but without Perseverance

(o) Et quid Cæsar non suum videat. *Paneg. Traj. p. 145.*
Tantum ipse, quantum omnes habet. *Idem. p. 87.*

272 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

severance they are all abortive : and therefore the only way we can know whether a Prince sincerely loves his People, is by considering whether he loves them always : that is to say, if their Interest be what he has alone in view, and only consults, in all his Undertakings, in all he does, in all he desires.

ARTICLE IV.

How much it is a Prince's Interest to love his People.

I. When by such a noble Disposition of Mind he is truly Father of his People, he cannot but be known to be so. His Bounty and publick Love discover themselves a thousand ways ; and all he does discovers the exhaustless Riches of his benign Soul. Truth and Sincerity appear in every part of his Conduct. Every Action proves Regard to the publick Interests to be deeply rooted in his Heart. The Felicity of his People resides there, and spreads it self from thence over the whole Kingdom : and it is incredible what Affection and Gratitude so general an Opinion of him excites in the Breast of every Subject.

II. (p) This is the first Fruit and most legitimate Recompence of his Love to his People. He is universally and sincerely belov'd ; because he so loves : he is loaded with Benedictions in publick and private ; because his whole Soul is set on doing good : He is rever'd as a common Father, Guardian, Defender, Protector, because he has all the Dispositions necessary to those respective Characters : He reigns in the Hearts of all ; be-
cause

(p) A totâ civitate amatur, defenditur. Eadem de illo homines secretò loquuntur, quæ palam. . . Hic Princeps suo beneficio tutus, nihil præfidiis eget : arma ornamenti causâ habet. Senec. l. 1. de Clem. c. 13.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 273

cause all are persuaded they are deeply imprinted on his : He has no need of Guards but for the sake of Decorum and outward Majesty ; (q) because he lives amidst his Family, wherever he goes he only sees his Children, his Friends, and a Country committed to his Care and Goodness, upon which he every day bestows Marks of his attentive Love, and beholds the happy Success of his Zeal and Orders.

III. The People are not in pain how to evidence their genuine Love of him ; (r) there is no need of Flattery to supply the Want of Sincerity. His own Truth and Candour vouch to him, for that of his Subjects. He is conscious that he does not deserve to be deceiv'd ; and he easily believes that others have the same good Disposition he feels in himself. It is quite otherwise with Princes who do not love their People ; and therefore they are with good Reason diffident that they are not loved. Greater Professions are made to them ; and more than for a sincere, amiable Prince ; (s) but they reckon all but false Pretence, because they are inwardly convinced that they do not merit real Love.

IV. It is not necessary to tell them, they are not lov'd. 'Tis sufficient to convince them of it, that they know they love none but themselves : (t) For it is written on the Hearts of all Men, that

(q) Quod tutius Imperium est, quàm illud, quod amore & caritate nutritur ? Quis securior quàm Rex ille, quem non metuunt, sed cui metuunt subditi. *Synes. de Reg. p. 13.*

(r) Agnoscit sentiturque sibi, non Principi dici. *Paneg. Traj. p. 23.*

(s) Quamvis faceremus quod amantes solent, illi tamen non amati se credebant sibi. *Paneg. Traj. p. 213.*

(t) Neque enim, ut alia, subjectis, ita amor imperatur : neque est ullus affectus tam erectus & liber, nec qui magis vices exigat. Potest fortasse Princeps unicuique, potest tamen odio esse nonnullis ; etiamsi ipse non oderit : amari, nisi ipse amet, non potest. *Paneg. Traj. p. 234.*

274 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

that Love is only due to Love: That in this respect Sovereignty gives no peculiar Privilege; and that to refuse to be amiable and to love, is to renounce all Right to the Pleasure and Glory of being loved: For it may happen, that a Prince may not be agreeable to all whom he loves; but a Prince cannot possibly be loved if he be so unjust as not to love.

V. The Princes who have renounced this legitimate and effectual Way of reigning over their Subjects, have been sensible of what they have thereby lost; but they have not had Courage and Force enough to sacrifice their low and selfish Passions to the nobler Obligation of devoting themselves to the Publick, as Fathers of their People. They have allowed themselves to be infected by those pernicious Maxims, That the People's Advantage is not the King's; that those two Interests are different and sometimes opposite. Thus they swerv'd from the Principle that ought to conduct them; and having forsaken it they could not but go astray. But what hath most contributed to their Seducement has been on the one Side the Incompatibility of publick with all other Love; and on the other Side, a Troop of Passions which they would gladly gratify, and which have always rendered them Enemies to publick good.

VI. They willingly give up the Love of their Subjects, if they are fear'd by them. They have substituted Force in the Room of Merit; and not being able to attain to all the Qualities of a King, they have abandoned the internal
Ones

(w) Vox dira & abominanda: oderint dam metuant. *Senec. L. 1. de ira sub finem.*

Execrabilis versus qui multos dedit præcipites. *Senec. L. 2. De Clem. C. 12.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 275

Ones as too difficult, too dear a Purchase, and contented themselves with an external Command which they could maintain by outward Means without meriting it.

VII. They have reckoned very little on the Fidelity of their Subjects, and a great deal upon the external Means of keeping them at under, and reducing them. They have kept up standing Armies, rather for their own Security, than to defend their People; and have considered their fortified Towns, not merely as Barriers against foreign Incurfions, but chiefly as Strong-holds for themselves to strike Terror into their Subjects.

VIII. They have not reflected, that in order to be safe they must be loved by some, and not disunite the Members of a State by becoming indifferent about them all; that (x) to trust to Troops, to Places of Strength, to provincial Governours, they must have strongly attached them to their Interest, and have made their Security necessary to them; that (y) this cannot be the Case when they look upon Love and Hatred with Indifference. They have not reflected that Fear is but a Restraint which may on some Occasions be despised; (z) and that some very trifling Emergence may (a) effectually evince the Weakness of all those Supports, which have

no

(x) Metus & terror,

infirma vincula caritatis, quæ ubi removeris, qui timere desierint, odisse incipient. Tacit. vit. Agric. p. 462.

(y) Reputante Tiberio publicum sibi odium, extremam ætatem, magisque famâ, quàm vi stare res suas. *Tacit. L. 3 Annal. p. 119.*

(z) Nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum est, quàm fama potentie, non suâ vi nixæ. *Tacit. L. 13. Annal. p. 219.*

(a) Sic habet nihil infirmius eo homine, quem oderant omnes. *Theophrast. Institut. Regia Patre. c. 14.*

275 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

no Foundation but in Fear join'd with Hatred.

IX. Divine Providence, which guards States, even when its Rulers are asleep, doth not always permit their Injustice and Imprudence to have their natural Consequences. As it is from hence the Obedience and Patience of Subjects proceed, so it holds them in Submission, even when they do not love their Governours. But Princes who are so unhappy as to satisfy themselves with the Dread of their People, do not know the Danger to which they expose themselves and their Kingdom; by thus shaking the sole Support of Society, Love; and by rending from sovereign Power, the principal Motive of the People's Subjection to it.

X. It would be of Use to them to consider, what an infinite Difference Men of all Ranks and Conditions put between a Prince acknowledg'd to be the Father of his People, and another who only keeps them in Fear and Servitude; with what Joy, what Ravishments, what Acclamations they may see the former appear; (b) what Names they give him, according to their Age, their Dignity, their Wants; how profound and universal the Respect paid to him is, tho' diversified agreeably to the different Characters of those who are penetrated with it; how thoroughly they interest themselves in his Safety; with what Eagerness they exert themselves in his Defence; (c) what cordial Thanks they offer to Heaven

(b) Quum in amore omnium imperasset (he speaks of *Marcus Aurelius*) ab aliis modò frater, modò pater, modò filius, ut cujusque ætas sinebat, & dicebatur, & amabatur. *Jul. Capit. in ejus vita, p. 146.*

(c) Certis omnibus (his at Death) quod à Diis commendatus ad Deos redisset. *Idem, ibid. p. 146.* They were ignorant of the Unity of God, what was deficient in the Virtues of the Pagans: in other particulars their Notions were right.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 273

Heaven for having given them such a King; and how worthy they look upon him of returning thither. No such Thing can happen to the other, against whom every one murmurs in Secret; and not un-frequently even in Publick; whose Reign seems very long, and whose Successor is impatiently expected; whose Government is considered as a Punishment inflicted upon them by Divine Justice, and whose Misfortunes, tho' the Publick should suffer by them, are regretted by none.

XI. This Comparison, methinks, is sufficient to teach Princes what they lose by not being loved: But without considering the Sentiments of the People, a Prince who neglects his Dominions, who drains them for his own Sake alone, and renders them miserable by a cruel Disregard of their Interests, is he not the first who suffers by his Male-administration? Would it be prudent, if he had but one Field, or one Vineyard, to think of nothing but eating the Fruits, and quite neglect its Culture? Do not the first Years hurt the succeeding ones? Does he not ruin himself by letting his Heritage perish? And does he not dry up the Fountain of his Revenues, by giving himself no Concern about what produces them?

XII. (d) Ought not one, on the contrary, for his own Sake, to add to what he received from his Forefathers; to improve it, and put it in a better Condition than he found it; to repair its Ruins, and support what is in Danger of falling; to make wholesome Laws, Commerce and Agriculture flourish throughout all; to facilitate to poor Parents the Education of their Children; to

T

mul-

(d) *Tantâ diligentia Subjectos sibi populus rexit (Antoninus Pius) ut omnia, & omnes, quasi sua essent, curaret; Provinciæ sub eo cunctæ floruerunt. Jul. Capit. in vita ejus, p. 138.*

274 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

multiply his People in Country and Town; to better the Face of every Province, by diffusing over them all, Marks of wise and truly paternal Oeconomy? Is it not visible, that he lays an unfurmoutable Obstacle in the Way of all those Blessings, by abandoning the Care of his People? And is it not evident, by Consequence, that a Prince who loves not his People, does not love himself?



C H A P.



CHAPTER II.

A Prince ought to have an exact Knowledge of his Kingdom, and to make a right Use of it. Means of succeeding in this.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to make an accurate Enquiry into the State of his Dominions, and to make a good Use of that Knowledge.

I. **N**othing almost is left to be said to a Prince about other Duties, when he fulfills the first, and has as real and tender Love to his People, as a good Father to his Family. There is no Need of Precepts to love; it is the fulfilling of all Precepts: (e) It is permitted to it to do whatever it pleases, (f) because it can do nothing but what is good: (g) But without giving Laws to it; it is allowable to add to its Light; and it cannot but be grateful for Instruction, since being full of good Desires it thinks of nothing but satisfying them.

II. The most salutary Counsel that can be given to a Prince when he first takes the Reins of

T 2

Go.

(e) Qui diligit, legem implevit.

(f) Ama, & fac quod vis. S. August.

(g) Dilectio proximi malum non operatur.

276 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

Government into his Hands, is to make a strict Review of his Dominions, and to follow the Advice of the wise Man who addresss Kings in this allegorical Manner (b). *Be thou diligent to know the State of thy Flocks; and look well to thy Herds.* For without that Knowledge it is impossible to manage well the Interests of the People committed by Divine Providence to his own personal Care; from which he can no more be exempted by those who serve under him, than they can usurp his Place.

III. We are here to consider the Dominions of a Prince, only under the Notion of a political and temporal Government: In another place we shall consider them in a nobler View, and with Respect to Religion: But the one depends on the other; and the Basis of all is an exact Knowledge of the Country and People, with whose Interests the Prince is charged.

IV. This Knowledge is of great Extent and consists of many Parts. It is proper to distinguish them, and to follow the most natural Order, by beginning with the Consideration of what is most general.

V. It highly concerns a Prince who sincerely desires to avoid all Faults, thoroughly to know the Genius and reigning Dispositions of the People under his Authority. Every Province hath not the same Taste or Temper, but altogether form a certain general Character, compos'd of differing Inclinations, ballanced and moderated by one another: And it is this general Character of the Nation he ought to understand, that he may accommodate himself to what is good in it; avoid the directly shocking it in what it may be de-

(b) *Diligenter agnosce vultum pecoris tui, tuosque greges considera. Prov. c. xxviii. v. 23.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 277

defective; and make certain excellent Qualities serve for a counterpoise to others, which ought to be changed.

VI. Some People have Courage and a very lively Sense of Honour, and yet are indolent: The one Inclination ought to be corrected by the other. Some are very sensibly touched by the Confidence the Prince places in them, and are attached to his Government, in proportion to the Share he allows them in it; but are easily dissatisfied if they think themselves slighted in any degree, and treated in an absolute or despotick manner: A Prince must therefore extirpate all the Seeds of Division and Revolt, by giving his People a Share in the publick Deliberations. There are others who are entirely influenced by certain Persons of Distinction in their Country; and who hold fast to their Allegiance, by their Regard to Chiefs, whose Birth they honour, and upon whom they depend. A Prince must therefore gain the Nobles to him; give them Employments; and bind them by their private Interest to that of the Publick. These few Examples are sufficient, a particular Detail would run out into an immense length; and to a well instructed wise Prince that is unnecessary.

VII. If we take a near View of the different States which compose a Monarchy, we shall observe some Remains of the ancient Division into many Provinces under separate Masters, before they were united under one Head, and made one Body. These Provinces can scarcely lay aside the Antipathies, jarring Interests had engendered in their Minds, and the Wars and Jealousies of Sovereigns had upheld. A very slight Occasion will make an old Wound bleed afresh; or revive an Enmity of which a confused Remembrance lasts long after its Origin is quite for-

278 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

got ; the smallest Pretence is sufficient in certain delicate Cases to create Discontent in Provinces, especially when others they formerly did not love, are preferred to them ; or they think themselves treated with greater Indifference about their Interests.

VIII. It is wise and good in a Prince to prevent this Evil, by giving more Testimonies of his Concern to such jealous Provinces, and by interesting them in his Person and Government by many different Motives : But he must conceal this Intention, otherwise he will but augment, instead of curing the Disease, by discovering his Diffidence of them ; and thus shewing them by his Fear of them, that they have it in their Power to disquiet him.

IX. Besides the ancient Divisions of a Monarchy into many different Kingdoms, which have left behind a sort of Scar that may yet be seen ; there are particular Provinces which are more unmanageable, more liable to Commotions and Storms, either on account of their neighbourhood to some Prince, their Access to foreign Succours, or there is a Spirit of Opposition to whatever certain other Provinces approve or disapprove, as it were become natural to them. A Prince even in this profound Peace must not forget this Character, and content himself with taking such Measures with regard to this People, as would suffice to keep other Provinces to their Duty : He ought to maintain Places of Strength in good Condition, in such Provinces ; often change the Garrisons and Commanders in them, and pay them well : And to all those Precautions he ought to join a great deal of Equity, Mildness and Attention to their Interest, and to take care to entertain good Intelligence with his neighbouring Prince.

X. The

X. The particular Privileges of certain Provinces, true or pretended, ought to be thoroughly enquired into. He ought to know their Origin, Foundation, Duration and Interruption; he ought to know the Causes which have at any time suspended their Prevalence; and he ought religiously to preserve those which are in use; to renew those which were well founded, but have not been well observ'd; to compensate by other Favours those which are long ago proscribed, and to hold it for a Maxim, that nothing keeps a People so firm in their Loyalty, when a Prince is not jealous of their lawful Immunities, and does not place his Royalty in destroying them, but in maintaining them as Proofs of the Generosity and Fidelity of a Sovereign.

XI. It is absolutely necessary, that he be fully instructed in the Revenues of each Province; that he know in what they consist; how they are levied and how they are employed; what Augmentation of them may be made without loading the Publick; what Diminution on the contrary the People's Necessities require; what these Necessities are; how they may be relieved without encroaching on the Prince's Revenues; what Expences with which the Province is charged may be suppressed; what Abuses have crept into the Management of the Fund and its Product; and what Misapplications of them are made.

XII. He ought to know exactly the State of Commerce in every Province; with what one abounds, and what another wants; the proper Means of supplying their mutual Exigencies by Traffick; and how to facilitate Commerce by Navigation, by the Goodness and Safety of the high Ways, and by certain Immunities and other Methods.

XIII. He ought to know what Provinces are fertile, and which are uncultivated; if the latter are such because the Soil is bad, or through Negligence. If the fruitful Provinces are peopled, or if for want of Inhabitants a part of the Country is quite desert; how one may remedy its being unpeopled, and so supply by Commerce Countries where many Things are wanting, that Inhabitants may chuse to establish themselves in them.

XIV. He ought to know the Towns in each Province; at least, the principal ones; and to inform himself of the Condition they are in; their Walls, their Bridges, Aqueducts, Fountains, publick Works, their Funds and the Administration of them.

XV. He ought to be instructed in all that relates to the Distribution of Justice in them; the Tribunals from which it is dispensed; the Merit of their chief Magistrates; the Complaints made against them, or against Persons of Power who oppose the Execution of the Laws and abuse their Authority.

XVI. He ought to know the noble Families in every Province; those which have been most faithful to his Predecessors, and have done the most eminent Services to the State; those which have fallen from Wealth into poor Circumstances; and those which still retain both Riches and Merit.

XVII. But what most concerns a Prince is to be well instructed in the Abilities of his Subjects, and to know who excel in any good Quality, but principally in Capacity for Business, in Prudence, in Probity, in Disinterestedness, and in publick Spirit. He cannot be too vigilant to discover such, however remote from him; or in however great Obscurity they may be hidden, because
they

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 281

they are his chief Riches, and without their Assistance he cannot undertake or execute any thing worthy of him.

ARTICLE II.

The Means a Prince ought to employ to get an exact Knowledge of his Kingdom, and to make a right Use of that Knowledge.

I. There are many Ways of being informed of all I have hitherto mentioned. The first is to demand exact Memoirs from Governours of the State of their Provinces; to testify to them, that he will be well informed, and give them to understand that they will make their court to him, in proportion to their Diligence and Sincerity.

II. But as it is difficult for one Man to know all, and as he may be hindered by several Considerations from discovering all he knows, a Prince will never be well informed if he satisfies himself with the Memoirs he demands, and that are publicly sent to him.

III. To supply this Defect he must employ intelligent Persons, who being conceal'd have a full Liberty to tell him all; and he ought to employ several such, each unknown one to another, and who therefore imagine that he absolutely possesses the Prince's Confidence.

IV. It will then be his Business to compare their Vigilance, their Views, their Counsels. He will judge of all their Observations and of their Capacity; and at last he will fix upon those Persons who have served him best.

V. A third more sure way would be (i) for the Prince to pay a Visit, not in a Hurry, and with

(i) Non modò nationes, sed & civitates perlustrat. *Synes. de Regno*, p. 26.

282 *INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.*

with a great Tumult of Attendants ; but with a small Train not to oppress the Publick, consisting of able and wise Persons capable of making Observations on the Spot, such as will listen readily to the best instructed in every Profession, and who after having conferred together, can reduce their Deliberations to a judicious Harmony, to be laid before the Prince, and judged of by him.

VI. But such a Visit ought to be paid at different Times, to be less fatiguing ; and it would turn to better Account, if it was undertaken after having carefully perused the Memoirs drawn up by Governours and Intendants, and having compared them with the Information from unknown Persons.

VII. Perhaps, after all these Researches, one may not see it possible to make all the Use of them that might have been expected ; and the present Advantage accruing from thence, may come far short of his Hopes. A Prince must even prepare himself for receiving many Remonstrances from Persons fruitful in finding out Difficulties ; who will imagine themselves very prudent, because they can discover some Inconveniencies, without ever seeking after a Remedy for any one. A Prince must not be surpriz'd at this. He must graciously suffer all to be laid before him ; he will by that Means be the better informed : But he must beware of taking his Measures from the timid Counsels of Persons who have not the same Concern about the Publick he hath, nor his Authority and Courage.

VIII. Should it happen that at first nothing could be undertaken, he must not for that Reason give up all his noble and great Views, which may be accomplished at another Time. A Prince who thoroughly understands his Power and his
Obliga-

INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.* 283

Obligations, preserves his noble Designs for many Years, and by doing some thing less considerable at first, he prepares himself for doing greater Things afterwards.

IX. He is too wise to undertake every thing, and too well disposed to undertake nothing. He does not attempt the Impossible; but he neglects nothing in his Power.

X. Discouragement is a Source of new Evils, and leaves the old ones without Remedy. It lulls every one into a pernicious Lethargy, and it multiplies the Enemies to the Publick; under the Pretence that all Efforts would be to no purpose, every one becomes listless, and only thinks of passing the present Moments; and those who are entrusted with the Administration, cover their Avarice and Robberies under the Veil of necessary Expences, always exacted and never sufficient, which none enquires into, because none knows how to go about such an Examination.

XI. Under a Prince who hath large Views with respect to Futurity, and observes Order in his present Conduct, things never more come to that pass. He will know what Advantage the State reaps from what it furnishes. He will not allow many Things to be undertaken with Funds not sufficient to perfect them. He knows it is the Way to ruin his Kingdom, and to enrich those who plunder it. He takes care that every Expence be proportioned to its End, and that whatever is undertaken be finished; so that, for the future, they may reckon upon that Work as ended, and it may be no more mentioned.

XII. To make himself obey'd in this essential Point, he is not satisfied to know what Fund is appropriated to it, and to forbid its being otherwise applied. He will over and above be informed

formed of his Capacity and Fidelity, who hath the Charge of overseeing it; and if Persons of Probity give him a good Character, he will send for him to tell him that he keeps an Eye on his Management; and that he charges him not only with the Labour but with the Success: That it belongs to him to chuse Persons of Capacity and Honesty to execute his Orders; and that he must answer for his Choice. That he is ready immediately to hear his Remonstrances; but that he will give time to make his Reflections; and that afterwards he will attend to nothing but his Exactness in obeying him.

XIII. I am persuaded that if a Prince will take the Trouble to enter into this Detail, at the Beginning of his Reign more especially, and steadily pursue his Design; recompence the Fidelity and Zeal of those who serve the Publick well, and severely punish every Prevarication: I am persuaded, I say, that all will go well afterwards; his Commands will be obeyed, Probity will be in high Request, and Knavery will be loaded with Ignominy: That the number of those who love the Publick will increase by Emulation; and that many Evils will be remedied which false Prudence would have look'd upon as incurable.

XIV. But if it was no more than the Reparation of a Bridge, or some Highway, a Prince who would give an Idea of his Application and his Firmness, at the Beginning of his Reign, counts the giving his Orders but little, and lays the whole Stress on the Execution of them; and even considers the Execution much less than the Solidity and Duration of the Work that was undertaken.

XV. If the narrow Revenues of a Prince, exhausted by War, or by former Male-administration,

stration, do not allow him to undertake great Things, he will not place his Glory in forming Designs above his Power. He will content himself with what may be carried on jointly with his other indispensable Expences, and with his Inclination to ease his People: And if he can only behold their Distresses and Sufferings with Pity, without being able to relieve them, he will console himself, that his good Wishes are only ineffective thro' his Want of Power to execute what he most sincerely desires.





CHAPTER III.

One of the most important Duties of a Prince is to distribute Justice. That Obligation is personal. The Rules that he ought to observe.

ARTICLE I.

One of the most important Duties of a Prince is to distribute Justice.

I. **I**T is the same to be a King and to be a Judge: The Throne is a Tribunal; and the Sovereign Authority is the supreme Power of distributing Justice. “(k) God has made you King over the People; said the Queen of Sheba to Solomon, to do Judgment and Justice.” Solomon was King then only for this Reason, to do Judgment: And would have degraded himself, if he had neglected that important and august Function. This also was the only Thing which David his Father asked of God for him, in that Psalm where the Kingdom of the Messiah is figur’d by that of Solomon. “(l) O God, said he, give the King thy Judgments, and the King’s Son thy Righteousness, that he may judge the People” with

(k) Idcirco posuit te super eum Regum, ut facias judicia atque justitiam, 2 Paral. c. ix. v. 8.

(l) Deus judicium tuum Regi da, & justitiam tuam filio Regis; judicare populum tuum in justitia, & pauperes tuos in judicio. Psal. lxxi. v. 1 & 2.

“ with Righteousness, and the Poor with Judgment.”

II. A Prayer for him of this nature was asking of God for something worthy of the Royal Dignity: for to be judge of all, and especially of the Poor, is to be above all; it is to have the Power of checking all Injustice, to put a Stop to all Oppression, and of consequence to have a sovereign Power.

III. But it is worthy of the Spirit of God to represent it as an Obligation to do Justice, that a Prince may see at once his Duty, and learn what he owes his People in becoming King, and what was the great Design of God in placing him above all. Wisdom also, when instructing Kings, satisfies herself with (m) recommending to them the Love of Justice; because they are made Kings only to judge Men, and it is rendering that Power which God has given them useless and destructive, to misemploy it to any other purpose.

IV. But what is that Justice that God has entrusted to Kings? And upon what does that strong Obligation depend, which they are under to distribute it? That Justice, of which Kings are the Guardians, is the same with Order: and Order consists in the Preservation of Equality, and the Prevalence of Law over Force: that the Property of one may not be exposed to the Violence of another; that the common Bands of Society may not be dissolv'd; that the Interest of private Persons may not be preferred to the publick Good; that Artifice and Fraud do not triumph over Innocence and Simplicity; that All enjoy Peace and Safety under the Protection of the Laws; and that the weakest of the Subjects be secure.

V. In these Things consists Justice; and the first Obligation under which God has put Kings, is to maintain

(m) Diligite justitiam, qui judicatis terram. *Sap. c. i. v. 1.*

288 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

maintain that Justice: To declare themselves the Enemies of those who are Enemies to Justice: to give all that Authority to the Laws that they have received for that purpose: and to employ the Sword that God has put in their Hands against those whom Respect and Fear cannot restrain.

VI. It appears from this, that nothing would be more contrary both to Justice, and the Obligation of distributing it, than to make any Distinction among Men to whom Justice is due: that would be to destroy Equality, and to put a Difference where Justice has made no Difference: the Law of God has expressly forbid these odious Distinctions, which considers the Man and not the Law, not the Merits of the Cause but some adventitious Circumstances. (n) "Judge righteously, says the Scripture, between the Citizen and Stranger. Ye shall not respect Persons in Judgment: you shall hear the Small as well as the Great; for Judgment belongs to God, and it is in his Name that you judge.

VII. In a State there are different Ranks of Men, and all have not equal Merit; and I do not intend to confound these: but with regard to Justice all are on an equal Footing, that is to say, every Man has the Right of Justice, and a Judge ought carefully to attend to this Right when he is employ'd in distributing Justice, because every other View is foreign, and ought by no means to influence him. (o) "Take heed what you do," said

(n) Quod justum est judicate, five civis sit ille, five peregrinus. Nulla erit distantia personarum. Ita parvum audietis ut magnum, nec accipietis cujusquem personam, quia Dei judicium est.

(o) Videte quid faciatis, non enim hominis exercetis judicium, sed Domini: & quodcumque judicaveritis, in vos redundabit. Sit timor Domini vobiscum, & cum diligentia cuncta facite: non est enim apud Dominum Deum nostrum iniquitas, nec personarum cceptio. L. 2. Paral. c. xix. v. 6, & 7.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 289

said a religious King of *Juda* to the Judges whom he placed in all the Cities of his Kingdom, "for ye judge not for Man but for the Lord, who is with you in Judgment. Let the Fear of the Lord be with you, take heed and do it, forthere is no Iniquity with the Lord, nor respect of Persons, nor taking of Gifts."

VIII. God has made Kings above all, that they may have nothing to fear but God, and that they may have no other Consideration but that of Justice. He has intended to attach them inviolably to Justice, (*p*) in making them independent. He has given them all his own Power, that they may not make their Weakness their Excuse: and he has made them Masters of every Method proper to stop the Career of Oppression and Injustice, that these Vices may be afraid to appear, and may have no Power to injure the weakest of his Subjects.

IX. It is chiefly by this Independence, which puts Kings above every thing that may oppose their Zeal for Justice, that they are the living Images of God who is equally just and powerful: it is in this View that the Scripture (*q*) calls them Gods: and they are called so in a very lawful Sense, if they have the Government of the Passions so far as only to regard the sovereign Justice; and if they subject, by their Authority, whatever Men oppose to its Reign.

X. But if they don't love Justice, or if they suffer her to be oppressed, (*r*) they are only but mortal Men, corrupt and weak like others: and whereas they would have been immortal if they had paid an inviolable Regard to Justice and Truth, they shall pass away as a Flower, and

U

their

(*p*) In principatu beatissimum, quod nihil cogitur. *Paneg. Traj. p. 33.*

(*q*) *Psalm lxxxi. V. 6*

(*r*) *Ibid. V. 7.*

their Reign shall resemble that of infidel Princes, who have not known the Way of acquiring an immortal Kindom: it shall be short and unhappy, and terminate shamefully in the Grave.

XI. Princes, however, do not lose their Rank or temporal Greatness when they lose the Love of Justice, or when they cease to protect her: but they are only Kings till Death: and (s) the supreme God who presides in the Assembly of the Gods, makes them descend then from that Throne, in which he had placed them to judge in his Name; and he ranks them among the Guilty, whom he judges in his Anger.

XII. In this World no Man judges Kings: God has reserved them to be judged by himself. It belongs to him and not to Men to call them to an Account for their Actions: but (t) in the time, appointed by his Providedce, he will examine all they have done, or allow'd to be done: every thing that has been sanctified by their Name and Authority; all their Decisions and Judgments: and the less it has been allowed to appeal from their Tribunal to another, the more rigorous and severe will his Examination of their Actions be.

XIII. For there is no absolute Independance: all is subject to review. Every Decision in this World is only provisional. To God alone belongs the final Decision. It is by simple Commission that Men judge for him. Every thing unworthy of his Name is annulled. Injustice cannot have his Sanction, and Kings who have a Power of granting a Pardon to Criminals cannot hinder their Crimes being wrote down in a Book where nothing can be effaced but by sincere Repentance.

A R-

(s) *Ibid.* V. 1.(t) *Psaln lxxiv.* V. 2.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 291

ARTICLE II.

The Obligation of a Prince to distribute Justice is personal.

I. Though these Truths be terrible, they ought not however to induce a Prince to devolve the Burden of distributing Justice upon another. It is a personal Duty which he cannot transfer. It is to him and not another that the State is entrusted. It is in his Hand only that God has committed the Sword, either to intimidate or to punish. It belongs to him as his Minister to execute his Will, and to protect Justice and Innocence. Him he has placed Judge over his People: and it is to him only that he has communicated his Power over the Property, Liberty, and Life of all his Subjects.

II. It would therefore shew an Inclination in him to reign by others, to allow them alone to judge, and it would be only retaining the Name of a King to distribute Justice by his Deputies. It is reasonable the Prince be assisted in this august Function, as he is in others: but his calling for Assistance is not to divest himself of Majesty. He continues Judge as long as he continues King. He communicates his Authority, but without quitting his Throne, or sharing it with others. They judge under him, or by his Order; and tho' he may use the Assistance of the Arms, yet they are to be entirely governed by the Head.

ARTICLE III.

The Rules that a Prince ought to observe to acquit himself of his Duty.

I. It is only Necessity obliges him to devolve on others what he cannot manage himself. If hu-

man Infirmary was not an Obstacle to his Zeal he would be present every where, and would take Cognizance of every thing : but Distance of Place,

Load of Business, the Brevity of human Life, the Duty of preferring more important Cares to others less necessary, oblige him to multiply himself, by communicating a Share of his Power to inferior Judges ; and to take Advantage of the Advice that was given *Moses*, (v) not to wear himself away by judging in Affairs which others might resolve as well as he ; but to reserve himself for such as required his Light and Authority.

II. Of the Affairs which a Prince ought to reserve for himself, and which he cannot devolve upon another, the most important is, a general Inspection into all his Dominions, that he may examine whatever is committed in them contrary to Justice, and that he may remedy the Disease. No other but himself can fulfill this Duty, nor calm his reasonable Disquiet. If the Master's Eye be wanting, nothing can supply its Place. Children are safest under their Father's Care : and nothing equals the Vigilance of a Prince who has a Concern in every Affair, and who is answerable for all.

III. A Prince must not delay remedying Evils till the Complaints of them reach his Ears. He may be ignorant of them a long time, or perhaps for ever, if he has shewn a Disposition to know only those Things which are laid before him, and of which he can't pretend Ignorance. The Weak, who groan in secret, are at so great a Distance from the Throne, so many things happen in Provinces, which lie hid there, and buried in silence ; Persons oppressed, so rarely surmount all those Obstacles which turn aside that Justice they expect from

(v) *Exod. xviii. V. 18. & seq.*

from the Laws, that if the Prince don't march at the Head of all, if he don't watch, if he don't employ all possible Ways of being instructed, his Kingdom will be full of unpunish'd Crimes, and of Violence, varnish'd over with a smooth Appearance; and one may observe in his Kingdom, in spite of his good Intentions, what the Wise Man lamented: (x) Men of Worth shedding Tears in vain, without Comfort and without Relief, and the Unjust, who oppress them living in Affluence and Peace.

IV. It is hardly possible but in a large Kingdom, some things must escape the Intelligence of the most attentive Prince: yet the Wise Man says; (y) "That a King, sitting in the Throne of Judgment, scattereth away all Evil with his Eyes:" that is to say, by the Reputation he has acquired of desiring to be inform'd of every thing, and by the Proofs he has given, that no Injustice of whatever kind, or however powerfully supported, continues unpunished, he defeats all mischievous Designs, and every wicked Attempt formed against Justice.

V. The Prince not only carefully enquires into the Conduct of the Magistrates, but of all those who have any Authority; whether they are Governors of Provinces, Managers of the Treasury, Collectors of the Taxes, or of those in Military Command. He takes Care by his Vigilance that no private Person shall defeat the Law by his Money, or Influence; and (z) he immediately remedies the evil Effects of Injustice by giving Orders, that

U 3

not

(x) *Ecl. C. iv. V. 1.*

(y) *Prov. C. xx. V. 8.*

(z) ô Verè Principis. . . . intercedere iniquitatibus magistratum, infectumque reddere quidquid fieri non oportuerit: omnia invisere, omnia audire, & undecunque invocatum, statim, veluti numen adesse & assistere. *Paneg. Traj. p. 223.*

not only the Author of it be punished, but also the Judge who has connived at the Villany.

VI. By this watchful Conduct of the Prince all are kept in their Duty, and every Disorder is remedied : he allows the Magistrate to punish Crimes less hurtful to the Publick, and only interposes when the Authority of the Judge does not suffice.

VII. But there are some Affairs which he ought to examine into himself, because they concern his whole Kingdom, as the Laws, the Treasury, and the Taxes : what relates to particular Provinces, Cities, Privileges, or Communities. Every thing of this nature ought to be enquired into before the Prince, and should not be determin'd but by his Order: it would be allowing his Ministers to usurp his Authority, to suffer them to give Judgment in these Affairs in his Absence.

VIII. It is the Right of the Prince, and essential to his sovereign Power, to recognize all the Decrees of superior Judges. It is of Importance to him to exert this Right in his Council : whether Affairs are brought before him in the ordinary Forms, or whether he is inform'd by any other way, of the Injustice of his Judges. He is in this respect above the Law, that the Law may be the better executed. Every thing is subject to his Review ; and he ought to look upon nothing as fix'd and unalterable but Justice.

IX. There are some times Contentions among Noble Families, about certain delicate Points, the Consequences of which may be dreaded ; these the Prince may stop by his Authority, either by deciding them in his Council, or by appointing Deputes to determine the Affair. When these Things happen it would be Goodness in the Prince to judge in them himself, but having first con-

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 295

consulted Persons of great Knowledge and Experience, if it is convenient. For, in general, a Prince ought to leave the Causes of particular Persons to the ordinary Course of Justice, that he may not load himself with what others may execute; and that he may not bring upon himself the Hatred of the Parties; one of which is commonly dissatisfy'd, and sometimes both of them.

X. I do not include in this Rule all Affairs relating to Persons exposed to Oppression, and who are often refused what the Justice of their Cause requires: as (a) the Poor, Widows, Orphans, and Foreigners. The Prince will always allow these to have free Access to him. He will know their Demands, and what has been denied them; and he will remember, that he is (b) in a more particular Manner their King and their Judge: (c) that it is to him God has entrusted them: that (d) he ought to supply all their Wants: that it is upon their Account he is powerful and great: that it belongs to him to wipe away their Tears, to comfort them, and to be to them as a Father and a Guardian; and that the most Helpless of his Subjects ought to be the most dear to him, as they have no other Support but in his Goodness.

XI. I do not pretend that the Causes of Men in Poverty are always just, or that it is allow'd to Princes to be prejudiced in favour of them; Justice knows no Biass, and does not believe but after the most narrow Examination and Enquiry the Poor may complain without reason, and the Rich may be unjustly accused: the Scriptures admonish Princes not to be pre-possessed in favour of the Poor,

(a) *Causa viduæ intret ad te, causa pauperis, & ejus qui non habet quod det. Bernard. l. 1. de consider. c. 10.*

(b) *Psal. lxxi. V. 1.*

(c) *Ibid. ix.*

(d) *Job xxiii. V. 14.*

296 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

Poor, from a Compassion of their unhappy Circumstances.

XII. But there are so many things which contribute to the Oppression of the Weak, and which hinder the Distribution of Justice, that a Prince ought always to have an affectionate Concern for their Interest, and make his Throne an open Sanctuary for the Oppressed. Their Enemies are often very powerful, and their Judges Men of timorous Minds. None expect Favours, or fear any Dangers from them. Those whom they employ to defend their Cause are employed in a Variety of other Business, and can only give a superficial Attention to their Interests and Concerns. A Prince ought to hinder the Poor from becoming a Prey to Men of great Power, and deliver them out of the Hands of their Oppressors. He ought to search to the Bottom of those Causes which the great Endeavour to involve in Difficulty, and render perplexed and intricate: if a Prince does not imitate the Diligence and Constancy of Job, whom the Scripture proposes as his Pattern, he can bring no Relief to those who stand most need of his Protection. (e) “ When the Ear
“ heard me, said that great Man, then it blessed
“ me, and when the Eye saw me, it gave witness
“ to me; because I deliver’d the Poor that cried,
“ and the Fatherless, and he that had none to
“ help him. The Blessing of him that was ready
“ to perish came upon me; and I caused the Wi-
“ dows Heart to sing for Joy. I put on Righte-
“ ousness, and it clothed me; my Diadem was
“ Equity. I was Eyes to the Blind, and Feet
“ was I to the Lame. I was a Father to the
“ Poor; and the Cause which I knew not I
“ searched out: And I brake the Jaws of the
“ Wicked, and pluckt the Spoil out of his Teeth.”

Be-

(e) Job, c. xxix. v. 11, & seq.

Behold the Conduct of the most ancient and most perfect Prince of whom we read in History. Kings shall be esteemed neither great nor just, but in proportion to their Efforts to resemble his amiable Character.

XIII. A Prince will not determine in every Cause of the Poor, the Orphan and Widow who implore his Justice: but he will make choice of Men of approved Integrity and Virtue to examine into their Cause, who may give him an exact Account of it. He will not always acquaint the Publick with the Names of the Persons, nor with their Commission, lest those whose Interest it is that the Truth should not be discover'd, labour to obscure and darken it.

XIV. Those also who believe that Justice has been denied them, ought to be allow'd the Liberty of applying to the Prince for Justice, as well as Men of miserable and unhappy Circumstances. (f) The Prince will reject impertinent Complaints. He will preserve the Authority of Judges. He will only pay a Regard to Probabilities, which deserve to be set in a clear Light. He will not make use of Informations put into his Hands against Judges, and Men in Power, but with the greatest Caution and Prudence: Truth will find free Access to him from all Quarters, and lest she should meet with any Obstacles every Information will

(f) Sit quis est, *says the great Constantine*, qui se in quemcunque judicum, Comitum, amicorum, vel Palatinorum meorum aliquid veraciter probare posse contendit, quod non integrè atque justè gessisse videatur, intrepidus & securus accedat. Ipse audiam omnia, ipse cognoscam: & si fuerit comprobatum, ipse me vindicabo de eo, qui me usque ad hoc tempus simulatâ integritate deceperit. Illum autem, qui hoc prodiderit & comprobaverit, & dignitatibus & rebus augebo. Ita mihi summa Divinitas semper propitia sit, & me incolumem præstet, ut cupio, felicissimâ & florente Republicâ. *Cod. Theodos.*

298 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

will be received without Enquiry ; because there can be no Danger that a just and wise Prince hear what he ought afterward to despise, but very great Danger may arise to him from Ignorance of what deserves his Attention and Zeal. And besides, it is a very effectual Way to keep his Subjects in their Duty, when they know that all are allow'd upon every Occasion to address themselves immediately to the Prince, and that their Petitions will not be in vain.

XV. It is evident, that it would be of great Importance to a King, in order to facilitate the Observation of these Duties, if he allow'd his Subjects, from time to time, to inform him of what the World expected from his Justice. It would not be impossible to preserve all the Majesty of a Prince, and, at the same time, act in the august Character of a Judge. Great Princes have behaved in this noble Manner, and by this have heighten'd their Greatness. It is well known what Historians say of *St. Lewis*, and many others. I cannot hinder my self from asking a King, much better instructed in his Duty than *Augustus* possibly could be, what he thinks of his Example. (g) “ He administrated Justice him-
 “ self, and was very assiduous in this. Some
 “ times he heard Causes till Night, and when his
 “ Weakness of Body would not allow him to sit
 “ in the common Tribunal he gave Judgment in
 “ his Palace, lying on his Couch. He executed
 “ this Function not only with Assiduity and Ap-
 “ plication, but with a Lenity and Goodness, which
 “ charmed all the World.” We know very well what was the vast Extent of the *Roman Empire*
 at

(g) Ipse jus dixit, & in noctem nonnunquam : si parùm corpore valeret, lecticà pro tribunali colloeatà : vel etiam domi cubans. Dixit autem jus non diligentia modo summâ, sed & lenitate. *Sueton. in ej. vit. c. 33.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 299

at that time, and what a Multiplicity of Causes *Augustus* had to determine. We know also how much he was respected, and that the acting as a Judge did by no means diminish his Character.

XVI. I don't insist on his Example, nor that of any others. (b) If a contrary Practice has prevail'd, there is no Necessity for making any Change, providing that the Prince inform himself in any way of the Complaints and Petitions of those whom he does not hear in a publick Manner, and that he acquaint them to whose Hands their Requests may be safely committed: he is under the strongest Obligation to see Justice done to all, since he owes it to all: and to put an end to the Complaints of his Subjects against the inferior Judges; since it is for this Reason he has a Superiority over them. (i) "If thou seest the
" Oppression of the Poor, says the Wise Man,
" and violent perverting of Judgment and Justice
" in a Province. Marvel not at the Matter. One
" Judge is superior to another: and if any un-
" just Determination has been given by the Judges
" you may at last have Recourse to the King,
" whose Authority is supreme." Thus the remedying of all Iniquity depends upon the Prince. If he neglects this Duty he is answerable for all the Injustice that is committed: and must bring upon himself all that Ignominy which Oppression and Injustice necessarily produce.

(b) *Domitian himself, tho' otherwise very faulty, thought the Distribution of Justice, a Duty incumbent on him: Jus diligenter & industrè dixit. Ibid. c. 8.*

(i) *Eccel. c. xv. V. 7. 8.*





CHAP. IV.

A Continuation of the same Subject. The Rules which a Prince ought observe that he may not violate the Justice he owes his People.

ARTICLE I.

We have already observ'd what a Prince ought to do in order to acquaint himself of that Obligation he came under in ascending the Throne, to judge impartially his People; it remains to observe what he ought to avoid that he may commit no Mistakes in the distributing of Justice.

I. **T**HE greatest Danger a Prince can fall into in this Matter, is that of allowing his Mind to be influenced with what others say to him, without bringing any Proof to support it; and when they form a Judgment about Things before they have sufficiently examin'd into them, or when they shew a less Desire to find out the Truth than to prejudice their Minds, that they have already discover'd it.

II. These two Errors flow from the same Source, and the one is seldom to be found without the other, for what others say makes an Impression according to the different Tempers of the Mind. Or, as Man is credulous, suspicious, and rash, the Reflections of others produce different Effects

Effects in his Mind : and one is always ready to be imposed upon who has first imposed upon himself.

III. A Prince then must begin with regulating his own Opinions : he ought not to give to Probability the Name of Truth : nor to give his Sentiments in any Matter without fully comprehending it : he ought to view an Affair in all its different Lights, that so his Judgment may be the more clear and sound.

IV. It is seldom that Men are at this Care. An Examination of Opinions which keeps the Mind in suspense gives Uneasiness. The Will also has its Share in our Judgments of Things ; and a thousand secret Prejudices make us form rash and hasty Conclusions, without giving us time to reflect upon the Grounds on which they are built.

V. But Men may acquire, by their never receiving Principles as clear and demonstrated but what are really so, a Solidity and Ripeness of Judgment which will not allow them to be imposed upon by any Appearances, nor to be in danger from Prejudice ; then they do not inconsiderately give into the Sentiments of others without Examination ; and are much on their Guard against all the Attempts of Rashness, Artifice, and Passion to blind their Reason, and darken Justice.

VI. The Prince, without doubt, remembers what has been said against (k) Credulity, the common Vice of the Great ; and against Informers, the secret Enemies of all good Men : but I can't chuse but to observe again in this Place, that Justice will be always banish'd from a Court if clandestine Accusers, who dread nothing but the Light and are only safe in Darkness, be listened to by the Prince. A Prince must stop his Ears against all Speeches which begin with Flattery,

with

(k) Chap. xvi. Of the first part.

with a Design to end in Calumny; let the Prince have no Prejudice in his Mind against that Man whom these Informers design to render suspicious to him, but against him who accuses without Proof; let him conclude, that the one is possessed of substantial Merit, since he is the Object of these Mens Envy, and that the other is without Virtue, since he cannot suffer it in another; (l) if the Prince supposes himself in the room of the accused Person he will easily discover what Justice requires, and that it is unreasonable to entertain Suspicions of another which he would reckon unjust when form'd against himself; he ought not therefore to grow distrustful and suspicious upon account of Things, which, not being prov'd, may be said against the most worthy, without their deserving their Virtue to be call'd in question; let the Prince punish every Calumniator, whose Perfidy and Malignity he shall discover, and by this he will inform the Publick (m) that they have the Laws and common Forms of Justice to dread, and not the secret Accusations of vile Informers, and by this he will make all his Subjects safe and secure, by banishing far from him all those who cannot become powerful, but in Confusion and Disorder, and who are only formidable thro' the Weakness of Princes.

VII. The best Princes are apt to be surpris'd into Mistakes by cunning and designing Men, who want to support their Injustice by the Authority of the Prince. They ask of Princes Privileges and Immunities with regard to certain Jurisdictions, as being of no great Consequence: but a Prince that has a regard to Justice will be sure to refuse their Requests. He continues firm in the maintaining of

(l) *Ecc. c. xxxi. v. 18.*

(m) *Non jam delatores, sed leges timentur. Paneg. Traj. p. 109.*

of publick Order, and whoever demands of him to be exempted from the Law, becomes suspected, and puts him in mind, that the Law ought rigorously to be just in Execution against him.

VIII. Whatever degree of Favour some Men may have with the Prince, he ought never to skreen them from the common Rules of Justice. Distinctions may take place in other Things, but where Justice is concern'd the greatest Lord and meanest Subject ought to be on an equal Footing. A prime Minister, even a Favourite, have no Title in this Respect to be preferr'd. The Prince is the Guardian of Equality; and it belongs to him to maintain it: he ought to love none so far as to depart from Virtue and his Glory, to gratify them. *Augustus* had his Friends, and was himself a good Friend; but (n) when their Causes came before him, he consider'd only the Justice of them. *Antoninus Pius* did not promote his Friends, (o) tho' they had a very sincere and tender Affection to him. And *Alexander Severus* had the publick Good (p) more at heart than the Interest of his Friends, who were Men of great Merit. The Prince, in attaching himself to any other Interest but that of Justice, lessens and degrades his Character, and becomes as wicked as those whom he supports in Villany.

IX. It follows from the same Maxim, that a Prince ought never to recommend any Cause to the Judges, nor allow others to do so in his Name.

This

(n) Amicos ita magnos & potentes in civitate esse voluit, ut tamen pari jure essent cæteri, legibusque judiciariis æquè tenerentur. *Sueton. in vit. Aug. c. 56.*

(o) Amicis suis non aliter usus est quàm privatus. *Jul. Capitol. in vit. Anton. Pii. 140.*

(p) Amicos & parentes si malos reperit, aut punivit, aut dimisit à se, dicens: his carior est mihi tota Respublica. *Lamprid. in vit. Alex. Severi. p. 223.*

This is to act in direct Contradiction to the essential Quality of a sovereign Judge, who is equally the Judge of all, and whose Duty it is to reform all the Iniquities committed by the Judges. He ought only to attend to Equality, and to have no View but Justice, if he was to give Judgment in the Cause himself: and how can he consent that Judges, full of Regard to him, and who have a strong Desire to please him, should have any other Motive to influence their Minds but a Regard to Justice.

X. When the Prince thinks it convenient to appoint Men to decide in any Affair, he ought to exclude those whom he is entreated to nominate, tho' they are, perhaps, Men of Integrity. His only Aim should be Justice, and any Attacks upon Equality must destroy Justice.

XI. As all Men are fond of Honour and Preferment, it is very hard for Judges not to have a strong Inclination to find Justice on the side of those who are in favour with the Prince. But as this Disposition of Mind is base, a Judge, tho' he acts agreeable to it, will endeavour to persuade himself, that his Views are honest and upright; he loves Justice, but at the same time he loves to please; especially those who can either be hurtful or serviceable to him: and then it is not difficult for him to believe, that when he acts from a View of Interest he is solely influenced by Justice.

XII. The bad Effects of this Turn of Mind are many; when those in favour with the Prince have numerous Friends, and a strong Desire to serve them, the Contagion becomes general, and there will be few Judges found, even in the Provinces, who faithfully discharge their Duty, and are not under the Influence of the Prince's Favourites.

XIII. The most speedy and effectual Cure for this Evil would be for the Prince not to shew his Favour to those who have so many depending upon them, (q) but always to prefer the Good of his Kingdom to the Interest of private Men, who abuse his Favour to elude Justice.

XIV. But if he does not incline to apply this Remedy, he is at least oblig'd to charge, in the strongest Terms, his principal Magistrates, as the Chancellor, his Solicitor General, to pay no regard to any Distinction he has put between any of his Subjects when Justice is concern'd; ordering them to inform the other Judges of his Intentions, and declaring that they will not only highly displease him if they depart from the most rigorous Justice in favour of any Man, but that they will find him always very watchful over their Conduct when they have before them any Cause of any that more nearly concern'd him.

XV. These Declarations ought to be made in very strong Terms, often repeated, and what is of greater Consequence supported by a steady and uniform Conduct.

XVI. The Prince will not allow the Judges to shew any Favour to his own Interest, when Questions relating to the Revenue are brought before them. Justice will be his only View: this he will reckon his true Glory and Diadem, (r) as *Job* expresses it. He will show himself above all mean and low Considerations which Influence private Men. (s) He will be pleased that those who have the Management of his Treasury, are call'd to account for their Villany; and that any of his Subjects are protected from Oppression. He will be

X

per-

(q) Dicens his carior est mihi tota Respublica. *V. supra.*

(r) *Job C. xxix.*

(s) Dicitur auctori atque procuratori tuo: in jus veni; sequere ad tribunal. *Paneg. Traj. p. 109.*

306 INSTITUTION *of a Prince.*

persuaded, that the most essential Difference betwixt a good and bad Prince, is this, that under a bad one the Exchequer and Treasury are often in the wrong, but always gain their Cause; and that under a good Prince if what is unjust is claimed, it is sure of being rejected.

XVII. There are some Things which a Prince ought to reckon more dear than the Increase of his Revenues. Have Men of Merit done eminent Service to their Country? he will esteem it just and reasonable to reward them. The Prince however will never reward them at the Expence of Justice, and the injuring of others.

XVIII. I am somewhat more afraid of the Attacks of Flattery and Praise; it is hard to resist these when managed with Art and Cunning? A Prince may be Proof against all Solicitations and Entreaties, and yet yield to Flattery, and allow it to gain upon his Mind. How can he hinder his Heart from being pleas'd and gratified? (x) Surely Flattery is a very dangerous Snare to Princes. A Prince disdains every thing which does not enlighten his Mind, and which has not a Tendency to discover Truth: Flattery, in place of softening him, puts him in mind of continuing steady and firm to Justice, and makes him believe they want to impose upon him as a weak Prince.

XIX. Goodness and Clemency, Virtues so worthy of a Prince, are also dangerous if they make him act contrary to Justice. They are fit to soften Rigour and Severity: but they don't inspire with Courage and Fortitude of Mind. (y) "Seek not
" to be Judge, not being able to take away Ini-
" quity,

(x) *Sæpius vincitur fiscus, cujus mala causa nunquam est sub bono principe. Ibid. p. 110.*

(v) *Fisco nunquam judicans favit Marcus Aurelius. Jul. Capit. in ej. vit. p. 144.*

(y) *Eccl. C. viii. V. 18.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 307

“quity,” says the Scripture. Injustice may have powerful Protectors in a Kingdom, (z) a timorous Policy would persuade to connive at them, and Wisdom gives the same Advice, when bringing them to Punishment only encreases the Disease: but Softness, or misplaced Compassion, which spares the Wicked to the Ruin of the Publick, must not be call'd Prudence. One Example of steady Conduct in punishing Crimes prevent many Evils, and Disorders, in a State; but when Compassion and Severity prevail in their turn, and produce Irresolution and Instability of Conduct, then there is necessity for often having recourse to Punishment.

XX. The Prince will shew himself inexorable when the Publick expects of him an invincible Firmness of Mind. He will never pardon Crimes which shew a Cowardice and Villany of Heart, such as assassinating and poisoning of Men. He will have Pity and Compassion to his People, but none to those who oppress them. His Goodness will extend to the Poor and Innocent, but not to the Guilty and Wicked.

XXI. The Prince, that he may avoid one Extreme, will not run into another, all the Passions and Affections of the Mind, even a Zeal for Justice, when excessive and immoderate, lead to dangerous Mistakes. When Suspicion passes for Proof thro' a strong Desire of discovering and punishing every Injustice, Innocence is in danger. Severity makes a Prince odious, and does not become one of a humane and equitable Temper, who inflicts Punishment with Regret, and wishes that he were not obliged to it.

X 2

XXII.

(z) *Ibid.* C. viii.

(a) *Iustis suppliciis illacrymavit, etiam & ingemuit. Sueton. C. 15. speaking of Vespasian.*

308 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

XXII. (b) He will not employ his Authority, when that of the Laws is sufficient. Nor disturb Order thro' an excessive Zeal to make it observ'd. He will not exert his Power but when all other Methods are ineffectual and in vain.

XXIII. (c) He will leave to Judges all that Liberty and Authority which is necessary to determine Affairs brought before them. He will repeal none of their Judgments but for the most important and weighty Reason, nor suspect them but in the same View. He will maintain Order and the Laws, and preserve to every Jurisdiction their just Rights and Privileges. He will oppose all Changes and Alterations: and be persuaded, that what is examin'd by many, and agreeable to the common Forms, is less liable to Injustice than what is examin'd only by a few, and in a way not so publick or solemn.

XXIV. He will never allow, but upon the most urgent Motives, a stop to be put to the deciding in any Cause, when a Delay may be of infinite Loss to one of the Parties. He is answerable for the Injury, when he acts upon small and trivial Reasons. His Aim in every Thing will be, to make the Laws well observ'd, and hinder Privileges and Wants from destroying Justice and Equality, so essential to it.

(b) *Non utendum imperio, ubi legibus agi possit. A wise Maxim of Tiberius, according to Tacitus. L. 3. Annal. p. 101.*

(c) *Nero, in the Beginning of his Reign, was convinced of these Truths, tho' very little solicitous to put them in practice. Nero, formam futuri principatus præscripsit. Non se negotiorum omnium judicem fore. . . . Nihil in penetibus suis venale, aut ambitioni pervium: discretam domum, & Rempublicam, teneret antiqua munia Senatus. Tacit. L. 13. Annal. p. 213.*



CHAPTER V.

A Prince is answerable for the Judges who distribute Justice in his Name: The Qualities they ought to have. The Difficulties of the Choice, and the Way of succeeding in it. The Prince ought to examine into their Conduct. How he may be inform'd of this.

ARTICLE I.

The Prince is answerable for the Judges who distribute Justice in his Name.

I. **I**T is Necessity that obliges the Prince to devolve the Distribution of Justice upon the inferiour Judges: but this very Necessity brings upon them a new Duty, and of great Extent: the choosing Men fit to assist him, is of great Consequence, and attended with no small Labour.

II. The wise Counsel which *Jethro* gave *Moses* not to judge the People alone, contained two Parts: (d) "This thing, said he, is too heavy for thee; thou art not able to perform it thy self alone. Wherefore thou shalt provide out of all the People able Men, such as fear God, Men of Truth, hating Covetousness." (e) *Moses* followed this Counsel; he made choice of worthy Men to share in his Authority; without this Precaution he would only have thought on his own Ease, and abandoned the Interest of the People.

III. The Prince ought to imitate this Example. He can't do every thing, what is in his power he

X 3

does;

(d) *Exod. c. xviii. v. 18 & 21.* (e) *Ibid. v. 24, 25.*

310 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

does; and what exceeds he executes by others who are worthy; those therefore whom he calls to his assistance must be Men of Abilities, and who have the same Views of things, otherwise they will only serve to destroy his good Intentions and Designs.

IV. He alone is entrusted with Justice, and there is no other to distribute it but to whom he communicates the Power. It belongs therefore to him to examine into whose hands he has put this important Trust. He ought to know if those he places so near his Throne, deserve to share with him the sovereign Power; if they deserve to be Masters of the Lives and Fortunes of their Equals; if they will make a wise Use of that Sword which God has immediately put into his hands. Without this wise Discernment, the Prince will render contemptible what is greatest in Royalty, and dispose without Choice and Judgment, of what is more valuable than temporal Riches.

V. It would be a manifest Injustice to have Men of Wisdom, Prudence and Virtue, judged by others inferior to them in every respect. The Law of Nature condemns this Disorder. Whoever are exalted above others in Power, ought to have been first so by their Merit; Reason and Virtue alone deserve Authority and Power.

VI. (f) The Prince is answerable for a Conduct contrary to these wise Rules. All the Faults of those he employs will be imputed to him. In entrusting his Power to Men who abuse it, he becomes criminal, and will suffer Reproach, when a wiser Choice would have produced happier Effects. To avoid this Evil, the Prince must look out

(f) Potestatem non habent, nisi quam tu eis aut tribueris, aut permiseris. Tibi imputa, quidquid patieris ab eo, qui sine te potest facere nihil. *S. Bernard. l. 4. de consid. C 4. p. 134.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 311

out for those whom God destines for Employments, by conferring upon them the Qualities of Mind that are necessary in acting otherwise, he despises whom God points out to him as his Choice.

VII. A Prince who has a sincere Love of Justice, is desirous to communicate his Zeal, Attention and Disinterestedness of Mind, to those he employs, before he communicates to them his Power. He wishes they were all animated with the same Soul and Spirit.

VIII. There is a wonderful Example of this in the Scripture, all the Circumstances of which deserve carefully to be considered. *Moses*, full of Tenderness to a People always inclined to murmur, but restrained by his Conduct, expressed himself thus to God: (g) "Wherefore hast thou afflicted thy Servant, in laying the Burden of all this People upon me? Have I begotten them, that thou shouldest say unto me, Carry them in thy Bosom, (as a nursing Father carrieth the sucking Child) unto the Land which thou gavest unto their Fathers? This Burden is too heavy for me." Behold the Sentiments of a Prince who knew his Duty, and who knew what God required of him, but who confessed his Weakness, and asks to be assisted. (h) And the Lord said unto *Moses*, Gather unto me seventy Men of the Elders of *Israel*, and bring them unto the Tabernacle of the Congregation, that they may stand there with thee: and I will take of the Spirit which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the Burden of the People with thee, that thou bear it not thy self alone." *Moses* has his Assistants, but it is his Spirit that animates them; it was from him they received their Knowledge and Authority to judge.

X 4

(g) *Numb. c. xi. v. 11, & seq.*

(h) *Numb. c. xi.*

judge. It is always the same Head which governs, the same Spirit that directs, the same Love of Justice that reigns in all, tho' the Powers be shared.

IX. A Prince formed on this Plan, wishes that all the Judges had the same pure and upright Intentions with himself, that they consulted only the Law of God, and in this Sense were all Prophets.

X. Instead of fearing Men of shining Merit, and keeping them in obscurity, he makes search for the Worthiest and Greatest, to put them in eminent Places of Trust ; he does not listen to the Advice of those who tell him, that this diminishes his Power, and that he would act with greater Prudence, if he did not advance to great Power Men of great Qualities. He answers them in the same generous Manner with (*i*) *Moses*, when they endeavour'd to inspire him with Jealousy, by the same Motives. "Would to God the Lord's " People were all Prophets, and that the Lord " would put his Spirit upon them." It is the Good of the People, and not my Glory, that I desire ; and this I don't make to consist in the lessening of others.

XI. A little Attention to what I have already said, may let us understand, that a Magistrate has occasion for many good Qualities ; the Senators chosen by *Moses* are a great Proof of this ; for they are taken from the Elders of *Israel*. *Moses*, directed by a Divine Light, makes choice of them ; and God adds to their Wisdom and Experience, the miraculous Gift of Prophecy, and preserves it to them during the Continuance of their Office. Whoever will weigh these Circumstances well, need not be surpris'd at the Timourousness and Caution of a Prince in choosing the Senators of the People, and

(*i*) *Numb. c. xi. v. 28 & 29.*

and that he does not regard some peculiar good Qualities, but all those which concur to render Merit perfect and compleat.

ARTICLE II.

The Qualities a Judge ought to have.

I. The first is Capacity: (k) he ought to have Knowledge before he is fit to judge; (l) to have his Mind stored with Maxims; to have carefully studied the Laws, compared them with one another, and with the Actions of Men. It is not time to instruct himself in the Knowledge of the Laws, when he must give Judgment. Good Sense, which all Men flatter themselves they are possessed of, is rare, and does not instruct us in what depends upon human Institution and Appointment. One exposes himself very often to judge rashly, when he does not found his Judgment on the Law; he will be in great Perplexity, and much embarrass'd when the Cause is simple and easy. Thus Affairs are either much retarded by the slow Procedure of the Judges, or they are in danger of determining hastily in Matters which deserve to be fully considered, and set in a clear Light; or if they have any Modesty, they will satisfy themselves with following the Advice of others, without being able to discern whether it is agreeable to Reason and the Laws.

II. A Judge must be possessed of Integrity as well as of Capacity and Knowledge: for without Integrity, he will deviate from Justice, and set himself to find out plausible Arguments to support the worst of Causes, he will corrupt the Simplicity of the Laws by subtile Interpretations, and believe

(k) *Exed. i. xviii.*

(l) *Nrmb. c. xi.*

314 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

lieve himself very able, because he is always prepared to serve his Friends and Men of Interest, by his great Dexterity in finding out Arguments to make the Law favour his Designs. Integrity is an Enemy to all these base Arts ; she knows only one Way, and has only one View ; she studies the Spirit and Intention of the Law, without seeking for any thing in the Letter to weaken and destroy it.

III. A Zeal for Justice strengthens and invigorates Integrity ; without this Zeal a Judge does his Duty but faintly, he sees Iniquity without feeling any Indignation against it ; he does not give that Force and Energy to his Arguments, which Truth requires : but when he has an ardent Zeal for Justice, he does all that is in his power to protect and defend it, and is filled with Sorrow when the Interests of Justice are abandoned.

IV. Fortitude naturally flows from Zeal ; this secures the Heart, where it is prevalent, against all Sollicitations, Hopes, Fears, Threats and Dangers. A Judge of this Temper opposes the Torrent of corrupt Example, and is not afraid to stand single in the Cause of Justice. He is full of Respect, but at the same time invincible, and is not influenced by any bad Consequences which may happen to him, but purely by a Regard to his Duty.

V. Disinterestedness is the Foundation of this Firmness of Mind ; not such a Disinterestedness only as rejects Bribes, makes the Mind above the Love of Money or the Fear of Poverty, tho' this be infinitely rare in the World ; but such a Disinterestedness as despises Ambition, Favour, and even the Desire of being applauded for Firmness of Soul ; attends only to one Object, which is Justice, and surmounts, by the Fear of departing from it, all worldly Hopes and Fears. Men flatter themselves,

themselves, without any Foundation, of having these Virtues: but the least Interest discovers their Minds to be more weak, selfish, and ready to be alarmed at the least Danger, than they imagined; their Love of Justice then vanishes, because they have other Passions that are more deeply rooted, and of greater Influence. This will always be the Case, till their Minds have only one Master, and Self-Love be perfectly subject to the Love of Justice.

VI. One may know this supreme Love of Justice, by the Love of the publick Interest, the great Quality of a Magistrate; this Love for the Publick is founded on Disinterestedness of Mind; for when one confines his Views to any private Interest, he is incapable of promoting that of the Publick: one cannot expect any thing that is grand or generous from a Man of this Character; he has always some secret Views, of which he is the Centre and End. The Publick is only a Pretence, and the People a Vail to conceal his Designs. He will forsake the most worthy Cause as soon as he has obtain'd his Wishes.

VII. The Love of the Poor, so much inculcated in Scripture, and so much neglected, naturally arises from this Love of the Publick. A Judge that has a Feeling of the Circumstances of the Poor, and who resolves to serve them with Honesty and Zeal, must bring upon himself the Hatred of their Oppressors, how can he submit to this, if he is selfish, or acted upon by Fear or Hope? And how will he make their Cause his own, if he has not a Soul above all Consideration of private Interest.

VIII. It is impossible that a Magistrate can act from such pure and worthy Motives, if he is ambitious, if he desires Preferment, or is afraid to lose it. He ought to know the Danger of his Employment,

316 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

ployment, and not accept of it but with the greatest Caution, nor continue in it any longer than his Respect to Providence obliges him ; if he can do no good, he should not look upon it as an Evil to resign. Without these Dispositions of Mind, he will always discover a Timorousness and Weakness of Spirit. The Service he does the Publick will be of small consequence, and bear the Character of his Weakness.

IX. Princes who have had the best Knowledge of Mankind, and could best judge of the Qualities necessary to Magistrates, have sought out those who shun'd Employments, and rejected the Ambitious. (m) They were able to see, “ that the Commonwealth was most safe in the hands of those whose superior Merit made them afraid to undertake the Charge ;” and (n) they sought out with so much Care, Men worthy of the chief Employments, that they were obliged to constrain some to accept. Their Example ought to be a Rule to other Princes, who will always make a bad choice of Judges, if they choose those who offer themselves, and brigue for Employments.

X. Innocence of Life, and a great Reputation for Probity, are also indispensable Qualities in a Magistrate ; it does not suffice that he is really honest, he must always have been so, and even those who are not satisfied with his Determinations, should not have it in their power to make any personal Reproaches against him. It is not suitable that one who has contemned the Laws should be chosen to protect them. Men must have full Confidence and Trust in him whom they believe virtuous,

(m) *Præfectum prætorii fecit, ne fieret, fingerat, dicens : invitos, non ambientes, in Rempublicam collocandos. Alexand. Sever. in ej. vit. p. 211.*

(n) *O Rem memoriæ literisque mandandam ! Præfectum prætorii non ex ingerentibus, sed ex subtrahentibus legere. Paneg. Traj. p. 235.*

ous, for this reason, that he has been always so, and they will entrust him with their most dear and valuable Interests, because he has never discovered Vices or Weaknesses.

XI. Fidelity to the Prince is one of his principal Characters; a Fidelity that cannot be shaken or corrupted. He hath no other View but his Master's Interest, no other Attachment or Dependence. He will receive nothing from a Stranger, not even from any foreign Prince; he is a thorough Enemy to all Factions and Parties; no Pretence of publick Good is able to blind him; no Scheme of Reformation, however hopeful it may appear, can tempt him to swerve from his Duty; the harshest Treatment, nay even Disgrace, is not able to diminish his Zeal for his Master. Duty and Conscience are his moving Principles, and not Interest; and in the most difficult times, he is ready to quit and give up all for a Prince who may not have render'd Justice to his Merit, or treated him as he deserved.

XII. The Fear of God is the Basis of all these Virtues, the Soul which animates and actuates them, and makes them real and unchangeable. It enlightens the Understanding of a Man, whose Sanction it is to distribute Justice; it fortifies his Mind, elevating it above all merely human Views, and presenting to it eternal Motives, quite independent of all sublunary Events: it renders him as exact in his private Counsels, as in his publick Judgments: it inspires him with a particular Regard to the Poor, because they are not in a Condition to make Returns to him for the good Offices he does to them; it holds him firm to his Prince and the publick Interest, without Expectation of Reward; and it comforts him in all his Labours with the Consciousness of his sincere Desire
to

318 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

to approve himself to God, who hath given him such an important Charge.

XIII. Without this inward Principle, which acts uniformly on all occasions, and subsists without any visible Support, the best Qualities of a Magistrate are but superficial. They languish when they are not applauded; they often yield to secret Temptations; having no Root nor fixed Scope, they perish for want of Nourishment, or borrow it from Pride.

ARTICLE III.

The Difficulty of the Choice; and the Way to succeed in it.

I. It is easy to see, from what hath been said, how difficult it is to give to a State Magistrates worthy of the Dignity and Trust; and of what Consequence it is, that a Prince be not deceived in his Choice of them. The chief Judges in a State are as it were its Soul and Spirit.

II. The Senate of a great City, of the Capital more especially, is not merely its Ornament and Glory, but its Strength. (o) 'Tis not in the Buildings, said the Emperor *Otho*, nor in external Magnificence, that the Glory and Stability of the Empire consists. All that is merely material is of little moment; it may be destroyed and re-established, and the essential Part of a State may in the mean while suffer no Change: but to violate the Authority of the Senate, is to attack the Foundations of a State, and the Prince himself.

III. The

(o) Quid? vos pulcherrimam hanc urbem domibus, & tectis, & congeſtu lapidum ſtare creditis? Muta iſta & inanima interciderẽ & reparari promiſcue poſſunt. Æternitas rerum & pax gentium, & mea cum veſtrâ ſalute, incolumitate Senatus firmatur. *Tacit. L. 1. Hiſt. p. 334.*

III. The Emperor *Adrian* had the same Sentiment, and even carried it much farther; (*p*) for he thought nothing in the Empire so important, so great as a Place in the Senate. He raised no Person to that Dignity, without the strictest Precaution; and he was persuaded that it required such extraordinary Merit, being high above all other Honours, that when he had bestowed it upon one who had been Prætor and Consul, he told him he could not raise him higher, the Rank of Senator being superior to all others.

IV. This Prince judged of it according to Truth, and not according to popular Prejudice, which looks on some Places as more shining, because they are near to the Court; or because they have an outward Appearance of greater Authority; and does not (*q*) perceive that all Affairs of moment are laid before the Senate, and then only have a regular and stable Form, when they are determined by this last Tribunal, which in reality is only respectable, in proportion as it is fill'd with Persons deserving the People's Confidence and Veneration; and sinks when the Prince suffers it to be filled with Persons without Birth, without Generosity, without Learning, or without Regard to good Principles, without Zeal for the Publick Good, and without Virtue.

V. It is not impossible to prevent this Evil, or to remedy it, if the Prince will but give as serious Attention

(*p*) *Senatus fastigium in tantum extulit, difficile faciens Senatores, ut quum Tatianum ex Præfecto prætorii ornamentis consularibus præditum, faceret Senatorem, nihil se amplius habere quod in eum conferri posset, ostenderit. Spartian. in vit. Adrian. p. 128.*

(*q*) *Qui quid sit Respublica nesciat: faciat eos Consules, Duces, Judices, quorum vitas, merita, ætates, familias, gesta, non novit. Said Metius Falconius, a Senator of Consular Dignity, speaking of Princes, indifferent in the Choice of Magistrates and Judges. Vopisc. in vit. Imperat. Tacit. p. 285.*

320 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Attention to the Choice of Judges, as the Importance of the Affair deserves.

VI. He will not attempt, in the beginning of his Reign, to make Changes ; for that only creates Diffidence and Disgust in those who are possessed of Places.

VII. He will satisfy himself with declaring in general, but in strong and moving Terms, that Justice is what he hath chiefly at heart ; that he considers himself as charged with all that the Judges do throughout his whole Kingdom ; that they can do nothing so agreeable to him as to employ the Authority entrusted to them as it ought ; and that he will make it his chief Business to inform himself of their Conduct.

VIII. He will speak to the first Magistrates, who have the Honour to receive his Orders more immediately, and in a particular manner, and recommend it to them to be exact, upright, disinterested, and to watch over the other Judges with such Earnestness, that they will plainly see it would be to touch him in the most sensible part, to commit any Trespas against Justice. And perhaps no more is wanting but such publick and secret Admonitions to amend the Plurality of the Judges ; for the Authority of a Prince, when it is united with Goodness, has infinite Power ; and the Success is much greater, when he applies himself to hide the Faults he has remedied, and chooses rather (r) to make it believed that he found all in good Order, and had no occasion to make any Reformation.

IX. If he finds that any Magistrate distinguishes himself by his Knowledge and Probity, whether in the Provinces, or in the Senate of the Capital, he will take all Opportunities of praising him publickly,

(r) *Rarissimâ moderatione maluit videri invenisse bonos, quàm fecisse. Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 454.*

ickly but in few Words, as becomes a Sovereign. On the other hand, he will advertise privately, those of whom he hath had Complaints, to give them time to change, and to excite them to Amendment by his Tenderneſs about their Reputation. And by ſuch wiſe Conduct (s) he will raiſe an Emulation that will have a better Effect than Fear or Conſtraint.

X. While he takes these Methods to stir up honest Zeal in the Minds of the Judges he found established, he will exert himself to find out Persons worthy of his Confidence, and capable of filling the first Places, that he may give them to such when they become vacant.

XI. He will afterwards make use of these first Magistrates to assist him in the choice of others. He will consult them when a President, a Procurator, or Advocate-general is to be appointed in the other Parliaments; or when Intendants are to be sent into the Provinces. He will charge them with getting Information of the most eminent Persons of the Gown; with finding out those who have added to their Birth great Talents and Virtues. He will take such Memorials from them as may be of use to him in Promotions; and he will prohibit their admitting a Person into any Office in any Tribunal, whose Capacity is not well known to them, and whose good Conduct is not attested to them by Witnesses above all Suspicion.

XII. I know Enquiries of this kind commonly are but for Form's sake, and very superficial; that all who get any Charge are knowing, virtuous, and full of Merit, and yet many are of very little account before they are received; but it is an Abuse that may easily be reformed: and would a Prince employ Judges of Integrity to examine others,

(1) Laudando promptos, castigando segnes, ita honoris accumulatio pro necessitate erat. *Ibid.* p. 419.

thers, make them responsible for all the Consequences of their Facility; shew his Displeasure against those who have deceived the Publick, by giving false Characters of Persons of no worth; seek true Information from unsuspected Persons, but unknown to the first Magistrates: when, I say, a Prince takes all these Precautions which are so essential a part of his Duty: he will make Enquiries become very serious, which formerly were but mere Ceremonies, and will convert that into a severe Scrutiny, which before was but Collusion and Complement.

XIII. I can't choose but relate how the Example of a Prince, who by his Care to appoint good Judges, has deserved to be proposed as a Pattern to all who understand like him their Obligation in this respect. (1) He laid it down as a Rule not to promote any Person to the Dignity of a Senator, till he had taken the Opinions of all those who were already in that Rank, and had Testimonies of his Merit from the most illustrious Persons: but if he found out, that Recommendations had been given thro' Favour, and that certain Senators had been gained, he punished such traiterous Recommenders in a publick manner, and degraded the Senators who had dishonoured their Body, by admitting a worthless Member into it.

XIV. It is not perhaps necessary, that a Prince should carry his Severity so far; but it is of the last moment that it should be known, that it is equally dangerous and difficult to attempt to deceive him. Making one Example in certain Circumstances of such Villainy, may prevent the Necessity

(1) *Senatorem nunquam sine omnium Senatorum, qui zelum, consilio locat, ita ut per sententias omnium crearentur, testimonio dicerent summi viri: ac si sefellissent, vel teiter, et si per sententias dicebant, postea in ultimum reprecarentur locum, et in ultimum reprecarentur arbitrium.* Lamprid. in vit. Alex. 66. p. 211.

of a second. The Will of the People, yet, as
 insisted, is a strong barrier against the tyrant.
 All that is needful is but to bring the People
 which seemed most unforeseeable, still in the
 ground of themselves, when one is allowed to do
 spite to him: and if Nations have power, what have
 have in their power to do for Justice, they would
 meet with almost no resistance.

CHAPTER IV

A Prince ought to enquire into their Conduct. If he
 has any business of it.

I. But either the numberless Difficulties which
 immediately present themselves, act which I had
 to augment is never wanting; I incline Prince to
 attempt a serious Reformation in the Adminis-
 tration of Justice; by setting Judges to, as it is called,
 good Judges: or he himself from the
 Date which demands Perseverance and Firmness
 and thus he renders all his first Steps, useless, by
 not pursuing them.

II. (1) It is better indeed, not to have establish-
 ed a bad Judge, than to be forced to revoke the
 Nomination: it is extremely difficult to amend a
 bad Choice: and therefore the chief thing to
 take great care of the Choice. (2) But one may
 be deceived notwithstanding all this Precaution:
 and how shall that be discovered, if he thinks he
 did all that could be done in the first Scrutiny?
 One may have preferred a Person of pleasing countenance,
 who in his Charge does not preserve the same
 or he bore. One may have depended upon the

Y. 2.

V. 2.

of the Court of Maxims, it is introduced such, as are particularly
 introduced for contrast. See the same in the same.

of the Court of Maxims, it is introduced such, as are particularly
 introduced for contrast. See the same in the same.

thers, make them responsible for all the Consequences of their Facility; shew his Displeasure against those who have deceived the Publick, by giving false Characters of Persons of no worth; seek true Information from unsuspected Persons, but unknown to the first Magistrates; when, I say, a Prince takes all these Precautions which are so essential a part of his Duty; he will make Enquiries become very serious, which formerly were but mere Ceremonies, and will convert that into a severe Scrutiny, which before was but Collusion and Complement.

XIII. I can't choose but relate how the Example of a Prince, who by his Care to appoint good Judges, has deserved to be proposed as a Pattern to all who understand like him their Obligation in this respect. (t) He laid it down as a Rule not to promote any Person to the Dignity of a Senator, till he had taken the Opinions of all those who were already in that Rank, and had Testimonies of his Merit from the most illustrious Persons: but if he found out, that Recommendations had been given thro' Favour, and that certain Senators had been gained, he punished such traiterous Recommenders in a publick manner, and degraded the Senators who had dishonoured their Body, by admitting a worthless Member into it.

XIV. It is not perhaps necessary, that a Prince should carry his Severity so far; but it is of the last moment that it should be known, that it is equally dangerous and difficult to attempt to deceive him. Making one Example in certain Circumstances of such Villainy, may prevent the Necessity of

(t) Senatorem nunquam sine omnium Senatorum, qui aderant, consilio fecit, ita ut per sententias omnium crearentur, testimonia dicerent summi viri: ac si fessellissent, vel testes, vel ii qui sententias dicebant, postea in ultimum rejicerentur locum, civium condemnatione adhibitâ. *Lamprid. in vit. Alex. Sev.*
p. 211.

of a second. The Will of the Prince, well manifested, is a strong Barrier against the Unworthy. All that is needful is but to begin. The Obstacles which seemed most unsurmountable fall to the ground of themselves, when one is resolved to despise them: and if Princes but knew what they have in their power to do for Justice, they would meet with almost no Resistance.

ARTICLE IV.

A Prince ought to enquire into their Conduct. How he may be informed of it.

I. But either the numberless Difficulties which immediately present themselves, and which Care to augment is never wanting; hinder a Prince from attempting a serious Reformation in the Distribution of Justice, by setting himself to give his People good Judges; or he himself soon tires of a Duty which demands Perseverance and Firmness, and thus he renders all his first Steps fruitless, by not pursuing them.

II. (v) It is better indeed, not to have established a bad Judge, than to be forced to revoke the Nomination; it is extremely difficult to amend a bad Choice: and therefore the chief thing is to take great care of the Choice. (x) But one may be deceived notwithstanding all this Precaution; and how shall that be discovered, if he thinks he did all that could be done in the first Scrutiny? One may have preferred a Person of seeming worth, who in his Charge does not preserve the Character he bore. One may have depended upon the

Y 2

Vigilance

(v) Curæ tibi maximè sit introducere tales, quos postmodum introduxisse non pœniteat. *S. Bernard. l. 4. de Conf. c. 4.*

(x) Officiis & administrationibus potiùs non peccaturos, quàm damnare cum peccassent. *Tacit. in vit. Agric. p. 458.*

324 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Vigilance of the first Magistrates, who are sometimes inattentive, ill-informed, indulgent, connected in Interest with those whose Faults they ought to have discovered. It is therefore requisite, that the Prince himself watch over the Sentinels he has placed ; (y) that he carefully inform himself of the Conduct of Judges, whether near him or more remote : that he have some trusty Persons in every Body, to instruct him in whatsoever requires his Attention ; that he know in every Province some Persons from whom he can learn how Justice is administered in it ; that he know to the bottom those who give him Information, because there is hardly any such thing to be found as Probity not to be moved by Interest ; and in fine, that he inform himself by so many Means and Methods, that he cannot fail to come at the Truth.

III. Certain *Roman* Emperors have succeeded in this, tho' that Empire was of far greater Extent than any Kingdom ; and consequently it was much more difficult to get into the exact Detail of all Affairs in it. The same Methods they took will be equally successful, when Sovereigns employ the same Assiduity and Perseverance we admire in Pagan Princes, who knew not to whom they must answer for their Care about Justice, but yet were strongly persuaded that they could not neglect it, without abandoning the publick Interest with which they were charged ; and that it was to neglect Justice, not to give uninterrupted Attention to the Administration of it.

IV. A

(y) De iudiciis omnibus semper cuncta scrutando, tamdiu requisivit, quamdiu verum inveniret. *The Emperor Adrian, in his Life by Spartian, p. 182.*

(z) De omnibus hominibus per fideles homines suos semper quæsit, & per eos, quos nemo nosset hoc agere : cum diceret, omnes prædâ corrumpi posse. *Alex. Severus in his Life by Lampridus, p. 212.*

IV. (a) It were in reality better for the Publick that a Prince was vicious, so he was but zealous for Justice, than that he were regular in his personal Conduct, and indifferent about publick Justice. His personal Behaviour regards himself only, but his Neglect of Justice is universal Destruction. He flatters himself he is a good Man, but his Ministers are unjust; and the Publick, who reaps no benefit from his good Intentions, is left a Prey to the Avarice and Injustice of those who abuse his Authority.

V. *Domitian* was a very bad Man; but (b) under him all the Provinces were governed by Judges of Integrity. He forgave himself for every thing, but pardoned nothing in them. He gave full swing to his Passions, but he chose Magistrates who had none to mislead them. He distinguished Merit, and imployed it without desiring to have himself any share of it, and the (c) People under a very wicked Prince, in respect of his personal Vices, had better Judges than under *Trajan*, so distinct from *Domitian* in his private Character, but less assiduous to nominate good Judges, and less attentive to their Conduct.

VI. Then

(a) Notum est illud, Constantine Auguste, quod in Mario Maximo legisti, meliorem esse Rempublicam & propè tutiorem, in quâ princeps malus est, eâ in quâ sunt amici principis mali: siquidem unus malus potest à plurimis bonis corrigi; multi autem mali non possunt ab uno, quamvis bono, ullâ ratione superari. *Lampridius in vit. Alexand. Severi, p. 223.*

(b) Magistratibus urbicis, provinciarumque præsidibus coerendis tantum curæ adhibuit (*Domitianus*) ut neque modestiores unquam, neque justiores extiterint. *Suet. in ej. vit. c. 8.*

(c) *Trajan* said one day: *Domitianum pessimum fuisse, amicos autem bonos habuisse. And a Man answered him, that he himself was more to blame. Qui rempublicam pejoris vitæ hominibus commendaverat: quia melius est unum malum pati, quàm multos. Lamprid. loc. cit.*

326 INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE.

VI. These two things ought to unite and meet personal Merit and Vigilance: a good Example, and Care to find out those who follow it ; blameless Behaviour, and Care not to employ any in the Administration of Justice who are not so. There all is regular, and all naturally moves in the Footsteps of the Prince ; all is guided and influenced by his Counsel, his Inspection, and his Virtue: for if the Attention of even a vicious Prince is able to keep the Judges to their Duty, that of a Prince, who is not only zealous for publick Justice, but himself just, cannot fail to have a very great Effect.





CHAPTER VI.

The Venality of magistratical Officers is a Disorder contrary to Justice : Excessive Expences to attain to them are a second. It is the Duty of a Prince to remedy both.

ARTICLE I.

The Venality of magistratical Officers is repugnant to Justice.

I. I Have hitherto supposed it to be in the Prince's Power to chuse all the Judges in the several Tribunals throughout his Kingdom ; and to consult nothing in this Matter but Merit : but if Venality in magistratical Offices hath been introduced into his Kingdom by his Predecessors, he hath then only the Liberty of chusing Judges from among the Rich and Ambitious. Those who have not plentiful Estates are excluded ; and all the Rich who are not presumptuous are so likewise. He can admit none but those who offer themselves ; and thus is he constrain'd to commit the most august Power he has received of God, to Man.

II. We have seen that Princes who had no other Light than that of natural Reason, judged none worthy of Magistracy but those who avoided it,

it, and (*d*) whom it was (*e*) necessary to force into an Acceptance of the Charge: and we know moreover, that in all well-grounded States, Monarchies and Republicks, nothing hath been so strictly forbidden as bargaining for Offices, or more severely punished, than Bribery or Largeffes to attain them. There are yet several States where such Abuses are not connived at: there are even some where it is required of the Magistrate, before his Admittance, to give this solemn Oath; That he did not make presents or solicit for the Employment, or do any thing to procure it to himself. How does it therefore happen, that in other States almost all Offices are sold, are auction'd, and that at a very high Price? How is it possible not to see the fatal Effects of a Disorder so opposite to the publick Interest? And how is it that Princes could ever have consented to deprive themselves, for ever, of the only way of rendering Justice to their People, by putting it out of their Power to chuse the Judges?

III. The Necessities of the State are pleaded as a Defence of this Practice; but is not the impartial Distribution of Justice the most pressing Necessity of a State? The most real Distinction is not that which appears to our Senses; nor are those the greatest Evils which can be redressed by Time and Experience. The deep Wounds which Avarice and Ambition make are Evils almost remedyless and eternal: and to shake (*f*) the Foundations of Justice and Integrity is to strike at the Vitals of the State, and the solideft Matter of a Throne.

IV. Besides, it is certain, that the present Bait arising from the Venality of Offices has a terrible
Re.

(*d*) *Inviti, non ambientes in Rempubicam collocandi.*

(*e*) *Non ex ingerentibus, sed ex subtrahentibus legere.*

(*f*) *Prov. c. xvi. v. 12.*

Return by the Weight with which it over charges the Prince, and by consequence his Dominions. The transient Relief soon vanishes, and a sinking Debt remains. It is the Remedy of a Day, and its evil Consequences are everlasting.

V. And let us examine into the Reality of such an Expedient; and we shall find that the Sale of magistratical Offices, (Sir, I speak only of Places of Jurisdiction) hath been ever but a very feeble Resource. The Price of Money hath been employ'd to very unnecessary Purposes; and such as are very diffident from the real Exigences of the State. These pitiful Rivulets have run dry without any Effect, leaving nothing behind them but Slime, Gravel and Rubbish: and such dangerous and insufficient Means had never been recurred to, if bad Politicks, set intirely upon a momentary Interest, had not made a Sacrifice of all others to it.

VI. But it may be said, if it is an Evil it is already incurable; and it is needless to lose time in deploring what cannot be helped.

VII. I do not believe the Disease is irremediable, as we shall see afterwards: but were it so, it infinitely concerns Princes, who are so happy that their States are not yet infected with this Gangrene, to know their Felicity, and to know how to preserve it; and for others, it is profitable to afflict themselves on account of a Disorder, which ties up their Hands, and sets such narrow Bounds to their good Intentions; to be deeply penetrated with the Iniquity of it. They may look out diligently for a Remedy, and may at least lay it down as an inviolable Law to themselves, not to add to an Evil which they ought to exert themselves to the utmost to eradicate.

VIII. I conjure both to consider what is most august, most divine in the high Dignity to which
God

330 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

God hath exalted them : (g) it is doubtless to be established by him, Arbitrators and Judges of the Lives and Properties of their Subjects : (h) Does it then become them to transfer that Power to Men, whose only Merit consists in their Riches ? Does it become them to put it to Sale ? To set it on a level with Things Money can purchase, and thus give to the Purchasers, and to the People in general, a very low Idea of it ; to invite the Ambitious, and repulse the Modest ; openly to justify Corruption and Bargaining ; to receive themselves the Bribes they condemn others for taking ; nor to regard Merit till they are sure it is able to pay them ; and never to deposite Justice in other hands but those which are plentifully furnished with Gold and Silver.

IX, (i) Since what time are Riches become the distinguishing Mark of Integrity, of Wisdom, and of Zeal for Truth and Justice ? Who has bereaved Persons of small Fortunes, or even the Poor, of all Virtue and Merit ?

X. Are Riches always justly acquir'd ; is there never any reason to suspect the Honesty of their Origin ? May not one have remained in Poverty, merely because he was resolute to maintain his Uprightness ? Is Disinterestedness no Virtue ? What must we think of all that was so called before Things were perverted ?

XI.

(g) Magistratuum delectus divina est magnificaque providentia. *Synef. de Regno, p. 29.*

(h) Assessores suos, qui ab eo secundi inter reliquos primas tenent, regiâ animi moderatione componet, juvandorum hominum studiosos. *Ibid.*

(i) Quid enim, si quis ex hoc ipso quòd improbus esset divitias congeffit, num ab eo æquum est magistratum geri, non verò ab eo, qui sit quidem pauper, sed legum tamen, justitiæque cultor : qui ob idipsum quòd justus est, paupertate laborat, nec udore afficitur. *Synef. de Regn. p. 30.*

XI. (k) What will become of those Persons of profound Knowledge and uncorrupted Manners, who are left in Obscurity and Oblivion? Who will pursue a Course that leads to Indigence and Contempt?

XII. Is it not to stifle Merit in the Cradle; is it not to extinguish the Love of Letters, Laws, ancient Maxims? Can there be any such thing as truly noble Emulation, if Riches alone can find Access to all honourable Employments? To how little purpose will other Distinctions serve if Riches only gain the King's Favour and Esteem.

XIII. Can he possibly hinder those, to whom he sold the Power of administering Justice, from selling it after his Example? And is it not a Consequence of that abominable Traffick, that he who buys Merit, hath the Liberty of making others pay him for what he himself bought? (l) " For my
" part, said a Prince full of Honour and Equity,
" I would not have the Assurance to punish a Magistrate for his Avarice and Interestedness, if I
" had taught him to become such: and I should
" think he had purchased Impunity from me, if
" I had sold him the Permission of dealing with
" others as I had done with him.

XIV. How can a Prince fill the Tribunals with Persons, illustrious by their Birth, and more so by their other Qualities, if their Poverty exclude them?

(k) Tu verò (*says the Emperor Arcade*) fac ut virtuti aliquid in pretio habeatur, quamvis sit cum egestate conjunctum nec te prudentia lateat hominis, aut justitia, reliquaque bonorum animi multitudo, sub vili, abjectâque veste delitescens. Quin potius in medium virtutem producas, quam domi segnem contineri nefas sit. *Synef. de Regn. p. 31.*

(l) Honores juris aut gladii nunquam vendi passusest, dicens: necesse est, ut qui emit, vendat, Ego non patiar mercatores potestatum: quos si patiar, damnare non possim. Erubescio enim punire illum hominem qui emit & vendit. *Alexandre Severe in ej. vit. 219.*

332 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

them? And how, on the contrary, can he hinder obscure Upstarts, without Reputation, without Birth, or Alliances; without Courage or Dignity, to fill the most august Places, if they alone are able to furnish the demanded Price to the Royal Treasury?

XV. Will the Publick have much Respect for Men of the meanest Extraction, bred up in Servitude, become rich by a thousand unworthy Methods, and very often by sucking the Blood of the People? And when such are raised to Power, will they pay much regard to Justice and Virtue? They who are utter Strangers to them, never hoped for any thing from them, and owe all to their Riches?

XVI. (*m*) Is it not the Way to propagate Avarice, thus to put Honour on Riches; to bestow all on them, and to look on them as having a Right to all? Is it not to excite the most moderate and wise not to satisfy themselves with a small Fortune, and to excite the Avaritious to become yet more greedy; and the Rich to act inhumanely to others, and to lay their Hands on all they can get hold of? Is it not to add Spurs of all sorts to a Passion, of it self exceeding furious, to open to it alone the Port to all Dignities? It is not to take away all Distinction between just and unjust, lawful and unlawful Gain, to shew Men to what they may pretend, and to what they may arrive, if they set their Hearts upon becoming rich speedily and immeasurably?

XVII. It is foolish to expect always to find sufficient Choice among the Rich. Experience proves the contrary: for on the one hand the Price of Offices

(*m*) Novit enim se auri beneficia in honore esse, sublimique in folio sedere, nec modo à vulgo circumspici, sed ab ipsis etiam justis, & divitibus & pauperibus. *Synes. de Regn.*
p. 39.

fices rises in time of Peace ; and on the other hand the ancient Families of the Gown, or of the Sword, become extinct or poor. The Dignities, highly respected while possessed by illustrious Names, pass to other Persons ; and it must be so because Places must not continue vacant, and prevailing Venality offers them to the highest Bidder. For it is a vain Chimæra to dream of keeping the Unworthy at a distance, while Riches make the chief Merit. It opens the Door to every thing : and the first Magistrates either make but a feeble Resistance, or suffer themselves to yield to their Interest ; or become weary of struggling against a Minister who thinks of nothing but the Revenue.

XVIII. But could it happen in such a Situation, that the Magistracy is well fitted tho' bought, is it not a great Evil to load a Family with so heavy a Burthen that ordinarily produces but a very inconsiderable Income, which is however the principal Part of their Estate, and that puts it out of a Father's Power to provide for any other of his Children but him who succeeds to his Charge ?

XIX. Is it not a crying Evil, that Magistracy, invested with the Power of Life and Death, should be disposed of like Houses and Lands : that the Prince should never be consulted about the Disposal of any such Offices but in a few he has reserved to himself : that the Seller should never think of more than sending a solvable Purchaser ; that all that regards the most sublime and sacred Concern in a State, should be managed in this low, infamous, profane Manner ; and that Money, the Idol of the Age, always a capital Foe to Justice, should dispose of Offices, Dignities, and Employments ?

XX. But the greatest Evil of all, and one that cannot be hid, is, that the indisputable Duty of choosing the justest and worthiest Magistrates becomes

334 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

comes impracticable in consequence of Venality: for it is the greatest Absurdity imaginable to suppose, that Riches and Merit go hand in hand. And therefore when they are separate, Riches with much less Merit will be preferr'd to the most eminent Qualities, when they are united with that Disinterestedness and Poverty, which re-double their Value. It is no more the Man who is chosen, it is merely his Estate. And (n) what can we expect from such a Depravity as does not hesitate to give the Preference to Riches; counts for nothing the most perfect Virtue if it is not well endowed; and thus excludes it from the Administration of Justice for no other Reason but because it is worthy of it?

XXI. Would such Abuse be excusable in things of infinite less Importance? Would one prefer a Physician of less Skill and Experience to another who far excels him, because he is able to buy the Confidence we place in him? Would we take this Method in any other Professions, and reject those who are eminent in them because they are not rich? Is any one capable of such Folly and Blindness, with respect to the Choice of an Artist, a Labourer, or a Servant? What then can have taught or persuaded Men to make the Knowledge of the Laws, the Love of Justice, Integrity of Life, depend upon a Thing so foreign to them as Money, but Avarice, an irreconcilable Enemy to every Virtue and to Publick Good.

XXII. I shall only oppose one single Example to the criminal Abuses introduced by Venality: an Example highly worthy of our Attention. *Aurelian*, who was afterwards Emperor, being at the Head

(n) Habeat quàm fieri potest, justissimos atque optimos rectores, in quos Imperium dividat, virtutis, non divitiarum, ut nunc assolet, inita ratione. Medicis enim corpus committimus, non qui ditissimi, sed quicunque suæ artis peritissimi. *Ibid.*

Head of the *Roman* Army, and having gained an important Battle, *Valerian*, who then govern'd the Empire, wrote to him to congratulate him upon it; and (o) to assure him, that he design'd him for Consul the following Year: But as the Consulship now engaged in great Expences, introduced by the corrupt Example of his Predecessors, and so that Honour cost one who had no great Estate very dear; the Emperor added, "that the whole
" Expence should be defray'd out of the publick
" Treasury: for it is just, said he, that those who
" have served long, and done great Service to the
" State without enriching themselves, should be
" aided by the Publick, and it is principally of
" such that Care should be taken they be not
" pinch'd." A truly royal Maxim that ought to be engraved on the Memory and Heart of every Prince! But the Orders sent by the Emperor to the Treasurer are yet more worthy of our Attention: (p) "You will furnish, said he, *Aurelian*,
" whom I have named Consul, with all that is
" necessary for defraying the Expences of the publick Spectacles, to which Custom now obliges
" him. He deserves this Assistance on Account
" of his Poverty, which renders him truly great,
" and far exalts him above all others."

XXIII. It is shameful and deplorable that those noble Sentiments should have been extinguished by base Avarice, which no more can perceive the Grandeur of Mind there is in despising Riches when they are not join'd with Merit, and which
ex-

(o) Consulatum in annum sequentem sperare te convenit; sumptu publico levanda est enim paupertas eorum hominum, qui diu Reipublicæ viventes, pauperes sunt, & nullorum magis. *Vopisc. in vit. Imper. Aurel. p. 274.*

(p) Aureliano, cui consulatum detulimus, ob paupertatem, quâ ille magnus est, exteris major, dabis ob editionem Circensium, &c. *Ibid.*

336 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

excludes from the Magistracy the greatest Men of the State, because they are above all others in their Probity and Disinterestedness.

XXIV. (q) " The Consulship, and the same is
 " true of all the other Dignities, is thus become;
 " according to the Reflexion of a sage Historian,
 " not the Recompence of Virtue but a Tax upon
 " Property : a Proof of Riches, and not of Me-
 " rit. The time when all Employments were
 " given to the Deserving are no more. Ambition
 " and Avarice have got the Ascendant ; and they
 " will soon extinguish the small Remainder of
 " Virtue and publick Zeal among us."

ARTICLE II.

*It is the Duty of a Prince to apply a Remedy to
 this Venality.*

I. It is impossible for a Prince, who is touched with this Disorder and its fatal Consequence, not to search for a Remedy to it ; or to let himself be discouraged by Difficulties which may seem unformountable in that Endeavour.

II. But he ought to avoid those extreme desperate ones, which would throw the State into Confusion instead of reforming it : for the Love of Justice, when it is wisely directed, never leads to any violent or unjust Measures. The Nomination of Magistrates formerly belong'd to the Prince, but by selling them he has divested himself of that Right. He cannot recover it but by making Restitution of the Price paid ; and that only when the
 Sale

(q) Factum est ut jam divitiarum sit, non hominum, consulatus. Quia utique si virtutibus defertur, editorem spoliare non debent. Perierunt casta illa tempora, & magis ambitione populari peritura sunt. *Vopisc. p. 275.*

INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.* 337

Sale of Offices, by having been carried very far, is not become the chief branch of his Revenue.

III. It would be unjust also to declare the magistratical Offices revertible to the Prince upon Death, if the hereditary Succession to them has been acquired for an onerous Cause, or it has been secured to the Family on Terms that constitute a kind of publick Right, having served for a Foundation to a Commerce of Offices.

IV. There is then no Remedy for Venality but Reimbursement; and this is what the Prince ought to aim at gradually.

V. He will begin with settling the Prices of Offices at a moderate Rate, as equitable Judges shall determine to be such: which Judges shall be chosen in every Province. Their Opinion shall be laid before a Council, establish'd to enquire into this Matter, and composed of Persons of Wisdom and Integrity.

VI. The Prohibition to exceed the Price fix'd by this Council shall be very rigid. All indirect Methods of adding to it shall be interdicted under pain of Confiscation of the Office; which Loss shall fall equally upon the contracting Parties.

VII. The Prince shall appropriate a yearly Fund, for refunding in every superior Judicature the Money paid for the Offices of most publick Concern; and he will begin with those of the chief Tribunal.

VIII. After having thus discharged these Offices, he will never lay any Burden on those on whom he bestows them, but even strongly forbid so much as speaking of it, or soliciting him for it, under the severest Penalty. He will carefully preserve what he has redeemed; and if he is disposed to reward a Magistrate for his good Services, he will take other Ways of doing it than by rendering a Charge tributary.

338 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

IX. He will not grant the Survivance to any Person under whatsoever Pretence, even when the Possessor is willing to remit: these Demissions degenerate at last into Reversions, or pave the Way for them.

X. Having redeem'd the Offices which have the nearest Relation to the Prince and the Publick, he will endeavour to do the same with respect to Counsellors of Parliament, by degrees, without attempting too much at once, but rather confining himself at first to one or two.

XI. The Prince should have a written List of all the Persons of the Gown worthy of his Notice, their Ages, their Residence, their Employment, their Province ranged in order, according to the several Departments of the Kingdom.

XII. He will reserve to himself alone the Nomination to Places he hath thus redeemed. (r) All who ask them shall be for ever excluded, and those for whom they are asked shall be suspected Persons. The Prince will fill them with Men of known Merit, independently of all Recommendations; and he will preserve to those Places all their Dignity, by conferring them on Persons of real Worth.

XIII. Sometimes the Prince will satisfy himself with helping a Person who is able but to pay one half of the Price, to pay the other; but he will never bestow that Favour except on those who do not ask it, and who would never have thought of it if it had not been proffered to them. In this Case, the half of the Charge belongs to the Prince, and it cannot be purchased after the Possessor's Death without a peculiar Grant.

XIV.

(r) Pro quo rogaris, fit suspectus qui ipse rogat, pro se jam judicatus est: nec interest per se, an per alium quis roget. *S. Bern. l. 4. de Confid. c. 4.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 339

XIV. By these Means, which are not impracticable, and others, which the Wisdom of God will discover to a well disposed Prince, there will be a Recompence for Merit suitable to it. He will rescue out of the Hands of the Rich, Employments to be bestowed on disinterested Persons. Emulation and Honour will lend their Aids to Virtue, and many whom Discouragement had render'd violent will distinguish themselves by Study and Industry.

XV. There is even ground to hope, that when the Prince's Prudence and Application to chuse good Judges shall be known to the Publick, there will arise Magistrates, who having no Heirs of their own Family, and leaving great Estates behind them, will remit their Charges into the Prince's Hands, and supplicate him to dispose of them as his Wisdom thinks properest. But then the Prince will carefully examine, if there is no reason against his Acceptance, and he will not accept but when he can do it without committing the least Injustice, or doing any thing that is odious.

ARTICLE III.

The excessive Expensiveness of Justice is likewise a great Disorder.

I. When he shall set himself to suppress or reform Venality he will likewise endeavour to amend another Abuse, which has follow'd upon it; that is to diminish the Expences of procuring Justice, become excessive thro' different Causes in which the Princes have had as great a Share as the Judges.

II. Such is this Abuse, that Justice is no longer for the Poor, the Widow, the Orphan, the Weak,

340 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

the Oppressed, tho' it be chiefly due to them. It is refused them not at one time only but on all Occasions. It is to them inaccessible, because the Admittance to it is heavily taxed, all is put up at a very high Price, and nothing can be commenced or carried on without Money.

III. Even Persons above Indigence are reduced when they have any Law Affair. They often give it up, because they would be quite drain'd before it is determin'd; and many are as effectually ruined by gaining a Suit as if they had lost it.

IV. The number of Judges is unnecessarily multiplied. They pay dear for their Charges: They are often taxed under different Pretences: their Appointments are ill paid: they are pinch'd by domestick Necessities; and (s) they greedily seize whatever they can get to support them, without suffering Things at a distance to make any Impression upon them.

V. Even those who have any Compassion to the Poor being either of a more humane Temper, or more at their Ease, content themselves with bemoaning their Condition, because they cannot deliver them from the Formalities of Justice, and all Methods of Proceedure are taxed by the King's own Orders, who in proportion to the Sums he exacts of the Officers in Judicatures, grants them new Taxes upon every Affair they expedite.

VI. (t) Thus the Poor, the Widows, and many Persons who seem not to be in destitute Circumstances implore the Laws in vain. Nothing is within their Reach, because nothing is gratuitous. A great State full of Tribunals and Judges, is with respect to them like a Desert, in which the stronger unjustly oppresses the weaker. Their
Tears

(s) Isai. c. i. v. 23.

(t) Jerem. c. v. V. 28 & 29.

Tears flow in vain before those who despise them as feeble and impotent, because they do not see him whose Eyes are upon them, and who prepares a terrible Punishment both for the Judges and the Princes, whose Hearts are not moved by such a Disorder.

VII. The Prophets of the Lord speak of it in Terms capable of intimidating the most insensible; and I cannot chuse but mention at full length what the Spirit of God says by one of them: (v) "He will not accept any Person against a poor Man, but will hear the Prayer of the Oppressed. He will not despise the Supplication of the Fatherless: nor the Widow, when she poureth forth her Complaint. Do not the Tears run down the Widow's Cheeks? And is not her Cry against him that causeth them to fall? The Prayer of the Humble pierceth the Clouds: and till he come nigh he will not be comforted: and will not depart till the most High shall behold to judge righteously, and to execute Judgment. For the Lord will not be slack; neither will the Mighty be patient towards them till he have smitten in sunder the Loins of the Unmerciful, and repaid Vengeance to the Heathen; till he have taken away the Multitude of the Proud, and broken the Sceptre of the Unrighteous.

VIII. It would be to no purpose here to exaggerate the Robberies and Violences of some interested Judges. The Prince cannot remedy such Injustice but by severe Laws, exemplary Punishment, and which is yet a surer Way, by entrusting the first Places only with Judges full of Honour, and whom Avarice or Corruption can neither escape, nor look in the Face.

ARTICLE V.

The Prince is obliged to diminish these excessive Expences.

I. We are speaking of a Reformation depending on the Prince alone, and which consists in diminishing the Expences established by the Laws, or by received Customs, and in rendering the Distribution of Justice as gratuitous as possible. The Venality of Offices puts an insurmountable Obstacle in the Way of rendering it such: for it is not to be expected, that Judges who have given much will receive nothing, or that they can subsist on their Appointments, always small, and which frequently comes to them very late.

II. But the new Creations of Offices, Sums borrowed from Companies, frequent Taxes, some times compensated by Grants of new Duties, and other Methods of this Nature are yet greater Impediments than Venality to the Diminution of the Expences of Justice: and a Prince will flatter himself in vain with a Desire to make it accessible to his Subjects, if he uses any of these Methods, which are almost intirely banished out of his Territories.

III. He must protect the Judges if he would open a free Course to Justice: it must cost them little that it may cost little to others; and the Prince ought to reckon on it, that all the Laws imposed on them fall on the Poor, or rather upon an infinity of Persons, who are reduced into the Rank of Poor by an equal Incapacity of supporting the Charges the most just and simple Process would cost them.

IV. He ought never to listen to the pernicious Council that will be given to multiply Offices in Judicatures; since he ought rather to think seriously

ously of lessening their Number, and of putting an End to Venality.

V. He will endeavour to reimburse those which fall heaviest on the Publick, and to suppress new additional Duties, by making Restitution of the Price of them.

VI. He will put an End to Imposts, which augment the Charges, by abolishing or reducing them, or excepting whatever relates to the Dispensation of Justice.

VII. He will think of Methods of establishing for the Poor some Tribunal like that of the Judge Consuls, when all may be decided in a simple Manner, and with less Expence.

VIII. He will recommend their Persons and their Affairs to the Judges in every Town, and every one shall know how concern'd he is about it, and that there is no more successful Way of making Court to him than by rendering Justice in a Manner that bespeaks Compassion, not with regard to the Subject of the Suit, for that is not its proper Object, but with respect to the Expences of obtaining a just Decision.





CHAP. VII.

A Prince, as Protector of the Laws, ought to maintain the ancient ones. Rules to be observed in the Establishment of new ones.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to maintain the ancient Laws.

I. **A** Prince's Zeal for Justice would be of little use, if he did not set himself to make the Laws obeyed: for it is the same thing to judge justly, and to judge according to the Laws. They are the Standard, and Judgment is the Application of it; they point out what ought to be done, and it executes.

II. But what Laws better deserve to be observed than the ancient ones, which are authorised by long Practice? One has had leisure to look into all their Effects and Consequences, all their Inconveniences and Advantages. The people is accustomed to respect them. They have for a long time preserved Peace and Order in the State. They make part of its Constitution and Strength. To suffer new ones, would be to shake it; Custom has given them Prevalence, and it is therefore the Prince's Duty to protect them zealously, and to take care that the Judges do not depart from them.

III.

III. When the Judges are too young, or want Knowledge, Experience and Solidity, they are very apt to introduce a new kind of Jurisprudence, very different from the ancient, unless they have at their head Guides of Authority to direct them, and to teach them to march in the Steps of their Fathers. But such Guides die, or become rare. A Set of rash young Judges, strong by their Number, become Masters of all Decisions. They invent instead of studying. They imagine they are able, by the good Sense they are possessed of, to discover more than is to be found in Books. And thus they form by degrees a new System of Law, without sure Principles to support it, without adhering to the essential Maxims of the State, without any Foresight of the Inconveniencies that may arise from it, and indeed without any Uniformity: for the Example of the first Innovators is followed by others, who think they have equal Authority to innovate. And hence proceeds such an Inconsistency in the Judgments, that he who does not daily attend the Tribunals, cannot build any Conclusion upon the Decrees of the preceeding Year; nor form a probable Conjecture how a new Affair will be determined, or according to what Rules it will be judged.

IV. From this Abuse which renders Justice almost arbitrary, inevitably springs another Inconvenience, which is Ignorance of the real Rights of the Prince and his Crown; Ignorance of his true Interests, and of those of his People; Incapacity to give him Counsel in difficult Cases, and to judge how far Fidelity and Courage ought to go, when artful Persons have created a Jealousy between the Ecclesiastical and the Royal Power.

V. In order to preserve the State, the ancient Maxims on which its Constitution depends, must be preserved. The Princes who suffer them to
be

346 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

be neglected, commit a great Fault against their Successors, and against the State, (x) which ought to be immortal in respect of the Duration of its Laws: and they themselves sometimes feel to their cost, before the End of their Reign, how much it was their Interest to oppose themselves to the Prevalence of new Opinions, over the ancient Maxims on which depended their Safety and Glory.

VI. A truly wise Prince makes always great account of the ancient Jurisprudence. He commands the Judges to make it their serious Study. He places none in the first Offices of Magistracy, but those who are thoroughly instructed in it. He does not intrust the Defence of the Rights of his Crown but to Persons full of Knowledge and Zeal; and he does not suffer Ignorance or Artifice to rob him of the most precious Remains Antiquity has left, and to substitute in its place new Usages contrary to his Authority, and to the Liberty of his People. But this Article shall be handled elsewhere. It is sufficient to have shewn here, tho' but transiently, of what consequence it is for the Prince himself, that the ancient Laws be maintained, and what may be the Consequences of neglecting or forgetting them.

VII. I am not speaking of that which was never in use in the Prince's Dominions, nor of that which hath been long ago abrogated. It would be an imprudent Innovation, and not a faithful Attachment to ancient Laws, to think of restoring such. I speak of that which was in force in the preceding Reigns, which yet subsists, tho' neglected, is only obscured by Ignorance or Contempt, and may be easily secured against Prescription, by Attention to make it observed.

VIII.

(x) Principes mortales, Rempublicam æternam esse. *Tacit. L. 3. Annal. p. 78.*

VIII. It is not necessary to renew them by Edicts, which would be useless if they were only general, and did not enter into a Detail almost infinite. It is enough that the Prince advertise the first Judges to adhere firmly to ancient Usages, to follow the Laws, and not Conjectures and Interpretations; to instruct themselves thoroughly in the good Rules, and to establish an uniform Justice upon certain and invariable Principles. It is Regard for the ancient Maxims will give them Credit; and his Kingdom will be filled with Persons capable of going to the Fountain of Laws and Customs, and of bringing into Contempt every Deviation from a noble and pure Antiquity.

IX. He will see by Experience, that all was already regulated, but that the Rules were not known; and (y) that no more is needful but to follow the old, instead of making others.

X. The ordinary Pretence for that is to remedy some Inconveniencies the ancient Legislators appear not to have foreseen. But it is impossible that human Laws can be free from all Inconveniency. A new Inconveniency, and very often a greater, is occasioned by Attempts to remedy some particular one. We ought to be satisfied with the Advantages which compensate it; and it is commonly much wiser to keep by ancient Usages, the Consequences of which are well known, than to establish others which have not yet been tried.

A R-

(y) *Jus magis vetus restituit, quàm novum fecit: A noble Encomium bestow'd on the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, a Prince of great Wisdom and Prudence. Jul. Capitol. in ejus vit. p. 144.*

ARTICLE II.

Rules to be observed in establishing new Laws.

However, if a State happens to stand in need of new Laws, I think, the first Rule a Prince ought to lay down to himself, is not to distinguish the Beginning of his Reign by many new Statutes, that may cast a Reflection on his Predecessor, and shew a strong Inclination to set out his own superior Wisdom, and beget an Idea of Precipitancy unworthy of a Prince, who ought never to establish any thing but what deserves to last for ever. He should first of all know the State of his Dominions thoroughly, have carefully enquired what needs Amendment, and not allow himself to be misled by Appearances of Good, which deeper Experience will afterwards prove to be a Cheat.

II. When a Law appears necessary, the Prince will form the Plan of it; but in order to examine it, and not to establish it. He will consider it on all sides and in all senses. He will observe whether the Execution of it be difficult or easy: if the People desire it, if its Advantages be great; if it does not weaken other Laws of more Utility, if it is a proper Remedy for the Evil it is intended to prevent or cure, or if it will only serve to perplex it, and multiply the Violations of it.

III. (z) In this Examination the Prince will have Recourse to Magistrates of the greatest Experience and Sincerity for Assistance. He will ask
their

(z) Semper cum optimatibus, non solum bellicas res, sed etiam civiles, prius quam faceret aliquid, contulit. *Marc Aurele, comme le rapporte Jul. Capit. dans sa vie, p. 147.*

Si de jure civili, aut de negotio tractaret, solos doctos & discretos adhibebat. *Alexand. Sever. selon Lamprid. p. 211.*

their Advice and not their Approbation. (a) When the Matter is of great importance, he will even demand their Judgment in Writing, and after their most mature Consideration of it. He will not only consult Persons learned in the Law, but others renowned for their Prudence and Learning, tho' they be not actually engaged in the Administration of Justice. He will lay himself out to know and to attach to himself Persons of Reputation for Wisdom and Probity; and he will not publish a Law, or give it his Sanction, till he hath first taken their Advice about it. Thus have Princes always acted, who deserved on account of their Wisdom and Deliberation to give Laws to other Men. They deliberated long before they enacted any Law. They hearkened to others in order to merit to be obeyed, and they had in view not to shew their Power, but to give real Authority to their Commands by their Wisdom and Justice.

IV. Thus they avoided an Inconvenience which Precipitation always involves, which is Variation and Inconstancy; for long Examination, with the Assistance of the best Counsellors, having discovered to them all the Difficulties which could arise, they never found themselves obliged to change, explain, or abrogate Laws which were well digested, and accurately canvassed: Whereas, on the other hand, Princes who give rashly into whatever one single Minister proposes, and do not call to their Council any other Persons but those who have very confined Minds, and whose Compliance

is

(a) Neque ullam constitutionem sacrauit sine viginti legisperitis, & doctissimis ac sapientibus viris, iisque disertissimis non minus quinquaginta . . . Et id quidem ita, ut iretur per sententias singulorum, ac scriberetur quid quisque dixisset, dato tamen spatio ad disquirendum, cogitandumque, prius quam dicerent, ne incogitati dicere cogerentur de rebus ingentibus. *Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. Sever. p. 210 & 211.*

350 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

is their chief Virtue, are for ever making Alterations, and scarcely leave any Edict for a long time in its first shape and form. (b) They themselves destroy their own Laws; and they so often oppose their Will to their Will, and their Authority to their Authority, that at last the People begin to despise it, and to look upon the Prince's Inconstancy as a sure Sign that he is led by some Guide, and has not so much as Judgment enough to choose his Leaders.

V. Thro' this Variableness Laws multiply to an infinite number: for (c) an Edict is immediately followed by a Declaration, and that by many others, which mutually darken and perplex one another, and by means of contradictory Explications, leave no Trace of the first Design; the same Matter is hinted in very different Views. The first Motives disappear, and in their room succeed unforeseen Difficulties. A Law is founded on a particular Reason, and a contrary one is founded upon an opposite Reason: and because before enacting a Law, all Consequences and Circumstances were not taken into the Account; as many new Laws are passed, as new Circumstances cast up, and at last both the first and all the following Views are abandoned as imperfect; and thus the Disease is augmented instead of being remedied: for no greater Evil can befall a State, than to be oppressed and embarrassed with a Multiplicity of Laws, and (d) their Multitude hath even been regarded as a certain Proof of bad Administration, because it is the Effect either of Imprudence, *i. e.* Incapacity to choose, or of Weakness, *i. e.* Inability to execute; of Inconstancy, not able to support any thing,

(b) *Suarum legum autor idem ac subverfor. Tacit. L. 3. Annal. p. 85.*

(c) *Tunc legibus laborabatur. Tacit. ibid. p. 84.*

(d) *Corruptissimâ Republicâ plurimæ leges. Tacit. Ibid. p. 85.*

thing, or of Capriciousness, which converts all its Whimsies into Laws.

VI. Things do not go on so under a wise and prudent Prince. He considers Fickleness as a shameful Blemish. He would look upon losing his Reputation for Steadiness, as losing a part of his Authority: and he will have every thing proposed to have the Authority of a Law, to be examined with such strict Accuracy, that he may not be afterwards obliged to make any change in it.

VII. Besides the Precautions that he takes himself not to be deceived, (e) he even consents that the Judges in the high Tribunal of his State should not register a Law sent to them, till they have examined it with Respect indeed, but at the same time with perfect Freedom and Impartiality. He does not pretend either to shut up their Eyes or their Mouths; and he does not pervert into a new Form a Practice which is no less a Security to the Prince than the People, against the cunning Encroachments that may be made upon their Religion. He knows that wise Men mutually light up one another's Understandings: that it is but just to listen to Senators who have become gray-haired in the Study of the Laws, and who are the Depositories of them: that he corroborates his Authority, by shewing publicly that he desires to use it for Justice only, and that he gains particular Respect to his Orders, by requiring that the most distinguished Judges in his State for Integrity and Ability, should warrant their Equity to the Publick.

VIII.

(e) Nihil in vobis Imperatoribus tam popolare & tam amabile est, *said S. Ambrose to Theodos. the Great*, quam libertatem in iis diligere. qui obsequio vobis subditi sunt. Siquidem hoc interest iuter bonos & malos principes, quod boni libertatem amment, servitutem improbi. 8. *Ambros. Epist.* 40. n. 2.

352 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

VIII. (*f*) If he did not desire that the Judges should have any thing else to do in the Matter, but to hear a Law read, and implicitly to give their Assent and Approbation to it, or to hold their Peace and say nothing about it, he ought to ease them of this Servitude, which can be of no benefit to the Publick, and only serves to distress Consciences. He would rather choose to carry his Authority with a high hand, than to seek for Approvers of his Will condemned to Silence; and would reckon it much more generous not to ask publick Approbation, than to shut up the Mouths of those from whom he pretends to ask it. A great Prince is always sincere; what he appears to will, he really wills. He does not forbid what he seems to exact; and if he is inclinable that the first Magistrates in his Kingdom should authorize a Law sent to them for that effect, he leaves them full Liberty to give their sincere Opinion; and does not degrade them by making a false shew of consulting them.

IX. Otherwise what is most august in the State is but an empty Shadow, a mere Ceremony. Nothing is less approved of than what seems to be approved. (*g*) All is determined by one Voice, and no other Person has opened his Mouth, or at least none has done it sincerely. Sometimes deep Silence is the only way the Judges opine. Sometimes

(*f*) Tuæ moderationis hæc laus, constantia nostra: & tibi obsequimur, quòd in curiam, non ad certamen adulationis, sed ad usum munusque justitiæ convenimus. Hanc simplicitati tuæ, veritatiq; gratiam relaturi, ut te quæ vis, velle, quæ non vis, nolle credamus. *Paneg. Traj. p. 160.*

(*g*) Quis antea loqui () quis niscere audebat, præter miseros illos qui prius interrogabantur? Unus solusque censebat quod sequeretur omnes, & omnes improbarent, imprimis ipsi qui censuerat; adeò nulla magis omnibus displicent, quàm quæ sic fiant, tanquam omnibus placeant. *Paneg. Traj. p. 216.*

times the Act of Registration is not pronounced by the President, and the Clerk dispatches it as a Matter of mere Form. If any one should dare to mutter any thing that had the smallest Semblance of Liberty, he would be reckoned mutinous, and punished as such. And thus the Judges do not assemble on such Occasions as Judges but as Flatterers: and indeed the Flattery is so gross that nobody is deceived by it, and the Registration is rather a Proof of Improbation, than of Consent and Approbation.

X. When a Prince has carefully canvassed by himself, and with the Assistance of a wise Council, the Fitness and Justice of an Edict, he is not afraid that Persons zealous for his Glory, and full of Respect to his Will and Authority, do not accept it with intelligent and willing Compliance. But the less Precaution he takes himself, the less will he allow others to take even for his sake. He will not permit others to deliberate, because he hath not done it himself; but he looks upon it as Presumption to dare to enquire into what he never thought of understanding.

XI. It is commonly thro' the Influence of too absolute a Minister, that a Prince forbids all Examination of his Edicts. They are the Spawn of this Minister, who will neither be instructed nor contradicted; who cannot bear that his Authority should be checked by any Tribunal, but sets himself to depress whatever is most great or noble, and firm in a State, that he may reign the more absolutely in the Name of his Master.

XII. This Minister has often private Views very opposite to publick Good; and were his Intentions always pure, he has not so much Wisdom, nor such a Compass of Judgment, as not to stand in need of any Light from others. The Senators of the first Rank would be able to supply what he

354 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

may want, or to rectify what may be contrary to the Publick Interest. The Prince, whose Interests are inseparable from those of the State, charges them to guard carefully against all Mistakes, and sends to them with that Intention whatever is designed to be confirmed into Law : and by an Inconsistency, of which his Minister's Jealousy is the Source, he retracts what he commanded, and forbids them to give any Attention to his Interests, or to shew any Concern about Publick Good.

XIII. When a Minister has imposed Silence on every Person, and can make his Master the Executor of his Will, he often carries Matters to such a length, as not to trouble him with any Instruction about a Law ; but forms it as he pleases, and presents it to the Prince to be signed by him, with as much Assurance as he would to his Secretary : and he reckons so fully on his Complaisance or his Indolence, that he not unfrequently sends a Project to the Press, which his Master never so much as heard once read. Yet all bends under the arbitrary Power of a Servant, because he hath been able to persuade his Master, that implicite Obedience is the Duty, the only Virtue of Judges, and that their Submission ought to be blind to such a degree, as not to presume to enquire whether it is the Prince himself who commands, or another who hath usurped his Place. And thus it happens, that the more a Prince affects to be absolute, the more he shews the Publick the Dependence in which his Minister holds him subjected to him.

XIV. There is therefore no more sure or evident Mark that a Prince himself governs, than the Liberty he leaves to the superior Judges to take Cognizance of the Laws laid before them, and to examine into his Interests, which are those
of


of Justice and his People: for it is then manifest, that he is disposed to know all, that he is upon his Guard against Errors; and that he will not suffer his Name and Power to be abused into the Establishment of what is unjust.

XV. This is sufficient to prevent, and to cut off all Thoughts of leading him; for when respectful Remonstrances are permitted, they are seldom necessary. The Ministers will not give occasion to them. They are wise and circumspect: and they propose nothing to the Prince which is not worthy of him, worthy of his Justice and Goodness: nothing but what is conformable to the ancient Maxims, and conducive to the Publick Good.

XVI. The Sound of a Remonstrance offends not Prince's Ears if he loves Truth. For he seeks it: he prefers it to every thing; and invites every one to speak it out. He fears nothing but Falshood and Flattery; and he considers Sincerity and Faithfulness as essential Qualities in Magistrates. He knows these Virtues are not only not contrary to Respect and Submission, but that they are the surest Characteristicks of them; and he would look on himself as affronted, if he was thought incapable of taking Advice, or if any one was afraid of displeasing him, by telling him what was for his Advantage. He does not oblige himself to follow, tho' he hears it. He is always Master, and he knows he is so: but it is because he is Master that he will know all, and not suffer his Minister to rob the Judges of the Liberty he gives them.

XVII. The Manner of making humble Remonstrances to him depends on his own choice. He may consent that certain Officers be deputed for that effect, and may regulate their Number.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY
1890
CHICAGO, ILL.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY
1890
CHICAGO, ILL.



CHICAGO



CHAPTER VIII.

A Prince ought to govern his States with Wisdom, and according to the Laws: not to confound the sovereign Authority with arbitrary Power: distinguish what seduces to that Error, and avoid it.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to govern his People with Wisdom, and according to the Laws.

I. **A**LL the Principles hitherto laid down (*b*) are so many Proofs that a Prince is indispensibly obliged to consult his Wisdom and Reason in every thing, and not give his Will for a Law, but when and because it is agreeable to Justice.

He is the Minister of God, who is sovereign Wisdom; he ought to hold as it were his Place on Earth, and vindicate his Providence. He is entrusted with a Care of his People, resembling that of Heaven. He has no other Interest but that of his People; he makes one Body with them, and he desires to be happy by making them so. He loves them; he is their Father, their

A 2 3

Protector,

(*b*) See Chap. II. and III. of the 6th Part, and Chap. I. of the second.

356 INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE, &c.

He may satisfy himself with a Memorial in Writing containing the Reasons. He may hear his Chancellor or any other he pleases. There are Circumstances in which one of these Methods is properer than the other : but they are all respectful, and they may all be used on different Occasions.



CHAP.



CHAPTER VIII.

A Prince ought to govern his States with Wisdom, and according to the Laws : not to confound the sovereign Authority with arbitrary Power : distinguish what seduces to that Error, and avoid it.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to govern his People with Wisdom, and according to the Laws.

I. **A**LL the Principles hitherto laid down (*b*) are so many Proofs that a Prince is indispensibly obliged to consult his Wisdom and Reason in every thing, and not give his Will for a Law, but when and because it is agreeable to Justice.

He is the Minister of God, who is sovereign Wisdom ; he ought to hold as it were his Place on Earth, and vindicate his Providence. He is entrusted with a Care of his People, resembling that of Heaven. He has no other Interest but that of his People ; he makes one Body with them, and he desires to be happy by making them so. He loves them ; he is their Father, their Protector,

A a 3

(*b*) See Chap. II. and III. of the first Part, and Chap. I. of the second.

358 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

Protector, and their Judge ; he gives them holy Laws, and he will have them to be executed ; and how can he despise them himself, and take from them by his Example the Authority he hath given them ? What does having established them signify, if he pays no Regard to them ? Or what Advantage can the People reap from them, if they are governed by quite contrary Wills ?

II. “ (i) By me, saith eternal Wisdom, Kings
“ reign, and Princes decree Justice. By me Prin-
“ ces rule, and Nobles ; even all the Judges of
“ the Earth. I lead them in the way of Righte-
“ ousness, in the midst of the Paths of Judg-
“ ment.” In the Language of the Scriptures, it
is therefore the same to reign, and to command
things that are just ; to be invested with supreme
Authority, and to ordain nothing but what is e-
quitable. Eternal Wisdom disowns whatever
does not proceed from her, and does not allow
that one reigns, when he does it without consult-
ing her.

III. Not that a Prince does not retain his Au-
thority which God hath given him, even when
he abuses it ; but nothing is more opprobrious
than to abuse it : there is a Justice in Laws inde-
pendent of him, which condemns him when he
swerves from it. This Justice is his Rule. (k) He
remains subject to it, tho’ raised above other Men :
and he can neither substitute in its room his Passions,
nor his unjust Desires ; because he himself is neither
the Source of its Authority nor its End : He is
but an Administrator of an Authority entrusted to
him for a certain time, with which God hath in-
vested

(i) *Prov. c. viii. v. 15 & 16.*

(k) *Ipse te legibus subjecisti, quas nemo principi scripsit, Pa-
neg. Traj. p. 190.*

*Leges Imperator fert, quas princeps ipse custodiat. S. Am-
bros. Ep. 21. ad Imp. Valentinianum jun. n. 7.*

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE. 359

vested him, that he may reign for God, and consequently make Justice and the Laws reign.

ARTICLE II.

*He ought not to confound arbitrary Power with
sovereign Authority.*

I. Nothing is more diametrically repugnant to the Designs of God, and to the first Institution of Royal Power than arbitrary Sway, which dishonours it by making it degenerate into Tyranny : but (*l*) as there are certain Vices which assume the Appearances and Colours of certain Virtues, as Prodigality has some of the Features of Liberality, Rashness some Likeness to Courage, Slowness to Prudence, so is it with respect to arbitrary Power and supreme Authority. It imitates its Elevation, its Independency, its Vigour ; and it dazzles by this Resemblance the Uncautious, who do not consider or attend to any thing in Grandeur, but that which flatters Pride and Self-love, and despise whatever moderates it, and renders it truly salutary, by subjecting it to Equity and the Laws.

II. If a Prince is so happy, as not to confound two things so essentially different, but which have a certain common Exterior, he is absolutely safe. (*m*) The principal Temptation to which his Station is obnoxious is overcome. But he is led into a Mistake in his Choice, by the Propinquity between Vice and Virtue, not perceiving their real Difference ; and thus all his good Qualities either

A a 4 evanish,

(*l*) Regiæ dignitati Tyrannis vicina, & foribus admodum propinqua est, sicut fortitudini temeritas, liberalitati prodigentia. *Synef. de Regn. p. 6.*

(*m*) Nullum tibi venenum, nullum gladius plus formido, quam libidinem dominandi. *S. Bernard. l. 3. de Consid. c. 1.*

360 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE &c.

evanish, or become of no effect either to himself or the Publick.

III. It is therefore of the last Consequence to him to understand thoroughly all the distinguishing Characters of supreme and arbitrary Power; and frequently to compare his Conduct with the one and the other, that he may discern whether it keeps within due bounds, or begins to take Licences.

IV. The first Characteristick of sovereign Power, when it is pure, and hath not degenerated neither from its Origine nor final Scope, is to govern by the Laws, to regulate it self by them, and to look on every thing as interdicted to it which they forbid. Thus (*n*) the Prince and the Laws command the same thing. Authority is not divided. (*o*) The Prince's Example does not enfeeble the Laws, and the Laws do not condemn the Prince's Conduct.

V. It is quite the reverse with respect to arbitrary Power. It gives its Will for Laws, and its Conduct for a Rule. It distinguishes its Authority from that of the publick established Law. It despises that of the Laws, and the Laws condemn the Abuse it makes of its Power.

VI. A second Characteristick is, that (*p*) the sovereign Authority reunites all that is wise and prudent in the State, and thinks and acts as if the Republick itself thought and acted in Person; and it is indeed at once its Soul, its Interpreter, its Head, and its Arms.

VII.

(*n*) *Regimus à te, & subjecti tibi, sed quemadmodum legibus sumus. Paneg. Traj. p. 81.*

(*o*) *Regi pro moribus leges sunt, Tyranno pro legibus mores. Synes. de Reg. p. 6.*

(*p*) *Nihil immaturum, nihil properum, nihil asperum, formidandum est. Omnia teria, cuncta gravia, & quasi ipsa Respublica jubeat, auguranda sunt. Vopis. in vit. Taciti Imp. p. 285.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 361

VII. Arbitrary Will has quite different Views. It looks upon the Republick as an Alien, as a separate Body, as a State whose Interests are often separate from, and often contrary to its Interests. It is jealous of it, and fears its growth; it looks with an evil Eye on its Advantages; it places Prudence and Policy in weakening it; it takes Precautions against it as against a Rival; and far from thinking and acting as the Republick would do, it employs all its Cunning and Art against it, if Force be not sufficient,

VIII. A third Characteristick is, that the Prince considers himself as the Pastor of his Flock; and has the Vigilance, the Care, and Goodness of one. (q) He watches that his People may be in Surety; he loads himself with Cares that his People may be easy; he chooses whatever is salutary for them, and wards off every thing that can hurt them; he places his supreme Joy in seeing them flourish and encrease; and exposes himself with cheerful undaunted Courage to protect them.

IX. Arbitrary Power likewise considers the People as a Herd, but as one to be sacrificed to it; it takes care of them, but it is to eat them up; it feeds them, but it is for it self; it not only fleeces them, and sucks their Milk, but it sucks their Blood and Marrow; it treats them as Beings of another

(q) Qui id in vitæ ratione sequitur quod subditis commodum videtur, qui laborem & molestiam perferre vult, ne quid illis molestum sit, qui pro illis periclitatur, ut in pace & securitate degant: hic in genere quidem ovium pastor, in hominum verò genere Rex est. . . . Qui gregem non saginare, sed à grege saginari vult, eum inter pecora coquum appello. *Synef. de Reg. p. 6.*

(r) Rectè omninò vetus sententia, subditorum multitudinem Regem non potius facere, quàm Tyrannum, sicut nec ovium multitudo pastorem potius quàm coquum, qui illas abigit, ut mactatis non modò ipse famem expleat, sed & aliis epulandas venum proponat. Iisdem prorsus limitibus Regem censeo à Tyranno diffidere. *Idem. ibid.*

362 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

another Species, made only for its Pleasure ; and it does not look upon their Impoverishment as any Loss, if instead of being one to it, it is fattened by its Decrease.

X. A fourth Characteristick is, that the Prince only considers his Elevation as an honourable Servitude, (*s*) which by raising him above all, charges him with the Care of all. He (*t*) knows that Authority is not given for his sake to whom it is entrusted, but in their behalf who are submitted to it, and that he ought to desire no greater Happiness than that of procuring it to them with Ease and Success.

XI. But arbitrary Will hath very differing Sentiments ; it thinks all due to it, and that it owes nothing to any other but what it pleases. It considers Authority as born with it, incorporated with it, and natural to it ; it reigns for the Pleasure of reigning, and for no other end. It indulges it self in enjoying all that Grandeur can afford, and banishes all Concern about the Good of others as far from it as it can. It sets it self at the head of the People to have Domination over them, and it tramples them under its feet, that it alone may appear great and powerful.

A fifth Characteristick is, that the Prince is well instructed in two things : the one is, (*v*) that the People is incapable of absolute Liberty : the other, that they do not deserve absolute Servitude : and he knows that there is a wise Middle between a weak Government that would be pernicious

(*s*) Ita præsis, ut provideas, ut consulas, ut procures, ut serves. *S. Bern. L. 3. de Conf. c. 1.*

(*t*) Præes & singulariter, numquid ut de subditis crescas ? Nequaquam : sed ut ipsi de te. Principem te constituerunt, sed sibi, non tibi. *Ibid. c. 3.*

(*v*) Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem, *said the Emperor Galba to Piso. Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 313.*

nicious to a People, and an unjust one that would oppress them. He takes no Liberty from them but what they would abuse to their own Hurt, and preserves them in Possession of all that Liberty which is requisite to their Happiness. He occupies the first Dignity that the Factionous may not seize it. But (z) he possesses it to maintain Order among the Citizens; and not to shackle Slaves. He contents himself with reigning over an Obedient Family, and will not pervert paternal into despotick Government.

XIII. But arbitrary Power is a Stranger to this sage Moderation. A despotick Prince exacts every thing because something is owing him. He takes away the People's whole Liberty, because he has Right to a part. He does not acknowledge them as Children, because he wants the Bowels of a Father. He sees them to be Slaves because his Eyes are open to nothing but his Power; and he takes whatever would lighten the Weight of his Burden to be Effeminacy unbecoming a Prince.

XIV. The last Characteristick, but the most marked of any is this, that (y) a Prince worthy of reigning does every thing for a good Reason, and is never reduc'd to give his Will (z) for the sole

(x) *The Emperor Claudius sending Meherdates to the Parthians, who had demanded him for their King, gave him the following Advice: Ut non dominationem & servos, sed rectorem & cives cogitaret. Tacit. L. 12. Annae. p. 189.*

(y) *Quomodo non indecens tibi voluntate pro lege uti. . . non minus dejecti quàm elati animi est, veluti rationis expertem, non pro ratione, sed pro libitu agere... Quis in te, rectore omnium, tantam contumeliam naturæ, honoris injuriam serat. S. Bernard. L. 3. de Confid. C. 4.*

(z) *The usual Phrase of the Edicts, for such is our Will, does not fall under this Censure. The Expression is very proper. The Prince ought to command. The Law speaks in the same Terms. Both the Law and the Prince have Reasons and just Motives for what they do, even when they do not think fit to alledge them.*

sole Cause of his Actions; and he considers it as an Injury done to Mankind, and to him in particular who is charged with the Government of Men to be able to give no other Reason for his Conduct but Instinct or Impulse.

XV. But this is precisely what despotick Power glories in. He thinks it mean to give any other Reason for his Actions but his Will and Pleasure. He is highly offended if one presumes to ask his Motive or Scope, and fancies himself Master when he humours his Caprices, and is become the Slave and Sport of all his Whims and Passions.

XVI. In this Extravagance therefore, properly speaking, does arbitrary Power consist. It never examines Motives. It is enough if it be its Humour or Will to do a Thing. It is irritated by the most modest Remonstrances. To oppose good Reasons to its Will, serves only to make it more headstrong. It is to importune it sadly to put it in mind of the Laws of Equity: To represent the publick Interest to it is Guilt. Whatever is within its Power is right in its Eyes; and knows no other Boundaries but those which want of Power sets to its Caprices.

XVII. A wise Prince, tho' young, who seriously considers and takes a near View of a Conduct so opposite to Reason and Equity cannot imagine that one can preserve his right Wits and it fall into such Excesses: But if he is not upon his Guard he himself will degenerate into them like others, who set out with Moderation and ended in Tyranny.

ARTICLE II.

He ought to know what it is that seduces into confounding these two different Things and to avoid it.

I. Nothing ever more sage was said or that better deserves to be engraved on the Memory of a young Prince than an Emperor's (a) Discourse to his Son on this Subject. " You have, "
 " (b) said he, only been tried as yet by Adversity and Misfortunes, and you have acted in them with Dignity and Magnanimity: But adverse Circumstances do not make the severest Trial: it is Prosperity that discovers the bottom of the Heart, lays it open and shews what the Man is. To bear one up under Affliction no more than Patience is wanting: But to resist the Temptations arising from Affluence requires Firmness and Strength of Mind of another Kind. Distress rouses our Vigour: But Ease and Plenty soften and corrupt us. I am sure that a Change to the Worse will not begin on your Part; and that you will preserve your former Sentiments in your new Situation: That you will always remain disposed to Friendship, and to allow free Access to every one to lay open his Case to
 " you :

(a) *The Emperor Galba to Pison.*

(b) Fortunam adhuc tantum adversam tulisti; secundæ res ætioribus stimulis animum explorant: quia miseriæ tolerantur, felicitate corrumpimur. Fidem, libertatem, amicitiam, præcipua humani animi bona, tu quidem eadem animi constantiâ tetinebas: sed alii per obsequium imminuent: irrupet adulatio, blanditiæ, pessimum veri affectûs venenum, sua cuique utilitas. Et jam ego ac tu simplicissimè inter nos hodie loquimur, cæteri libentiùs cum fortunâ nostrâ, quàm nobiscam: nam suadere principem quemcunque, sine affectu agitur. *Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 313.*

366 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

“ you: That you will by your Sincerity merit
 “ to be dealt with candidly and sincerely; and
 “ that you will prefer such Advantages which
 “ are certainly far superior to all others, be-
 “ fore the Sweets of meer Power. But those
 “ who will attach themselves to you, or rather
 “ to your good Fortune, may weaken these noble
 “ Dispositions by their excessive Complaisance.
 “ In spite of all your Precautions, Flattery will
 “ search to find Entrance to you, and violate
 “ your Modesty. Submission, Courtesy, artful
 “ Insinuations and a continual Attention to please,
 “ will supplant genuine, solid Friendship, and
 “ even render it disgustful. No Person will speak
 “ to you disinterestedly; and whereas we con-
 “ verse together with a Liberty and Sincerity
 “ proceeding from mutual Friendship and sincere
 “ Regard to one another’s Interests, others will
 “ rather make their Addresses to our Fortunes
 “ than to us: For a Prince rarely meets with a
 “ sincere Friend. It requires too much Address
 “ to render a sage Advice agreeable to him, or
 “ to admonish him of a Fault without offending
 “ him. ’Tis much easier to flatter him; and the less
 “ Regard one has to his Interest, the better he
 “ succeeds in the Arts of Adulation.” His In-
 clinations become so many Laws: Whatever he
 does some will justify; and thus a Prince is ac-
 custom’d to imagine whatever he orders is just,
 that he becomes unwilling to bear so much as
 Counsel, not to mention Opposition or Remon-
 strance.

II. But among those who thus make court to
 his Power, some are more dangerous than others,
 and would teach to exercise his Authority, as
 they themselves would do were they possessed of
 it. They are continually representing to him the
 Extent of his Power, and endeavouring to make
 him

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 367

him look upon it as Weakness not to dare to do what he hath in his Power to do. They gradually extinguish all the good Sentiments a happy Education had inspired into him (c). They insinuate into the Room of Equity, Moderation and Benevolence, Arrogance, Cruelty and Lust of Domination; and by their pernicious Lessons pervert a wise and legal Administration into an arbitrary lawless one.

III. But independently of such dangerous Corrupters, there is in all Men a secret Bias to Pride and the Love of Power, which is beyond all Comparison still much more violent in Princes invironed with Flatterers and accustomed to uncontrouled Rule. This Propensity is daily augmented and strengthened by them, and they are not sensible of it. They become inured to the Pleasure of commanding. They think themselves shackled by whatever limits their Power. They consult others with more Reluctance. They hearken to Advice with less Condescension. They resolve with greater Precipitancy. They become more delicate and sensible. They leave less Access to Truth. They are disgusted at those who deal sincerely with them, and feel more Ease and Pleasure in employing those who approve whatever they order, and think of nothing but executing their Commands (c). They more seldom reflect upon themselves and their Duties; and so frequently the Change is so very sudden, that in a Year or two a Prince is no more the same Person, so much hath Power intoxicated him, and got the ascendant over his former good Sentiments.

IV. History

(c) Irrepentibus dominationis magistris, superbior & atrocior. *Tacit. L. 2. Hist. p. 354.*

368 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

IV. History mentions (e) but one Prince who became a better Man by ascending the Throne. The most moderate have hardly been able to preserve themselves absolutely from the Infection of the contagious Air surrounding them. They have oftener remiembred that they were Masters, than that they were obliged as such to conduct themselves according to the Rules of Justice and the Laws: And have generally been more concerned to maintain their Power than to render it beneficial.

V. (f) *You know*, said the Son of God to his Apostles, *You know that the Princes of the Gentiles exercise Dominion over them; and they that are great exercise Authority upon them.*

This is almost the universal Character of Princes. Empire and Domination, the Lust of Power, the Pleasure of reigning and of making others feel their Superiority; which is properly arbitrary Sway: (g) *But*, says the Son of God, *it shall not be so among you; but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your Minister.* This more immediately respects Ecclesiastical Government, so diametrically opposite in its Nature and End to Tyranny; but it likewise extends to temporal Government, which ought not to be different from the other with Regard to Justice, but only in the Manner of exercising it. The Son of God gives no Authority to despotick Will of any kind. He condemns it even in Infidel Princes, (*principes gentium*) and *Moses* inspired by his Spirit had rigidly forbidden it to all who should reign over the People of *Israel*. The

Terms

(e) *Ambigua de Vespasiano fama (before he was Emperor) solusque omnium ante se principum in melius moratus est. (after he was chosen.) Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 323.*

(f) *Matth. c. xx. v. 25.*

(g) *Non ita erit inter vos. Ibid.*

Terms of the Prohibition are very emphatical, and as it is a Law extending to all Princes, it well deserves our most serious Attention (*b*).

“ When thou art come into the Land which
 “ the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shall possess it, and shall dwell therein, and shalt say
 “ I will set a King over me, like as all the
 “ Nations that are about me. Thou shalt in
 “ any wise set him King over thee whom the
 “ Lord thy God shall chuse: One from among
 “ thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee,
 “ thou mayst not set a Stranger over thee which
 “ which is not thy Brother, neither that he
 “ multiply Wives to himself, that his Heart
 “ turn not away, neither that he greatly multiply to himself silver and gold. And it shall
 “ be when he sitteth upon the Throne of his
 “ Kingdom, that he shall write him a Copy
 “ of this Law in a Book out of that which is
 “ before the Priests the *Levites*. And it shall
 “ be with him, and he shall read therein all the
 “ all the Days of his Life; that he may learn
 “ to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the
 “ Words of this Law, and these Statutes to do
 “ them, that his Heart be not lifted up above
 “ his Brethren, and that he may prolong his
 “ Days in his Kingdom, he and his Children in
 “ the midst of *Israel*.”

VI. A Condemnation of arbitrary Power cannot be conceived in clearer or stronger Terms: But what I would principally observe in it, are the Precautions God judges requisite in order to avoid this dangerous Rock, upon which a Prince cannot too much reflect. The King's Subjects are his Brethren. 'Tis God who establishes them and not Men. 'Tis his Law that ought to be their Guide, and that same Law which he has

B b

given

(*b*) *Deuter. c. xvii. v. 14, & seqq.*

370 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

given to all their Inferiors. The Prince ought to copy it himself, that he may the more strongly imprint it in his Mind. He ought to receive an authentick Copy of it from the Priests that he may not be deceived by defective Copies. He ought to carry it always about with him, and to read it incessantly, that he may make it the Rule of all his Actions. He is not allowed, tho' he be King, to dispense himself from the Observance of any Precept in it. It is to him as well as to all others, a Path from which he is not at Liberty to swerve under any Pretence whatsoever. He is obliged every Day to learn to fear God, and to humble himself under his Hand, that he may not be lifted up by Pride to bear hard upon his Subjects who are his Brethren, tho' they be under his Authority. This is the only Way to preserve the Kingdom to himself and his Posterity for a long Time. It is only on these Terms that he fills the Throne worthily; and if he does not so reign, Providence suffers him with Regret to possess the Throne, and will ignominiously degrade him after a short Domination.

VII. This is what a wise Prince ought to oppose to all the dangerous Seducements, the Principles of which he carries about with him in his own Heart. He ought daily to call himself to a strict Account; to examine his (i) Temper and Disposition, and enquire into his Love of Power, (k) that he may know whether the excessive Homage paid to him diminishes his Modesty; and whether his Love of Truth continues the same; whether Flattery does not begin to gain upon him:

(i) *Memini tunc verissimè judicari, meruerit quis honorem nec ne, cum adeptus fuerit. Paneg. Traj. p. 252.*

(k) *Quasi imperare posset, magis quàm vellet. Tacit. L. 1. Hist. 2: 313*

INSTITUTION *of* a PRINCE. 371

him: If he makes Justice reign as he promised, or if he begins to substitute his Will in it's Place; if he rules according to the Laws, or if they are a Yoke upon him; if he becomes daily more worthy of reigning, and more indifferent to the Glory of it.



B b 2

CHAP



C H A P. IX.

A Prince that he may govern wisely, ought to govern by his Council, the Qualities of those he ought to consult. The Way of making a right Trial. The Use he ought to make of them.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince that he may govern wisely, ought to govern by his Council.

I. **W**E have shewn already ⁽¹⁾ that the Wiser a Prince is, the more he will see the Necessity of having Advice ; his confessing the Want of it is one essential Part of his Wisdom ; and we have also shewn in the same Place, that all does not depend upon his asking Counsel or Advice, but that the greatest Difficulty is to distinguish amidst a Variety of Advices the best to pursue and resolve upon ; and that it requires a Greatness of Mind to be both docil and prudent.

II. I suppose the Prince remembers all that has been said on this Subject ; as also the Directions
and

⁽¹⁾ Voyez chap. xvii. de la I. Partie.

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE. 373

and Precepts that have been given, in order to enable him to form a Judgment of Men and their different Characters.

III. The Prince has occasion to shew his Knowledge of Men in his Choice of a Council, which he may assemble upon all Occasions, and which ought to be composed of Men of the greatest Worth in his Kingdom.

IV. The Prince must have these Men always near him, that he may consult them upon every Emergency. He should not confer upon them any other Employments which may be apt to distract their Minds by a Variety of Cares.

V. It is a Council thus regulated which gives to the Government a fix'd and determin'd Form. Under the Prince, and in Dependance upon him, the Council is the Source of publick Order, and the Origin of every wise Resolution and Design.

VI. 'Tis upon the Council the Prince devolves his Concerns, which would oppress him if he did not call for Assistance; and by it he executes all his Resolutions.

VII. By this Council are preserv'd the great and important Maxims of the State, the Knowledge of its true Interests is perpetuated, and all Changes or Innovations are prevented.

VIII. 'Tis in this Council that great Men are form'd; here they become, by a mutual exchange of Knowledge more wise and prudent, and learn from Practice and Experience more than can be acquir'd from Speculation and Study; here they are made capable of instructing others, of supporting the State in the Minority of the Prince, of supplying his Absence in any Sickness, and of preserving his Spirit and Method of acting when they have not the Liberty of consulting him.

ARTICLE II.

The Qualities of those he ought to consult.

I. 'Tis easy to conclude from hence, that the Council which ought to be under the Prince, as the Soul of the State, can't be compos'd of Men too knowing or upright ; and that none ought to be admitted but Men of superior Genius and Merit.

II. By this Rule young Men are excluded. For what Trust can be put in them (*m*), what Proofs have they given of their Capacity, Prudence, Virtue, Secrecy, Fidelity and Disinterestedness. (*n*) Old Men who have seen much of the World, and reflected on every Occurrence are best qualified for giving Counsel. Princes ought to remember the young Men whom *Rehoboam* the the Son of *Solomon* consulted, and reflect upon (*o*) the pernicious Consequences of their Counsels, which that rash Prince preferred to the sage Counsels of those Senators who had a Share in the Government of the State under his Father.

III. But it is not sufficient that Men have grown old in Employments, one may have liv'd long in the World, and made little Improvement of what he has seen in it. A Man may have had many Parts, and continued in them ignorant and weak. Age alone, nay even when join'd with Dignities, gives no Title to Preferment. Experience must be added, and this Reflection only can acquire ; for without it Men make no

Ob-

(*m*) *Ecc. c. ix. v. 9.*

(*n*) *Ecc. c. xxv. v. 6 & 8.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 375

Observation, nor reap Advantage from what happens in Life.

IV. (p) To Experience must be added the Knowledge of History both ancient and modern, they ought to have compared Events of which they have been Witnesses, with others they have read of in History; their Minds ought to be stored with Examples and Observations; they ought to be ready to point out in important Matters how other Princes have behaved in like Circumstances, and able to profit by their foolish or wise Conduct. Above all, to be well instructed in the Knowledge of the Treaties, Negotiations and Alliances which have any Relation to the present Situation of the Kingdom: To have an exact Knowledge of the Constitution of the State, 'tis Strength, Weakness or Wants; to be well informed of the Situation of neighbouring States; to know their Genius; to have an exact and sure Account of all those Things; not to rely upon old Accounts, which a Change of Affairs may have rendered quite useless; to be constantly judging what happens in *Europe*; to enquire into the Causes of all Events, and make solid Reflections upon them; to know what Concern the Prince and State may have in Affairs, which in Appearance have no Relation to their Interest, but the Consequences of which may greatly interest them; and be able by an exact Knowledge of what hath passed, and a constant Attention to the present, to predict, with probability, what will happen.

V. All

(p) Sepe benè meritos adhibebat: (*the Emperor Alexander Severus*) & locorum peritos ac bellorum & castrorum, & omnes litteratos, & maxime eos qui historiam norant, requirens, quid in talibus causis, quales in discrepatione versabantur, veteres Imperatores, vel Romani, vel exterarum gentium fecissent. *Lamprid. in his Life, p. 27.*

376 INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE.

V. All this supposes an excellent natural Genius, great Sense, and a wonderful depth of Judgment; for without this Foundation all the Knowledge acquir'd by Study is only a confused Collection of Facts which will prove of no Use; and the Reflections one makes will always smell of the defective Source from which they flow: it would undoubtedly be better for a Prince to have in his Council one Man of Sense, tho' ignorant of Antiquity, and even without Letters, than many learned Men, who are not able to form a solid Judgment of Things: But Learning and Prudence ought to be united, and then the Advantages of Study and Experience are vastly great.

VI. I don't speak of Fidelity nor Secrecy: these two essential Qualities are put to a Trial, and found out sooner than any others: I only beg of the Prince not to reckon upon the Fidelity of any Man but in Proportion to his Disinterestedness, nor to trust in this but when it proceeds from Integrity: Without great Probity one cannot get the Conquest over all the Passions; and it is impossible to answer for the Conduct of Men who are not perfectly influenced by a Regard to their Duty.

VII. The Prince can't be too cautious with respect to Secrecy, which ought to be inviolably kept. Every Man who does not show as strict a Regard to Secrecy, as the publick Good requires of him, ought to be excluded the Council. Without this he will employ his great Qualities of Mind to other purposes. A Prince will never deliberate about any Affair before those who have Friends from whom they can conceal nothing, and who believe they can keep Secrets, because they can conceal one part of them and discover the other; or because they have

have only spokc of what has been already executed. A Man worthy of being consulted by a Prince ought all his Life to be silent about the Secrets of Government. Men are ready to draw Consequences, and infer one Thing from another: The safest Way is not to speak of what has pass'd, nor of the present, lest Men be led by this to form Conjectures about what may happen.

VIII. Whatever Merit a Man may have, he must not affect to make himself necessary to the Prince, nor display his Wisdom with a Show of Ostentation; that Character is odious; it is a Mark of Vanity and Levity: A Prince ought not to depend much upon the Prudence of a Man of this Character, who can't conceal his own Folly.

IX. There are some, in other respects, Men of Worth, who are so positive and over-bearing that they will absolutely persuade and force from the Prince a Consent to an Advice they think for his Interest. This sometimes succeeds with a weak Prince, over whom Men think they may assume a sort of Superiority and Influence: But this Conduct soon proves disagreeable to him, and then he thinks of getting free of a Minister who rather governs than advises. Men of this Character ought not to be suffered by a Prince. He ought to be Master of all his Deliberations; to make his Ministers regard and esteem him; to teach them to rely upon the Strength of their Reasons without employing any other Methods to influence.

X. 'Tis however necessary he allow them full Liberty to declare their Sentiments, since he consults them with a Design of being instructed. He ought to be well pleased that they have the Boldness and Courage to oppose his Inclinations when they

378 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

they think them unjust, or dread their Consequences. Liberty and Courage are two important and useful Qualities, and the Prince ought not only be glad to find them in his Ministers, but he should not admit them to his Council till he is well assured they are possessed of both.

XI. To Liberty and Courage much Prudence must be added, that they may be able to examine every Thing, and foresee every Danger: to trust nothing to Chance; to chuse those Remedies that are most expedite, but least liable to Dangers.

XII. 'Tis even advantageous that Prudence lead to a cautious Timidity in Matters which may be delay'd without Danger. The least Danger, when there is no urgent Reason for opposing it, should occasion Fear; it is not enough to foresee it, it ought to be carefully considered. Courage when not necessary proves hurtful, Fear is more commodious when the Question is only to avoid some Danger.

XIII. But the same Man who appear'd timorous and wary, when there was no Necessity for coming to a Determination or running any Hazard, decides and explains himself in Terms precise and positive, when the Reasons for acting are strong and cogent. He does not leave the Prince who consults him in an Uncertainty; he does not fluctuate betwixt different and opposite Opinions; he knows that when the Question is to act or not to act, the worst of all Sides is to take none; he chuses rather to answer for the Event of his Council, than to leave his Master in Perplexity.

XIV. He carefully avoids the giving of violent Counsels, which may endanger the whole State. Tho' War is unavoidable he gives free Access to Negotiations; he has a flexible pliant Mind,
and

and preserves at the same time a Greatness of Soul. He is fertile in Expedients and Projects, but without proposing either weak or shameful ones. When he engages in any Affair which it was not in his power to avoid, he thinks of ways to get free of it, but never at the expence of his Sincerity or Honour.

XV. He is incapable in any Danger of advising his Master to violate his Promise, and much less his Oath. He is an Enemy to all these false Interpretations which elude the most sacred Obligations, and he reckons he has no Recourse, when he can find none but in Perfidy and Lyes.

XVI. A Man of this Character, (and when I speak of him I include all others who ought to resemble him) has an inviolable Attachment to the Interest of his Prince. He has no other Aim in all his Counsels, but to assist and serve him, and to advance his Glory, which he places in the promoting of Justice and Virtue; this Glory he looks upon as of immortal Duration.

XVII. He has no other Passion but the Love of the Publick Good, nor any other Interest than that of the State. He never quits this Point of View which directs his Conduct, and influences all his Thoughts and Designs. He is happy if the People are so. He is satisfied if the Prince is employed in virtuous Pursuits.

XVIII. His House is free from Corruption, his Servants either receive no Money, or if they do are immediately turn'd off. Sollicitations have as little Influence upon him as Presents or Money. He never bestows Favours to the Hurt and Prejudice of Justice.

XIX. When he gives his Opinion he supports it with solid Arguments, and he endeavours to add to it all that Authority which Truth deserves. But he does not pretend to carry his Opinion against

380 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE.*

gainst that of another, by any Advantages of Power or Influence; he hears him with a Resolution to follow his Advice, if it appears preferable, and he discovers a Joy when he finds it so. He looks upon it as a Littleness of Soul, (*r*) to be attach'd to any Opinion which hath no other Support but that of the Author. He places his Glory in discovering Truth, and reckons himself much obliged to that Man who discovers to him what he was enquiring into, and could not find out.

XX. He is far removed from the Character of those who do not incline to admit any to a share of the Prince's Confidence and Trust, and who want to have the sole Management of Affairs. He knows that this Jealousy is an eternal Source of Divisions and Parties: that when it reigns in the Soul, it hinders the Man from thinking on the Interest of the Prince or State, but solely on his own Advancement: that all kind of Merit, whether equal or superiour, is odious to him, and that he is always ready to persuade his Master to what may secure his own Interest, and lose him the Affection of his most zealous Servants.

XXI. The Prince ought to be much upon his guard against a Man of this Character, and exclude him his Council, when he has discovered this horrible Vice directly opposite to that Fidelity which is due to him. He should not suffer himself to be imposed upon by his other Qualities, however shining, his Services however great, nor his Zeal however forward. He will become his Slave, if he gives ear to his Counsels, and repent too late of having promoted him, if he consents to the removing or degrading of all others.

XXII. In fine, the last Character of a Statesman, but more essential than any we have yet mentioned,

(*r*) *Consilii, quamvis egregii, quod non ipse afferret, inimicus, & adversus petitos pervicax. Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 316.*

mentioned, is not to trust in human Prudence, to be convinced that tho' he employs all the Care in his power all his Schemes and Designs are uncertain; that God alone governs; he must have a great Regard for Providence and its secret Counsels, and submit, with a humble Devotion, all that relates to Futurity, to the sovereign Power and Willdom of God.

ARTICLE III.

The Methods a Prince ought to use in choosing his Council.

I. Behold the Model the Prince ought to have before his eyes in choosing Men worthy of deliberating with him about publick Affairs. Tho' this be attended with great Difficulty and Danger, yet in my opinion this is the way to succeed in it.

II. First, there is Reason to think that among those who have been employed in the former Reign, there are some both of Capacity and Integrity: the Prejudice is on their side, and a Prince should not begin his Reign with turning out them, and putting in their place Men of no Experience, tho' otherwise of great parts.

III. The Prince, tho' he employs Men of the greatest Knowledge of Affairs, yet he examines into their Conduct, without discovering that he does so. He appears to put full Trust and Confidence, but he knows whom he trusts, he fears lest a too narrow Attention serve only to make Dissimulation more guarded: he inclines to discover what they endeavour to conceal from him, and not to redouble their Artifice, which would conceal their Intentions with greater Success.

IV.

382 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

IV. During this Enquiry, the Prince is informing himself by sure Methods, of all the Persons who are possessed of the Qualities we have been mentioning : and (*s*) he pays more regard to a Reputation that is well establish'd, than to secret Informations, which are often the Effect of Prejudice, and have no greater Authority than that of the Authors of them. It is easier to impose upon private Men than the Publick, which examines every thing, and is made up of an infinite Variety of Characters, who don't agree in praising the same Person, unless his Merit claim their Esteem.

V. The Prince then acts a wise part, when he brings into his Council those the Publick points out to him as worthy of his Choice : and he makes an useful Improvement of this Testimony of the Publick, either in keeping Men in his Service, or in calling others to it.

VI. But with regard to the latter, it is safer to try them in inferior Employments, before they are admitted to the most secret Deliberations. There is no knowing of Men but by Trial, and it is not prudent that Affairs of great Importance should be entrusted them in this View.

VII. A Prince should consider, even before this Trial, how those who are mentioned to him have behav'd ; in what Affairs they have been concern'd ; what Intimacies they have had ; how they have managed their own Affairs ; what Authority they have had in their Families ; what Views

(*s*) Tales non crede qualis fama cujusque est : huic aures, huic oculos intende. Ne respexeris clandestinas exultationes, nullisque magis quàm audientibus insidiantes susurros. Melius omnibus, quàm singulis, creditur ; singuli enim decipere, & decipi possunt. Nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt. *Paneg. Traj. p. 185.*

Haud semper errat fama, aliquando & eligit. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 455.*

Views they have followed in the settling of their Children; what Delicacy they have shewn with regard to Riches villainously acquired, in refusing to receive them into their Family by Alliances; with what Regularity they have paid off those Debts which they themselves have not contracted: with what Equity they have put an end to Law-Suits which they could not avoid. For there is Reason for having great hopes of Men, who in all these Points have given Proofs of their Probity, Prudence and Justice. But the Publick can expect no great or important Service from Men, who never made a right Choice of Friends, nor knew how to manage their own Affairs, or govern their Families with Prudence; who could not distinguish betwixt Justice and Injustice, or perform the Duties of private Life. All other Qualities, however shining they may appear, are only vain Ornaments: but the Bottom of their Heart is wicked, and Authority, far from curing it, will only serve to make it more corrupt.

VIII. The most infallible way for a Prince to succeed in his Choice of Men of worth, is sincerely to have the Matter at heart, and not to be afraid of finding out Merit, which he pretends to be searching after. This is the greatest Obstacle, but the least taken notice of. Princes who are not possessed of certain Qualities, are well pleased that those they employ likewise want them. They would have none surpass or equal them; it is with them a great Crime to see more than they do; and a greater share of Wisdom and Prudence is sure of incurring their Hatred and Displeasure.

IX. They don't pardon this Species of Offence, unless imminent Dangers call for the Assistance of Men of great Abilities; on other occasions they bear a secret Hatred to superior Merit. They on purpose

purpose shew a Contempt of Men of worth, keep them in obscurity, and refuse to bestow on them any Honour or Preferment. On the other hand, they shew favour to Men of weak parts, whom they think they can manage at pleasure; these however, often have the Art and Address of governing them, by an affected and counterfeit Simplicity. Upon these are conferr'd the most important Places of Trust, they alone are heard, at least more often and for a longer time than others; and it is only a Resemblance of their Character, and concealing great Qualities, that can preserve one in any degree of Favour, or advance him to it.

X. It is reasonable every Subject have a high and profound Regard for the Prince, and that he only apply to him to continue his Power, or exalt him higher, that his great and excellent Endowments may be more illustrious. Any other Disposition of Mind is criminal, and very opposite to true Merit: the Prince, on his part, may be persuaded that (t) Men of the greatest worth are the most faithful and steady, more disinterested, generous and zealous for his Glory, than those who without great Talents may have great Ambition.

XI. He should not be surprized, they tell him, that there are none perhaps in his Kingdom on whom God has bestowed more Knowledge and Wisdom. (v) He ought to be greatly desirous of finding out Men who are possessed of those Qualities

(t) Optimum quemque, fidelissimum putare. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 458.*

(v) Quemcunque sapientiore seipso sciet, ultrò invitabit, accersetque in Aulam. *Theophil. Instit. Reg. ad Constantin. part 2. C. 17.*

Rectos ac vividos animos, non ut alii, confundis ac deprivatim sed foves & attollis.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 385

lities of Mind which he wants ; and if he is so happy as to find them, he should value himself still more upon profiting by their Counsels, and making a wise Improvement of their Instructions and Advices.

ARTICLE IV.

What Use the Prince ought to make of those who compose his Council.

I. It is so seldom one Man is to be found who is possessed of all these Qualities we have been mentioning, that we have no great Reason of expecting to find many of them. Thus there is a Necessity for limiting the Number of Counsellors, rather from want, than from any Precaution of avoiding Confusion, and keeping Secrecy ; for if all were well qualified, their Number would be a new Advantage, Order and Secrecy would be better kept.

II. When the Prince shall think proper to assemble them in Affairs of great importance, he will take care to conceal his own Opinion, if he has already any Leaning to a certain side ; for by a Discovery of his Inclination, he would prevent their proposing their real Sentiments.

III. He will hear their Reasons and Opinions not only with Patience, but also with Goodness. It is for his Interest they speak with Freedom, and it is he who assembles them to know their Opinions ; it would defeat this Design to deprive them of the Liberty of telling their Minds with as great Freedom as they would do in his Absence ; and very often a small Matter suffices to prevent this Liberty of Debate.

386 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

IV. When any Affair, that deserves a careful Examination, comes before them, he will not be satisfied with hearing them, he will demand their Opinion in Writing, supported with the principal Reasons, and allow them sufficient time to think upon them.

V. He will employ the same Method, when he would have more certain Information about any Secret, and use the Precaution of forbidding every one of them to discourse about it with any other, or even to mention his having consulted them.

VI. Whether they are equally divided in their Opinions, or the greatest Number is on one side, the Prince will reserve the Decision to himself, when the Affair concerns his sovereign Authority.

VII. But in Matters where Justice ought to be the Rule, he will commonly join the greatest Number of his Council, unless he is persuaded that they have given into wrong and unjust Opinions.

VIII. When he has heard or read all they have to propose, and the Secret is of great consequence, he will declare to his Council the Resolution he is to take, but entrust one with the executing of it.

IX. The Execution of any Design requires Activity and Dispatch, and the entrusting it in the hands of many, renders it slow, and exposed to Difficulties and Dangers; but consulting about it requires mature Deliberation and Reflection. Counsels are not much to be relied on, when the Result of a few, and much less so when confin'd to those who are to execute what has been determined.

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE, &c. 387

X. The Finances ought to be managed by one, or by very few ; and lest a perfect Equality serve as an Excuse and Pretence of Negligence, one ought to have the principal Authority. But neither he or his Assistants should have any Authority to command, without the Approbation of the Council, they must be limited to obey.

XI. All Affairs that relate to Peace or War, Trade or Commerce, ought to be governed in this manner : certain Persons should be appointed as Intendants, but the Council must have the decisive Power.

XII. Councils must not be made up of particular Persons, and confin'd to one Affair, the Finances for instance, or War ; in this case they would be expos'd to great Inconveniencies. 1. Many Men of eminent Abilities, who are capable of giving their Advice in them, would be excluded by this Limitation.

2. They would be compos'd of Men employ'd in the Management of the Finances, or who have command in the Army ; these would be reckon'd interested, and of consequence liable to Suspicion.

3. Their Conduct would not be subject to the Inspection of the best Judges, who have no other Interest at heart but that of the Publick.

4. Their Counsels would be entirely influenced and directed by one who having the greatest Power and chief Authority in their Executions, would soon become Master of their Deliberations, which depend on him in many respects for their good or bad Effects.

5. Thus in a short time one would have the sole Management, the rest being useles Spectators or weak Opposers, and perhaps from some Motives of Interest, give their Approbation, and become his Accomplices.

6. The Prince would consult this Man alone, as better instructed than all the rest, who takes upon him the whole Load and Fatigue of their Business; and as this would be the Situation of other Councils, they would all of them be either suppress'd, or quite superfluous; and a few having acquired this immoderate Power, would govern the whole State, and even the Prince, (x) who would know nothing but as they pleased to inform him.

XIII. I know only one way of preventing this Tyranny, which reduces the Prince to a kind of Servitude; that is, to have the Counsel general, that those who manage the Finances give their Sentiments about what relates to War or Peace: that those who are employed in foreign Affairs be consulted about the internal State of the Kingdom, and that those who give their Opinions about Trade and Commerce, be also consulted about the Finances. By this all Affairs are examined by Men free from all Suspicion. All the Ministers have a mutual Inspection over one another: their Views and Knowledge of publick Affairs is render'd more extensive, and they become equally capable of managing every thing that relates to the Service of the Prince, because they are obliged to inform themselves of all these Matters, that their Advices may be wise and judicious.

XIV. The Prince however must take care, that this Council may not altogether consist of Men who have particular Places of Trust: for the Bent to Power is so strong, that Men to obtain it in one part of the Government, easily consent that others assume it in another. A Minister who wants to be independent, allows another to be so too. The Minister who has the Management of the Finances, delivers himself from the troublesome

(x) See Chap. XVII. of the First Part, towards the End

some Inspection of one who manages foreign Affairs, by allowing him to govern without Jealousy. Thus the Council becomes a Cabal, where every thing is approv'd, however pernicious to the State; and where the greatest Interest pursued is only that of a few private Men, who have shared among themselves the Government of the Kingdom, and who without any mutual Love or Esteem, assist one another to preserve that Power they have usurp'd.

XV. To prevent this Combination, or to dissolve it, the Prince must admit to his Council some Men of great Integrity, who having no share in the Execution of what is debated there, may have no other Employment but to give their Opinion, and examine into the Conduct of all.

XVI. (y) If a Prince could find two or three Men of such great Abilities and Integrity, as to be qualified for the highest Dignities, but who don't chuse to accept of any, the admitting these to his Council would make Fidelity and Sincerity flourish there, and prevent the corrupt Designs of his Ministers.

XVII. But without this Precaution, private Interest must prevail, and if the Prince is the Occasion of this, by shewing a Disgust of his Council, and consulting in every Affair one who has the principal Management of it, under a Pretext of greater Conveniency or quicker Dispatch: he must expect to see nothing but what every Minister pleases, and to preserve no more than the Shadow of his Authority, when he abandons to him the Substance and Reality.

XVIII. He will imagine he governs with absolute sway, because he gives Orders that command Obedience; but his Orders are prescrib'd him by

C c 3

his

(y) See what is said in Chap. XVII. of the First Part.

390 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

his Ministers, whose will he blindly follows, they are absolute and independent, and he their Slave.

XIX. I make bold to intreat Princes to hear on this head one who imagin'd he govern'd with absolute Power, when Master of the Empire, but who afterwards voluntarily resigning, and being then more able to see in what Servitude his Ministers had kept him, confess'd that nothing was more difficult than to avoid their Artifices, nothing more hard than for a Prince to govern with Equity. “ (z) I remember often of having heard “ my Father say, (these are the Words of the “ Historian) that when *Diocletian* became a private Man, he look'd upon the Duties of an “ Emperor as the most difficult and hard of any “ to perform. Four or five Men united and combined to deceive him, easily succeed in this. “ They never shew Affairs but in that light “ which may make him approve them, and conceal every thing which may contribute to give “ him a true and exact Knowledge of them. “ He is kept shut up at home, and inform'd of “ nothing but what they are pleas'd to tell him. “ Thus he confers the Magistracy upon Men “ quite unfit and unworthy, and removes from “ the Management of the State those of the greatest Merit. And in fine, a Prince in other respects well disposed, who might have been an “ excellent Emperor if his Ministers had been “ faithful

(z) Ego à patre meo audivi, Diocletianum principem, jam privatum, dixisse; nihil esse difficilius quàm benè imperare. Colligunt se quatuor vel quinque, atque unum consilium ad decipiendum Imperatorem capiunt; dicunt quid probandum sit: Imperator, qui domi clausus est, vera non novit. Cogitur hoc tantùm scire, quod illi loquuntur. Facit iudices, quos fieri non oportet: amovet a republicâ, quos debeat obtinere. Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipse dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur Imperator. Hæc Diocletiani verba sunt, quæ idcirco inserui, ut prudentia tua sciret, nihil esse difficilius bono principè. *Vopisc. in vit. Aureliani Imper. 282.*

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE. 391

“ faithful and upright, is corrupted by them in
“ spite of his Vigilance, Caution and Suspicion.
“ This, says the Historian, is what an Emperor
“ deplor’d, who had known the Snares which en-
“ viron a Throne, after he had descended from
“ it; and from this we may judge that nothing is
“ more rare than a Prince of true Wisdom, nor
“ nothing more difficult than to govern well.”





CHAPTER X.

A wise Prince has no Favourite ; grants nothing upon Sollicitations ; punishes severely those who puts them to Sale ; gives Women no share in the Government.

ARTICLE I.

A wise Prince has no Favourite.

I. **W**HAT I understand by a Favourite, is one who without any Merit has acquired a great Power and Influence over the Mind of the Prince ; who pleases him, but is of no real use to him : who has observed his Weaknesses, that he may have the Government of him : who depends in appearance upon the Prince's Will, that he may insinuate into him, with greater Ease, his own : who studies his Passions to gratify them, and by them to govern ; who endeavours to destroy and prevent the Growth of great and noble Sentiments in his Mind, that his Influence may be the more sure and lasting : who gives him a Taste for Pleasures and Amusements, that he may have the whole Authority and sole Management of Affairs : who allows none Access to the Prince but those who are devoted to his Interest, and who are, as it were, his Spies and Watches ; who dreads

dreads Merit, and bears it mortal Enmity; who sacrifices to his private Interest that of the Publick, who confines to himself, and those attach'd to his Fortune, all the Fruits and Advantages of his Favour with the Prince, who looks on nothing as great but external Show, Independance and Riches, and in a word who is only capable of inspiring the Prince with a Love of Tyranny, Pride, Profusion, Expence, Pleasures and Errors.

II. Such a Favourite as I have describ'd, owes his Rise to Flattery, and endeavours to maintain himself in it by the same Methods. His Character in every respect is opposite to that of a faithful and sincere Friend, worthy of the Confidence of the Prince. He unjustly occupies his Place, and when in appearance he affects to resemble him, his Sentiments and Heart are quite different. There is nothing a Prince has more to dread, than one of this false and dangerous Character, and he ought to bear him all that Hatred and Aversion due to Flattery.

III. I have endeavour'd, in another place, (a) to describe Flatterers. Their most remarkable Character, and which is in common to them all, is that they love none but themselves, and would sacrifice both Prince and State to their private Interest. But Artifice and Cunning may resemble Zeal and Affection so nearly, that it is hard not to be deceived and imposed upon. A Courtier who is naturally of an aspiring Temper, and which Ambition improves and heightens, studies with (b) so

(a) See the Character of a Flatterer, in Chap. XI. of the First Part: and the Character of a sincere Friend, in Chap. XIV. of the same Part.

(b) Tiberium variis artibus devinxit adeo (Sejanus,) ut obscurum adversum alios, sibi uni incautum intellectumque efficeret. Tacit. L. 4. Annal. p. 166.

394 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

so great care every thing that can touch or affect the Prince, that he discovers, in spite of his Attention to conceal his Sentiments, that they give him pleasure. He makes an artful Improvement of his first Insinuations; he appears reserved, modest, full of Respect, without any Views, ready to obey the Prince's Pleasure, and to interest himself in nothing, if this be more agreeable: zealous for the Interest of the Prince, and with regard to his own quite indifferent; he shews Capacity and Abilities, but at the same time clouds and obscures them. (c) When he displays any Signs of Courage or Greatness of Mind, it is in surprize, and he appears concern'd and vex'd for allowing it to be observ'd that he has any Merit. He sets himself to destroy all who can give him any Jealousy, and takes all Opportunities of lessening their Credit or Interest with the Prince, he speaks no good but of those who are in secret Intelligence with him, and affects a Silence with regard to those whose Connections with him are well known, he applies himself with the greatest care to discover, if the Prince distrusts him, and conceals from him with the utmost Caution his End and Aim to seduce and corrupt his Mind, and to lull him asleep by base and mean Flattery.

IV. When he has overcome and surmounted the natural Repugnance that a Prince has to deliver himself up to the Government of any, he employs more outrageous Flattery to persuade him that he could honour none with his Confidence that have more Respect and Confidence than he. He consults the Prince in every thing, he gives him an account of the smallest Matters, and appears wary and moderate in the Exercise of that Power he has bestow'd

(c) Animus audax, sui obtegens, in alios criminator: justa adulatio & superbia *Ibid.*

bestow'd on him. Thus he cures and prevents all Suspicions and Jealousies about his Management; he gains every Day after this somewhat more Influence and increase of Power; he takes upon him with greater Freedom than at first to ease the Prince of the Trouble of Business. At last he advises him to enjoy Repose and Pleasures: these he provides for him according to his Taste, at first innocent; but at last shameful and criminal; he inspires him with a Disgust and Hatred of a numerous Court, where his Conduct is too much expos'd to view; he gives him a Fondness for Solitude, where he may be at full Liberty, and more his own Master; and in fine, he gains so powerful an influence over the Prince, that he leaves him only the Title of King, while he is in Possession of all the Power.

V. What I have been describing is not so uniform but that it may admit of great Variety. All Princes and Favourites have not in every respect the same Character: But when once a Prince has given himself up to the Management of a Favourite, he may be carried as far as the Ambition of the Favourite pleases; and his want of Spirit or his Moderation or dread of the Consequences may engage him to set Bounds to his Ambition; but his immoderate Desires will meet with no Check or Controul from the Prince.

VI. There are some Favourites who love Pomp and Splendor, who want all the World to know by their haughty Manner that they have the absolute Power of the Prince. (d) A Prince who has any Degree of Discernment, need only open his Eyes to be disgusted with this insolent Favourite; yet he is seldom delivered from his imperious Rule, without submitting to another who was irritated at the Favour of the First; thus

(d) *History is full of like Examples.*

396 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

thus he rather changes his Master than gets free of Servitude.

VII. There are other Favourites more wise and cunning (*e*), who are indifferent about a Shew of Power ; they allow the Prince with Pleasure to enjoy all the Badges of Royalty, to give Orders and do every thing, provided it be with their Direction and Advice.

VIII. 'Tis more difficult to persuade the Prince to remove these Favourites ; he does not feel his Dependance, they have gain'd his Heart by first seducing it, and thro' an Appearance of Modesty have likewise obtain'd the Government of his Mind. Mean time none are imposed upon and deceived but the Prince ; and all know to whom they must pay their court, in order to obtain any Favours or Preferment. All know which of the Masters is most to be dreaded, which of them ought to be attended with the greatest Assiduity and slavish Dependance.

IX. Sometimes such a Favourite is a Domestick, an inferior Servant of the Prince's Palace, a Man of no Birth, without any Merit, but of a cunning and insinuating Temper, who knows all the Passions and favourite Inclinations of the Prince, and knows how to make himself necessary ; he understands and has a Taste for a great many trifling Amusements. He insensibly passes from the Confidence of a Domestick, to a Familiarity with the Prince, and from this to Favour ; then he assumes a great Ascendance over his Master, who is not on his Guard ; and who thinks that the Authority he allows a Servant to have is of no consequence, because he will be always able to

(*e*) *Sublatis inanibus, vora potentia augere. Tacit. L. 4. Annal. p. 124.*

Scilicet externæ suberbix sueto, non erat notitia nostri apud quos jus imperii valet, transmittuntur. Tacit. p. L. 15. Annal. 273.

to degrade him and lessen his Power when he pleases.

X. If any Person of high Birth or eminent Rank should take the same Liberties with his Servant, the Prince would immediately see all the Consequences of such Freedom and Familiarity, redouble his Attention, and assume more State and Majesty that he might put a Stop to the Increase of his Power; but this Domestick, as he thinks, is only what he pleases in a Moment, he can humble him and bring him to that low Station from which he rais'd him. He considers the Power that he allows him to assume as his own Work, and a Favour which he has always in his Power to recal.

XI. He does not know the influence of the Heart, and how weak and feeble all Reflections of the Mind are, when once Liberty and Independance are lost. He is ignorant of the Advantage that a cunning Domestick takes from the Fondness and Favour of his Master; in fine, he is a Stranger to the Knowledge of that propensity natural to all Men, but especially the great, to justify their Choice and Inclination, and to preserve to one that Degree of Favour conferr'd upon him, purely for this Reason, that others are offended with this Preference, and reckon he did not merit it of the Prince.

XII. (f) 'Tis thus that so many Princes jealous of their Authority, and of the Power of the Nobles have allow'd themselves to be govern'd by their Servants, either actually in a State of Slavery, or who lately obtain'd their Liberty;

they

(f) *Flerique principes, cum essent civium domini, libertorum erant servi: horum consiliis, horum nutu regebantur: per hos audiebant, per hos loquebantur; per hos præturae etiam, & sacerdotia, & consulatus, imò & ab his perebantur. - - - Scis præcipuum esse indicium non magnis principis magnos libertos. Paneg. Traj. p. 218.*

398 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

they granted and refused Favours, as those Men of obscure Birth, but nobilitated by their Favour, advised them. All the Great paid their court to these Favourites born in Servitude, and imitated the slavish Submission of the Prince who had resigned all his Authority and Majesty to the lowest and most worthless Servants of his Palace.

XIII. These Princes did not want Ambition, and much less Pride and Haughtiness, they even affected more than others Domination and Empire, yet they were entirely govern'd by those Servants whom they rais'd to that high Degree of Power by their Favour.

XIV. A wise Prince ought to make an useful Improvement of their Conduct, and to imagine he will not always continue the Master of those he advances to Power, when he follows the Bent of Inclination, and does not consider their Merit. Let him distrust the smallest Beginnings, if he is prudent, and not suffer himself to be gain'd by superficial Qualities; let him always show a Hatred of all kinds of Flattery; and not allow any Thing to influence him but Truth and Justice; let him not communicate to any a Share of his Authority, but with great Prudence and after a long Trial: And let him preserve his Mind free and independent, that he may always continue the Master of others.

XV. Let him rigourously and strictly examine if no Change or Alteration has happen'd in his Conduct, and if he has faithfully observed his former Resolutions of governing single and independent: Let him not suffer his Mind to be seduced, by preserving it pure and free from those Passions which give Access and Admission to Fa-

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 399

your: (g) Let him be upon his Guard, and chiefly against Luxury, Delicacy and Pleasures, because this Turn of Mind gives one of a Taste skill'd in those Things, Opportunity to make himself agreeable, and of consequence necessary; let him by a sober, grave Conduct banish his Court all those who can't arrive to Favour but by contributing to the Pleasures of the Prince; and let him be afraid of being delivered by Divine Justice (h) into the Hands of a Favourite, that is, the most corrupt of all Flatterers, if he does not preserve a Love for Truth, and show a particular Regard to those who are capable of telling it to him.

ARTICLE II.

A wise Prince never grants any Thing upon Solicitation.

I. He must not upon any Occasion be influenced by Motives purely humane; nor grant upon Solicitation what he ought to refuse according to the Rules of Justice. He must always be able to give an Account of his Conduct, and this Reason must not be any foreign Consideration. His Will must be directed by Knowledge and Truth, and not directed by the Will of another. He must be determined by proper Motives, and not by Recommendations which only inform him of what

(g) Ut alios industria ita, (Petronium) ignavia ad famam protulerat: habebaturque, non ganeo & profligator, erudito luxu. - - - inter paucos familiarium Neroni assumptus est, elegantiae arbiter, dum nihil æmulum putet, nisi quod ei Petronius approbavisset. Unde invidia Tigellini (another Favourite of Nero's) quasi adversus æmulum, & scientiâ voluptatē potiozem. Tacit. L. 16. Annal. p. 297.

(h) The Power of Sejanus, Favourite of Tiberius, was rather a Divine Punishment, than the Effect of his Cunning. Non tam solertiâ, quam Deum ira in rem Romanum. Tacit. L. 4. Annal. p. 106.

what others desire, and not of his Duty. He must judge and chuse for himself, and not allow others whose Interest it is to conceal Merit, to make Choice for him.

II. If a Prince is not firm and steady in this Point, and if he is not Proof against all Sollicitations of whatever Nature, he will as often forsake the Path of Justice, as the Passions of Men force and oblige him. He will see indeed what is best, but abandon it thro' Weakness. He will have upright Intentions, and nevertheless out of a soft Complaisance yield to the ambitious Views of those who attack him.

III. He will avoid raising one Man to great Favour; but in the Issue he will grant almost every Thing to an unjust Request. He will do for many what he would reckon shameful and base to do for one, and without having a Favourite he will be as dependant upon the Will of another as if he had one.

IV. The least Deviations from the rigid and severe Rules he ought to prescribe himself will be of dangerous Consequence. Men will know in what Instances he has been overcome, and hope to have in other Cases the same Success; they would urge his own Conduct against his Firmness; and Refusals, after Favours 'granted to others upon Sollicitation, will become upon this Account the more odious.

V. A Prince ought to be more upon his Guard in this Point than others, for he may easily be influenced, by certain natural Inclinations, a Desire of using his Liberty, and showing the World that he is Master, and Fondness of pleasing, and removing every Thing that may cause Pain, to grant what he would refuse if he was more attentive to the Dictates of Conscience

and was more affected with Regard to the publick Good.

VI. Next, he should be on his Guard against the Nobles of his Court, and allow them no influence over him, when they only make Use of Entreaties; 'tis of Importance that they know Sollicitations only serve to hurt Merit, and are rather an Obstacle than Advantage. A few Examples would convince them of this, but a Prince must not afterwards awaken their Hopes or Passions by an opposite and contradictory Conduct.

VII. After the Nobles, all the Officers of the Palace, all the Domesticks, all who approach near the Prince, and who have Access to speak to him upon all Occasions, ought to be enjoind Silence with Regard to asking him Favours.

VIII. It may perhaps be thought proper that such Persons should have a freer access than others: But this ought to be allow'd only where they support a just Cause, and inform a Prince either of the Merit, the Necessities or the Sufferings of Persons worthy his Regard. They should be such only as are known to be Men of Probity and Disinterestedness. Without these Qualifications, they deserve not to be heard, or even to approach their Prince. The standing general Rule ought to be, to refuse every Thing they ask: even when they alledge any specious Reasons, not to allow them any Weight, till they have been examin'd both as to their Grounds and Equity (i); that it may be notorious, that

D d

100

(i) Libertos suos (*the Emperor Adrian*) nec sciri voluit in publico, nec aliquid apud se posse dicto suo, omnibus superioribus principibus vitia imputans libertorum, damnatis omnibus libertis suis, quicumque se de eo jactaverant. Cum servum suum inter duos Senatores è conspectu ambulare vidisset, misit qui ei colaphum daret; & diceret: noli inter eos ambulare,

402 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

nothing about the Prince carries any personal Credit; and that nothing can prevail but Truth and Justice.

IX. Without such a Barrier the Prince will be beset with continual Sollicitations. The Moment his Ear is open to any one, it is known; the Instant he takes any of his Attendants into Favour, the whole Court rings of it: And the only Way for the Prince to put a Stop to the forward Addresses of Courtiers, is to give them to know that he is inaccessible in any other Way, but that of Justice and Reason; that it will be in vain for them to try any indirect Methods, by gaining over to their Interests, by Promises or Presents, those who approach him; and that this will be the infallible Way of losing his Favour.

ARTICLE III.

A wise Prince severely punishes those who put to Sale their Interest, and receive Money for Sollicitations.

I. 'Tis chiefly against this sort of Corruption that the Zeal of the Prince ought to be inflamed; for no good can be expected if Sollicitations are bought, and Interest with the Prince put to Sale: Then neither Virtue nor Merit are advanc'd or promoted to Honour. No Regard is paid to Knowledge or Probity; the publick Good is look'd upon as a Chimæra; Money determines every Thing, and immediately infects all Conditions and Ranks of Men.

II. At first Men of great Rank who have Dignities and Honours, are asham'd of so scandalous

bulare, quorum esse adhuc potes servus. *Spart. in his Lives of Adrian, p. 132.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 403

a Traffick ; but they allow Persons who serve them to share in it, and promise their Interest to those who do them a Favour. 'Tis, say they, with a good Intention. A Girl of Good-nature shall be the better married for this, a faithful Servant whom one is not able to reward, shall be freed from Poverty.

III. In time, Avarice overcomes Modesty ; they share with their own Domesticks the Advantages and Profits of their Recommendation : and at last they appropriate this Trade wholly to themselves. From this they find a Resource for Gaming, Luxury, and Expences which exceed their lawful Revenues ; they don't even conceal from the Ministers of the Prince, that the Sollicitations they make them are attended with Gain : The Ministers hear these Kind of Informations without Surprize or Astonishment, and only advise them to keep the Secret. As many are concern'd in the same Commerce, the Secret degenerates into Suspensions, and these even reach the Prince's Ears : He is at first enraged, resolved to make a narrow Scrutiny and be at the bottom of it : But he has been inform'd so late, and so many in his Service have been concern'd that he judges all Noise about it useless, and satisfies him with disapproving of it. After this he tolerates it, and at last he wants those who approach him the nearest to confess how much they receive, and approves of it ; then his Favour is put to Sale, even with his own Consent.

IV. This involves the State in publick Calamities. Preferments are only acquired by satiating Avarice, and by Presents the most unworthy may obtain them ; the State is delivered up to these Vultures, as a Prey which they have bought, and who plunder from the Publick what their Ambition has cost them.

V. The most Modest and Virtuous, who at first deserted their Example, immediately follow it, no other Way but that of Corruption being open. Thus the Kingdom is filled with Men of insatiable Avidity, who are quite Strangers to Generosity and Goodness. No Service is gratuitous. Nothing succeeds but a selfish Activity; not only the publick Good is despis'd, but even in private Families all Sentiments of Humanity are extinguished, and even Compassion must be bought.

VI. This Description, as frightful and hideous as it may appear, does not exaggerate Matters. Kingdoms have felt all the Miseries I have represented, and precisely in the Degree and Order I have pointed out.

VII. If a Prince is afraid of running into such Excesses, he must oppose them in the Beginning; for nothing spreads quicker and becomes more universal, than Corruption introduc'd by Avarice. A Prince can't be too happy in having none in his Service but Men of a disinterested Spirit; but it requires Vigilance to discover those who are not possessed of this Virtue and Firmness of Mind to punish them. As I have already observed he ought to hold suspected every Solicitation, and show the highest Displeasure against it; and every Solicitation that has been bought, he ought to look upon as an unpardonable Crime, both in the Corrupter and Corrupted.

VIII. The least Punishment ought to be the Restitution of the Money receiv'd, which ought not be restor'd to the Persons guilty of giving it, but given it to the Poor; it were but reasonable that on both Sides the Punishment were double, and that the Solicitation purchas'd by Money should cost the Accomplices the double of what it was sold at: But such Punishments are small

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 405

in Comparifon of the Crime; and there is no effectual Remedy but the difgracing thofe who dar'd even to fell the Prince, by felling that Power and Intereft they have with him, and depriving them of their Employment, without any hopes of a Return.

IX. Thefe Punifhments were lefs rigorous than thofe we read of in the Hiftory of fome of the *Roman* Emperors, who had feen all the Confequences of fuch Diforder. When Men boasted (*k*) of their Credit with the Prince, and promifed to obtain fome Favour of him, this fufficed to their Condemnation. It was a capital Crime to receive any Money for Sollicitations. (*l*) It coft one his Life who imagined himfelf in favour, and had received of an Officer of the Army an hundred Crowns to recommend him. His Body was expofed to view on the Road that led from the Prince's Palace to one of his Houfes of Pleafure fituated in the Suburbs of *Rome*, that all the World might be intimidated by this terrible Leffon: and (*m*) another who had abufed the Confidence of the Prince, by taking Money of thofe he had recommended as Men of Merit, was condemned to be ftifled by Smoke, a Herald crying with a loud Voice, *Thus he ought to perifh, who in felling his Master's Credit fold only Smoke.*

X. This unworthy Recommendation was juftly named: for there is nothing more frivolous nor

D d 3

more

(*k*) *Damnatis omnibus libertis fuis, quicunque ſe de eo jactaverant. In vit. Imp. Adriani.*

(*l*) Qui de eo (*c'eſt l'Empereur Alexandre Severe*) fumum vendiderat, & a quodam militari centum aureos acceperat, in crucem tolli juſſit, per eam viam, quâ eſſet ſervis ſuis ad ſuburbana imperatoria iter frequentiffimum. *Lamp. in ejus vit. p. 212.*

(*m*) Fumo appoſito, quem ex ſtipulis atque humidis lignis fieri juſſerat, necavit. *Præcone dicente: fumo punitur, qui vendidit fumum. Ibid. p. 275.*

406 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

more impertinent than a false Recommendation bought by Avarice, the Design of which is to impose upon the Wisdom and Equity of the Prince, from whom, like Smoke, it conceals the Knowledge of what he ought to be acquainted with.

XI. But this Smoke will spread an eternal Darkness over the Prince and his Ministers, if Avarice is not severely banished, if (*n*) the Hands of all are not pure, if the Testimonies given of Persons are not founded on Truth; if Employments are granted to any but Men of worth, and if Virtue ever wants the Support and Protection of Riches.

ARTICLE IV.

A wise Prince gives Women no share in the Government.

I. A Government so pure and disinterested, will not allow Women to have any Management in it. When they have any Power, then Passion and Interest govern; therefore a wise Prince will not allow them to share his Authority.

II. But before I proceed further, I must explain what I mean by a Government in which Women have a share of the Management: it is not that where a Queen, who has the same Views with the King, and who has as high a Regard to Justice and the publick Good, is consulted upon the Affairs of the State; nor even when a Lady,

full

(*n*) Amici ejus (*d' Antonin le Pieux*) nunquam de eo per forum aliquid vendiderint. *Jul. Capit. in ej. vit. p. 140.*

Nec dedit alicui, (*P' Empereur Alexandre Severe*) facultatem fumorum vendendorum de se. *In ej. vit. p. 223.*

Amicos sanctos & venerabiles habuit, continentes, religiosos, amantes principis sui, & qui de illo nec ipsi riderent, nec risui esse vellent, qui nihil venderent, nihil mentirentur, nihil fingerent, nunquam deciperent existimationem principis sui, sed amarent. *Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. Sever. p. 223.*

full of Wisdom and Virtue, whom the Queen honours with her Confidence, has a share in the secret Deliberations of the Prince. When he stops here, and allows no other Woman to have a Concern in publick Affairs, the Danger is either not great, or the Remedy is easy.

III. But if he suffers cunning intriguing Women, full of Projects, to advance their own and Family's Interest, to fill his Court, this is what I understand by a Government where Women have a good deal of share. And the Prince will take it in good part that I warn him, it will be impossible in this Case to prevent Favour, Partiality, and Interest, from reigning in his Court.

IV. Women, for the most part, are not very capable of discerning true and solid Merit, and are little affected with it ; but they are touch'd with outward Appearances, and every thing that surprizes and dazles them. Complaisant and polish'd Manners gain their Favour, and they are easily overcome by excessive Flatteries and Respects. As they think of nothing but pleasing, they attend to nothing but what pleases ; and as they always shew a Fondness for Compliment and Praises, it is not hard for Men who know this Turn of their Mind, to appear worthy their esteem, by testifying a good deal for them.

V. They have, besides these Faults, that of never continuing in the wise Mean, but carry their Sentiments, whether favourable or disadvantageous, too far ; they manage all their Designs with a Degree of Activity and Forwardness, which converts all into Passion ; and they can't bear, but with the greatest Pain, any Delay or Reflection.

VI. As they quickly follow what strikes them, they are often as suddenly disgusted with their Resolutions. They are govern'd by the first Impression,

408 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE.*

pression, which again gives way to another: thus they are successively push'd on by contrary Motions, which agitate them with new Designs and Projects, and makes their Conduct so unsteady and unconstant.

VII. Their Ambition and Jealousy make them Enemies to one another, tho' a common Interest seem'd to unite them; they labour to destroy one another by a thousand Artifices; and to arrive at a new Degree of Favour and Credit, few Methods appear wicked or unjust.

VIII. The Desire of Revenge is so strong in them, that they employ every way of satiating it. To this they sacrifice the State, the publick Good, the most sacred Duties, and nothing but Impotence can stop its Fury.

IX. 'Tis the same with Love; every thing appears allow'd and lawful to this Passion. Tho' the Government be overturn'd, a civil War kindled; all is of small Consequence, if this Passion is gratified.

X. Interest and Avarice have also a great sway over Women, and one may observe the Venality of Favours and Sollicitations always begins with them, and that every thing is to be bought when they have the liberty of putting every thing to Sale.

XI. They love Expence and Profusion, and give themselves little trouble how they acquire the Means of gratifying this Humour. Their Delicacy, if they have any, is soon surmounted by the Desire of having and spending; they are not scrupulous how they have obtain'd Affluence, and are only solicitous about the Continuance.

XII. (o) As they are timorous in Danger, and not capable of bold and daring Counsels, they are also imprudent in the time of Peace, and think of nothing but Joy and Pleasure.

XIII. The Court where they bear any sway, from being serious degenerates into Amusement, Pleasures, and trifling Entertainments. Luxury, Flattery, Game, Love, and all the Consequences of these Passions, reign there. The City immediately imitates the Court, and the Province soon follows these pernicious Examples. Thus the whole Nation, formerly full of Courage, becomes soft and effeminate, and the Love of Money comes in place of the Love of Virtue.

XIV. 'Tis therefore necessary, in order to banish all Favour, Venality, Interest and Passion, to grant Women no share in the Government. They will be modest and reasonable when govern'd, but will fill the Court with Corruption, if they are allow'd to govern.

(o) *Inesse mulierem comitatu, quæ pacem luxu, bellum formidine morentur. . . non imbecillem tantum, & imparem laboribus sexum, sed, si licentia adsit, sævum, ambitiosum, potestatis cupidum. Tacit. l. 31 Annal. p. 87.*

The same Character cannot be given of all, that the Historian bestows on Agrippina, Germanicus's Widow, that she was only ambitious, without any other female Frailties. Agrippina æqui impatiens, dominandi avida, virilibus curis, sceminarum vitiis exuerat. Tacit. l. 6. Annal. p. 154. Pleasure and Ambition are found united in most of them.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.



CHAPTER XI.

A prudent and skillful Prince has no Prime Minister. The Life of a Prince is serious, loaded with Labours and Care.

ARTICLE I.

A prudent and skillful Prince has no Prime Minister.

IT can scarce be expected all the Ministers of a Prince should have the same Merit, the same extensive Genius, the same Capacity for Business, the same Degree of Virtue, and be animated with the same Zeal ; it is not therefore reasonable the Prince should put equal Trust and Confidence in them all, but should regulate his Confidence by the Inequality of their Talents.

II. But there is a great Difference betwixt a very great Confidence in one who merits it, and an unlimited Confidence in a Prime Minister. 'Tis the Duty of a discerning Prince to distinguish Merit, but a Prince of this Character will not allow himself to be entirely governed by any one. He continues the full Master, Judge, and Arbitrer of all. He alone gives Motion to the State, from him proceed all Orders, and to him they must give

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 411

give an Account how they are executed. The only Difference the Prince makes betwixt a Minister of great and one of less Abilities, is, that he employs the one in Affairs of great Importance, and the other in Matters of smaller Moment: but the Prince directs them both, and points out their different Occupations and Employments.

III. This Authority which presides over all, and oversees all, is the essential Character of a Sovereign. This he can't transfer to a Prime Minister, without degrading himself, and putting the Subject in his place. He ought to understand that he yields him his Throne, the moment he abandons the supreme Intendance over all his Ministers, and all his Affairs: for the Throne is not a vain Image of Power and Grandeur, 'tis the same as Independance and sovereign Authority; and it is really to descend from the Throne, to give themselves up to the Government of a Prime Minister, and allow him to dispose of every thing, to keep his Colleagues in Subjection, to make them give Account of their Conduct to him, while he is accountable to none; to give the Management of the Finances to whom he pleases, to have the sole Disposal of Posts and Rewards, and to be the chief Arbiter of War and Peace.

IV. What remains to a Prince thus spoil'd, but the vain Phantom of Royalty? How can he, if he has any Spirit, see with Calmness of Mind, another reigning in his stead? If he was worthy his high Station, would he suffer another to reign in his Throne? Why does he declare his Weakness to the World? Why does he deliver himself and Kingdom to be governed by one born to obey him? Cannot he call for Assistance, without abandoning the Management of every thing? Has Providence given him as a Show to the People,
and

412 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE.*

and may he indulge himself in Indolence and Ease? In what can he employ his Mind and Time, when all Affairs of importance are determin'd without him? What Talents or Parts has he, if he amuses himself in secret with things that should be the Employment of a Mechanick, or one of a curious Taste?

V. What would he have his Subjects and Foreigners think of him, when they see his Authority necessary in nothing; that all is done when they have obtain'd the Consent of his Minister, and who know that all is determined before the Minister gives him an Account? Does not he blush, when the Minister comes to converse with him for Form's sake, about what has been agreed to without him? Does he know any thing but what the Minister pleases to tell him, as proper to bring him to his Sentiments?

VI. Mean time, what Assurance has the Prince that the Views of his Minister are upright and honest? And if they are not, is not he answerable, tho' he is ignorant of them? What Blindness is it to share in the Villanies of others? Why does he abandon his People, that are his Children, to a Man perhaps cruel, and of insatiable Avarice, and who certainly is not their Father? Why does he authorize Oppression, the greater perhaps as they know very well it will be unknown to him?

VII. But if he is indifferent to all this, why does he allow one Man to have all the Reputation, Glory and Honour of Success, while his Crimes are imputed to him? Why does he suffer one to have the sole Praise for Favours conferr'd, while he is loaded with the Odium of the Refusal? Why does not this affect and touch him, that the Minister employs all Arts and Methods to attach his Subjects to his own Interest, and disengage them from their Loyalty?

VIII.

VIII. Does not he know what happened in *France* to the last Kings of the first and second Race, for having suffered Ministers to usurp their Authority? Two succeeding Prime Ministers have it in their power to bring about great Changes in a Kingdom; and when a Prince has no mind to fear these dangerous Consequences, why is he so imprudent to make them so powerful?

IX. But tho' they should not carry their Ambition so far as to usurp the Throne, it is impossible but their immoderate Power must create great Disorder in a State, by the Factions and Parties which Jealousy and Discontent excite, and which the Weakness of the Prince, as well as the excessive Authority of the Minister occasion.

X. Obedience to the King is not reckon'd hard, but to a Subject insupportable. Men acknowledge the Master, but not the Servant; they incline to submit to sovereign Authority, but not fervilely to cringe to one who ought to obey as well as others. (*p*) They submit however if they are constrain'd by force, but with a secret Indignation, and they seek out all Ways to pull down a Power that gives them such Disgust.

XI. Under a weak and credulous Prince, many Attempts of this nature are made, which commonly prove unsuccessful, but which as often involve the Nation in Confusion, and under a Prince who will hear no Complaints against the Minister who governs, the Hatred against the Minister sometimes fixes on the Master; and 'tis surprizing to see, almost among all Ranks, a Disposition to Discontent, not far from a Revolt. This Evil, of all others, is the greatest; and a Prince, who
has

(*p*) *Potentiam apud unum, odium apud omnes adeptus. Tacit. l. 1. Annal. p. 37.*

414 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

has any Love to his People, ought not to hazard so criminal an Attack.

XII. He ought likewise to fear lest Fondness in the Minister to preserve his Power, and make himself necessary, influence him to make War, or continue it without any lawful Reason. For it is more easy for him to preserve his Power when the Army depends upon him, and the State has occasion for his Services, than when Peace exposes it to intestine Commotions. Thus will Prime Ministers, who understand their Interests well, continue and keep up the Army, and take great care to find out Pretexts for this, which they varnish over with a Regard to the publick Good. The Prince is answerable for all the unjust Wars of which the Ambition of his Minister is the sole Source; and he exposes himself, as well as his Kingdom, to all the dangerous Consequences which attend Wars rashly gone into.

XIII. In thus abandoning himself, without bounds or reserve, to the Management of his Minister, he banishes from the Hearts of his Subjects all Love and Regard to the publick Good; then private Interest is only pursued, because the Minister regards none but those who are attach'd to him; for, from acting in one common Interest, Men strive to form themselves into Parties. They know that (q) the speedy Way to obtain Favours is tamely to submit to the Will of the Minister, that what is asked by Bodies of Men, and upon publick Motives, meets with infinite Slowness. Thus whatever regards the common Good is neglected, a Disunion of Interest follows, as if the Subjects stood in no Relation to one another.

XIV.

(q) *Tarda sunt quæ in commune exposculantur : privatam gratiam statim mereare, statim accipiat. Tacit. l. 1. Annal. p. 19.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 415

XIV. From this proceeds another Evil, the Oppression of all Men capable of conducting the State, or worthy of the Prince's Confidence: A Prime Minister, who has begun with depriving his Master of his Power, leaves none in Authority who don't bend the Knee to him. All Liberty and Generosity are odious to him, (r) and the more unjust his Hatred of all Men of Merit is, who don't submit to his Insolence and Pride, the more implacable is it, and 'tis even a new Ground of Hatred (s) to have us'd one ill without any just Reason.

XV. But the greatest of all Evils, is, that the Prince is look'd upon as a Rival, and they endeavour to rob him of his Power and Authority. (t) He indeed, in appearance, has the disposal of certain Posts; but there is a secret Condition required by the Minister, which is a blind Submission to his Will. Thus the Reward of Fidelity becomes the Price of Treason, and the Prince bestows no Favours which are not merited by Crimes and Perfidy.

XVI. It is in vain to answer, that a skillful Prince will make a better Choice of his Prime Minister, that he will get Information of his Conduct, or only give him a limited Power.

XVII. Nothing but Trial discovers the Bottom of the Heart, and makes Mens real Characters known: but Trial, with regard to a Prime Minister, can be of no use, because the less faithful he
is,

(r) *Odiorum causæ acriores, quia iniquæ. Tacit. l. 1. Annal. p. 21.*

(s) *Proprium humani ingenii est, odisse quem læseris. Idem in vit. Agricol. p. 466.*

(t) *Ad consulatum, (c'est il faut dire la même chose de tous les emplois) non nisi per Sejanum aditus: neque Sejani voluntas, nisi scelere quærebatur. Tacit. l. 4. Annal. p. 134.*

416 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

is, the more Precautions he will take to maintain his Power.

XVIII. None will dare speak against him to the Prince whom he governs : and if any are so bold, they will soon be involved in Ruin, and serve only as an Example to intimidate others.

XIX. It would have been reasonable in the Prince to have limited his Power before he employ'd him as his Minister ; but since he has pleas'd to make every thing depend upon him, how will he be able to reduce to just bounds a Power become superiour to his own ? And how shall he deliver others from a Yoke he first submitted to ?

XX. The only Precaution a Prince can employ, is to make all his Ministers equally dependent upon himself, and not to confound two things which appear alike, entire Confidence and complete Authority. A Man of worth may deserve perfect Confidence ; but he can never deserve of the Prince a renouncing and abandoning to him his own Authority and Power : And if a Prince is so weak, he ought not only not to take advantage of him, but employ his utmost Endeavours to hinder his Prince from thus degrading himself ; if he does otherwise, he fails in the most essential Part of his Duty.

XXI. It will be to no purpose to object the Example of the famous *Joseph*, (v) whom the King of *Egypt* exalted above all his Ministers. The Life of this great Man is all over mysterious, and can't serve as a Rule for common Conduct. He was inspired of God, who revealed to him what would happen in *Egypt*. His Prudence more than human, gave him a Superiority over other Men ; and his Fidelity had been put to divers Trials, which left no room for Suspicion. A
Prince

(v) *Genes. c. xli. v. 44.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 417

Prince who shall find himself in the same Situation with *Pharaoh*, and to whom Providence shall present a Man as wonderful as *Joseph*, will judge very wisely in preferring him to all his Ministers; but the Prince will also reflect upon what *Pharaoh* said to *Joseph*: (x) "According to thy Word shall all my People be ruled, only in the Throne will I be greater than thou." Which signified that he would always preserve to himself the immediate Inspection of all his Kingdom, and continue Master of all.

ARTICLE II.

The Life of a Prince is serious, requires Care and Labour.

I. It is not by Words that a Prince preserves his principal Authority, (y) 'tis by a Life of Action, Labour, and serious Application to Business. 'Tis by remembering his Time belongs to the Publick, and avoiding to consume it in Game, Amusements, trifling Conversation, or Employments unworthy of a Prince; 'tis by passing from Care to Care, solacing himself after one Affair by attending to another, never continuing absolutely idle, and knowing what Proportion of his time Exercises necessary to Health require.

II. (z) A Prince born to command is also born to Labour both of Body and Mind. It is his Duty

E e

ty

(x) *Genes. c. xli. v. 40.*

(y) Tiberius, nihil intermissâ rerum curâ, negotia pro solatiis accipiens, jus civium, preces sociorum, tractabat. *Tacit. l. 4. Annal. p. 111.*

(z) Qui laborem & molestiam perferre vult, ne quid subditis molestum sit, qui pro illis periclitatur, ut in pace & securitate degant, hic Rex est. *Synes. de Reg. p. 6.*

418 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

ty to watch, and even to suffer, to preserve the Security and Safety of those whom God has entrusted to his Care. He is in the State (*a*) what a Pilot is in a Ship, who keeps close by the Helm, wakes while others are asleep, and who suffers the Hardships of Cold and Winds, that those who trust in his Application and Activity may not suffer any Danger.

III. He is in the State what a General is in the Army he commands, who must give all Orders, visit all Posts, prevent all Dangers, and pass Nights and Days in Disquietude, that he may deliver others from it, and put them in Safety.

IV. He is with regard to the State what the Soul is with respect to the Body. He must inspire others with Activity and Ardour, animate them by his Example, make them indefatigable by his Patience in Labours and Fatigue, and comfort them by his Attention to their Interests.

V. Without this Vigilance every thing carries the Marks of the Prince's Weakness and Languor: his Indolence either lulls his Ministers asleep, or awakes their Ambition. They accustom themselves to do only what they please. Their chief Care is to indulge Pleasures, they give no Application to Business but out of selfish Motives. If any among them has more Spirit and Understanding than the rest, he soon takes possession of that Station which the Prince has thro' Softness forsaken.

VI.

(*a*) Imperium curarum est laborumque gravium susceptio voluntaria. *A King is like a Pilot: qui aliis, suavi & profundo somno sepultis, vigilans obdurat. Theophil. Instit. Reg. pte. 2. C. 21.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 419

VI. The Prince must even remember, that (b) a bad State of Health does not divest him of his Character. His Love of his People must support him against the Infirmary of his Body. He must, if possible, (c) die standing. He must, to his last Breath, be the Soul and first Mover of his Kingdom.

(b) Si parùm corpore valeret (*L' Empereur Auguste*) lætlicâ pro tribunali collocatâ, vel etiam domi cubans, jus dixit, *Suet. c. 13.*

(c) *Vespasien étant malade de la maladie dont il mourut : cum nec eo minùs muneribus imperatoriis ex consuetudine fungetur, Imperatorem ait stantem mori oportere. Suet. in ejus vita. c. 24.*





CHAPTER XII.

A Prince ought to employ all lawful Methods to enrich his Kingdom. The first Way is to encourage Agriculture, and the second to facilitate the bringing up of Flocks.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to employ all lawful Methods to enrich his Kingdom.

I. **A** FATHER of a Family, regardful of his own Interest, and that of his Children, is the most natural Image of a Prince that has a Concern for the Happiness of his Subjects. The wise Oeconomy of the first, his Industry to preserve or increase what he has received from his Parents, his Care and Affection for the Provision of his Family, are the best Pattern for a Father of the People to imitate. There is no Difference but in Extent of Duty ; the Ground of the Obligations and Sentiments is the same ; and the Application of the one to improve, repair and turn to account whatever belongs to him, is in little the same as the Application of a wise King to make his People happy, to procure them Riches and Plenty, to repair their antient Losses, and to bring to perfection any Works or useful Establishments.

“ II. An unwise King, saith the Scripture (*d*)
 “ destroyeth his People, but thro’ the Prudence
 “ of them that are in Authority the City shall
 “ be inhabited: the Power of the Earth is in the
 “ Hands of the Lord, and in due time he will
 “ set over it one that is profitable.

III. All human Exhortations come short of these Words, and I know nothing that can affect the Prince, if he is not lively touch’d with them. Let him then put the Question if he would choose to resemble the unwise Prince who destroys his People! If he is allowed by God to reign as a Scourge to Mankind. Or if he is placed on the Throne to fill the World with Blessings and Happiness, and rais’d up after great Calamities and Distresses to comfort Mankind, if God has inspir’d him with Wisdom and Goodness, to make Cities and Countries populous, and draw from all Quarters new Subjects and Citizens.

IV. Let him all his Life remember two Things: that God, touched with Compassion to Mankind, grants them in his appointed Time good Kings; and that the first Fruits of the good Government of these Kings are Riches, a multitude of Subjects and publick Felicity.

V. Let him examine at all times if his Conduct answers the Designs of God: If it is for his own Interest, or to promote that of the People that he reigns; whether he enriches his Palace or the Kingdom; whether his People grow rich by his Care, or are ruin’d and oppress’d by extravagant Expences.

VI. Flatterers may deceive him, his affluence may contribute to seduce him; but Scripture gives

E 3

him

(*d*) Rex inspiens perdet populum suum, & civitates habitabuntur per sensum potentium. In manu Dei potestas terræ, & utilem rectorem suscitabit in tempus super illam. *Ecclesiasticus* 10. 3. & 4.

him Marks, by which he may know if he is a Prince, whom the Compassion of God has put upon the Throne. He has only to reflect upon the Condition of his People, and what good he has done them. If from being Rich he has reduced them to misery, he is an unwise King : If from misery he has advanced them to Riches and publick Happiness, he is a wise Prince, that God has given to the World, to be profitable to it by his Care and Application.

VII. (e) He ought continually to be thinking on Ways and Means of improving what the Providence of God has entrusted to him that he may give a Proof of his Fidelity, by the increase of what he has received. Every Province and City, ought to be dear to him. He ought to wish the meanest Villages and Cottages may feel the effects of his Goodness and Care. He ought to extend his Concern if possible, to private Persons, and not be satisfied till all the World has Reason to be pleased with his Wisdom and Vigilance ; thus endeavouring to imitate divine Providence, which is present every where, and attends as much to the good of Individuals as the general Good.

VIII. He ought to study in the Life of good Princes, not certain Actions which are described in History with too great Pomp ; but their wise Oeconomy and Understanding in enriching their State, and giving a new Face to a Country ruined by Divisions and Wars. There is a good Example of this in the Book of *Maccabees*. *Judeab* had been made desolate by the Princes, who had resolved

(e) *Tantâ diligentia subjectos sibi populos rexit, ut omnia, & omnes, quasi sua essent, curaret. Provinciæ sub eo cunctæ floruerunt. Ful. Capitol. in vit. Antonini Pii.*

(f) *Ad Dei imitationem te conseras, civitatesque non solum omni bonorum genere cumules, sed etiam felicitatem, quantum potes, in unumquemque subditorum effundas. Synes. de Reg. p. 9.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 423

resolved to leave no Inhabitants in it. (g) Two Brothers defended it, but without being able to hinder the Enemies Arms to commit great Havock; they ended their Lives without restoring Tranquility and Peace. *Judeab* began to enjoy this under *Simon*, the third Brother, who by his wife Conduct made their ancient Calamities be forgot, and restored in a little time to his Country Abundance, Felicity and Glory, of which it had lost all Hopes. Observe how the Scripture speaks of this: (b) “ As for the Land of *Judeab*, that was
 “ quiet all the Days of *Simon*, for he sought the
 “ good of his Nation in such wise, as that ever-
 “ more his Authority and Honour pleased them
 “ well, he was honourable in all his Acts, he took
 “ *Joppa* for an Haven, and made an Entrance to
 “ the Isles of the Sea. Then did they Till their
 “ Ground in Peace, and the Earth gave her
 “ Increase, and the Trees of the Field their Fruit.
 “ The ancient Men sat together in the Streets
 “ communing of good Things, and the young
 “ Men put on glorious and warlike Apparel. He
 “ made Peace in the Land, and *Israel* rejoiced
 “ with great Joy: Every Man sat under his Vine
 “ and Fig Tree, and there was none to fray them
 “ neither were there any left in the Land to Fight
 “ against them, yea, the Kings themselves were
 “ overthrown in those Days; moreover he strength-
 “ ened all those of his People that were brought
 “ low. The Law he searched out, and every
 “ Contemner of the Law and wicked Per-
 “ son he took away, he beautified the Sanctuary,
 “ and multiplied the Vessels of the Temple.

IX. A Prince will be well advised, when he takes for his Model, a Conduct which the Scripture so justly praises, and the Success which was
 so

(g) *Judas*, *Maccabees*, and *Jonathas*.

(b) *L. 1. Maccab. c. xiv. v. 4, 5. & seq. & ibid. v. 35.*

424 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE &c.

so speedy and Fortunate, but it is not a general Admiration of this Character, which will make the King imitate it; he must observe it minutely, and profit by every Circumstance of it, let us therefore consider it in a new Article.

ARTICLE II.

One of the first Methods a Prince ought to employ to enrich his Country, is to protect agriculture.

I. The Scripture begins with Agriculture “every one Tilled their own Ground in Peace, the Earth gave her increase, and the Trees of the Field their Fruit.” Then it passes to commerce the chief Support of which was the Harbour of Joppa. It continues by relating his Victories and warlike Preparations, and ends with Religion. I will endeavour to follow the same Order. I begin with Agriculture, since it ought to be the first Fruits of Peace, and the first source of Plenty.

II. (i) It is indeed the Source of true Wealth, and of riches which have a real Value, and not depending on the fancy of Men, which supply the Necessaries, and even the delicacies of Life, and make a Kingdom have no dependence upon Foreign Nations, but necessary however to them, they are the principal Revenue of the Prince, and supply the want of all other Parts of it.

III. Tho’ Mines of Gold and Silver should be drained, tho’ Pearls and Diamonds are buried in the Bowels of the Sea and Earth, tho’ all Commerce with Foreign Nations be forbid, tho’ all Arts which are only employed about Ornament and Elegance should be abolished, the (k) Fertility of

(i) *Omnium rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agriculturâ melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine, nihil libero dignius. Cicer. L. 1. de Offic. p. 372.*

(k) *Agro benè culto nihil potest esse nec usu uberius, nec specie ornatius. Cato apud Cicer. de Senect. p. 414.*

of the Earth would supply the Want of them all: it would afford a sufficient Revenue, and serve both to maintain the People and Armies, necessary for their Defence.

IV. Agriculture, is then of the highest Consequence and Moment to a Nation; since strictly speaking it alone is necessary. One is forc'd to acknowledge this, for its Evidence is too apparent to be contradicted; and yet in almost all Nations Agriculture is the least protected: and most Princes are misinform'd of the Interest they have to hold it in Esteem and Honour, and to shew Regard to those who apply to it.

V. A wise Prince ought to put a Value, on all the Lands of his Kingdom, and discover all possible ways of Augmenting its Fertility. This he should reckon a fundamental Maxim in Government.

VI. One of the best ways of Effecting this, is to assign a certain Portion of Land in property to every Father of a Family, who lives in the Country Villages, that this Field may be (*l*) cultivated with great Care, when he has such Interest in it, that his Family may be maintain'd by it, and kept in the Country.

VII. When Men in the Country, have no Lands of their own, and are either upon Wages, or have Farms, they don't bestow such Care and Labour in cultivating the Ground, and even work with Regret. A bad Season, or a War, drives them away and disperses them, because they have not taken root in any particular Place. If they stay, they are a charge to their Masters, who are obliged to maintain them; and if they are put away, they Perish with Hunger.

VIII.

(*l*) *Semper boni assidue Domini referta cella vinaria, olearia & penuaria, villaque tota locuples est. Ibid.*

VIII. None of them have any resource for Futurity ; all that they can gain is little enough to preserve their Lives. None have an affectionate Concern for them, they are Strangers on the Lands which they cultivate ; when the War or rigorous Season ceases, they are not invited to Return ; another has taken Possession of their Lands. Thus a transient Accident depopulates the Country, and occasions the Misery of many Families, which a Paternal Inheritance would have preserv'd, either by keeping them in the Country, or inviting them to Return.

IX. This Truth strikes sensibly in *Flanders*, and the Neighbouring Provinces, which tho' they have been the seat of War almost Two Hundred Years, yet the Ground is as well cultivated, as if they enjoy'd perpetual Peace ; because the People in the Country have always some Lands in Property ; this makes them choose rather to live with the Enemy, than abandon their Properties ; and allow them to take a Part of their Fruits, provided they may safely enjoy the Rest ; they consider that tho' they may take away their Crop, yet the Lands are Immoveable.

X. It is by this Method that the Countries have been preserved ; and the proportioning the Taxes to the Riches of the People, has sav'd their Properties. For if these Taxes had been Arbitrary, or Immoderate, they would have forc'd the Proprietors to sell, without being able to make any new Purchases, since the excessive Taxes, extend over all the Country : And the Price of Land would sink, the Country formerly Rich, and Happy, would become Poor, and Wretched.

XI. This Misfortune has become almost general in certain Provinces, formerly Rich and Wealthy,

thy; and all the Miseries I have mention'd, have proceeded from it as their natural Consequences.

XII. The only Remedy a Prince can apply to this Evil, is to lessen the Taxes upon Men, and Lands, that the Industrious may save something, and acquire a Stock from their Frugality; which they will always do, when it is in their Power.

XIII. (m) A Prince instead of oppressing Farmers, ought to make their Condition easy and agreeable, encourage others to imitate their Labour and Industry; relieve them when they are Old, and have a numerous Family, be extremely pleased when in their old Age, they have any repose, and the conveniencies of Life, behold without Envy, their having acquir'd something by their great Labour, that they may be free from it afterwards, for it's by a very laborious and abstemious Life, that they are able to pay their Masters, and support their Family: This all will be convinced of who keep their Estates in their own Hands, in hopes of greater gain; they will find themselves losers, because they are neither capable to endure the same Labour, or Abstinence.

XIV. A Prince should shew Favour to all who lead a hard and laborious Life, in cultivating the Earth, which maintains the Rich, who with all their Gold and Silver, would Dye of Hunger without its Fertility. He ought not to deprive those of their Bread who give it to others, nor rob those of the Fruits of the Earth, who make them spring forth. They have the best Title to them who water them with their Sweat; it is cruel and barbarous too, when Men are enrich'd by their Labours, to leave them in Poverty and Want.

(m) *Ipsa Agricultura magnum incrementum fumeret, si quis, vel per agros, vel per vicos, optime terram excolentibus præmia constituerit. Xenoph. de Regno p. 916.*

428 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

Want. Their Groans tho' despised by Men, ascend to the Throne of God, and a Prince ought to dread nothing so much as forcing those who cultivate the Ground, to address God with Tears in the Words of the *Jews*, in the Time of *Esdra*s:

“(n) The Land which thou gavest to our Fathers, for to maintain them with its Fruits, is now Subject to other Masters, and we are in Bondage. It only bears Increase for the Kings thou hast set over us, for the Punishment of our Sins; they Exercise over us, and our Flocks, an Arbitrary domination, and we are all in great Distress.”

XV. Of all Employments which have not an immediate Relation to God and Justice, Agriculture (o) is the most Innocent. It was the Exercise of the first Man in Paradice, and afterwards, it was a Part of the Punishment God inflicted on him; thus in both these States of Innocence and Sin, it was commanded him, and in his Person, all his Posterity: Nevertheless, it has become in the Judgment of Pride, the most Contemptible and Vile of all Employments: And when useles Arts are Encouraged, and marks of Honour are put on Employments, which contribute to the oppression of the People, those who Labour for the Wealth and Happiness of others, are left in Misery and Want.

XVI. (p) A wise Prince will not fall into this Error. He will prefer Agriculture to all the Arts which

(n) *Esd. C. IX. v. 36. & 37.*

Ecl. C. VII. v. 16.

(p) Cyrus minor, Persarum Rex, præstans ingenio, atque Imperii gloriâ, cum Lyfander Lacædemonius, vir sumæ virtutis, venisset ad eum Sardis, eique dona à fociis attulisset, ei quemdam conscriptum agrum diligenter conscriptum ostendit. Quum autem admiraretur Lyfander, & proceritates arborum, & directos in quinquuncem ordines, & humum subactum atque puram

which Pride and Vanity have taught Men. He will speak of it on all occasions with the greatest Esteem; he will advise the Great not to despise Oeconomy, and the Culture of their Lands, he will not praise their sumptuous Palaces, and superfluous Expences, but their wise and reasonable Care of their Estates; and he will set a higher Value upon a Farm that is well cultivated, than all the Beauties of Splendid Houses which bring no Profit. Two or three Words of his will be observ'd, and have a great Effect. Men will return from a false to a true Taste; from Superfluity, to what is necessary, and whereas, Men of high Birth, knew nothing but to ruin their Estates, they will learn to preserve and increase their Riches, by a lawful Care of their Estates, which will greatly redound to the Good of the Publick.

XVII. The Prince will inform himself by his Governors, or Intendants, of those Countries which are not cultivated for want of Inhabitants, or thro' Negligence. He will consult skilfull Men, about ways of Populating desert Places, and making them turn to Account and Profit. He will hear Mechanicks, who have Sense and Experience. He will give to Neighbours Lands that have been a long Time abandon'd, but having first advertis'd the Antient Proprietors. He will excite the Industry of the Inhabitants, by taking all Methods of banishing Sloth and Ignorance. He will invite Foreigners who are laborious, to come and cultivate the Lands which are only Barren thro' their Carelessness. He will grant Exemptions from Tributes for many Years,
to

puram, & suavitatem odorum; ei Cyrus respondit: atqui ego omnia ista sum dimensus, mei sunt ordines, mea descriptio: multæ etiam istarum arborum meâ manu sunt satæ. *Cicer. de Senect. Xenoph. Oeconomico. pag. 414. apud. Xenoph. pag. 830.*

430 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

to those who shall improve them. In fine, he will examine if the Fields which are reckon'd naturally barren, are so in every respect; he will not allow them to be neglected, till he is quite convinced that all Care would be superfluous.

ARTICLE III.

A second Way is to facilitate the bringing up of Flocks.

I. But a Way from which a Prince may expect greater Advantage, is the bringing up of Flocks: upon this Agriculture chiefly depends. Without Flocks the best Lands can't be cultivated, and a Farm is ruin'd when it wants them. On the other hand, they soon enrich and render fertile the most barren Lands. “(q) Where no Oxen are, says the wise Man, the Crib is lean, but much Increase is by the Strength of the Ox.”

II. A Country changes its Appearance, and is renew'd in a moment, when it is full of Beasts, some of which serve to plough the Earth, others to give Milk and Wool, others are fit to carry Burdens, others to be fed for Sale; but all of them enrich the Ground, it becomes barren and wild when these fail.

III. The Office of Shepherd (r) and Husbandman should be inseparable; the one feeds the Cattle, which serve to cultivate the Earth; and the Earth, in her turn, maintains the Cattle.

IV.

(q) Prov. c. xiv. v. 4.

(r) Ars pecuaria cum Agriculturâ conjuncta est. Xenoph. Oeconom. p. 831.

IV. By these two Methods, a Country as narrow as *Judeab* was crouded with an infinite Number of Inhabitants, and full of Towns and Cities, was fertile to the Tops of the Hills, and maintain'd the neighbouring Nations. But since a covetous People, Enemies to Labour and ignorant of Agriculture, have become Masters of that Country, it is a mere Defart, full of Sands and Rocks. And those who are Strangers to what Industry and Art may produce, can scarce give credit to what the Scripture relates of its Fertility, and which it compares to Rivers flowing with Milk and Honey : but this Comparison was just, when the Country was full of Flocks, and by Culture produced Corn and Grass enough to feed them ; and when all Places, tho' naturally barren, were made fertile by Methods, the natural Result of numerous Flocks.

V. Independently of Agriculture, Flocks are the Riches of a State ; they provide it with Food, Clothes, Materials for principal Manufactures, Exchange for Commerce, and a perpetual Succession of Riches, which are renewed and multiplied every Day ; these formerly made the principal Wealth of the Ancients. One may see by the History of *Job*, one of the most powerful Eastern Princes, what was their chief Riches : and they would still be the principal Resource of Princes and States, if they applied themselves as seriously as the Ancients, to this lawful and fertile Fund of increasing their Revenues.

VI. The Answer of an ancient *Roman*, (*Cato the elder*) very well skill'd in Agriculture and Oeconomy, to a Question propos'd to him about the lawful Ways of becoming rich, is well known. He insist'd chiefly upon feeding Flocks ; he had
Ex-

Experience on his side, and deserves to be credited.

VII. But since Tributes have been rigorously exacted, Flocks have been seiz'd like other Goods. Poor Families have been robb'd of those Beasts which afforded them their Subsistence. Thus the Shepherd and Husbandman are discouraged. The Country is emptied both of Men and Beasts, the Fields neglected have a miserable and melancholy Appearance, which, when cover'd with Flocks, were agreeable and wealthy, and afforded abundance of Materials both for the Pleasures of Life, and Advantages of Commerce.

VIII. To remedy Evils, or to prevent them, a Prince ought to forbid, under the highest Penalty, the seizing or carrying off any Beast, upon any Pretence, nay not for the most necessary Tributes. The Prince will gain by this, tho' he may seem to lose by it; he ought to hear, against this wise Resolution, neither the Remonstrances nor Complaints of those who receive his Revenues.

IX. He ought also to forbid the killing of young Animals, except at certain times, when it would be difficult to bring them up upon account of Winter.

X. A Prince ought to take the Advice of Men of Knowledge and Skill in this Affair, and to contrive with them all Methods of increasing Animals as much as possible; (s) he should, according to the Advice of the wise Man, look upon this part of Oeconomy as essential, and not to judge according to the false Ideas of most Men of Business, who give themselves small Concern about the State, provided they are enrich'd; and who think they promote the Interests of the Prince, by putting to death

(s) *Ecc. c. vii. v. 24.*

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE, &c. 433

death his Subjects, by draining the Source of his Revenues, in diminishing the Number of Flocks, which, if protected, would greatly increase them: for upon these depend Commerce and Manufactures: and we shall immediately see of what consequence Trade and Manufactures are to a Prince and his Kingdom.





C H A P. XIII.

A third Way for a Prince to enrich his Kingdom, is to encourage Commerce both at home and abroad. A fourth is to establish Manufactures, and employ all his Subjects in useful Labour and Industry. Observations upon these two Methods.

ARTICLE I.

A Prince ought to favour Commerce, and first Home-Trade.

I. **A** Kingdom, however large, may be compared, when it is well govern'd, to a rich House in the Country, where they buy very few things, and sell a great many.

II. It must have few Wants when other Nations have great occasion for the Produce of the Country. Otherwise it will be soon drain'd of Money, if it has no Commodities to sell, and will always continue poor, if it is perpetually constrain'd to buy.

III. The Business then of a wise Prince is to put his Kingdom in a Condition of having a great many Superfluities which may compensate by Exchange the Necessaries they may want of other Nations.

IV.

INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE.* 435

IV. It is of great Consequence to favour Commerce in the Kingdom, by giving all encouragement to it, and removing every Obstruction. Otherwise a Province, which for Example has no Oil or Wine, but abounds in Iron and Flocks, can't dispose of what they have too much, nor buy what they want, and it is just so with that Province, which draws no Profit from Oil or Wine proportioned to what it would do, when allowed to Trade with a Province depriv'd of these.

V. Immoderate and high Taxes upon Commodities often ruin Trade and Commerce, because they exceed the Profit and Gain arising from them.

VI. This Obstruction too proceeds from a Tribute put on a certain River, the Entrance of a City or Province formerly on the Frontiers of the Kingdom, because it belong'd to another Prince. This tribute has been however kept up, and even augmented, tho' the Province has been reunited to the Kingdom.

VII. These hindrances and obstacles devour Trade, make Goods which have no Consumption in the way of Commerce quite useless, and reduce other Places, where they are necessary to Misery and Want, where they might have been sold at a reasonable Profit, or exchanged with Goods of equal Value.

VIII. The Union of the principal Parts of the Kingdom is thus interrupted, Wealth does not circulate, the Natives of the Country, are almost always forced to buy for Foreigners what they would have found at Home, if their Commerce had been freed and open: Foreigners sometimes buy in one Harbour of the Kingdom to sell to another, because they grant them Priviledges which are refused to Subjects.

IX. If a Prince would remove the Impediments

436 *INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.*

of internal Commerce, by diminishing Taxes, his Revenues would considerably increase by some Consumpt and Transport : And besides, the riches of the Provinces arising from Trade would turn to great Account, they would bear with greater Ease the Expences of the Publick.

X. Sometimes Commerce between different Provinces is prevented by the badness of the Roads ; if this Difficulty is not insurmountable, a Prince ought to Remedy it.

XI. A River may often be made Navigable without any great Expence ; or another may be made further so. These Advantages a Country attentive to the Interest of Trade will not neglect ; and in the time of Peace, a Prince full of Affection to his People, will not show indifference in this Affair.

XII. Sometimes the Inconvenience of passing an uncultivated and desert Country prevents all manner of Commerce : It would be highly useful to build there some Villages and Inns, and invite Inhabitants, by certain Priviledges to facilitate the passing from one Country to another. Nothing makes Commerce go more briskly on in a Kingdom than frequency of Towns, safety of Roads, and convenient care of Carriage : It is incredible how much constant Trade contributes to make a Nation active, and rouse their Industry.

XIII. All Commerce from one Harbour of the Kingdom to another, ought to be in the Hands of the Natives of the Country. Foreigners must not be allowed to take Advantage from their sloth and indolence, and much less have certain Priviledges granted them by the Prince, which are refused his Subjects. All tributes put on Entries into Harbours should be equally paid by all : And if the Prince thinks proper to make any difference, it should be in Favour of his Subjects.

XIV. It is incredible how great mischief the not observing these Rules brings upon a Kingdom, by rendering almost all the Merchants of Maritime Towns simple Factors, by reducing great Numbers of the Sailors to misery and sloth, for want of Employment; and thus transferring to Foreigners, often the Enemies of the State, the principal branches of Trade.

ARTICLE II.

A Prince ought to favour Commerce with other Nations.

I. It is greatly the Interest of the Prince to favour Foreign Commerce, that his Subjects may get free of what they can't consume, and which would prove useless to them, that their Industry may be excited, by seeing the advantages of their Labour, that Manufactures may not languish and Decay, that the Kingdom may be provided in what it does not produce; or at least not in proportion to its Wants, that Merchants, Sailors, and all kind of Mechanicks may be usefully employed, Commerce being as it were their Soul and Life, that the State which has no Mines may have Gold and Silver, that a rich Revenue that will occasion little Expence to the Subjects, the greatest Part of it being paid by Foreigners may arise from the Duties of Export and Import, that a Navigation may be brought to Perfection, by the knowledge of the Seas, and different Coasts, that Sea Officers may be trained up, and prepared for Danger, by guarding and protecting the Merchants Ships, and that there may be Troops which other trading Nations can't conquer; but

E 3 there

(g) Major mercatorum numerus excitabitur, si is qui plurimum negotiatur, affectus honore fuerit. *Xenoph. de Regno* p. 916.

438 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

there are few Subjects which require more Attention and Prudence than Foreign Commerce.

II. The Prince ought not to allow Goods to be carried out of the Kingdom which it has Occasion for, and must soon buy at a much dearer Rate, as Corn for Example, Oil or Wooll. He ought not only to make rigorous Laws against this, but observe an incorruptible vigilance, he should trust the Management of the Harbours to Men of integrity and indefatigable Application, because Interest finds ways of eluding all Laws, and when the Gain is very great, no Fidelity almost is Proof.

III. He must not allow a great part of the Money of the Nation to go out of it for frivolous things which have no Value, but what Fancy and Vanity put on them, otherwise the Nation would be soon full of needle Works, as useles as Cobwebs, and would give in exchange for them what is of necessary and substantial Use.

IV. But it is for raising of Commerce they must be allowed to enter the Kingdom, the State ought to make up their Loss in admitting them by a very high Tax. Private Men who buy these Vanities deserve to be punish'd for preferring them to the publick Good, and to have their Avarice smart for their Pride. All lenity and softness in this Matter is hurtful and prejudicial to the State.

V. The Prince must not allow the Manufactures of the Kingdom to be ruined by the importing of Foreign Goods, or exporting what ought to be employed in them. Faults or Neglects in these two Points are of dangerous Consequence, and too great Care can't be taken in preventing them.

VI. Merchants must not be consulted about their Commerce, when the Business is to compare it with another Branch of Trade that may be destructive to it. Their Opinion ought not to determine the Matter, but a Council of Trade established by the Prince.

VII.

VII. The Council of Trade ought to be composed of Men of the highest Rank in the Kingdom, but the most skillful and upright Traders ought to be admitted. Without this Caution they would fall into great Mistakes which a Speculation without Experience cannot prevent. However, Men who have a perfect Knowledge of the Interest of the State, and are influenced purely by a Regard to the publick Good, ought to be the Judges in all these Matters.

VIII. The Maxim that Trade ought to be free, is only true in part; what we have already observed makes us see that it is false in many respects; but when the Precautions that have been mention'd are well observ'd, 'tis advantageous to the State not to disturb or molest Commerce, not to make too narrow an Enquiry in some things, but rather to rely on the Information and Honesty of the Merchants, who understand them better than Men who are not of their Trade, and whose Inspection and Curiosity will only serve to vex and fret them.

IX. It would be of great advantage to the State, to have some Harbours free from all Taxes, in order to invite Foreigners; but if these Goods are only of an imaginary Price, or ruinous to the Manufactures of the Kingdom, they must not be allow'd to enter the Harbour without paying a Tax appointed, thus to learn Foreigners to load their Ships with more useful Commodities, and the Subjects not to buy Goods which they won't be allow'd to sell.

X. What chiefly invites Foreigners to trade with any Nation, is the Attention of the Prince to protect them, to hinder all Injustice being done them, to command a quick Reparation of the least Injury, to suffer no delay to be put to this by any of his Officers, to shew a great Aversion to al

440 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Subtleties and Tricks, which are destructive of Commerce.

XI. He will refuse all Protection to Traders who have abus'd the Trust and Confidence of the Publick; or who endeavour to obtain of their Creditors a Diminution of their Debt, in order to enrich themselves. Their Affairs shall be rigorously examin'd into, and that by Persons whom Interest cannot corrupt.

XII. The Prince will carefully maintain the Authority he has been pleas'd to give the Judges call'd Consuls, and particularly those of them who are careful in preserving the Interest of Traders: he will inform himself of their Probity and Skill, by Persons who are not suspected.

XIII. He will look upon the Reputation of the Kingdom, with regard to Equity and Honesty, as essential to Commerce. He will establish this Character both by his own Conduct and that of his Officers, whom he will punish if they act contrary to his upright Intentions: he will put no difference betwixt a Foreigner and his own Subject, the powerful or weak, those who have many Protectors, and those who are quite unknown.

ARTICLE III.

The Attention of the Prince to Manufactures.

I. His principal Concern will be about Manufactures already established in the Kingdom, or which he intends to establish in it, because upon them depends all Commerce, he will look upon this part of his Administration and Oeconomy as the most important to the publick Good. There are Rules to be observ'd in this: the most essential, in my opinion, are the following.

II.

II. He ought to know what his Kingdom produces, and employ it in Manufactures ; it would be a shameful Negligence in him to allow other Nations to carry it off, and thus discourage the Industry of his Subjects.

III. He ought to inform himself of the Wants of his Kingdom, and what draws most Money from it ; and endeavour to buy Materials for Manufactures at the least Expence, that his Subjects may be employed in useful Work.

IV. He ought to hold for a Maxim, that things wrought in the Kingdom, tho' dearer than foreign ones, are more profitable to the State, because they employ the Natives of the Country, and make Money circulate without going out of it.

V. In establishing a Manufacture, he ought at the same time to be sure of its turning to a profitable Account, that so the Undertakers may not be ruin'd.

VI. When he establishes a new one, he ought to take care it don't hurt another of the same or a different kind ; by encreasing the Number of the Silk Manufactures, the woollen ones may be injured. A Manufacture of old standing is exposed to Ruin and Decay, when a new one of the same sort is established very near it. He must not be imposed upon by slight Probabilities, nor by Proposals in which particular Persons are interested. He must carefully examine into every thing, and without Prejudice.

VII. 'Tis for the Interest of the Publick, that no Manufactures be allow'd which injure the poor and inferior Tradesmen, by depriving them of their Work ; and that no Manufactures be carried on by Machines, which would have employ'd Numbers of the People. The great Care of the Prince should be to employ all his Subjects,
that

that by their Labour they may be supported. He may praise and reward those (v) who make new discoveries in Mechanicks; but if they prove a prejudice to the Poor, he ought to reckon it sufficient that he reward the Inventor, but at the same time forbid the use of what would only serve to increase the number of the Poor and Indolent.

VIII. The having of certain Things at a low Price is a weak Relief of these two great Evils. The diminution of the Price is but little felt; but a multitude of idle Subjects is a heavy load on a Government.

IX. For this Reason those Manufactures ought to be encouraged most, which employ the greatest number of Hands in both Sexes, and where both young and old may be of some Service; for all ought as far as possible live by their Labour. Beggary ought to be banish'd, and none who have Health ought to be idle and useles to the State.

X. If idleness in some Places is invincible, and Hands are wanting to carry on Industry, laborious and skilful Workmen must be called from another part of the Kingdom, or from Foreign Countries, to teach the Natives of these Places to Work, and make them ashamed of their Laziness.

XI. It is also necessary in these Circumstances (x) to invite Foreign Merchants to settle in the best Towns; to grant them Privileges, and religiously observe

(v) *Vespasian well knew the importance of this maxim. Mechanico, saith his Historian, grandes columnas exigua impensâ perducturum in Capitolium pollicenti, præmium pro commento (for the invention) non mediocre obtulit, operam remisit: præfatus, sineret se plebeculam pascere. Sueton. C. 18.*

(x) *Negotioribus, ut Roman volentes concurrerent, maximam immunitatem dedit: mechanica opera Romæ plurima instituit. The Emperor Alexander Severus: It is related in his Life. p. 212.*

observe the Promises that were made them. This is a sure way of giving Life and Spirit to Trade of inspiring the Citizens with Emulation, of exciting their Industry, and of reaping Advantage from every product of the Country, which otherwise would be useless: For the best Countries become Poor and Barren thro' idleness, and every thing it produces is lost, when they don't know its use, or neglect it. A little jealousy towards Foreigners that are more active and diligent, serves to rouse and awaken the Spirit of a Nation. The Prince ought to make use of this Spur to excite his Subjects to industry; but he should not hear their complaints and murmurings against Foreigners invited by his Promises.

XII. It is not advantageous to the State to encourage Manufactures, which are supported by Luxury, for when their Number is much increased, there is a necessity of suffering Luxury, tho' pernicious to the State, for fear of even ruining it, by putting an end to Luxury. The Prince must carefully attend to this, otherwise the Evil and Remedy will become equally dangerous.

XIII. Manufactures employed in consuming and destroying Gold and Silver are hurtful to the Publick, because they render Coins more scarce, by employing these precious Metals, which are the Soul of Trade, and not natural to the Country, in Works that are trifling, and of more real Value.

XIV. If the Prince does not think proper entirely to suppress them, he ought at least to lessen their Number; he ought not so much as tolerate them if he is not certainly informed that the Gold and Silver they consume is repaired by the Foreign Gold and Silver they bring into the Kingdom.

XV. If he is well assured that Manufactures serve only to promote Luxury, he must absolutely forbid them, but allow the Workmen a considerable

444 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

derable time to seek a Settlement elsewhere, and even in Part, make up their Loss at the publick Expence, since the State will be a Gainer by their Departure.

XVI. For this Reason he ought to prohibit all who deal in gilding, who are a real loss to the State since their Trade brings in no Foreign Money, such as ornament Household Furniture, or Equipage by gilding, which are not transported out of the Kingdom, and which consume Gold and Silver without repairing them.

XVII. It would be even very advantageous not to allow Manufactures to enrich Stuffs where Gold and Silver are employed, unless it is to sell them to Foreigners, and the Subjects are prohibited the wearing them. A sage Republick (y) observes this Rule, severe to Luxury in their own State, but magnificent in the Stuffs they sell to Foreigners, thus making the Gold and Silver they consume turn to Profit and Advantage.

(y) The Republick of *Venice*.





CHAPTER XIV.

The fifth Way of enriching a State, is to banish Usury, forbid by the Law of God, contrary to the Interest of both Prince and People, of Agriculture and Commerce.

ARTICLE I.

Usury is forbid by the Law of God.

IT would be in Vain for a Prince to enrich his Kingdom, if he allow'd Avarice and Usury, to rob the People of the Fruit of his Care. He ought to remember that God, when he gave Laws to the People of Israel, and model'd their Common-wealth (z), forbid their taking Usury of any but Strangers; and by this he has inform'd all who govern Kingdoms, that Usury is contrary to the Publick good, and ought to be look'd on as an Evil, the pernicious Consequences of which, should be turn'd upon the Enemies of the State: For the Strangers that are mention'd in the Law of God, were consider'd as Enemies; and the People were order'd, not only to deprive them of their Goods, but also, to take away their Lives.

II. This

Deut. C. XXIII. v. 19, & 20.

446 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

II, This distinction of Strangers and Brethren, ceas'd by the Gospel, which unites all Mankind in one Body, of which Jesus Christ is the Head.

III. Thus all Usury is forbid ; and those (a) who will elude the Force of the Command, by confining it to the Poor are condemn'd by the Laws distinguishing betwixt Brother and Stranger, and not betwixt Rich and Poor, by the Terms of the Law, which are general ; (b) by the Expressions of the Prophets, which are as general ; and by the Consent and Practice of the *Jews*, who are convinced that all Usury is forbid them, and who only exact it of Strangers.

IV. The Son of God, who came to make the Antient Law more Perfect, and not to abolish it, and who commands us a more Perfect Righteousness than that of the *Pharisees* ; advises us at most (c) to take it in certain Circumstances, without expecting the Principal : That we may excel Infidels, who have no View to Eternal Rewards, and who always expect to receive as much as they have given.

V. This Doctrine has been unanimously taught by the Saints of the Church. None of them have spoke doubtfully in this Matter. They were all persuaded that Usury was forbid by the Law of God, and that Christians were more severely enjoyn'd this Command, than *Jews*. They expressed themselves strongly against it, both in their Writings and Discourses, without Regard to contrary Customs, or Civil Laws, which appear'd

to

(a) *Psalms*, XIV. LIV. LXXI

(b) *Ezechiel*. C. XVIII. v. 5. 8. & 13.

(c) Si benefeceritis his qui vobis benefaciunt, quæ vobis est gratia ? siquidem & peccatores hoc faciunt : & si mutuum dederitis his à quibus speratis recipere, quæ gratia est vobis ? nam & peccatores peccatoribus fœnerantur, ut recipiant æqualia. Mutuum date, nihil inde sperantes : *Luc. C. VI. v. 33. 34. 35.*

to Favour it. The Church at last had the Interest, to get the Civil Laws made agreeable to the Law of God ; and the Christian World has been so govern'd for many Ages, except in Countries where Heresy has taught Men, to despise the most Sacred Laws, and Ancient Traditions.

ARTICLE II.

Usury is contrary to the Interest of a Prince.

I. Tho' Religion ought to be our Guide in every Thing, and teach us what is just, or unjust : I shall consider Usury, not as forbid by the Laws of God, but as it is destructive, to the Interest of a State, and shew that good Policy would persuade to banish it, tho' the Law of God, had been less clear and precise.

II. The Prince is more interested in this Affair than any other ; for he commonly gives rise to Usury, and falls the first Victim, the disorder of his Affairs spreads the Disease thro' all his Kingdoms, which at last consumes and devours it.

III. A Prince who manages his Affairs with Wisdom and Regularity, who measures his Expences by his Revenues, who has always something in reserve till they are paid him, has no occasion for Usury : And he is far from thinking that he can't support his Dignity, without abandoning Part of his Riches to devouring, and unjust Usurers to supply him with Money.

IV. He knows that with Regard to Oeconomy, there is no difference betwixt a King, and a private Lord ; that if a private Man ruins his Affairs, by borrowing upon Usury, the same Conduct will also ruin him ; that if the Manager of a private Man's Estate, ruins it by advancing him Money,
upon

448 *INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.*

upon exorbitant Usury, those who employ the same Methods with Regard to the Prince, must be bad Servants; and that if the Estate of a private Man come at last into the Hands of this Manager, the Revenue of the Prince will also fall into their Hands, who under a pretext of relieving and assisting him, pillage and rob him.

V. Good Management and Order exclude Usury. It is an Evil which arises from another; and only becomes necessary when all is in disorder, and the Affairs of the Prince are in such a bad Situation, that he can't subsist but by borrowing, and new Taxes; which give him relief for some Time, but soon involve him in greater Confusion and Perplexity.

VI. Usury, in Place of remedying the Evil, only serves to Increase it. It not only diminishes the Revenues of the Prince, but also the Fund that produces them, which it obliges him to sell, and reduces the Prince to the Necessity of delaying the Payment of his Debts, or giving Assignations upon uncertain or distant Funds, and thus involving a great many who had trusted him with their Money, in Misery and Want.

VII In this new disorder, Usury is apply'd to a second Time, as a new Remedy: But what Remedy! It takes advantage of the Publick Calamity by a thousand Tricks and Villainies, which would be severely punish'd at any other Time, but which the dangerous Situation of Affairs, oblige to conceal and connive at: Then the most exorbitant Usury appears necessary to preserve some remains of Happiness, after it has ruin'd both Prince and People.

VIII. All these are the necessary Consequences of Usury, these are the Advantages it brings a Prince: Thus it increases his Reputation and Revenues; thus it enables him to protect his People,

ple, to govern them mildly, and to relieve them in their Distress ; thus it makes him attend to the Merit of the disinterested, the Enemies of covetous avaricious Men. It no Doubt makes him slow in imposing new Taxes, merciful and tender in levying the Old.

IX. In this Manner will a Prince, of the most upright Intentions, be obliged to Manage, when he receives any Assistance from Usury. For none can borrow always upon hard Terms, without throwing themselves into great hardships, parting with their Estates, or declaring themselves incapable of paying their Debts. The most Powerfull will be forced to this, as well as private Men, tho' somewhat more slowly. He ought to consider which is more shamefull and base ; loading his Estate with immense Debt, and governing with as little Prudence, as a Minor who ruins his Estate by borrowing on Usury ; or be obliged not to pay the most Just and Lawful debts.

X. There are none that can bear the Weight of Usury long, without considerable gain by Commerce, to pay off their Debt, for if they spend the Sums they borrow, it will be impossible for them to pay the Interest, and much less the Principal : And it's well known a Prince does not employ the Money he borrows in the Way of Trade, but consumes it immediately. Thus, all he borrows becomes a Load, that at last will prove insupportable, and every Remedy renders the Disease more incurable.

XI. I know that tho' the Ancient Revenues of the Prince, have been Exhausted by the Anticipations of Usurers, yet new Inventions will be fallen upon to supply this loss, by the very Methods of Usury.

XII. But their Arts can't continue for ever, they all fall heavy on the People, whom a

450 *INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.*

Prince should treat as his Children. They bring less Profit to the Prince, than to these Usurers, who are sure to dissemble their Gain, and exaggerate their Losses. They make the Prince not only odious, but miserable, by keeping him in a constant Dependance, and reducing his State, his Patrimony and Heritage, to a deplorable Misery.

XIII. I know that a Prince may be hardned against these Calamities, and give himself little trouble about To-morrow, provided he has to Day, what may gratify his Passions. My Successor may he say, shall live Frugally, and Remedy the Misery of the State: This Care and Concern I leave to him.

XIV. But are these the Marks of greatness of Soul, and inward Worth? Had the Prince no other Views when he ascended the Throne, and assumed the Government, but to impoverish his People, and only to leave to his Successor, what he could not Waste and Destroy? Don't these Maxims involve the State in Misfortunes, and expose it to the inhumanity of Usurers; are not they pursu'd by Ministers, who have no Regard for the Prince, or Happiness of the People?

XV. Usurers indeed give out that without them, neither the State nor the Prince can subsist, this they easily persuade those who have a Share in their gains, and whom they lend Money to at high Usury, to give to the Prince at a much higher. They have Reason to talk so, when the Prince and State, are only supported by those who have ruin'd them: but they would be ashamed to advance these maxims in a flourishing Republick, or in a Monarchy, where all the Revenues of the Prince are free.

XVI. The surest Mark of the right Government of a State, is when there is no occasion for the

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 451

the Assistance of Usury; or when upon rare occasions there is a Necessity of having recourse to it, it may borrow upon very small Usury, and immediately pay it off, by appropriating Funds for that purpose.

XVI. On the other Hand, it's a sure Proof a State is without Credit, and of Consequence, according to the Sentiments of the Publick, it is ill governed, when it can't borrow Money, but upon high Usury: And it's as certain that a State is ruin'd, when it is obliged to borrow at so high a Rate.

XVII. It is sometimes Necessary, as I have already observ'd, for a State, or which is the same Thing, for a Prince to borrow Money. But in what Respects is a Prince on a worse Footing than a private Man, that they would refuse to lend him Money on easy Terms? If they had really a Zeal for his Service, could not they shew it by supplying him with Money, upon a small Interest? and if the Prince was well advis'd, would he be easy in granting them high Usury? or would not he think immediately of ways to pay them off?

ARTICLE III.

Usury is contrary to the publick Good.

I. It is so far from being true, that a Prince and State stand in need of such support, that for many Ages the most powerfull Princes and Kingdoms, have been ignorant of it, and forbid it as destructive. This has been the Conduct not only of Christians, but also of Infidels, Princes

452 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

who (d) had Reason and natural Equity only to direct them, and were so far from believing that Usury was necessary, and of publick Use, that they gave vast Sums of money to be distributed among the People, and to deliver them from the oppression of Usury.

II. I can't but relate in this Place the Words of a very wise Historian, which perhaps will make Men asham'd, who are as ignorant of true Politicks, as they are of the Gospel. “ (e) About this Time (it was under the reign of “ *Tiberius*) Accusations were brought before “ the Pretor, against Usurers, or violaters of “ the Law, that *Cæsar*, the Dictator, had made “ to regulate the Rate of Interest, and the Pro- “ portion of Lands, each Man ought to possess “ in

(d) *It is well known what Cato the Elder answer'd to One who ask'd him what he thought of Usury. Cum ille dixisset: quid fenerari? tum Cato, quid hominem, inquit, occidere? Cicer. L. 2. de officiis.*

(e) Interea magna vis accusatorum in eos irrupit, qui pecunias fœnore auctitabant adversum legem Dictatoris Cæsaris, quâ de modo credendi possedendique intra Italiam cavetur, commissam olim, quia privato usui bonum publicum postponitur; sanè vetus urbi funebre malum & seditionum discordiarumque creberrima causa, eoque cohibebatur antiquis & minus corruptis moribus. Nam primò duodecim tabulis sanctum, ne quis unciario fœnore amplius exerceret, cum antea ex libidine locupletium agitaretur. Dein rogatione tribuniâ ad semuncias reducta: postremò vetita usura, multisque plebiscitis obviam itum fraudibus, quæ toties repressæ, miras per artes rursus oriebantur. Gracchus Prætor, multitudine periclitantium subactus, retulit ad senatum: trepidique patres, (neque enim quisquam tali culpâ vacuus) veniam à Principe petivere; & concedente, annus in posterum, sexque menses dati- queis secundum jussu legis, rationes familiares quisque componeret. . . . Donec tulit opem Cæsar, disposito per menses millies sestertio, factâque mutandi copiâ sine usuris per triennium, si debitor populo in duplum prædiis cavisset. Sic resecta fides: & paulatim privati quoque creditores repeti. . . acribus, ut fermè talia, initiis, incuriose sine. *Tacit. L. 6. Annal. p. 150.*

“ in *Italy*. This Law of *Cæsars*, was not long
 “ observ’d, private Interest was more powerful
 “ than Love to the Publick. Usury is certainly
 “ one of the most Ancient Evils of the Re-
 “ publick, and most ordinary Cause of Seditions.
 “ For this Reason so many Laws have been
 “ made, to restrain it even in corrupt Times. At
 “ first the Laws of the twelve Tables, reduc’d
 “ it to one per Cent. whereas before that it was
 “ Arbitrary. Soon after at the Request of the
 “ Tribunes, it was brought one half lower : And
 “ at last absolutely forbid. And as it endea-
 “ voured to appear again under different Forms,
 “ and by different Artifices, the People made
 “ different Decrees to Root it out. The Prætor
 “ astonish’d at the Multitude of the Guilty, and
 “ not daring to give Judgment against them, re-
 “ ferr’d the Affair to the Senate. But almost all
 “ the Members of the Senate, being contain’d
 “ in the Accusation, had recourse to the Clemen-
 “ cy of the Prince, and demanded of him the
 “ Pardon of a Crime become universal. The
 “ Prince granted the Petition, and allowed them
 “ a Year and a Half, to regulate their Affairs,
 “ upon Condition that they would no more dis-
 “ obey the Law, nor exact in that interval any
 “ Usury. As Money became very scarce by
 “ this Regulation, the Usurers not inclining any
 “ more to give out their Money upon Interest,
 “ the Emperor remedied this Evil, by giving to
 “ the Publick, a great Sum for three Years con-
 “ tinuance, contenting himself with security for
 “ the Principal. It’s true this Reformation, was
 “ not supported with rigour enough, and so lost
 “ it’s good Effect.” But so it happens with e-
 very Thing that opposes the Passions of Men, and
 no other Argument can be brought from this,

454 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

but that Usury is an Evil which requires constant vigilance, and firmness of Resolution to destroy.

III Not only the Historian, who was a great Statesman, and had been Consul, judg'd so: But the *Roman* People, the most knowing in Politics of any Nation that ever was. *Cæsar* the Dictator, *Tiberius*, *Augustus*, as I shall shew immediately, the wisest Princes have always had the same Sentiments about Usury. “ (f) They have “ made severe Laws against it, they have look’d “ upon different pretexts to justify it as Fraudulent and Illusory, and have been convinced, “ that the true Source of Usury, was a love of “ private Interest, and a Contempt of the Publick Good.

IV. But what deserves our greatest Attention, in what I have been relating, is the Conduct of a Prince; who far from borrowing upon Usury, gave Money to the People, to deliver them from the Oppression of the Usurers.

V. *Augustus* had given an Example of this Nature to *Tiberius*: for we learn from his Historian, that he had always a great Sum of Money in reserve, (g) to give out without Interest, to those who wanted it, and that he requir’d of them only Security, for the exact Payment.

VI. This Prince who govern’d the most extensive Empire that ever was with so great Wisdom, had not only a View to relieve the People by this liberality, but also, “ (b) to diminish the “ Value

(f) *Vetus urbi funebre malum & seditionum discordiarumque creberrima causa. Obviam itum fraudibus, quæ toties repressæ, miras per artes rursus oriebantur, quia privato usui bonum publicum postponitur.*

(g) *Usum pecuniæ gratuitum, qui cavere in duplum posset, ad certum tempus indulgit. Suet in vita Augusti. C. 41.*

(b) *Ut fenore diminuto, plurimum agrorum pretiis accessisset. ibid.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 455

“ Value of Interest, and heighten the price of
“ Land.

VII. (i) He put Marks of Infamy upon those who borrow'd Money upon small Interest, to lend it out at a much higher Rate; and what is regarded in our Times by many as wise Oeconomy, was detested by him, as a Vice deserving Publick Disgrace.

VIII. The Emperor *Alexander Severus*, not being able to Root out, and entirely to suppress Usury, (k) reduced it to four per Cent. And absolutely forbid it the Senators, allowing them only to receive some small presents, tho' afterwards he was not so strict in this Matter. It's true he (l) himself gave Money upon Interest, but it was that he might be able to lend the Poor gratuitously; and assist them to buy a Portion of Land out of the Revenues, of which he pay'd himself slowly the Money he had advanced.

IX. I know very well that the Profit of Usury cannot vindicate it, and that the most innocent Intentions can't hinder it from being an Evil: But this Prince, who had but an imperfect View of Truth, ought to put those to shame, who even in the Times of the Gospel carry Usury to Excess, devour both Prince and People, and force great Numbers to sell their Estates, or leave them Desert and uncultivated.

A R T-

(i) Notavit aliquos, quòd pecunias levioribus usuris mutuati, graviori fœnore collocassent. *Ibid.* C. 39.

(k) Usuras fœneratorum contraxit ad trientes pensiones, etiam pauperibus consulens. Senatores, si fœnerentur, usuras recipere, primò vetuit, nisi aliquid muneris causâ acciperent. *Lamprid. in vit. Alex. Severi.* p. 213.

(l) Fœnus publicum trientarium exercuit, ita ut pauperibus plerisque sine usuris pecunias dederit ad agros emendos, reddendas de fructibus, *Ibid.* p. 212.

ARTICLE IV.

Usury is Destructive of Agriculture.

I. One of the greatest Mischiefs of Usury is, that it absolutely ruins Agriculture: This is enough to excite against it, the Indignation of the Prince, who is desirous of establishing Agriculture, and who sees that Usury must destroy all his Care and Labour.

II. We have seen that *Augustus* gave Money to the People (*m*) without any Interest, that he might lessen the Value of Money, and advance that of Land, which commerce in Usury absolutely destroys. For this unjust Way of making Rich, is more easy and short, than that of buying Land, and improving it. No Care or Trouble is requisite to accumulate this sort of Wealth, only let a few Months run on. And when one has felt the great (*n*) Advantages of Usury, and how quickly it enriches, Land is look'd upon as a slow and lazy Way of getting Rich, and all necessary Expence to improve it as lost.

III. Then every Body in all Circumstances, think only of putting what Money they can save, in the Hands of Men of Credit. The Great and Little follow this Example. The Profit over-comes

(*m*) Ut fœnore diminuto, plurimum agrorum pretiis accesserit.

(*n*) La loi de César obligeoit à mettre un tiers de son bien en fonds de terre, au moins dans l'Italie, & c'est-que Tacite marque par ces mots rapportez ci-dessus: Adversum legem Dictatoris Cæsaris, quâ de modo credendi possidendique intra Italiam cavetur. Ce qui fait voir que l'argent comptant étoit très commun, & que la commodité de la faire valoir par l'Usure, étoit pour le moins aussi grande alors qu'aujourd'hui.

comes the Modesty of those, who formerly had a Sense of Honour and Equity ; and when the Gain of Usury, has brought all the Money into the Hands of Usurers, many of the Ancient Nobility, many of honourable Families, whose Estates and Houses would be preserv'd by a Sum of Money lent them in good Time, are forced to sell all for want of a Relief, which their best Friends can't give them.

IV. Sometimes they seek this Relief in Usury : but it has become them so immoderate, so disdainful, that commonly it is inexorable ; or if it yields, it is upon so hard Terms, that its Assistance is a new Oppression.

V. If those who have great Estates to serve for Caution, and surety are so treated ; what must they expect who have less Wealth ? who will assist a Merchant a little distress'd in his Affairs ? Who will hinder a Tradesman in his straits, to sell the very Instruments of his Art, and thus deprive himself of all resource ? Who will support an obscure Family, ready to sink under a load of Poverty which a small Assistance would relieve ? The greatest Numbers of the State, are made up of Men of these Circumstances : And it's for the publick Happiness, that they are not left in such a wretched Situation. But Usury, when it Tyrannizes, and it does always so when tolerated, hardens every Man against publick and private Wants, and makes Men calmly behold the Ruin of their Country, if they are to Gain by its Destruction.

VI. One sort of Men are capable of softning the Severity of Usury, they who have some in all Estates in the Country, at the Mercy of some Usurer, in a Neighbouring Village : This Man is always ready to bait the Hook, with some Appearance of Service. He relieves them for some
Time,

458 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

time, but at last plunders them of their paternal Estates, having only assisted these unfortunate Men with a design to spoil them of every thing. Examples of this Kind are vastly numerous: Thus in a short time the Country is depopulated: Agriculture perishes, and it is to Usury more than any other Cause, that we must attribute a Misfortune, the dismal Consequences of which we have observed in another Place. (o)

VII. We may add to experience, what is taught us of this in (p) Scripture. The *Jews* after their Return from *Babylon* enter'd into the Possession of the Estates of their Ancestors, but many of them oppress'd with Taxes, and starv'd with Famine, were obliged to borrow of others to support them, and pay the publick Tribute. Immediately the Usurers robbed them of their Estate and Lands. Complaints of this came to *Nebemiah* Governor of the Country, a Man of great Virtue. He assembled the People, made the Rich ashamed of their hard Hearts, and put those in Possession of their Estates, who had been Plunder'd by Usurers. (g) Your Conduct is unjust, said he to them, ought ye not to walk in the fear of the Lord because of the Reproach of the Heathen our Enemies. I likewise, and my Servants might have exacted of them Money and Corn. I pray you let us leave off this Usury: Restore I pray you to them even this Day their Lands, their Vineyards, their Olive yards, also the hundredth part of the Money and of the Corn, the Wine, and the Oil that ye exact of them. Then said they we will restore them, and will require nothing of them. So will we do as thou sayst, then *Nebemiah* took an Oath of them that they should do according to this Promise

(o) Dans le Chapitre XII. de cette Partie.

(p) *Esd.* C. V. v. 3. 4. 6. 7.

(g) *Esd.* C. v. V. 9. &c. seq.

mise, he shook his Lap, and said, God shake out every Man from his House, and from his Labour that performeth not this Promise, even thus be he shaken out and emptied.

VIII. We see in this Event a great many things which deserve the attention of the Prince. Usury in a short time deprives numbers of Families of their Estates and Properties. These Families reduced to Poverty, are a burden to the State. Division and discontent separate and divide the People into two Bodies, and shake the Foundations of Society and Government. A wise Governour takes care to remedy their Disorders by putting a stop to Usury, and reinstating the lawful Possessors in the enjoyment of those Estates Usurers had deprived them of. He employs the authority of Religion, and predicts, that he, who should oppress his Brethren by Usury, should be reduced to the greatest Poverty and Want. Usury may be compar'd to a violent and devouring Fire, which at last involves those who rais'd it, in Flames. It is the plague of a State, involving both poor and rich in Calamity, and spreading general Misery.

IX. A wise Prince considers it in this Light, and as much as it is destructive of Agriculture, and an Enemy to the peaceable possession of Estates, so much the greater Care does he take in protecting these, and procuring (r) Lands to the Poor, which they may cultivate with greater Care and Affection, than those in which they have no Interest.

ARTICLE V.

Usury is injurious to Trade.

I. He gives the same Attention to free Commerce from all Usury, which is as fruitful a source
of

(r) *Nous avons vu l'exemple de l'Emp. Alexandre Severe. Ita ut pauperibus plerisque sine usuris pecunias dederit ad agros emendos, reddendas de fructibus.*

460 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE.*

of Wealth to a State as Agriculture, and he forms in this Matter, Rules very different from those avarice has introduced, and which it endeavours to vindicate.

II. He knows that the Publick have a great Interest in the happiness of Merchants, that they don't break, or at least very seldom, and that Credit, which is the Soul of Trade be firmly established. He is well persuaded that when Merchants borrow upon Usury, 'tis hard for them to support Trade long, that they are more exposed to ruin, and involving others in it; that it is dangerous to trust their Credit which often deceives, and that there is no knowing their real Wealth till their Death.

III. A wise Prince easily discerns that, if the Merchant makes so considerable a Profit by his Trade as to support his Family, encrease his riches, and pay the interest and capital of the Money he borrows he would still be more rich if he did not divide his Gains with his Creditors; that his Trade indeed would not be more able to bear losses, because he would not be oppressed at the same time with the high demands of Usury; that he would not be so rash, not being under so strong a Necessity of making great Profits, because all his Gain would be his own, and the term of Payment would not be so lively a Spur to lead him to dangerous Projects; that he would be more just, more sincere, and of consequence more useful to the Publick; that he would leave his Affairs in better Order, enjoy more Peace in his Family, and make rich with greater purity and innocence of Mind.

IV. It is indeed the imprudence of Merchants only, or their excessive Avarice that introduces Usury into Commerce. Some of them rashly engage in hurtful Projects, from which they can
only

only be deliver'd by borrowing; this seldom however saves them from ruin, if it is not gratuitous, and only makes their Loss the more certain, by retarding it for some time: For Usury does never resettle Affairs, which are once in confusion, and disorder, nor is it ever more excessive than when the credit of the Borrower begins to stagger.

V. Others, out of a desire of becoming speedily rich undertake beyond their Strength, and Burthen their small Stock by borrowing. If they had more Patience and Moderation they would come to their Point more surely, tho' somewhat more slow. But Avarice seduces them, and because some succeed in this, a great many following their Example, engage in Schemes that are very dangerous contrary to the happiness and safety of the Publick.

VI. There are Cities of very great Trade, who hitherto have been Strangers to Usury. Many Families in them have acquired riches by a lawful Commerce, they will always keep these riches if they don't depart from the Maxims of their Ancestors, who only traded upon their own Stock, and encreased it every Year, who left great Wealth behind them, because they did not make too great haste in acquiring it.

VII. If it is objected that the Interest of the Publick requires the forming extensive Schemes of Trade, which are beyond the Abilities of a private Man to carry on. I will agree to this; but I can't see that Usury is necessary to the carrying on of great Projects, it is more fitted to render them abortive, and I believe a Prince will rather choose to trust their Success to a Society of able Merchants, who Trade upon their own Riches, than to any single Man, whose sole Wealth depends on Credit, and must first run into considerable Debt in hopes of Success.

462 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

VIII. These kind of Schemes ought to be managed by a Council of Trade composed of wise and disinterested Men, Enemies to Avarice and Usury, and conducted by the spirit of the Prince, whose designs are Fair and Innocent.

XI. I can't finish this Subject without entreating the Prince to remove the last resource of Usury, by delivering from its snares an Age, exposed to seducement by want of Experience, and the violence of Passions, and to hinder those who have given Money upon Usury to young Men, under the Authority of their Fathers, or Conduct of their Tutors, from having a Right to claim their Debt at any time, either after the Death of the Fathers, or in Virtue of the Ratification of the others when of Age.

X. No Severity short of this can put an end to a Disorder, which ruins the best Families of the Nation, which plunders heedless Youth of their Wealth, and thus deprives them of the Means of serving their Country when they become more wise and prudent, which obliges them to Marry below their Rank to get Money to pay off their Debts; and contributes more than any other Cause to the indocility, licentiousness and corruption of Youth.

XI. *Vespasian* one of the wisest Emperors the Romans ever had, understood all the Consequences of this Disorder; and (g) it was by his Advice as well as Authority, that the Senate, by a Law, deprived those who lent Money to Youth of the Right and Hopes of getting Payment.

XII. If such a Law was rigidly kept, and no Regard was paid to Ratifications exacted with

a

(s) *Autor senatui fuit decernendi, ne filiorum familias fœneratoribus exigendi crediti jus unquam esset, hoc est, ne post patrum quidem mortem. Suet. C. 11.*

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE. 463

a design to elude it, the Estates of Families would be perpetuated; Youth would not find it so easy to indulge themselves in Vice, Fathers would be more regarded, and the State would be filled with excellent Subjects which Usury deprives them of, by corrupting and seducing them.



CHAP.



CHAP. XV.

A Prince ought to inspire his Subjects with the Love of all the Virtues, upon which the happiness of a State depends. What those Virtues are : What Methods ought to be employed to make them beloved and pursued by them.

ARTICLE I.

The Prince ought to inspire his Subjects with a Love to all the Virtues on which the Happiness of a State depends.

I. **I**F a Prince confines his Cares to enriching his People without any Thought of making them more virtuous or just, he would have as narrow Views as the common People, who have no further concern about the State, but that it increases in Wealth ; he would only minister to the Passions of Men, and neglect the principal end of Government, by taking no Care of the Morals of his People, and even corrupting them by Riches, in place of labouring to make them more innocent and pure.

II.

II. “ (v) What End and Aim do you think a
 “ Prince ought to have in View, said the most
 “ knowing of the Pagan Philosophers? Can it
 “ be any other than that of making his People
 “ as Perfect as possible? and yet we praise those
 “ Men as happy and great, who propos’d no o-
 “ ther Design in their Government, but softning
 “ the People, by delicate Pleasure, and provid-
 “ ing them with every Thing to satisfy their Pas-
 “ sions. The Vulgar admire them as the Au-
 “ thors of the Grandeur and Magnificence of
 “ Athens; and don’t observe that softness, and
 “ the Indulgence introduced by them, have left
 “ in the State Ulcers, which can’t fail of breaking
 “ and spreading general Corruption. For instead
 “ of Inspiring the People with a Love of Fruga-
 “ lity, Moderation and Justice, they have em-
 “ ploy’d their whole Care in the Embellishing of
 “ Harbours, building of Ships, encreasing the
 “ publick Revenues by Trade, Duties on Goods,
 “ and in other Things as frivolous, and as Vices
 “ the natural Consequences of a Government so
 “ corrupt, spread every where; they blame the
 “ present Magistrates, as the Authors of this
 “ Corruption, while they highly extol *Themisto-*
 H h “ *cles,*

(v) An is qui ad Rempublicam accedit, alterius cūjuspam
 rei curam debet suscipere, quàm ut quàm optimi cives simus?
 Laudibus illos homines effers, qui populum conviviis im-
 plexerunt, ipsius cupiditabus plus æquo indulgentes. Illos
 dicitat vulgus civitatem magnam effecisse: nec animadvertit
 totum veterum operâ civitatem tumere, et ulcere latente la-
 borare: nam temperantiæ atque justitiæ neglecto studio, por-
 tum, & navalium, & mæniū, & tributorum, cæterarumque
 nugarum copiâ civitatem impleverunt: quum igitur morbi im-
 petus ingruerit, in præsentis nunc consultores culpam referunt;
 Themistoclem autem, & Cimonem, & Periclem. malorum au-
 tores, laudibus commendant. *Platon dans le Dialogue appellé*
Gorgias, Tom. I. pag. 515, & 519.

466 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE,

“cles, Cimon and Pericles, who are the real Cause
“of all these Evils.

III Nothing is more Pure, more Worthy the
Attention of a great Prince, than these Senti-
ments; and I can't do them greater Honour, than
to compare them with those of St. *Augustin*, who
had the same Ideas of this Affair.

IV. “(x) Men, says that Father, judge of
“Things according to the Corruption, and dark-
“ness of their Hearts, they think a State Hap-
“py when the Cities are crouded with Magni-
“ficient Palaces, when Theaters of a great and
“prodigious Largeness are Built: when Glory is
“attach'd to extravagant Profusion, and Works
“of Compassion, are held in Contempt; when
“Comedians live in Luxury, and the Poor
“want the Necessaries of Life; but when God
“permits such abuse of Wealth, it is a terrible
“Effect of his Wrath. He punishes severely a
“State, when he leaves such disorders unpun-
“ish'd; and on the other Hand, when he takes
“from Men the support of their Vices, and re-
“duces them to Poverty, it is then he mixes
“Mercy with Judgment, and Punishes that
“he may Pardon.

V. But when I lay before the Prince, the Ob-
ligation he is under, to make his Subjects more
Just and Virtuous; I do not as yet speak of that
Virtue

(x) Perverſa & adverſa corda mortalium felices res huma-
nas putant, cum teſtorum ſplendor attenditur, & labes non
attenditur animorum; cum Theatrorum moles exſtruuntur, &
effodiuntur fundamenta virtutum: cum glorioſa eſt effuſionis
infamia, & opera miſericordiæ deridentur: cum ex his quæ
divitiis abundant luxuriantur hiſtriones, & neceſſaria vix ha-
bent pauperes. . . . Hæc ſi Deus pollère permittat, tunc in-
dignatur graviùs; hæc ſi impunita dimittat, tunc punit infe-
tiùs: cum verò evertit ſubſidium vitiorum, & copioſas libidines
inopes reddit. miſericorditer adverſatur. *S. Aug. dans l'Épi-
tre, 138. a Marcellin n. 14.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 467

Virtue and Justice, which arises from true Piety. I reserve this important Subject to another Part : not that I think the Moral Virtues, are different from those which have Religion for their beginning and end: On the contrary, I look upon the One, as a happy Preparation for the other ; and it is in this View, I have recommended them.

ARTICLE II.

What these Virtues are.

I. The Virtues, we are to treat of, are the Basis of a well regulated Government, the *Pagans* knew their utility, and both *Greeks* and *Romans*, have given us great Examples of them ; a wise and knowing Prince, is sensible he can be of no real Use to a State ; if he only enrich it, and neglect the promoting of the Virtues, which alone deserve solid Praise.

II. God has shewn all Men, how much the Virtues are capable of supporting and aggrandising a State, by founding on them the *Roman* Empire, the most great and glorious that ever was ; by granting it incredible Success, as long as they were held in Honour and Esteem ; and by permitting Seditions and Civil Wars to enter, which terminated in the Ruin of the Commonwealth, when Luxury and Voluptuousness, had extinguished all the Virtues.

III. This is the Opinion of *St. Augustin*, and it well deserves to be related in his own Words :

“(y) There are some Men so unjust, as to look
H h 2 upon

(y) Vitiis impunitis volunt stare Rempubicam, quam primi Romani constituerant auxerantque virtutibus, etsi non habentes veram pietatem erga Deum verum, custodientes tamen

468 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

“ upon the Impunity of Vice, as a Happiness,
 “ and who would think a Republick is not well
 “ establish’d, when Licentiousness does not
 “ Reign in it: those who should know that this
 “ very Republick, the first *Romans* founded
 “ and raised upon Virtue. For tho’ they were
 “ depriv’d of true Piety, that is the sincere
 “ Worship of the true God, they observ’d how-
 “ ever certain Rules of Probity and Justice, which
 “ are the Foundation of a State, and contribute
 “ to Increase and Establish it: and God granted
 “ them Success, to make Mankind see by
 “ the Example of so great and powerful an
 “ Empire, how useful the Civil and Po-
 “ litical Vertue, are to a State tho’ separated
 “ from true Religion, and of how much higher
 “ Value they would be join’d with true Religion;
 “ how they might become by them the Members
 “ of another Country, whose King is Truth,
 “ whose Laws are Charity, and whose Dura-
 “ tion is Eternity.

IV. The *Roman* Virtues, which St. *Augustin*
 mentions in general, are more minutely observ’d
 in the Sacred Books, in which it is shewn, by
 what Methods the *Roman* Republick became so
 powerful, with a design to instruct all who govern
 States, of the Care they ought to take, to make
 the same Virtues flourish in their Kingdoms.

V. The Scripture principally praises (z) their
 Wisdom

men quamdem sui generis probitatem, quæ posset terrenæ ci-
 vitati constituendæ augendæ, conservandæque sufficere: Deus
 enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo ac præclaro Imperio Roma-
 norum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine verâ religione vir-
 tutes, ut intelligeretur, hac additâ fieri homines cives alterius
 civitatis, cujus Rex veritas, cujus lex caritas, cujus modus
 æternitas. *S. August. Ep. 138. ad Marcellin. n. 17.*

(z) *L. 1. Maccab. C. VIII. v. 3.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 469

Wisdom and their Love (*a*) of the Publick, their Disinterestedness, (*b*) their Obedience to the Laws and lawful Authority ; (*c*) their Fidelity in treaties ; (*d*) their Patience in Labour ; and Firmness in their Resolutions, (*e*) their Courage and Valour, and above all their Love of Regularity, and (*f*) Distance from all Ambition,

VI. I can't do better than carefully follow this Model: I begin with Love of the Country, which is the same with Love of the publick Gain, because from this Love sprung all the *Roman* Virtues.

VII. Every Citizen look'd upon himself, as a Part of the Republick, who ow'd to it his Wealth, Liberty, and Life, he consider'd himself as bound to sacrifice his dearest Interest to the Happiness of the Republick, and he placed his whole safety and glory, in that of the State.

VIII. From this proceeded that general conspiring to promote the Publick Good : that mutual Assistance, all the Citizens gave one another, that anxiety for the Safety of the Publick : that Interest the People took in publick Deliberations, and Counsels : That Application private Men gave to discover what might contribute to the Happiness of the State : that Spirit of Wisdom and Policy, of which Artisans were possess'd.

IX. From this too flow'd that Love of every Citizen to his Country Men: The Joy he had in delivering any of them in Battle : The disposition to assist one another in common danger : a sensibility and feeling of the Happiness or Misery
H h 3 of

(*a*) *L. 1. Maccab. C. VIII. v. 15.*

(*b*) *v. 16.*

(*c*) *v. 12.*

(*d*) *v. 3.*

(*e*) *v. 2.*

(*f*) *v. 14.*

470 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

of the lowest of the People: The Shame and Pain it gave them, when they were not able to tear out of the Hands of the Enemy, a Citizen carried into Captivity: The Courage and Valour, they shew'd in defending their Companions, and with them the whole State.

X. From this proceeded an Attention to the Right Choice of Generals and Magistrates: The Concern they had in their Glory and Success: the Gratitude they shew'd to them for their Services: The Honour they paid their Virtues and Persons.

XI. This Union and Harmony, which a Love of their Country, and a Regard to the publick Happiness form'd amongst Citizens, made the Common-wealth as it were one Family; whereas private Interest (*g*), which is now so strong and powerful every where, makes every Family a separate State, absolutely indifferent, and often an Enemy to the Interest of the Republick; every one makes himself the Center all his Concerns: General Views affect no body: The publick Good is consider'd as a Vain Idea: the Sentiments of Honour pass for Weakness, and All endeavour to advance their own Interest, by separate Ways, in which they may walk alone, without having any Rival.

XII. (*b*) If any preserve a sincere Love to the State, and shew a Sorrow for its Misfortunes; these Men of Ancient Probity, are (*i*) either laugh'd at for their simplicity, or even insulted by the Rich. Insensibility goes so far as to make the Calamities

(*g*) Ut in familiis privata cuique stimulatio, & vile jam decus publicum. *Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 336.*

(*b*) Optimus quisque Reipublicæ curâ mærebat: multi odio præsentium, & cupidine mutationis, suis quoque periculis lætabantur. *Tacit. L. 3. Annal. p. 91.*

(*i*) Præcipuum pessimorum incitamentum, quod boni mærebant. *Idem. L. 1. Hist. p. 419.*

Calamities of the State be look'd upon, with the same Indifference, as those of a foreign Country, may even wish'd for to bring about some change of Government. Vice hardens their Hearts against every Evil that happens the State. All Views are center'd and directed to Self-love: (*k*) Emulation and Publick Spirit are extinguish'd: and both at Court and in the Country, none (*l*) think of becoming better Men, or more just: this Emulation is perfectly unknown.

XIII. A Publick Spirit made those in the Magistracy, zealous to Answer the Confidence the Publick put in them. As they had a most sincere Affection for their Country, they serv'd it from Conscience (*m*) and a Principle of Duty. If their services were known and esteem'd, this gave them Joy; but if they met with no Reward, or were even attended with Disgrace, they did not for this loose their Attachments to the Common-wealth. They return'd to a private Life, without any murmuring or complaints. They preserv'd for their Country, the Respect and Affection due from a Child to a Parent.

XIV. The Conduct of *Fabius* the Dictator, is well known, with what moderation he allow'd the Command of the Army to be shar'd betwixt himself and one of very inferiour Merit, whom they made equal to him in Authority, because

(*k*) *Nemo in illâ aulâ probitate aut industriâ certavit. Idem L. 2. Hist. p. 364.*

(*l*) *Fatali omnium ignaviâ. Idem L. 15. Annal. p. 286.*

(*m*) *Les sentimens des anciens Romains sont bien exprimez par la réponse du General Aurelien à L'Empereur Valerien, qui le felicitoit en présence de toute l'armée d'une victoire remportée sur les Goths. Ego, Imperator Auguste, ideo cuncta feci, ideo vulnera patienter accepi, ut mihi gratias ageret respublica, & conscientia mea. Vopisc. in vit. Imp. Aurel. p. 274. C'étoit un reste de cette ancienne Fidelité très-commune dans les premiers tems.*

cause they were not pleas'd with his slow Management of the War; what Goodness did he shew in saving his Collegue from the Danger to which his rash Conduct had thrown him; how zealously did he continue to serve the Publick, tho' he met with ungrateful Returns for his important Service.

XV. This Example, and some others of the same Nature are well known, but almost none imitate them. The State is poorly serv'd, and only to preserve an outward Decency, the least Disgust makes Men quit the Service of their Country, and a Disgust too often founded on a false Delicacy. Men of greater Merit are prefer'd to them. Men hang on a Minister or a Patron, but none attach themselves to the Interest of the Commonwealth, when she is in a bad Situation they abandon and forsake her.

XVI. The Patience of the *Romans* which the Scripture praises so much, had taken the deepest Root. They were prepared to suffer all Hardships for the common Cause; long Sieges, laborious Marches, remote Expeditions, the extraordinary Weight of the Arms, Baggage and Provision with which every Soldier was loaded; the ordinary Labour of fortifying the Camp for very short Stays, and several other Exercises of a very fatiguing Nature could not overcome the Love of the Glory of their Country; so invincible a Patience made them capable of conquering all the World.

XVII. It is useful for a Nation to propose to their Imitation such an Example, not to copy it in every Respect, which would be impossible, nor to prepare by hardening their Bodies against Labour for the Conquest of other Nations, which would be unjust: but that they may live in Security

curity without any Dependance on foreign Troops, and be invincible if attack'd.

XVIII. The Frugality of the *Romans* serv'd to harden them to Labour and form them to Patience : for they all led a hard and laborious Life, were commonly employ'd in Agriculture, or some other Work, expos'd to the Injury of the Seasons, and perform'd their military Exercises even when they did not serve in the Army. They were satisfi'd in every Thing with the simple Necessaries of Life ; they plac'd their Glory in retrenching their Wants, and not in diversifying them, and multiplying them without End, as Nations at present do, who value themselves on the greatest Politeness.

XIX. Pleasure is become with them a serious Study ; they make in it daily Discoveries ; one Nation communicates to another, what new Pleasures they have invented ; there are Masters for every Sort of Delicacy who have their Disciples ; the Love of Life and every thing that renders it sensual, has taken place of the Love of Glory (*n*). They go to Battel attended with every thing that can contribute to their Ease and Pleasure. Superfluities are more common than the Necessaries of Life, and the general Officers value themselves on their Profusion and Delicacy, when the common Soldiers are reduced to the greatest Hardships. They alone preserve their ancient Courage ; but it is justly complain'd that the Officers have not the same Bravery and Martial Spirit.

XX. 'Tis of great Importance for a Prince to restore Temperance and Frugality among his Subjects, and to prevent their being enervated by
Luxury ;

(*n*) Nec deerant, qui ambitione stolidà luxuriosos apparatus convivorum, & irritamenta libidinum, ut instrumenta belli mercarentur. *Tacit. L. 1, Hist. p. 336.*

474 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

Luxury; for in a little Time false Politeness would emasculate his Kingdom, by rendering his Nobles very effeminate, unable to bear the least Fatigue. To be deprived but a few Days of some little Conveniency, would render his Service quite intolerable to them, and only serve to make them regret the Pleasures and Ease they had quitted; and thus upon a decisive Occasion, more Epicures than Soldiers would be found in his Army.

XXI. But independently of that Consideration, which is however of essential Moment, care to hinder his Subjects to ruin themselves by superfluous Expence, would lead a Prince to reform Luxury in all its Branches: For there are Officers who in one Campaign consume what would be sufficient to maintain many; and thus put it out of their Power to serve longer, through an Affectation to follow the pernicious Example of others, and live in a more expensive Manner than they were able to support.

XXII. What preserved the *Romans* was their Love of Simplicity, not in their Repasts only, but in every thing; in their Dress, in their Buildings, in their Furniture. Their Wives being good Oeconomists sold much and bought little. Their Husbands were clothed with Stuffs of their Manufacture; they only valued what was of real Use, and despised all Pageantry, regarding it as a Shew to please Children; their Thoughts being wholly set upon preserving their Liberties or extending their Dominions; and some of them returned from Victory with great Chearfulness to the Plough which they had quitted to head an Army.

XXIII. Those Men, rustick in their Appearance, had it in their View to become Masters, and they gained their End. They pursued Glory
by

by good Methods, placing it in personal Virtues, and not in having magnificent Houses in which a Person of very little Merit might be lodg'd; nor in vain Splendor which commonly is the Purchase of Injustice and the Mark of a depraved Heart.

XXIV. Thus they reduced their necessary Expence within a very narrow Compass, and transmitted to their Posterity a Patrimony augmented by their Industry and good Oeconomy. They provided for and settled their Children with Ease, because it did not cost much. Simplicity at once preserved Estates and Virtue to Families; so that the most ancient ones were the most distinguishing Examples of frugal prudent Oeconomy.

XXV. What a vast Difference is there between their Moderation and our Excesses, their wise Rusticity and our Luxury? What Revenues can suffice to Profusion: which bad Example has rendered almost necessary? With what Wants and Demands have we not over-loaded our selves? How is it possible to content the Appetites which modern Fashion has introduc'd by lawful Means? (o) The richest Families are not equal to such extravagant Expence. Hence the rich are no more so. The ancient Nobility is beggar'd; and to make an outward Shew they are either totally ruined, or must take the most debasing Methods to retrieve their Fortunes.

XXVI. It is absolutely necessary that a Prince oppose a strong Barrier to this Torrent; and that he throw a salutary Ignominy upon Luxury and the vain, useless Employment of Riches, which may put a Stop to the extravagant Prodigality which

(o) Dites olim familiæ nobilium, aut claritudine insignes, studio magnificentiæ prolabeantur. Tacit. L. 3. *Annal.*
p. 95.

476 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

which lays waste the most illustrious Families, and amidst Affluence perpetuates Poverty; which corrupts the greater Part of the People into Injustice, tempting them to buy what they are not able to pay; instills into the most moderate an insatiable Thirst of Riches, for which they feel incessant Demands; which extinguishes the Love of Parents to their Children, whom they are not able to provide for; and converts the Respect of Children towards their Parents into a secret Indignation against them on Account of their Profusion, because they expect nothing from them but what Entail has put beyond their Power to waste.

XXVII. As Luxury naturally produces Avarice, because it must always have to satisfy its Cravings; the Frugality and Simplicity of the *Romans* on the contrary had inspired them with a Contempt of Riches, by rendering them insensible to the want of it. Modest Poverty was a Virtue among them, a Virtue in very high Repute. They considered it as a Mark of a well governed Mind; as the Source of Tranquillity and Peace; as a Barrier against corruptive Passions; as a perpetual incentive to industry; as an effectual Bar against idleness and effeminacy which they feared more than all other Enemies to their Republick.

XXVIII. They desired that the State might have enough for its Defence and Support, that the publick Treasury might be full and well managed, but were indifferent about all other Riches but that of the Commonwealth. No Promise could tempt them; no Wealth could dazzle them. All the Gold in the World was contemptible in their Eyes, and they could not be attack'd or conquer'd but by the Sword: This Disposition united them and kept them steady to

to the common Cause; made them submissive and faithful to Consular Authority, incapable of being seduced or divided by the Arts, Sollicitations or intrigues of Enemies. In fine, the Love of Poverty had made them invincible by rendering them incorruptible.

XXIX. But they lost these (p) Advantages by suffering themselves to be softened in their Manners by the Nations they had conquered, and by falling in Love with Riches, their Contempt of which had enabled them to make themselves Masters of the World. Then their Virtues vanished. From the Moment they became attached to private interest, the publick Good disappeared from before their Eyes. The Largeesses of the Ambitious easily divided an avaricious People into different Factions. Magistracy was bought, Liberty it self was set to Sale, and the World being subdued by the *Romans*, avenged it self upon them, by Means of its Riches.

XXX. 'Tis the *Romans* themselves who have deplored this fatal Change, and who have acknowledged that losing the Love of Poverty they lost all their other Virtues: But if they had not avowed it, their History, and the incredible Change that happened in their Manners, and then in their Government should teach us what we are to fear with regard to States (q) in which the
Love

(p) O urbem venalem & maturé perituram, si emptorem invenerit! says Sallustius concerning the Wars of Jugurtha, cited by St. Augustine in his Ep. 138. to Marcel. n. 19. The same Father cites also those Verses of Juv. Sat. 6.

..... Sævior armis
Luxuria incubuit, victumque ulciscitur orbem.
Nullum crimen abest facinusque libidinis, ex quo
Paupertas Romana perit.

(q) Ex quo pecunia in honore esse capit, verus rerum honor cecidit: mercatoresque & venales invicem facti quærimus

478 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Love of Money is become the universal Passion; in which no other Merit is acknowledged but Riches; in which Virtue is unhonoured; where Justice passes for Weakness; and it is not enquired how Riches were made, but merely if they are made; in which Families are so mixed and confounded that there is no such thing as pure Nobility; in which no other Use of Riches is known but Voluptuousness and Effeminacy; in which Avarice and Selfishness are universal, and the only Rule of Conduct; in which Virtue and Vice are upon a Level; if they are both able to give the same Price, and all is venal, even Conscience it self; Riches is supreme Master of all, and Probity must be content with what it will allow it.

XXXI. It is visible, that in certain Nations this Corruption is gone to a vast height, and threatens to spread it self over others. To get Riches is the sovereign Good, and no other Use of it is known besides what an *Epicurean* would make; nay, were he but a tolerable good Citizen, he would be ashamed to see the Use now made of Riches; for the received Maxim is to regard it only on all Expences, and to look upon all as lost which is not lavished away upon sumptuous Equipage, Furniture, Buildings, Gardens, Table, and a numerous Retinue of idle Servants.

XXXII. The Pleasure of lending to a Man of worth in his want is now quite uncommon: to give to Children of good Parentage what is necessary to their suitable Education; to establish such in a proper way of living, are generous Deeds now absolutely unheard of: one scarcely retains

Regard

mus non quale fit quid, sed quanti: ad mercedem pii sumus, ad mercedem impii: honesta, quamdiu illis spes inest, sequimur; in contrarium transitori, si plus scelera promittant.
Senec. Ep. 115. p. 672.

Regard to his own Posterity, to his own Family; but it is become common to leave them in miserable Circumstances, nay even to deprive them of Life, by banishing them into Monasteries, and thus to throw the Burden of them on the Church, hoping thereby to make amends for their domestic Profusion.

XXXIII. Others do not think themselves avaritious, because they do not heap up Treasures, but live splendidly, and so imagine themselves far removed from that sordid Thrift which they take to be the sole Characteristick of Avarice.

XXXIV. But they are egregiously mistaken: the Covetous, who amass Riches without making any use of them, are avaritious in one way only; whereas they who love Expence and Luxury are such in as many different ways as they covet things that can only be procured by Money. All their Passions, which can only be satiated in this way, include in them the Desire of Money; and the more violent and impatient they are, the more insatiable and furious do they render that Desire.

XXXV. The Avaritious who deny themselves every thing, and thus punish themselves by their Covetousness, have been but few in all Ages, and there are not many Examples of such Avarice in our times. The Shame and the Misery attending this Vice, hinder its becoming prevalent: but false Magnificence has Charms in all Eyes, and Voluptuousness finds its account in it yet more than Vain-glory: thus every one abandons himself to an Avarice as rapacious as the Appetites it hath to supply; and at last Voluptuousness having quite drained all the Sources whence it can be gratified, it brings Povetty; which, all the former Appetites still remaining, tempts Persons of Birth

480 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

Birth to have recourse to most infamous Mean-
nesses.

XXXVI. It would be worthy of a Prince to give Lessons upon this Subject to his Court, and to all his Subjects. To make them understand in what respect Money is truly estimable, and what is its real Value; and to make those who ruin themselves by wasting it most extravagantly, feel that by better Oeconomy they might preserve their Liberty, their Independency, their Glory, whereas they now are putting themselves under the feet of others; that they might be just, and pay their Debts, instead of blushing before their Creditors; that they might help their Friends, whereas they are a Tax upon them; that they might live suitably to their Birth and Rank, whereas they now dishonour it every Day of their Life, by a Baseness unpardonable even in Slaves.

XXXVII. Many things are taught the young Nobles which are of much less importance to them than such Truths. They are not cautioned against the reigning Vices, which have a shew of Greatness; and the wise Middle which separates Avarice from Prodigality, is not pointed out to them: that Virtue which is able to deny it self many Gratifications, that it may be able to give to others, and teaches how to bear Poverty with Dignity, that it may be liberal with Discernment and for ever.

XXXVIII. It would be of great advantage to put them upon remarking Examples of this noble Disposition of Mind in ancient Histories, and to oppose to the present Depravity, Maxims of Virtue that have been held in high Veneration even among Infidels. Perhaps it would touch them to see in History, how (*r*) a rich Man visited poor Families, to learn from them to deny himself
many

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 481

many things, and how he was filled with Confusion, when he thus observed that he had yet retained many Superfluities ; and that he was so severe to himself for no other Reason, but that he might divide his Estate with a great many Persons of Merit who were in want.

XXXIX. The Example of the best of his Friends (s) yet more deserves Consideration : For being born poor he would always continue so, and his Friend could not vanquish this his Resolution. I am not ashamed, said he, of a Poverty which has not hindered me from meriting the first Employments in the Republick, and the Command of Armies ; she has never made me ashamed, and I will not cast an Asperision on her by forsaking her.

XL. A Roman Knight (t) being moderate with regard to his private Expence, but magnificent with respect to others, was able to oblige almost all the Towns in Greece, by giving them large Sums of Money, and thus deserved to be looked upon by them as their Founder and Deliverer.

XLI. We read with Astonishment the Liberalities of another, (v) who furnished Persons of Condition with what was requisite to their honourable Subsistence ; who added to the Fortunes of young Girls of Birth ; who plac'd his chief Joy in making his Friends more easy and convenient in their Situation ; and who declares in his Letters that the Fund of all his so well placed Bounty, was his Oeconomy and Self-denial in several Respects.

XLII. I touch these Examples transiently, to shew what profitable Lessons we may learn from others, and to point out the Generosity, of which Disinterestedness together with Oeconomy, is the

I i

Source ;

(t) Cicero's famous letters concerning his Life.

(v) Pliny, surnamed he younger.

482 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Source ; whereas Avarice join'd with Lavishness naturally engenders in the Mind low and sordid Sentiments.

XLIII. Never had the *Romans* such noble and elevated Sentiments, as while they despised Riches. All mean low Practices were detested by them ; every Thing that favoured of Artifice ; and whatever was not straight and simple, was as odious to the People as to the Senate ; to the Soldiery as to their Commanders.

XLIV. They delated the Traitor without desiring any Profit by the Discovery. The Life of the Prince was as safe among them from all villainous Attempts as at Court. They thought of no Evasions for eluding their Word when they had given it. They did not imagine that War dispensed from observing the Rules of Equity and Truth. (*) In it they used only honourable Means, and never began it without a formal Declaration. Their Treaties were sincere. Fidelity and Probity were in high Veneration among them, and their Laws were so pure and just that they indeed deserved to give Law to other Nations ; and the greater Part of those we now observe are a Remainder of what prevailed among them even after the Extinction of the Republick.

XLV. How lamentable is it that such Virtues should have been sacrificed to vain Glory ; that their true Origine and End were not known ; and that Pride and Ingratitude should have taken away all their Value and Merit : But the Misfortune of those who do not know these Virtues or despise them, is yet more deplorable. They have the same Pride without having the same Light.

They

(r) Responsum, non fraude neque occultis artibus, sed palam & armatum populum Romanum hostes suos ulsci
Tacit. L. 2. Annal. p. 74.

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE. 483

They are Slaves to all the Passions which (y) the Desire of Honour had extinguished in *Roman* Breasts, and they fall as short of them in Worth, as the Senses are inferior to Understanding and Reason,

ARTICLE III.

The Means a Prince ought to employ to render the Virtues amiable.

I. 'Tis requisite that the Prince should sometimes praise these Virtues so essential to a happy State. He will give Birth to the Love of them by testifying his high Esteem of them; and he will make use of that Charm to raise the Courage of many above all low and interested Sentiments, which bow them down to the Earth, and keep them wrapped up as it were in themselves.

II. He will testify on the other hand, a vast Contempt of all the Passions, which have no other Object but sensual Gratification.

III. He will remove far from him and all Employments, those who being devoid of all Generosity and Greatness of Mind, are entirely taken up about themselves and their Families.

IV. He will signalize by Marks of his Favour all those in whatever Condition of Life, who have given any Proofs of their Zeal for the publick Interests.

V. He will signify on all Occasions his Hatred of Luxury and idle Expence, and his Love of Frugality and Simplicity.

I i 2

VI.

(y) *Veteres Romani laudis avidi, pecuniæ liberales erant. Gloriam ingentem, divitias honestas volebant: cæteras cupiditates hujus unius ingenti cupiditate presserunt. S. August. L. 5. de Civit. Dei C. 12.*

484 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

VI. He will pay no Regard to Wealth. He will condemn all Sollicitude to acquire it, and make it known that Wealth suddenly acquired will ever be suspected by him.

VII. He will highly honour Probity, Candour and Fidelity, and will cover the opposite Vices with Shame and Ignominy.

VIII. He will give assiduous and perseverant Attention to protect Virtue, to recompense Merit, and punish Vice.

IX. And by his own Conduct he will give an Example of it, that will have more Influence than any Rewards or Chastisements.

But these two Articles comprehend Duties of great Importance, that deserve to be handled more at large, and I shall begin with Example.





CHAP. XVI.

One of the principal Means to render a People virtuous, is the Example of a Prince. How his Example may have the greatest Influence. The Conduct of those about the Prince ought to weaken the Impression of his own good Example.

ARTICLE I.

One of the most effectual Ways to render a People virtuous is the good Example of the Prince.

I. (z) **W**HAT you are by Birth, said the Emperor *Tiberius* to *Nero* and *Drusus*, in Presence of the Senate, hold you up to the Observation of the Publick: and your good or bad Conduct will have Consequences of great Moment with respect to it. This is yet more true of a Prince who is actually upon the Throne, and sitting there draws towards him the Eyes of his whole People. (a) It is not in his Power to hide himself; when he disappears he is followed; and the Darkness in which he may study to hide him-

(z) Ita nati estis. ut bona malaque vestra ad Republicam pertineant. *Tacit. L. 4. Annal. p. 110.*

(a) Habet hoc primum magna fortuna, quod nihil rectum, nihil occultum esse patitur. *Pansg. Traj. p. 229.*

486 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE &c.

himself from Spectators, will only serve to discover him.

II. (*b*) In private Life Virtues and Vices do not so much interest the Publick. Men must be very extraordinary to pierce the Obscurity which covers it: and it's only the more enormous Crimes that are obscur'd: But in a Prince all is Conspicuous; his Virtues are placed upon the same Seat with him, and his Defects mount with him upon the Throne.

III. He may strive in Vain to hide himself for some Moments under the Habit of a private Person, his Grandeur betrays and points him out. It pursues him so that he cannot get rid of it; and it gives a Glare to all he does, even when he desires to Conceal it, whether thro' Humility or Shame.

IV. All is remarked even to his Words. The Secret which was thought impenetrable escapes by a Thousand Passages. There are always some retir'd Discourses, which come at last to the Knowledge of the Publick; and the more the Prince seems ignorant of them, the more the People credits them.

V. It is not therefore possible for a Prince to avoid the Reputation he Merits. He will have in spight of himself a far spread one, because his own Servants and Strangers will equally contribute to spread it; and consequently he ought to give
all

(*b*) Alia conditio est eorum qui in turbâ latent, quorum virtutes, ut appareant, diu luctantur, & vitia tenebras habent. Vestra facta, dictaque rumor excipit: & ideo nullis magis cavendum est qualem famam habeant, quam qui, qualemcunque meruerint, magnam habituri sunt. . . Aberrare à fortunâ tuâ non potes: obsidet te, et quòcunque descendis magno apparatu sequitur. Tibi non magis quam soli latère contingit . . . omnium in istam (lucem) conversi oculi sunt. *Senec. L. 1. de Clem. C. 8.*

all diligence to merit a good one : and because he can no more hide himself than the Sun can, he ought to think of shining like the Sun, by diffusing every where the Light and Influence of his Vertuous Example.

VI. This is the Method Providence commonly uses to reform the State, and to bring Probity and Integrity into Honour. It gives the Prince all the Qualities which deserve to be imitated : and his Rank adds to the natural Beauty, an Authority which makes them to Reign with him, and gains universal Respect and Admiration to them.

VII. There is in the People a secret Veneration for the Prince, which prepares the Way to the Influence of good Examples ; and which easily passes from his Person to his Qualities.

VIII. (c) It is besides their Interest to please him ; and they know they cannot without conforming themselves to his Inclinations.

IX. He is Master of their Wills, as of their Interests ; and he can turn them whithersoever he pleases, because they depend on him ; and he has the Key to their Hearts.

X. Self-love follows without Reluctance, the Path thus laid open to them : It has a certain scope, and it is equal to it to come at it by Virtue, or by criminal Complaisance. It is even an Advantage to it, to be able to unite Interest with Honour ; and it is doubly satisfied, if by concealing some Passions, it can gratify other more restless and imperious ones, such as Pride and Ambition.

XI. It is true, Self-love thus disquieted, is far

I i 4

remote

(c) *Flexibiles quaecunque in partem ducimur à principe, atque, ut ita dicam, sequaces sumus : huic enim cari, huic probati esse cupimus, quod frustra speraverint dissimiles. Pansg. Traj. p. 131.*

remote from Virtue. But it is a great deal gained to put a stop to external Actions repugnant to Duty. It is very much to remove the Example and Sight of them : It is a great deal to facilitate the Practice of Virtue to the Youth, by leaving nothing to their Observation, but innocent Manners.

XII. One becomes gradually accustom'd to Virtue, and after having put on the outside of it, the Motives to it begin to gain Ground. By acting reasonably, one is brought likewise to think reasonably. The Passions are weakned by denying them Increase; and Pride itself languishes when one would please a Prince who condemns it, and can distinguish counterfeit, from genuine Modesty.

XIII. But if there should be some Persons who only assume the Mask of Virtue, without having its sentiments, how many others are there to whom the Prince's Example, would give courage, who thro' false shame did not discover themselves? They durst not appear virtuous because Virtue was despised. They loved it in Secret, but they kept it in Prison. They had good Sentiments, but they wanted Resolution : Glory being render'd to Merit awakens them, and sets them at Liberty ; and whereas they were at another time invisible, they now appear all on a sudden in great Numbers, because they only wanted a Protector to appear, and they were hid in the State, as Seed in the Earth, which a seasonable shower, makes disclose itself, and sprout forth on all sides.

XIX. There are many born along with the Torrent, and who yield to bad Examples, tho' they are not incapable of following the Best. To change them, nothing but a good Pattern is necessary, because they can follow tho' they cannot

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 489

not go alone; and the Example of a Prince at once makes this Change.

XV. Many certainly are afraid to displease a Prince, and have a high Ambition after his Approbation. It is enough to make such hate Vice, that it is become ignominious, and to make them love Virtue that it is respected. Now both these are the natural Consequence of the Prince's Example: and consequently it is to this Source we must owe such sudden and happy Alterations.

XVI. But the most solid and advantageous Effect the Example of a Prince produces, is that it gives Persons of real Probity new Credit and Authority; it delivers them from Contradiction and Opposition; and makes them more sought after and consulted: it makes the Utility of such better known, and their Approbation and Friendship esteem'd and desir'd; and in order to merit their Favour they are imitated.

XVII. By this means all the Parties in a State are re-united in the Love of Virtue; for there are no Provinces nor Cities which have not their Men of Merit; and the Consideration they acquire by the Example of the Prince, and by his Esteem of Merit, makes them as it were the Centre of every Province, and of every City, by giving weight to their Counsels, and inducing every one to follow their good Example.

XVIII. Thus (d) the Kingdom soon enters into the Manners and Spirit of the Prince. His private Conduct becomes the general Rule. What he approves is imitated; what he condemns falls into Contempt; and his just Inclinations, agreeable to the publick Good, submitted to the Law of God, communicate themselves with so much easiness, that one would say he is the Soul of all his Subjects.

XIX.

(d) Eò pervenimus, ut propè omnes homines unius moribus vivamus. *Paneg. Traj.* p. 131.

XIX. No other Means can have so universal; nor so lasting an Effect. Prohibitions correct nobody. (e) Fear does not change the Heart, and the Command of the Prince when it is destroyed by his Example, serves only to irritate, or excite Railery.

XX. (f) His own Life ought to be the Censor of other Peoples, otherwise he justifies Vice more by his Conduct than he condemns it by his Edicts.

XXI. If he will abolish Luxury, he must love Simplicity; if he will limit Expences, he must make none but what are necessary; if he will put a stop to the Passion of Gaming, he must forbid himself to play; if he will eradicate Avarice, he must be the first to be free from it; if he will hinder Licentiousness and Corruption, he must be the justest Person of his Kingdom.

XXII. These are the Laws that the People will easily follow; but the others, tho' they should be conceiv'd in the most severe and threatening Terms, will meet with insupportable Resistance.

XXIII. Many Laws were made against Luxury before the time of *Vespasian*, and all to no Effect. (g) This Emperor made none, and he abolish'd it by an example of Modesty, which every body thought it an Honour to imitate.

XXIV. It was the same in the time of *Alexander Severus*. He condemn'd Profusion, Luxury, and the desire of Riches only by his Plainness, his Frugality, his Application not to burthen the State,

(e) Vita principis censura est, eaque perpetua, nec tam imperio nobis opus est, quam exemplo; quippe infidelis recti magister est metus. *Ibid.*

(f) Quis terror valuisset efficere, quod reverentia tui effecit. *Ibid.* p. 132.

(g) Præcipuus stricti moris autor Vespasianus fuit, antiquo ipse cultu victuque. Obsequium inde in principem, & æmulandi amor, validior quàm pœna ex legibus. *Tacit. l. 3. Annal. p. 95.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 491

State, and not to employ his Revenues, but for the publick Good. This *(b)* tacit Censure had a good Effect : The great Men imitated his Example, and the Ladies that of the Empress. And it will be always so, when Princes are worthy of being a Pattern to their Subjects.

XXV. *(i)* They must apply themselves to distinguish People of Merit; and show a Disdain, for whoever has no other Recommendation but Riches; hence every body will respect disinterested Virtue, and Avarice will become odious and despicable.

XXVI. They must satisfy themselves with little; have a frugal Table; retrench all superfluous Expences; this alone will cover all those with Shame who do the contrary, and make their Excesses odious, oblige them to conceal themselves, make the great Men of the State, and Persons of the highest Dignity, pique themselves on Simplicity and Modesty.

XXVII. *(k)* As soon as the Prince declares himself for Virtue, he will have a Number of Followers. He will not love it long without Rivals, and there will be a great many found who will value themselves the more upon his Example.

ARTICLE II.

How the Example of the Prince may have a greater Effect.

I. To attract an universal Respect, and make all the World follow him, this Example must

(b) Prorsus censuram suis temporibus de propriis moribus gessit. Imitati sunt eum magni viri, & uxorem ejus matronæ pernobiles. *In vit. Alexand. Sever. per Lamprid.*

(i) Quod si ita feceris, multos statim videbis, quos partiarum divitiarum pudeat, alios etiam, qui voluntariæ paupertatis nomine sibi placeant. *Synes. de Reg. ad Arcad. Imper. p. 31.*

(k) Te, ô Imperator, philosophiæ amor capiat, sinceriorisque disciplinæ; necesse enim erit rivalet tibi esse multos. *Id.*

496 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

must be perfect: for one will imitate the Prince, but will not be deceiv'd. One is tractable, but not credulous. One examines carefully, and even critically, his most secret Actions, to judge by those which have no Witnesses, of the Sincerity of those which he exhibits in publick: and if it is discover'd that the one does not answer to the other, we not only cease to admire them, but we look upon them as the Effect of a Vanity which belies and betrays it self: and the whole Disdain due to the Falseness and Hypocrisy of them recoils upon the Prince.

II. We are naturally upon our guard against every thing that carries the Air of Centure. Before we condemn our selves, we endeavour to find Faults in whoever seems to do better. And Pride is extremely clear-sighted, when, to justify its Weaknesses, it examines those of others.

III. Thus Dissimulation is a bad Remedy. The Prince ought to profit from the first Advice, and take away all Pretence for Censure, in carrying his Precaution even beyond Suspicion; this is the only Means; and it is a sure one: and a Prince who is attentive to reform all that the Publick takes the liberty of reprehending in his Conduct, not only shuts the Mouth of Slander, but adds to the Lustre of his other Virtues, that of Tractableness and Humility, more rare in Sovereigns, and likewise more capable of proving the Sincerity of their Sentiments.

IV. The Emperor *Valentinian* II. though very young, was expos'd to this Censure of the Publick; and the Manner in which he profited by it, ought to serve as a Pattern for all other Princes. It was said of him, (1) that he loved the Games of the

(1) Ferebatur primò ludis circensibus delectari: sic istud absterfit, ut ne solemnibus quidem Principum natalibus, vel imperialis honoris gratiâ circenses putaret esse celebrandos. Ajebant

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 493

the *Circus* ; as soon as he knew it, he laid down a Rule to himself never to assist at them, and did not even except certain Days when his Presence seem'd to be necessary. It was believ'd that he gave a part of his time to the Pleasure of Hunting, which he ought to have employ'd in Business ; he order'd all the Beasts that he had kept in his Park to be destroy'd. He was blam'd for going too early to Table ; the Advantages that he drew from this Reproach, was to exercise himself in Fasting, and to carry the Severity of it so far, that in the Ceremonies where Custom requir'd him to regale the Grandees of his Court, many of whom were Infidels, he assisted at the Entertainment without eating, even when it was a Fast-Day for the Christians, tho' he was not then (*m*) twenty Years of Age. Thus he found the Means of uniting Civility with Religion and Conscience.

V. We have this Account from St. *Ambrose*, who was well inform'd of it ; and it is to be wish'd that what he said of this young (*n*) Emperor could be said of many Princes ; that he was more severe in censuring himself than one commonly is in censuring others ; and that he had acquired a greater Authority over his Passions, than the most absolute Master has over his Slave.

VI. By this Tractableness, which profits by every Thing, and by this Exactness which reforms every thing, a Prince becomes perfect, and
worthy

Ajebant aliqui, ferarum eum venationibus occupari, atque ab actibus publicis intentionem ejus abduci ; omnes feras uno momento jussit interfici. Jactabant invidi quod præmaturè prandium peteret ; cæpit ita frequentare jejunium, ut plerumque ipse impransus convivium solemne suis comitibus exhiberet, quò & Religioni sacræ satisfaceret, & Principis humanitati. *S. Ambr. de obitu Valentin. n. 15. & 16.*

(*m*) He died in the 21st Year of his Age, according to Philostorges.

(*n*) Quis tam Dominus servi, quàm ille sui corporis fuit ? Quis tam aliorum arbiter, quàm ille suæ censor ætatis. *Idem n. 18.*

494 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

worthy of being propos'd as a Pattern for others: But he must take great care of giving himself for an Example. He ought to content himself with being so, and conceal even from himself his being so. Every one but himself must be persuaded of it; and every one must believe that he is ignorant of them: For the general Disposition is to hate Virtue when it is too austere, and to despise it when it is satisfied with it self. Imitation cannot be commanded, any more than Love. One must deserve it, and leave the care of finding it out to others.

VII. He must even go further; for Modesty alone is not sufficient to attract Imitators to the Virtue of a Prince. It has need, besides that, of Indulgence and Affability (o). He must be satisfied with little, in order to have more: Praise what is begun, instead of rejecting what is defective: Excuse, to give Courage: Dissemble, not to overburden: Wait for what Time must ripen, and not make it miscarry by an impatient Zeal.

VIII. To this indulgent Goodness, thro' Understanding and not thro' Weakness, he must join all the outward Qualities, capable of rendering Virtue amiable; take from it all those forbidding Appearances which do not proceed from it, but from the imperfection of those who profess it; soften its Severity by inviting Manners, and appear himself so calm, so free, so happy, that he inspires all the World with a Desire of becoming so by the same Means.

IX. Above all, he must shun the Air and Tone of a Man who instructs. A Prince ought not to be lavish of his Words, they should be receiv'd with Respect

(o) *An Encamium bestow'd in History on M. Aurelius, Fuit per omnia moderatissimus in hominibus deterrendis à malo, invitandis ad bona, remunerandis copià, indulgentià liberandis. Júl. Capit. in ejus vita, p. 144.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 495

Respect and Joy, and desir'd as Favours. 'Tis always bad to be profuse of them; but it is worse when the Matter is serious, and is not treated with that Dignity which is suitable to a Prince. Few Words, on Occasions which naturally offer themselves, are better than the most excellent Discourses. They must appear extempore, and the Design of the Prince in saying them must be more felt than perceiv'd (*p*). There is nothing he ought to apprehend more than the being Wise out of Season, and not discerning what is due to other People's Judgments.

ARTICLE III.

The Conduct of those about the Prince ought not to weaken the Impression of his own good Example.

I. This severe Precaution is nevertheless only for the Publick (*q*); for in Private the Prince has the same Liberty to speak of Virtue as the most zealous Ministers of the Church: And he is sometimes under an Obligation (*r*) of doing it, either to Persons of his Family, or to such of the Nobles whom he has honour'd with his Intimacy, or to (*s*) the Officers attach'd to his domestick Service by their Employments: For the Reputation of the Prince depends much upon that which the Persons have who live under his Eye, and whose Faults will be imputed to him.

II. His Zeal cannot be thought sincere, if he connives at them; nor can he be thought to give sufficient Attention if he is ignorant of them. Who will believe he has Authority if he is not obey'd?

(*p*) Plerisque ludibrio, pluribus tædio intempestiva sapientia, Tacit. L. 3. Hist. p. 391.

(*q*) Non oportet ut vitia domus tuæ ultimus scias: quòd quamplurimis novimus contigisse . . . de disciplinâ tu provide: illud nemini credas. S. Bernard. L. 4. de Considerat. C. 6.

(*r*) Est magnificum quod te ab omni contagione vitiorum reprimis ac revocas, sed magnificentius quod tuos. Paneg. Traj. p. 58.

496 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

obey'd? That he has Prudence, if he is not capable of chusing proper Expedients and Remedies? That he is fit to command a great Empire, if he cannot keep Order in his own Family? That he is solely attach'd to Virtue, when he gives his Ear to Persons of no Merit? That he is sincere in his Intentions to reform the State, while he suffers the Disorders of those employ'd in his own Service.

III. His personal Virtues can have no Effect, while he falls into such Faults; and yet one or other of these is commonly the Error of even the best Princes. Either they neglect the Government of their own House, or they find greater Difficulty in managing it than the Publick is apt to imagine, or perhaps their good Nature disposes to overlook some things, than to use severe Methods to rectify them.

IV. It would indeed be imprudent to use Severity to Persons more immediately attach'd to him; but there is certainly a Mean betwixt keeping too strict an Eye, and none at all. In my Opinion a Prince would succeed much better, would he persevere in his Duty, and not too easily despair of good Success.

V. With regard to such whom the Prince with one Word might make return to their Duty, if they don't amend, the Publick will never believe the Prince is dispos'd to do it: The People must imagine he is indifferent to their Vices, while they continue in Favour with him, and have free Access to him; and when they begin to entertain such a Notion, their former idea of the Prince's good intentions will vanish, and which is more deplorable, all his Projects for Reformation will be quite ineffectual.

(1) A se suisque orsus, primum domum suam coercuit: quod plerisque haud minus arduum est, quam Provinciam regere. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 458.*




THE
INSTITUTION
OF A
PRINCE, &c.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Prince's Attention to reward Merit and punish Vice is the most effectual Means of making a Nation virtuous. He is as much concerned in it as the State. Rules to be observed. The Happiness of a Kingdom where Merit alone is honoured and in Authority.

ARTICLE I.

The Prince's Attention to reward Merit and punish Vice is the most effectual Means of making a Nation virtuous.

- I.  Proper Attention to reward Merit and punish Vice would alone be sufficient for governing right; because this single Duty contains all the others, as it supposes all great Accomplishments in the Prince, and is the Source of all the Virtues that

B

can

2 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

can raise one Nation above the rest, and which are the End of Government.

II. In effect, St. Paul reduces all the Obligations of Princes to this one, in giving their Authority no other Office but that of protecting Virtue and punishing Vice (*t.*) *For he is the Minister of God to thee for good. But if thou doe that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the Sword in vain, for he is the Minister of God, a Revenger to execute Wrath upon him that does evil.* This Apostle opposes Praise to Punishment, and consequently means by this, a real Reward for Good, as Chastisement is a real Punishment for Evil. The Authority God gives to Princes is not limited to a simple Approbation of Virtue, no more than to simple Menaces against Evil. It places them in the stead of divine Justice in this Life, and lays them under an Obligation of rewarding or punishing what God himself would reward or punish were he to govern Mankind in a visible Manner.

III. The protecting Virtue and rewarding Merit is not then only an essential Duty in Princes; it is the very Foundation of their Authority: this is the end for which they have received it; and for this God has established them his Ministers: it is upon this account he puts a Trust in them: this is the Design he had in raising them above the rest of Mankind, and subjecting all temporal Riches to them. He had a mind that from this high Sphere, wherein he had placed them, they might be able to discover Merit at whatever distance, or however concealed in Obscurity: and that amongst all the Goods he trusted to their Wisdom, they might be in a Condition to chuse Recompences proportion'd to the different Sorts of Merit.

IV. Virtue and Merit are publick Goods. Every body is concern'd in them: and it is a greater Evil

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 3

Evil to leave them idle and unactive than to extinguish the natural Light, and deprive Men of the Use of the Sun : But the Prince alone is able to establish Virtue, and make it useful. He alone can (v) raise it, and shew it to Mankind. He alone can exercise and employ it. And consequently he must answer for the Wrong he does the Publick, in refusing the Protection and Authority to Virtue that might have evidenced it, and procured it the Liberty of communicating and spreading itself abroad.

V. He should go before it and lend it a helping Hand, place it in View, and make it share in his Grandure, draw Admirers to it, and teach others how to value it by his Example.

VI. (x) He ought to conquer the Timidity of true Virtue, which is always humble, and loves Obscurity, in proportion as it has Knowledge. He ought to commit a sort of Violence upon its Modesty in bringing it to open day, and pulling off the Vails with which it covers itself, and has no mind to part with ; because it was born in them, and owes its Being to them.

VII. (y) He must seek out for Merit, which is even invisible ; and be sensible of the Need there is of finding it ; put intelligent Men in pursuit of it ; take all the Precaution possible least it should escape him ; lay Snares for it as for his Prey ; look upon it as the Treasure of his State, tho' it is some times more concealed than the Gold in the

B 2

Mines,

(v) *Power is given to Sovereigns, says Signefius, to the Emperor Arcadius, ne inutilis ac iners virtutis natura in tenebris atque obscuritate marcescat. Synes. de Reg. p. 8.*

(x) *Quin potius in medium virtutem producas, quam domi segnem contineri nefas sit. Ibid. p. 31.*

(y) *Tu verò fac ut virtutis aliquid in pretio habeatur, quam vis sit cum egestate conjunctum. Nec te prudentia lateat hominis, aut justitia, reliquaue bonorum animi multitudo, sub vili abjectaque veste delitescens. Idem ibid.*

4 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

Mines, and the Pearls in the bottom of the Sea; not allow himself to be deceived by weak Out-fides, which often conceal rich Funds; and by his Penetration must imitate the Lapidaries, who know the Value of a Diamond before it is polished, which does not appear to be worth so much as a Bit of Glass to those who do not know what it is.

VIII. A Prince's chief Care ought to be that which he cannot share with another, and which is suitable to none else. (2) Private Persons may set up Prizes for those that excell in any bodily Exercise; such as Swiftnes, Address, or Strength: but the Prince alone has it in his Power to do so for Justice, Probity, Publick-Spirit, and Valour. It is his Business alone to excite a noble Emulation for Virtue, by Rewards that have some proportion to his Generosity, and his Views for the publick Weal. He is the only Source of publick Glory. It is he alone that can make Merit independent. It is only he that, after having made it free, can likewise make it reign, in subjecting to it all those that are its Inferiors. It is he alone that can defend it against Envy, give it an Exercise as extensive as his Zeal, support its Projects and Designs, and overcome the Obstacles opposed to it.

IX. Thus may true Merit be recompensed, in putting it in a Condition of serving the Publick: for as to itself it would be better pleased to be left in Darkness: but with regard to those who are not yet arrived at that Perfection, a little Applause nourishes and fortifies them. A little Favour encreases and supports their Number; and of this last Sort there are very many. For there are few capable of attaching themselves with
Courage

(2) *Turpe est jaculandi pugnandique solum certamina esse publica, & coronam ab iis qui ita vicerint reportari, temperantiae autem & virtutis nulla esse. Idem p. 28.*

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE, &c. 5

Courage and Perseverance to the Good, if Virtue leads to nothing, if it is despised and unhappy; if it excludes them from every Office, and is odious to those who distribute the Favours and Employments.

X. Many begin because their natural Inclinations lead them to what is good; but Experience disgusts them. They leave a Course that is hard in itself, and in which they find no Assistance. They are not strong enough to stand by themselves. They would be glad that Virtue and temporal Advantages were not separated: but in the necessity of chusing, they prefer what agrees with Weakness, to that which they would have loved better, if they had been supported.

XI. How soon Things are changed, and Virtue is in Honour, they all return to their first Views, and gladly leave the By-way Despair had led them into. Their Number daily encreases; and what an Ancient said is seen by Experience, That (*a*) all Virtues become easy when they have Justice done them, and that they never cost less than when they are in esteem.

XII. These two Things mutually assist each other, The Esteem of Virtue helps to make it easy; and its Facility in encreasing the Number of its Followers, and consequently its Admirers, likewise heightens its Reputation and Value.

ARTICLE II.

It is the Prince's Interest to reward Merit and punish Vice.

I. This is what the Prince's Attention produces in supporting it by Favour and Rewards: and

B 3

hence

(*a*) Virtutes iisdem temporibus optimè estimantur, quibus facillimè gignuntur. *Tacit, vit. Agricot. p. 452.*

6 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

hence he must consider that if he acted otherwise, he would stifle Virtue ready to shine forth ; he would eradicate that which should be produced ; he would render that which would be strong enough to support itself, useless ; he would destroy its Seed and Offspring ; he would directly oppose himself to God's Design, in concealing what he had a mind should be shewn, and in refusing the Publick what had been given him upon its Account. He would kill what he ought to nourish ; he would use that Authority he had received for protecting a Good to extirpate it.

II. Nothing could be more shameful for him, or heavier than such Reproaches : and even for his Interest and Glory he should take care to shun them ; because every Excuse would be in vain, and must be look'd upon as a Fault.

III. To excuse his Conduct, would he wish, for Instance, it should be said, He wants Understanding, and does not protect Merit, because he knows it not ? Would not this be owning that he has none, and that he is not told of the Value of certain Qualities, because he never was possessed of them ?

IV. He must then be look'd upon as a blind Artist, who would promiscuously take what came next to hand, and place it without Order or Design as he found it. He must be compared to a mad Architect, that would cut Stones for certain Places, and put others there that were not proper ; and should thus prepare a Ruin instead of raising a Building conform to Art. He must be consider'd as a Child, who having no Skill in precious Stones, taking Bits of Cristal for Diamonds, and counterfeit Pearls for natural Ones. All this is even too weak, for there is no Proportion between the same Failings of Blindness and Ignorance when

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 7

when they concern Merit and Virtue, and when their Objects are only corporeal and material.

V. God has not put it in the Power of Princes to give Merit to whom they please. They must seek for it, and find it, for they cannot make it. They must know what is proper for every Place, and examine the Fitness that certain Persons have to it. They cannot put the Hand in place of the Eye, nor substitute the Foot in room of the Head. The Symetry of the State is like that of the Body. Every Member has its Office, and every Office requires certain Springs and Motions. It does not follow, that because a Man can do one thing he should be capable of doing another. The loving his Character of Wit is a bad Reason for trusting him with the Finances or the Command of an Army, if he wants Experience and Capacity. Merit proper for these great Employments must be sought elsewhere; otherwise the Prince acts like a blind Man and a Child, and dishonours himself by this Weakness.

VI. Indifferency for Merit is still more shameful: for we pity the Blind, but cannot pardon the Contempt of the Light; and it is a more manifest Injustice to neglect known Virtue, or what is easily known, than to be ignorant of it. For that the Heart must be yet more corrupt than the Understanding: the Love of solid Good must be extinct in it; it must be insensible to all the Motives worthy of affecting it; all the great Qualities the Sages esteemed must be in the Prince's Eyes but as empty (*b*) Names; he must be absolutely indifferent about his State, and it must be the same thing to him whether he conducts it well or lets it perish; whether he is worthy of the Throne or deserves to lose it.

B 4

VII. I

(*b*) Virtus inane jam nomen, situ & squalore cooperta deseritur. *Theophylact. Instit. Reg. p. 2. Ep. 25.*

8 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

VII. I know nothing I can place below this fatal Disposition, but an Aversion to Virtue and a strong Jealousy against Merit. It is the greatest Misfortune, and at the same time, the most mortifying, a Prince can fall into, who, contrary to his Will, gives Evidence for Virtue in persecuting it, and (*c*) is only enraged against it because he despairs of attaining it though he admires it.

VIII. Under such Prince's Reign (*d*) Merit is not only neglected, but is odious; it is not only unrewarded but passes for a Crime. (*e*) It thinks it self happy in being able to lie concealed, and save itself by being forgot. To the Coverings of Humility it adds the Darkness of Precaution and Fear. (*f*) It fears being mention'd to a jealous Prince, by secret Enemies more jealous yet than the Prince of all Reputation and Virtue. It knows their affected Praises are only an Artifice to encrease a (*g*) distrustful Prince's Suspicions, who is enraged against every thing that seems to reproach his Lowness. It darkens and buries it self as much as possible, and only shuns Envy by assuming all the Appearances of (*h*) Idleness and Indolence. For it is much better in these unfortunate Times to have a bad Character than a good one: and one might be infinitely more easy, if, in place of some Virtues, one had all manner of Vice, took no care to conceal it.

IX. It

(*c*) Eamdem virtutem admirantes, cui irascuntur *Tacit. L. I. Hist. p. 329.*

(*d*) Nobilitas, opes, omissi gestique honores pro crimine & ob virtutes certissimum exitium. *Idem idid. 307.*

(*e*) Præcipuum votum ut memoriæ principis elaberentur. *Paneg. Traj. p. 243.*

(*f*) Causa periculi non crimen ullum, sed insensus virtutibus princeps, & gloria viri, & pessimum inimicorum genus laudantes. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol p. 465.*

(*g*) Sinistra erga eminentes interpretatio, nec minus periculum ex magnâ famâ, quàm ex malâ. *Idem ibid. p. 454.*

(*h*) Inertia pro sapientiâ, fuit. *Ibid.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 9

IX. It seems the Prince, of the Character I represent, does not think himself right Master but when his Subjects are (*i*) quite humbled, and imagines they deserve all to be treated like Slaves; because they have all the Sentiments of them. Then he lords it over them in Surety, because he perceives they have neither Courage nor Virtue; and he knows not that the more Merit a Person has, the more he is subject to the lawful Powers; and that the more vicious one is, the more he is prepared for contemning the Prince's Authority, by the Contempt that is made of Justice and the Laws.

X. In a short time all the Cowards, (*k*) prostituted to Flattery, (*l*) incapable of advancing themselves by any good Quality, put themselves in the place of exiled Merit. All who ought to obey Command: All that ought to be in a State of Humiliation is in Honour: And whereas Virtue mitigates Authority by Sweetness and Modesty, Vice on the contrary, when it has usurped it, adds a Fierceness and Insolence to it, that make it insupportable.

XI. (*m*) But even at this time, when all seem to declare against Merit, those are yet to be known who have it. The Usage they meet with makes them
be

(*i*) Vitiis potius civium (priores Principes) quam virtutibus lætabantur. Quod patientiores servitutis arbitrabantur quos non deceret esse nisi servos. *Paneg. Traj. C.* 128.

(*k*) Exemplar adulatorii dedecoris. *Tacit. L. 6. Annal.* p. 157.

(*l*) Quibus nulla ex honesto spes, & publica mala singulis in occasionem gratiæ trahuntur. *Tacit. L. 5. Annal.* p. 139.

(*m*) Labeoni quod præturam intra stetit, commendatio ex injuriâ *Tacit. L. 3. p.* 104.

Dolabellæ negatus honor gloriam intendit. *Idem L. 4. Annal.* p. 117.

Præfulgebant Cassius atque Brutus, eo ipso quod effigies eorum non viscebantur. *Idem L. 3. Annal.* p. 104.

10 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

be taken notice of. They are compared to those who enjoy the Employments which should be due to them. One raises them in esteem, in proportion as the Prince affects to humble them. We deplore his bad Taste, and bad Choice ; and he is secretly taken with those (*n*) who betray their Trust : who for interested Views inspire him with a Jealousy unworthy of his Grandeur ; and apply themselves to make all sort of Merit odious to him, in order they may reign alone, and subject even the Prince, in banishing all those who might inform him and discover what they are defective in by the great Qualities they should have.

XII. If the Prince were able to penetrate into the Hearts of his best Subjects, he would then see Justice rendered to Merit which he is an Enemy to ; the Grief there is for his substituting all that is despicable in its room ; and the Confusion with which one blushes for his allowing himself to be conducted by the low and shameful Passions of those who neither love his Person, Glory, nor Kingdom ; and (*o*) who endeavour to extinguish all Virtue, in beginning at him.

XIII. One sometimes succeeds better, in being contented to despise it, to set it at a distance from all Employments, to refuse it not only Favour but Justice, to treat it as suspicious, and to be always guarded against it, than in persecuting it in a more cruel Manner. This last Means which is more odious serves to shew Virtue, and thence to make it known and admired : but all the private Ways darken and bury it, take away its Life and Speech at the same time ; and a Prince who contents himself with these Methods is no less its dreadful Enemy in appearing more humane.

XIV. There

(*n*) *Amicitia Principis prosperè nunquam benè usus. Idem. L. 4. Annal. p. 118.*

(*o*) *Ad postremum ipsam virtutem excindere concupivit. Tacit. L. 16. Annal. p. 297.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. II

XIV. There is sometimes more Weakness than Ill-nature. The Prince unattentive to Merit accepts what his Ministers offer him. The more they are in favour the greater Haste they make to advance their Family. They distribute the Employments to Children, Sons-in-Law, and Brothers. The chief Merit then consists either in the Degree of Parentage or Friendship. One is capable of all as soon as he is an Ally. He knows all as soon as he knows to depend. One is charged with an important Expedition that he may be advanced, and have some Title of Honour in his Family, or get a personal Distinction that should be the Recompence of long Services and proved Valour. Another is put in a Place in order to enrich himself by it. Another is raised that he may find it easier to establish himself. The State is thus distributed among Persons unable to bear the Weight of it. It is known; but one thinks only of himself and his Friends. They conceal all from the Prince who do not cringe, and are not Slaves: They shew him nothing but what they please; and on his part he is satisfied with seeing what they shew him: and he does not perceive that they sacrifice him, expose him to the Censure of the Publick, make a Mock of the Trust he puts in them, and have no Value for his Glory and State.

ARTICLE III.

It is the Interest of the State that Merit be rewarded and Vice punished.

I. I think a Prince's Kingdom is the last thing that should become indifferent to him, and that he cannot neglect the Care of it, without acknowledging that he does not deserve to reign. But
what

12 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

what Care can he take of it if he falls into these Errors I have just now mention'd; and if he regards any thing else than Merit in the Distribution of Rewards and Employments?

II. The least Attention to what has been said is enough to shew that the Foundation of the State is attacked, if the same Faults are committed here which a Pilot would fall into, *who*, instead of Sailors, should man the Ship with People who know nothing of the Sea, are without Experience, and do not even understand what they are commanded to do.

III. There is no Misfortune but may be the consequence of imprudence and injustice in the choice of Persons and Offices.

IV. Once any thing but Merit is considered, all the means of attaining Offices are Evil, and they are only open to Party, Ambition, and Favour. None but the forward, and those who ought to be rejected are admitted. Private Interest is preferred to Publick Good. The People loose that Confidence they ought to have in the Wisdom and Goodness of the Prince. All the Parts of the State that ought to be of the same Mind are divided. Indifferency and Distaste, with regard to Government, get possession of the most Zealous. Merit is absolutely discouraged. The Nation looses what its Glory consists in. It becomes despicable to those who feared it. Thus it is exposed to the pernicious Designs of Foreigners, whom a Secret, but almost an universal and natural Discontent, renders more hardy for Enterprize; and the way to an Usurper's Ambition is prepared, in shewing him the Weakness of a great Kingdom, where all that might be able to defend it is without Credit, and all who have the Management of it are neither respected nor loved, and do not even so much as think of deserving to be so.

ARTICLE IV.

Rules to be observed in rewarding Merit.

I. The only Means of preventing all these Evils is a constant Application to discover, protect, and reward Merit, and on the contrary to punish Vice by Ignominy and the other Sufferings it deserves: but in both these it is necessary to observe certain Rules.

II. Great Care must be used to find out Merit, which conceals itself, because it is commonly the more solid and great in Proportion, as it is disinterested; and to value those People extremely who content themselves with the Testimony of God and their own Conscience: Who are very deserving and very diffident: Who sincerely love the Publick Good and are very capable of serving it; but who only find their safety in Obscurity and Silence. Two or three Men of this Character are exceedingly Valuable, and to find them is to find a Treasure.

III. The attention to Merit ought to spread over all; because the (p) Prince should animate and support all Sorts of it. He ought to be informed of all who are worthy of this Distinction, in every Society, Body, and Profession; to have a list of all who signalise themselves, by their great Qualifications in the Church, in the Field, at the Bar, or in the common Order of Citizens, and regulate the choice of Employments, and the distribution of Favours, by an exact knowledge of their Merit.

IV. In

(p) Si in omnibus perspicuum esset, non cariturum honore, si quis boni alicujus autor extiterit, multos hoc etiam impelleret, ut studiose boni aliquid investigarent. *Xenop. de Regno. p. 916.*

14 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

IV. In Men who excel in some Things, he ought greatly to esteem the Justice they do to others, the Inclination they have of serving them, and the Assistance they give them; this Nobleness and Generosity being the surest Mark of great Merit.

V. On the contrary, they ought to be look'd upon as publick Enemies, who are so to the Virtue of others; who are jealous of their Glory, who endeavour to calumniate their good Qualities, who make themselves Judges of every body's Merit, and cannot bear that the Prince should grant his Esteem and Protection to any but themselves, and their Creatures.

VI. After these general Rules (*q*), one of the chief Cares ought to be that of the Nobility, and particularly of the ancient Families, whose Names are respected by the People. They must be rais'd again by Favours, animated to Virtue by Glory, and carried on to greater Merit by Rewards. It is a shameful Conduct, and which argues great Meanness, to study to keep those humble, who ought to be the Honour of the State, and to take away their Courage who ought to be its Defence.

VII. But (*r*) Men of undistinguished Birth, who have made themselves remarkable by their Merit must not be forgot. They draw no Honour from their Ancestors, but can transmit a great deal to their Posterity. They must only be considered as what they are become, and look'd upon as what they are, with regard to the State,
which

(*q*) Tandem ergo nobilitas non obscuratur, sed illustratur à Principe. Sunt in honore hominum magna nomina ex tenebris oblivionis ex indulgentiâ Cæsaris, cujus est, ut nobiles & conservet, & efficiet. *Paneg. Traj. p. 200.*

(*r*) Deterior esset conditio eorum, qui posteros habere nobiles merentur, quàm eorum qui parentes habuissent. *Ibid. p. 102.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 15

which takes no Concern in their Origin, and desires they may be rewarded, (s) as born only of themselves, and for it.

VIII. Above all he must do strict Justice to those who execute their Duty right in War; never advance any out of meer Favour; nor lavish upon the unworthy, the Marks of Honour reserved for Virtue: Not depreciate Rewards in giving them in common to the Cowardly and Brave; know the Difference between a great and an ordinary Man: Praise, and even publicly, the great Actions that deserve it: Not be afraid of diminishing his own Glory by communicating it to his Generals and Armies: By Testimonies of Satisfaction and Goodness supply the Inability of recompensing every Thing by other Means.

IX. Establish Marks of Honour, consistent only with acknowledg'd Merit, after exact Informations; and that may be always refused, if one demands them himself, or solicits for them by others.

X. Establish such, whereunto the Soldier as well as the Officer is admitted, which may be attached to certain Actions of Valour, and which may have some sort of Relation to the different sorts of Crowns with which the *Romans* rewarded, either the Deliverance of a Citizen, or the Courage of having appeared the first upon the Breach, or the Glory of having recovered a Standard from the Enemy.

XI. He must not enflame Avarice in doing Justice to Virtue, nor pervert Merit in rewarding it. The Custom of giving a great deal, because
one

(s) *A Word of Tiberius's to conceal Rufus's want of Birth, otherwise a very great Man. Curtius Rufus videtur mihi ex se natus. Tacit. L. 11. Annal. p. 147.*

(r) *Amicos suos, says the Author of the Life of Emperor Aurelian, honestè ditavit & modicè, ut miseras paupertatis effugerunt, & divitiarum invidiam vitarent. Vopisc. in ejus vita. p. 282.*

16 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

one has begun to give, is pernicious to the State (u). It heaps upon one single Person what would be plenty for severals. It puts it out of the Prince's Power to do Justice to all ; and it only serves to support the Ambition and Pride of a private Person, courageous and zealous before he was rich, a Lover of Life and careless about the State, since the Time he has been loaded with Riches.

XII. It is likewise unjust to grant for certain Services, Rewards that have no Proportion to them ; to take the Riches of the Church wherewith to pay the Services done to the War ; to grant Governments to Persons of Courage, but without Prudence ; and to put Men in Authority who wanted but a Pension, and deserved nothing more.

XIII. The same Justice that orders Merit to be rewarded, must regulate the Manner in which it ought to be so ; and there is nothing that distinguishes the Wisdom and Discernment of a Prince more, than the Proportion that he makes between what he gives, and what one deserves.

ARTICLE V.

Rules to be observed in punishing Vice.

I. In regard to Punishments, they also have their Rules ; and one of the chief is, not to love to punish ; whereas the Prince should love to reward.

II.

(u) *The Emperor Alexander Severus kept an Account of all that he gave, and to whom, that he might observe an exact Justice in Rewards. Cogitabat secum & descriptum habebat cui præsstitisset. In ejus vit. p. 218.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 17

II. (x) There is a Fund of natural Generosity in Men, which he must know and manage; Threats sower them, and Chastisements cause them to rebel when one would make them good contrary to their Inclination. They want to be trusted in a certain Degree, to be left the Glory of becoming so by their own Choice, and to be led on to Virtue by Praise, instead of being forc'd to it, as if they were its Enemies.

III. It is sufficient for the good of the State, that whoever is not useful to it, have no Share in the Bounties of the Prince; that he be not admitted to any Employment, nor raised to any other more important one. Those Chastisements which consist in not granting Favours, are enough to keep Vice in a right Humility, and to keep all those at a distance from it who have any Thought or Honour.

V. Cowardice ought not to be treated in the same Manner. It deserves to be punish'd more severely than by the refusal of Favours, and especially in Officers. The Punishments may be diversify'd in several Manners. Some more mortifying, others less publick: but the shedding of Blood must be shunn'd. Ignominy and the Deprivation of Offices suffice to keep others, and to revenge the Nation of the Dishonour done to it.

V. The Rule is almost the same for prevaricating Judges, Intendants and Governours, unworthy of their Places. When their Faults are certain and proved, there is no Punishment that may be of greater Example, than deposing them

C

with-

(x) Tibi beneficiis potius, quàm remediis, ingenia nostra expetiri placet; & alioquin nescio, an plus moribus conferat Princeps, qui bonos esse patitur, quam qui cogit. *Paneg. Traj. p. 130,*

18 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

without ever relenting, either by their Sollicitations, or even Repentance, if the Fault is gross, or if it is not the first, and that they have not profited by the Advice they received. Such a Severity contributes to preserve the Prince's Bounty and Clemency : for he is not almost oblig'd to punish any more, when he has done it effectually in the Beginning. A less severe Conduct would multiply the Guilty, and likewise force him to multiply the Punishments.

VI. The greatest Severity should be against cowardly Crimes, such as Assassination and Poisoning ; against Calumny which must always be strictly examin'd into, and the Punishment of which ought sometimes to be the same as that which the Crime would have deserved, had it been true : Against Duels which must be abolish'd by the most shameful Punishments, without ever passing them over, or letting the number of Years, or the Services done in another Station, make them be forgot.

VII. In general, he must leave the Laws their full Authority : protect Innocence alone : always hate Vice : only excuse Misfortunes and involuntary Faults : and not charge his Conscience with the Consequences of Indulgence.

ARTICLE VI.

*The Happiness of a Kingdom where Merit alone is
honoured and in Authority.*

I. It is necessary to shew what the Happiness of a State would be, where the Rules now spoken of, either for Rewards or Punishments, should be observed, every one is able to form a just Idea of it, and to comprehend the Happiness of a Nation
where

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 19

where all the Strength and Authority should be granted to Virtue: where all the Threats and Chastisements should only be against Vice: whose Prince should be only terrible to those that doe evil, and never to those that do good: where the Sword that God has trusted to him should be the Protection of the Just, and make none but their Enemies tremble: where (y) Mercy and Truth should meet together: and Righteousness and Peace should kiss each other, and where one should see what the Apostle says accomplished: (z) *Tribulation and Anguish upon every Soul of Man that doth evil, but Glory, Honour, and Peace to every Man that worketh good.*

II. What Light, and (a) what new Age for a People, where (b) Merit should be the only Means of rising: where every thing should be refused to Party, and Ambition: where Modesty, the sincerer it were, should be the more sought after: where Men should be chose for Places, and not the Places usurped by the Men: where every thing should be useless but Honour and Probity: where Riches could buy nothing but things of the same nature with themselves: where neither Solicitations nor Calumny should have any Effect: where the Prince himself should seek out for those who were like to him; and (c) where the same Persons, who formerly placed this Security in being forgot, should by him be drawn out of their Obscurity, and honour'd by his Bounty.

C 2

III.

(y) *Psal. lxxxv. V. 10.*

(z) *Rom. c. ii. v. 9. 10.*

(a) Prodest bonos esse: his honores, his sacerdotia, his provincias offers. *Paneg. Traj. p. 128.*

(b) Nunc redit animus primo beatissimi sæculi ortu. *Tacitus vii. Agricol. p. 453.*

(c) Mutati sæculi signum hoc erat, quod florescent, quorum præcipuum votum ante fuerat, ut memoris Principis elaborentur. *Paneg. Traj. p. 243.*

20 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

III. But so perfect a Happiness is inconsistent with this Life, where it is necessary that Merit be proved, and left sometimes in Humiliation and Forgetfulness. Its a great deal that a Prince applies himself to discover and reward it. But for all his Enquiries he will not always reach it; and then Virtue must not repine. When it is sincere (*d*) it is humble, and has nothing of Haughtiness, or Falseness, that cannot be supported but by Glory, which in seeks for, in highly despising whoever despises it, and chusing to be unhappy with Magnificence, if by no other Means it can attract the Attention it desires.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The Prince ought to protect the Arts and Sciences : oppose Ignorance : know the Causes and Consequences of it : find out Remedies for it.

ARTICLE I.

The Prince ought to protect Sciences.

I. **N**OTHING does so much honour to a Nation as Literature and the Sciences, and the Character of having a great many People that excell in them. It is even in that wherein its chief Merit consists; for without this Advantage it is scarce superior to the Barbarian States; which can equal it in Multitude, Forces, and Riches; but which are as much inferior to an instructed and knowing People as the Body is to the Mind.

II.

(*d*) Non contumaciâ, neque inani jactatione libertatis, famam, fatumque provocabat. Tacit. vit. Agricol. p. 466.

INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.* 21

II. The Glory of the Nation reflects upon the Prince that conducts it: all the Light and Wisdom there are in his State become his own, as making up a part of the publick Good that is intrusted to him; and when he is able to know and value so great a Treasure, he draws upon himself the Admiration and Love of all that love Learning, and who are consequently the Dispensers of Glory, and that sort of Immortality, which Gratitude and the Works of the Genius can bestow.

III. This Glory is not confined to his State alone. It extends itself as far as the Sciences. It penetrates where they have. Amongst Foreigners it subjects to him all those who look upon him, as the Protector of what they love. It preserves a great number of zealous Servants to him amongst his Enemies, capable, when they have Credit, of bringing their Citizens to peace, and of inspiring them with the same Respect they themselves have for the Prince.

IV. People come from all Parts into a Kingdom where they can learn every thing: they stay there with Pleasure and Advantage. They give an Account in different Countries of what they saw there, of the learned Men they knew, and the Assistance they received in all sorts of Knowledge. In all Nations they speak of the accomplished Merits of the Prince, his Judgment, his exquisite Taste for every thing valuable, of the Protection he gives to Letters, of his Bounty to all those who distinguish themselves by Learning, of the Happiness of the People whom he governs with so much Wisdom, and who become daily more knowing and perfect by his Care.

V. They go so far as to look upon this Nation as a Pattern for others. They endeavour to imitate what is practised there: they consult it: they take it for Judge: they put off determining them-

22 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

selves on important Occasions, till they see what Part it takes. They study its Maxims, its Attachment to the ancient Laws, its wise Precautions not to fix a new Yoke upon the Conscience. With reason they look upon the great number of Learned with which it is filled, as the firm Support of Truth and of the Church; and they are a great deal more affected by their Opinions than by those of several Nations, where Ignorance is known to be predominant.

VI. All these Motives are interesting, and ought to make a Prince preserve the Esteem and Taste for Learning in his State, if he is so happy as to find them there. He ought even to render these Dispositions more lively and more universal if possible, because they grow weaker when there is no Care taken to animate them. And he ought to oppose to the natural Bent Men have to Indolence and Idleness, and consequently to Ignorance, a constant Attention to spirit up the Esteem and Ardour for all that deserves to be known.

ARTICLE II.

The Prince ought to oppose Ignorance.

I. Above all he must be well instructed himself, that he may be capable of judging soundly of a great many Things; that he may have Taste, and an exact one; that he may be able to discern the personal Merit of many of the Learned, and know if their Reputation be well founded; that he may have a great Penetration to know the Character of their Genius; if they have a just and solid one, if they are modest, circumspect, Enemies to Rashness and Presumption; for he must make a great Difference between them and the others.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 23

II. He should endeavour to form a Council of Persons of great Merit, and universal Knowledge, that might on Occasions judge of the capacity of those whom one had a mind to examine and know in particular.

III. By the Advice of this Council the Prince will have a Pleasure in assisting the Designs of the Learned, in facilitating the Edition of their Works, in contributing to them by some Helps, in distinguishing them upon Occasions, in chusing them for Employments, and in animating them by Rewards.

IV. He will engage them to educate Persons that may profit by their Knowledge, and be able to continue the same Studies and Labours. He will look upon them as the Glory of the Nation, and the Source of a solid and lasting Good ; and inspire them with the Desire of contributing, all in their Power, to the Instruction of their fellow Citizens.

V. He will carefully inform himself of all those who have the Character of being Learned in general, and those who are thought to excell in certain Sciences. He will have a Memorial of their Names, Qualifications and Works, divided according to the Provinces. He will be informed of their Wants: and he will not leave Men miserable who often neglect the heaping up of Riches, by spending their Time in instructing themselves. He will extend his Bounty even to their Families and Relations, if they stand in need of it: and by this Means, so worthy of himself, he will hinder Families from opposing the Inclinations of those who have a Genius for Learning, and do not look upon it as useless.

VI. He will chiefly esteem those that give their whole Care to the Study and Understanding of the Holy Scriptures, the Reading the Fathers, the

24 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Knowledge of Tradition, and who join to this Study of Religion a great Modesty and sincere Piety.

VII. He will revive the Taste of the learned Languages, if it is a little decay'd, in approving of those who cultivate them, and in testifying some times a little Astonishment that the original Languages of the Old and New Testament should not be known by the greatest Part of those who have the Charge of the Truth deposited in them.

VIII. He will put natural and medical Experiments in credit, as useful to the publick Good.

IX. He will have a great Esteem for true Philosophy and sound Morality, which contribute to form the Mind and Genius of Man, and have necessary Connexions with true Virtue.

X. He will excite the Nobility, either himself, or by those who have the Care of them, to be instructed after the Manner of the ancient *Romans* : who joined Erudition to Valour : who attained to Dignities by Eloquence ; and who could not exercise them without great Knowledge in the Law, because the Dispensation of Justice was joined to the military Authority.

XI. He will some times take pleasure in asking a few Questions of young Lords of his Court, who are better educated than others, and have an Inclination and Taste for Learning ; but this will be seldom, in few Words, and with the Decorum of a Sovereign.

XII. He will find it useful, that well qualified People be told as from him, that the best way of making their court to him is in taking great care of the Education of their Children : that he will distinguish them according to their Capacity and Knowledge ; and that he is sorry for a Courtier and Warrior's Condition who know nothing but their Employment, who out of that are beneath the ordinary sort of Men, who can employ themselves

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE, &c. 25

selves in nothing useful, and when they grow old become a Burthen to themselves and despicable to others: whereas if they cultivated their Genius by the Sciences, they would preserve the Esteem and Dignity they once had as long as they live, and would stand in need of no other Comfort but what their Books could give them.

XIII. He would not refuse to entertain himself some times with Men of Learning, whom he knew to be very wise and greatly disinterested: the Goodness he shews to them will be a publick Recommendation for the Sciences, and have no other Effect. For I suppose the Prince will not change their Condition, and on their Side, that they will have no Desire of being raised.

XIV. In fine, he will even condescend to know the manner in which the Youth are educated: if the Instruction they receive qualifies them for advancing themselves, by their own Labour, in the Knowledge of the fine Arts: if they are inspired with the Taste of them: if what they are shewn serves to raise their Curiosity: if, above all, they are most carefully formed to Virtue; and if they leave their Masters full of Respect for Religion, and well instructed in their Duty.

XV. It is not so hard as one may think, to know all these Points. The Bulk of a Nation is like a publick Testimony of it. We see what is predominant there, and by that we judge of the rest. And it is easy, by trusting some sure Persons with a more particular Examination, to be exactly informed how those, who are entrusted with the Education of Youth, acquit themselves.

XVI. There is no Employment in the State of greater Importance, because the Youth is like the Nursery of it; by them it is renewed and perpetuated; of them come all the Fathers of Families, Magistrates, Governours, Ministers, Persons in Authority,

26 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Authority, either in Church or State : and it may be affirmed, that whatever is good or defective in the Education of those who should one day fill all these Places, extends itself to all Conditions, and become as it were the Genius and general Character of the whole Nation.

ARTICLE III.

The Prince ought to know the Causes and Consequences of Ignorance.

I. If, instead of the Esteem and Taste for Learning which I have supposed to be preserved there, Ignorance has prevailed, or threatens to stifle what Ardour for the Sciences remains, it is the Prince's Interest exactly to inform himself of the Causes of this Misfortune, that he may the more effectually use the Means for remedying it.

II. Those Causes may be different. The most common and natural one is the Love of Rest : for it costs Labour to become knowing ; and nothing but Ignorance can be easy.

III. A second is the Want of Emulation ; and this proceeds from People of Fortune and Birth's not regarding the Sciences, and looking upon them only as the Portion of those who have no other Means of rising.

IV. A third is the just Disdain of certain useles and disagreeable Knowledges, substituted in the room of other more solid and satisfactory ones. Those who have not Education, think the Sciences as low as what is recommended to them under that Name ; and as they see nothing great or high in them, that these Things neither interest the Mind or Genius ; that the manner of treating them is mean and gross ; they easily comfort themselves for not knowing, what, if they had learned, they would

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 27

would endeavour to forget; and they do not wish their Children to be more accomplished in that way than themselves.

V. A fourth Cause is the Fear of making themselves suspected of an uncommon Learning, by a Judicature who judges despotically of Doctrine, and has sometimes more Zeal than Knowledge. It has been thought the easiest Way to know nothing, and, by this Means, to secure one's self from Censure and Suspicion.

VI. A fifth is the Jealousy of certain Persons, who want that none else should be esteemed; who are offended at all who do not admire them; (e) who are in possession of the Key of Knowledge, as the Evangelist expresses it, not entering in themselves and hindering others that would; and who keep the Nations where they govern as low and ignorant as they can, in order that they alone may have the Prince and Peoples Confidence, and that their Doctrine may become general.

VII. A sixth is the Application to exclude those who distinguish themselves by Learning, or are not willing to sacrifice their Knowledge to their Fortune, from all Dignities, Favours, and Employments. (f) It is easily understood, that to think of making one's self learned is to wander and follow a Road without an Outlet. He gives over Books, and applies to make his Court. It is known what pleases the Persons whom the Prince consults: he endeavours to deserve their Favour

(e) Woe unto ye Lawyers: for ye have taken away the Key of Knowledge: ye entred not in yourselves, and them that were entring in ye hindred. *Luke c. ii. v. 52.*

(f) Ut corpora lentè augeſcunt, citò extinguntur: ſic ingenia ſtudiaque oppreſſeris faciliùs, quàm revocaveris. Subit quippe etiam ipſius inertia: dulcedo, & inviſa primò deſidia, poſtremò amatur. *Tacit. in vit. Agric. p. 453.*

28 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

vour by an open Profession of Ignorance, and an equal Disdain for Learning and the Learned.

VIII. A seventh is the Distrust that is raised in the Prince of all those that have a Taste for the fine Arts; that have studied solidly, and are worthy to serve as Guides and Masters for others. He is prejudiced against them, under Pretences which he has never searched into the bottom of. He looks upon them as his Enemies. (g) The Exile of some, and Flight of others have spread abroad such a Terror that Science is even become odious to the Learned. One dares neither praise nor imitate great Men, whom their extraordinary Learning has made unhappy. One is afraid of the like Disgrace, and gets under cover by studying no more, or doing it with such Secrecy, that none can reap any Advantage from it.

IX. An eight and last Cause is the little Protection granted to the Universities; in too easily letting Men enter who are secret Enemies to them, and have endeavoured to destroy them. Excellent Genius's, capable of raising their Glory, have been neglected; and they have been often deprived of their Employments, for no other Reason but doing their Duty too worthily, contrary to certain Persons Inclinations. The Liberty of Suffrages is opposed, and the Prince's Authority is commonly interposed to hinder the Professorship's being granted to the most Learned.

X.

(g) Legimus, cum Aruleno Rustico Pætus Thrasea, Herennio Senecioni Priscus Helvidius, laudati essent, capitale fuisse: neque in ipsos modò autores, sed in libros quoque eorum favitum, delegato Triumviris ministero, ut monumenta clarissimorum ingeniorum in comitio ac foro urerentur, scilicet illo igne vocem populi Romani, & libertatem Senatûs, & conscientiam generis humani aboleri arbitrabantur; expulsis insuper sapientia professoribus, atque omni bonâ arte in exilium actâ, ne quid usquam honestum occurreret. *Idem ibid. p. 452.*

INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.* 29

X. The noblest of the Youth are suffered to be instructed out of the Universities, which are one of the firmest Supports of the State, and have had no other Masters but those who have very different Interests from that of the Prince and Publick.

XI. There is no Application to preserve the least Emulation between the ancient Professors and those who pretend to come to their Assistance, in keeping an equal Ballance betwixt them, and in not favouring but those who do their Duty best. All the Favour is for the New, and this Favour makes them so negligent and weak, that the Towns where they have the greatest Sway, are those where the Youth are the worst educated, and where Ignorance is the grossest and most universal.

XII. The Consequences of such an Ignorance are terrible. Idleness is the first Fruits of it; and from Idleness spring all sorts of Vice. The State has no more Subjects capable of serving it. The Places of the Church are filled by Persons unworthy, the Magistracy abandon'd to Men of no Learning, Education, or Knowledge of the Interests of the Prince, and of the ancient Maxims. The Nobility, Enemies to Things serious, disgrace themselves in an obscure Retreat, where they amuse themselves with trifling Studies, which accustom their Minds to Fictions and Lies, and give them a Dis taste for Truth. The People, naturally prone to Superstition, in the place of what Religion has most grand and serious, substitute vain Practices and false Histories, which confirm them in their Vices, and destroy all Idea of true Virtue. Those who are a little above the People, but as ignorant as they, are tempted to despise them, because they are often despicable; and as they

30 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

they improperly confound them with the true Religion, they are lead to Impiety by Ignorance.

XIII. It is likewise reasonably to be feared lest it should lead to Heresy; not only because it is accompanied with many Errors, but because it takes every thing for Truth that has the Appearance of it; and takes away all Human Means of opposing Seduction, in taking away the Knowledge of all that would serve to discover it.

XIV. It is known that the late Heresies did not spread with so much Ease, but because they were supported by Men who had the Talents of speaking and writing well; whereas the Defenders of the Truth were mostly ignorant of polite Learning: and the same Ignorance of Antiquity, which made the Hereticks so bold, made the Catholicks lose part of the Advantages they had over them. We are since instructed; and from that time Heresy has decay'd: but the Evil was done; which had it not been for Ignorance, might have been stop'd in the Beginning.

ARTICLE IV.

The Prince ought to find out Remedies for it.

I. If the Prince will take notice of the Counsels that have been given him in the second Article of this Chapter, he will there find all the Remedies, both for the Consequences and Causes of the Ignorance I have mentioned: but I beg he may remember, that (*b*) bad Examples last long; (*i*) that it is easier to destroy Learning than to establish it; that

(*b*) Diutius durant exempla, quàm autores. *Tacit. l. 4. Hist. p. 408.*

(*i*) Ingenia studiaque faciliùs opprèsseris, quàm revocaveris. *Idem. in vit. Agricol.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 31

that (*k*) without a strong Application to repair the Evils of preceeding Reigns, it will remain the same under the Successor; that (*l*) he must openly declare himself the Protector of those who have great Talents, and the Enemy of all those who are jealous of them; that (*m*) he must give the Universities their Liberty, and fill them worthily: that if it is necessary to call Professors from other Places, there must be neither Care nor Expences spared; and above all it is necessary, to hinder Science from being suspected, in supplying the Tribunal, which should judge of Doctrine, with Persons of Genius and Merit; that all Favours and Rewards should be preserved for those who join true Piety to the Sciences; and the surest Means of rooting out Ignorance, is always to refuse it every thing.

ARTICLE V.

Of the Arts in particular.

I. I have little to add to what I have said of the Arts in the twenty-second Chapter of the first Part, and in the thirteenth of this. The Prince should make a great Difference between the Arts which are necessary, and those which are subservient to Luxury, Softness and Effeminacy. He should protect, multiply and animate the one, but it is enough that he acknowledge and tolerate the others for the Good of Commerce, without allowing them to go beyond the Bounds he sets them.

II.

(*k*) *Magis alii homines, quàm alii mores. Tacit. l. 2. Hist. p. 364.*

(*l*) *Rectos ac vivos animos non, ut alii, confundis & deprimis, sed foves & attollis. Paneg. Traj. p. 129.*

(*m*) *Sub te spiritum, & sanguinem, & patriam receperunt studia, quæ priorum temporum immanitas exiliis puniebat. Idem. ibid. p. 135.*

32 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

II. Architecture deserves a particular Distinction. It is the Interest of the Publick that it be well understood : that it rectify the bad Taste by the Wisdom and Exactness of its Rules : and give that Decency and Majesty to Buildings allotted to Religion, which is proper for them.

III. Painting and Sculpture should be very valuable, if they are only used in lawful Subjects ; but it is seldom they are not dishonoured, in becoming the Ministers of Mens Passions, and not always contributing to preserve the Memory of virtuous Actions and Persons. The Prince will not protect them but as long as they are modest : will testify an extreme Aversion to the most finished Works, when they are contrary to Decency, and will even order Licence to be punished if it becomes scandalous.

IV. (n) The Prince will greatly value whatever is of use to Navigation, the Manufacturies of Cloth and Linnen, and the fabricating of Arms : every thing that is for Commerce : whatever helps to employ the People usefully ; to excite their Labour and Industry, and to banish Want and Idleness out of the Kingdom.

(n) Ingenia & artes maximè fovit. *Vespasian. in Suet. chap. 18.*



CHAP.



CHAPTER XIX.

The Prince ought to defend the People against the Enemies of their Happiness and Repose, whether domestick or foreign Ones. His Revenue is the chief Means of doing it. He ought to know them perfectly.

ARTICLE I.

The Prince ought to defend the People. His Revenue is the chief Means of doing it.

I. **T**HE Prince is the Sword and Buckler of the State. It is upon him that its Peace and Tranquillity depends ; and (o) it is his Business alone to defend it, and arm all those whom he inclines to employ.

II. The Repose of the State may be troubled at home by factious People, Enemies to the lawful Authority ; or, by Foreigners, Enemies to the Nation and its Happiness.

III. The Prince has need of several Things in defending the State ; Arms, Soldiers, Forts, Arsenels, Ships, and all that is comprehended under these Names. He alone has the sovereign Power
D and

(o) Dilatavit Judas gloriam populo suo, & protegebat castra gladio suo. 1 Maccab. c. iii. v. 3.

Exemplum militiæ, exemplum Imperii . . . quod imperium suscepisti gratias agimus. Tuere nos, tuere Rempublicam, benè tibi committimus quos ante servasti. Vopisc. in ejus, vit. p. 292.

34 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

and Intendance of them. But all these Things require great Expences: and the Source of these Expences are the Tributes; (*p*) which are consequently as lawful as the Defence of the State, and ought to be paid by the same Motive of Justice, which obliges the Prince to defend all those who are entrusted to him by Providence.

IV. It would be too late, and even useless to exact them, when the Factionous or Foreigners have put every thing in disorder: the Evil should be prevented, therefore the Tributes are always paid for that Purpose.

V. Besides, it is just, that the Prince have wherewith to support the Majesty of the Empire; and make his Person and Authority respected; and this is a second Reason, as essential as the first, for establishing Tributes.

VI. The People who should pay them, (*q*) not only out of Fear but likewise out of Conscience; that is to say, not only to obey the Prince, but likewise to obey God; are not the Judge of their Equity, or their Proportion, to the Necessity of the State. If they should be excessive there is no other Means but Patience and secret Complaints before God: and if they be loaded with them, they ought to believe that their Sins have drawn this Punishment upon them; and that the Goodness of God will make it useful, in purifying them in this Life, and making them deserve Happiness in the next.

VII. But it is not the same in regard to the Prince. He ought always to proportion the Tributes, of whatever kind they are, exactly to the Necessities of the State. He can augment them when

(*p*) Neque quies gentium sine armis, neque arma sine stipendiis, neque stipendia sine tributis. *Tacit. l. 4. Hist.* p. 419.

(*q*) *Rom. c. xiii. v. 6, 7, & 5.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 35

when the real Wants of the State increase ; but he ought to diminish them when the real Necessities of the State decrease.

VIII. I call real Wants, those which are so in the Sight of God, the only, but severe Judge of Kings, for they have none here below. The People he has entrusted to him are his. He has not given up the Care of them, for having associated them in his Providence. He carefully examines whether they consult him and his Justice ; if it is by his Spirit that they use the Power he gives them for the publick Good ; if they do not dishonour his Name and Authority, in making them serve for Oppression and Violence ; and if they do not make his Family murmur against his Conduct, and even blaspheme against him, in abandoning the Care of them to Men void of Goodness and Justice.

ARTICLE II.

The Prince ought to know his Revenue perfectly.

I. It is evident the Prince cannot judge, if the Tributes and real Necessities of the State be in a right Proportion, if he is not exactly informed of both : and there is an indispensable Obligation upon him to enter into this Discussion.

II. He should begin with informing himself of all his Revenues, and not be satisfy'd with a general Idea, which neither clears up nor determines any thing. (r) He must know wherein his Riches consists ; and must know it as an understanding and diligent Father of a Family knows his. The Difference which appears great is not such as is
D 2
imagined.

(r) *Assuescat Imperator cum Imperio calculum ponere. Paneg. Traj. p. 73.*

36 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

imagined. Great Sums are calculated in the same manner as ordinary ones. Provinces are to a Prince what Lands are to a private Person. Order and Division clears all. It is only necessary at first to take a little Care and Trouble, and afterwards it is but carrying on a Plan, all the Parts of which are exactly known.

III. Those who would make a Prince afraid of so easy a Work, should be suspected by him, as having a mind to conceal their Conduct from him, under an apparent Obscurity, with which the Finances are cover'd ; or pretending to remain the sole Masters of Business, which no body else could do.

IV. He must still harken less to those who would look upon a Knowledge so worthy of a Prince, and so strictly joined with his Conscience and the Good of the State, as unsuitable to his Grandeur. None can have so false Ideas but such as are capable of limiting a Prince's Life to Gaming and Hunting, and thinking him only Great when he does nothing. The Attention demanded of him here is not that of a Miser, busied about his Riches : but that of an understanding Prince, who has a mind to govern by himself, and not be led like a Child by his Ministers, become his Tutors ; it is the Attention of a just Prince who will know if his Estate is pure, if there is nothing unlawful or suspicious thrown into it, if it is dispensed with Equity ; of a Prince full of Bounty for his People, who fears, with reason, that his Officers do not treat them in a Manner which answers his Tenderness for them ; of a religious Prince, who knows the Account he must give of his Administration before the supreme Judges, who will not receive either Ignorance, or a blind Confidence in Men who ought to have assisted him, but who could not free him from his Duty, as an Excuse.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 37

V. He would be ashamed to do less than infidel Princes, (*s*) who knew exactly wherein the Revenue of the Empire consisted, at the time it extended from the farthestmost Part of *Spain* to the Frontiers of *Persia*, and from the Desarts of *Africa* even to the Mountains of *Scotland*: who had computed what every Province could bear, and every Tribute ought to produce: (*t*) who were better informed of it than any private Person could be of his Estate: who took Advantage of this Knowledge to regulate their Expences, and not exceed their Revenues. (*u*) And who examined every Year what failed on one Side, to supply it from another, and thus preserve an Equality amongst the different Parts of the State; who knew to mix private Interest with publick Good.

VI. The Disorder he is told the Finances are in, is no Reason for turning the Prince from so lawful a Care; on the contrary, it is a new Motive for applying to it with vigour; since by his Application he ought to put an end to Disorder which if neglected must draw on the Ruin of the State.

VII. He ought to know wherein this Disorder consists; by what Abuses it is introduced, by what Means it may be put a Stop to; if the Revenues are consumed before hand; if the Expences greatly exceed them; if his Credit is fallen, and the publick Trust lost; if he is obliged to have recourse to new Funds, to supply the present, and pay the most pressing Debts.

D 3

VIII.

(*s*) *It is said of the Emperor Antoninus Pius: Rationes omnium provinciarum apprime scivit & vestigalium. Jul. Capit. in ej. vit. p. 138.*

(*t*) *And the Emperor Adrian: Omnes publicas rationes ita complexus est, ut domum privatam quivis Pater familias diligens non satis novit. Spart. in ej. vitâ. p. 132.*

(*u*) *And of the same Prince: Reditus provinciales solerter explorans, ut si alicubi quidpiam deesset, expleret. Ibid. p. 129.*

38 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

VIII. He ought to be instructed of all this; but must go to the Remedies, and hearken attentively to what Persons who have more Capacity, more Practice, more Experience than others, will propose to him; for Discouragement and Dispair are unworthy of a Prince; and he ought to persuade himself, that if he will resolutely and by efficacious Means, bring the Finances into order again, he will very soon succeed in it. But this Matter has no Connection with that I here examine, and should be treated separately, for this only concerns the Knowledge the Prince ought to have of his Revenues, independent of the good or bad State of them.

IX. This Knowledge will only deceive him, if he does not join to it that of his Debts and publick Expences, He should reckon that he really has nothing but what remains after such a Deduction, and reduce the Idea of his Riches to what is free and independent. The other Sums ought not to make him vain: they cannot enter into the Projects of his personal Expences, or Pleasures: with respect to him they are a foreign Good, and he should always separate them from the Funds he is Master of.

X. He must even retrench what of these Funds does not come to him, but remains in the hands of the publick Officers and Collectors; he must deduct what unforeseen Accidents may make him loose inspite of the most careful Oeconomy; he must not expect to touch all his Revenues in the Space of a Year, if he is resolved not to forestall them by Pre-engagements and Borrowings.

XI. (x) Without these wise Precautions he cannot regulate his Expences, nor shun burthening the

(x) Tres consulares vestigalibus præposuit Nero, cum inspectione priorum principum, qui gravitate sumptuum justos reditus anteissent. Tacit. l. 15. Annal. p. 261.

the State with several Debts which encrease every Year, and which after having put the publick Affairs into Confusion, at last end in great Misfortunes, both to the Prince and People.

XII. When he has enter'd into these Discussions, and knows his Funds, his Debts, and what Revenue he has remaining, he must make a second Examination, and consider the Necessity of the Taxes which are the Foundation of his Riches; the Manner in which they are imposed; that in which they are levied, and in what Manner they are employ'd; because they may be unjust in some of these though they appear lawful in others.

XIII. When the Necessity of Tributes is examined, it is not in a general manner. They are undoubtedly due in this Sense; and the Maxim comes to be established on solid Grounds.

XIV. One examines then if a new Tribute is necessary, because the others are not sufficient; and likewise why the others are not so. There the People are out of the Question: it is the Prince who does it either alone or with his Counsel.

XV. For such an Examination there must be a great deal more Knowledge and Circumspection than ordinary; for before laying a new Load upon the State, it must be consider'd if all that it pays be usefully employ'd: if nothing can be reformed in other Expences; if it would not be better to lay some of them on Persons more priviledged than the Poor, and who are better able to bear a new Imposition; if it is certain that there is no other Method but this; that all the rest are drained, and that this is easier than any other that can be proposed.

XVI. If it is an ancient Tribute, or already established, a Prince who is in Peace and would reign by Justice and Clemency, examines if the

40 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Reasons which made it be establish'd subsist; (y) if it ought not to have been abolish'd when the War ended; if it has not been promised to the People; if it is not too odious; if it does not obstruct the publick Liberty and Commerce: and the Prince begins by Tributes of this kind to comfort People when he is able.

XVII. (z) The most lawful Impositions are often unequally divided. The Weak bear almost the whole Load: and their just Complaints are commonly despised. This Disorder is one of those which God condemns the most, who calls himself the God and Protector of the Poor. This may be remedied by Intendants, or Governors of strict Probity, and upright Judges; and much more by the Prince's Attention in recommending that Part of the Flock to them which is chiefly reserved for him, as being the weakest, and from thence have a particular Right to his Protection.

XVIII. The inhumane and violent Manner in which the Tributes are exacted, and the Expences People are put to, who would pay them if one had a little Patience with them, and managed them, make them very odious, and those who exact them by these Means, very blameable.

XIX. What Subsistence remains to People that have laboured the whole Year, and are some times charged with a numerous Family, is (a) taken from them. Their Cattle, Moveables, Bed, and

(y) Quæ gravia atque intoleranda, sed necessitate armorum excusata, etiam in pace mansere. *Tacit. l. 2. Hist. p. 361.*

(x) Frumenti & Tributorum auctionem æqualitate munerum mollire. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol. 458.*

(a) Ac primò boves ipsos, mox agros, postremò corpora conjugum aut liberorum, servitio tradebant: hinc ira, & questus, & postquàm non subveniebat remedium ex bello. *Tacit. l. 4. Annal. p. 136.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 41

and generally every thing that can be taken away, are seiz'd. The Prisons are filled with heads of Families, who have the sad Commission of stripping their Brethren; but who in doing that cannot make them solvent. Some of them are dispersed, who go and die where they can. Others are put to despair, having expences added to their Taxes which even greatly surpass them. Those who have any Riches left, are accountable for the Poverty of others. They make those who have any Industry repent of the very success of their Labour; because they are made answerable for the Insolvent. Consternation is spread all around. All is filled with Groanings and Tears, and in proportion as the Misery becomes more general, the hardness of those who cause it becomes more insensible.

XX. Can a Prince, in whose Name all this is done, be ignorant of it? Is he in safety, if he is so? Can he have a Moment's ease if he knows it? Is there a fortune on Earth that one would keep on such Terms? Is this the fruit of that Authority which God has given him to protect the People? Does one fear any thing who is not afraid of the effect of so many Tears, despised by Men, but which God is witness to? A religious Prince shuns above all things to occasion them. He informs himself not only with Care, but with a religious inquietude of the Manner, in which the Tributes are exacted; and gives so precise and rigorous Orders for preventing all Violence, or for punishing it, that he prevents the *(b)* Cruelty and Injustice which Avarice had added to them, in putting an end to the inhuman Methods of exacting

(b) Circumcisis quæ in quæstum reperta, ipso tributo gravius tolerabantur. *Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 458.*

42 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

ing them. He knows that (c) the People pay them honestly and even with Pleasure, when they are treated with mildness; that they love their Prince, and are zealous for his Glory; but that cruelty makes them revolt, and that above all they are enraged that the Collectors should make a traffick of their Misery, and enrich themselves with their Spoils.

XXI. But what grieves every Body
 The manner of employing Taxes.
 is the manner of employing Taxes which are the sweat of the People, and may be looked upon as a part of their Life and Blood. They are in some

Measure carried away before they come into the Prince's Hands. They are not faithfully applied to the uses for which they were appointed. They are squander'd in unnecessary Expences, sacrificed to Luxury, lavished to an avaricious and insatiable Court, (d) thrown away without discernment or choice, for the single Pleasure of distributing and loosing them, and out of a vain shew of Abundance, whilst the State is in Want and Misery.

XXII. A wise Prince who knows Mankind, knows that nothing irritates them so much as Profusion joined to Severity; and that the same People who would with pleasure give their Necessaries, if they were to be employed for the good of the State, would, if possible, refuse the smallest Contributions, when they are useless, and only serve for Pride and Wantonness.

XXIII. He knows that every Body, even to the meanest Tradesmen, informs himself of what becomes of so many Sums, so rigorously exacted; that every Body has their Eyes upon the Prince's Conduct,

(c) Tributa & injuncta Imperii munera impigrè obeunt, si injuriæ absint; hæc ægrè tolerant. *Idem. ibid. p. 456.*

(d) Solâ perdendi curâ, tanquam in summâ abundantia, pecuniæ illudere. *Tacit. l. 2. Hist. p. 364.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 43

Conduct, and that every individual compares what is taken from him, tho' pressed with want, with the Profusions which are the end of raising them.

XXIV. He knows that this so publick disdain of the Necessity, Patience and invincible Submission of the People, weaken the love of the Prince in many, and fill them with murmuring; and as he is convinced that one does not truly reign but when he does it over the Hearts and Wills, he firmly resolves never to employ the Tributes but to just and necessary Uses; to take care that his Ministers be as exact in that as himself, and to prove to the People that they cannot trust what they contribute for the defence of the State in better Hands than his.

XXV. But these Reflections are a little too general, and I should be afraid they would not have their full Effect, if I did not particularly examine the necessity of limiting the Taxes, and the lawful Means of preserving and defending the State, without having recourse to new Impositions. This shall be the subject of the two following Chapters.





C H A P XX.

*The justice and necessity of limiting the Taxes;
and delivering the State out of the Hands
of the Farmers of the Revenues.*

I. I do not here examine the ancient Taxes, and those which are in use. The Prince will discuss that at another time; and observe when his Affairs allow him, what difference he ought to put between such as are better established, less charge to the Publick, less prejudicial to Commerce, and these which are later, more inconvenient and more contrary to the publick Liberty. At present I shall suppose them all equally just; and only desire that the Prince in ascending the Throne, will firmly resolve to fix no new ones, and to withstand the warm solicitations that will be used to make him change his Mind.

II. (e) There are always Men zealous for encreasing the Revenues of the Prince, foreseeing futures at a Distance, full of Views and Designs, who furnish Memorials, who ask that they should be examined, and who pretend nothing in it, if one will believe them, but to do service to the Publick. These Men are listned to, when God has a mind to punish a Nation, and blind the Prince that governs it: But when he pleases to shew

(e) Nunquam principibus defuerunt, qui fronte gravi, & tristi supercilio, utilitatibus fisci contumaciter adessent: & erant principes, qui magistris non egerent. Plura tamen semper à nobis contra nos didicerunt; sed ad tuas aures, cum cæteris omnibus, tum vel maximè avaris adulationibus, obstructus est aditus. Silent ergo & quiescunt; & postquàm non est cui suadeatur, qui suadeant non sunt. *Paneg. Traj. p. 121.*

shew Favour to a People, and conduct the Prince by his Spirit, he delivers him from the Snares of these artificial Men, who conceal an insatiable Avarice under an appearance of Zeal, who have no other end but to make the Prince approve of their Rapins; who desire that he may make himself an Accomplice of their injustices; and interest himself in their Violences, that they may remain unpunished; they are openly his (f) Enemies, because they are so of his State; who want to have it in their Power to rob and carry away all; and who grieve as for a Misfortune that any sort of Good should remain in a Kingdom which they cannot get into their Possession.

III. Penetrating Ministers know them for what they are; but it is an Evil, say they, necessary for the State, which it must use with the same Precaution, as Poisons are in Physick, in converting them into Remedies. There are Occasions, continue they, when these Men are usefully listned to. All their Advices are not received; even many of them are rejected; but they sometimes give good ones. They charge themselves at their Peril with certain Treaties; they account for others. It is well enough known whence they have their Profit: They are narrowly watched. It is commonly known by Association every Affair is produced; and one has always the resource of taxing them, and making them return to the Prince a part of the Restitutions they owe him.

IV. For such Consideration one enters into Commerce with these dangerous Men: One makes himself dependent upon them, and is even obliged to protect them, to facilitate the execution of Treaties, of which he has received some Advances. By
this

(f) Quotidianorum scelerum reos, ac solos hostes inimicorum Republicæ vocans. *The Emperor Alexander Severus in his Life. p. 213.*

46 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

this he is carried to grant them more Things than he would. A rejected Affair is proposed anew, and accepted of. The wants of the State which several Events make more pressing, lessen the severity of the Minister and his Council, and encrease the boldness of the Farmers; and what had occasioned horror at a time when there yet remained some compassion for the People, is at another time looked upon as a wholesome Means that cannot be dispensed with.

V. Thus the Edicts and Tributes multiply. (g) Every Day new Views produce new Taxes. The watchfulness of the Farmers discovers from time to time what had escaped them. The State is laid out to their View and divided according to all the sorts of Goods and Persons that it contains. They go over every thing that is marked with their Seal to see if there is any room for a new Imposition. They examine, if contrary to their intentions, any thing is preserved free. They load their Memorials with their new Discoveries: And the Gain must be very small if they are rejected, for it is by this alone that they are examined.

VI. In the beginning (h) it was the pretence of the War which served to justify every Thing, but it is all revived even in Peace. The State has no more Foreign Enemies, but it has Domestick ones. The more quiet it is, the more it is the object

(g) *Nata servituti mancipia semel vaneunt; atque ultrò à Dominis aluntur. (Respublica) servitutem suam quotidie emit, quotidie pascit, in paying every Day new Taxes. Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 462.*

There is Britannia in his Text instead of Respublica

(h) *Hæc comprimendo (he means Monopolies and unjust Actions) egregiam famam paci circumdedit, quæ vel incuriâ, vel tolerantia priorum, haud minus quàm bellum timebatur; on Account of the new Taxes and Troubles. Tacit, in vita Agricol p. 495.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 37

object of their Envy; and it is because it begins to re-establish itself, that it awakens their Attention and Desire.

VII. By this the People are kept in continual Fear. The designs of the Farmers occasion an Alarm, and disquiet, which nothing can appease; and the new Impositions which are the fruit of them, compleat their Ruin. To the present Evils they add the fear of Futurity, they do not breath in Liberty. They know not what to reckon upon. They cannot tell what to look upon as their own, and with terror they think of the Authority, which is no more a Protection, and which almost always favours those who think of nothing but oppressing their fellow Subjects.

VIII. Thus the State finds itself divided (i) into two Parties, as in a civil War: The one behaves as Enemies; and the other is enraged at serving as a Prey to them. The one searches, and the other conceals. The one pursues, and the other flies. The affliction of the one rejoices the other. The Citizens are no more known. One does not know why he is united under the same Government. He reaps none of the advantages of Society. He would seek for an Azylum elsewhere; and would not stay where he is, but because he cannot break his Tyes, and that it would be a greater extremity to abandon all.

IX. What heightens the Consternation is, that the Taxes increase in Proportion as the Misery becomes more universal: For Experience always shews that new Impositions raise the Desire of the Farmers to favour the Prince's Profusions,
and

(i) *Quæstiarium illam nationem dico, homines præ cæteris ignobiles, atque improbos, planèque illiberales, in eàque solà Respublicâ, qua intestinis dissidiis laborat, non penitus infamem locum obtinentes. It is thus Synesius speaks of the Partisans of the Emperor Arcadius. Orat. de regno. p. 28.*

48 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

and make their Ministers more indifferent about the publick Good, and less delicate about the Means of satisfying the Passions of their Masters.

X. All that is raised by these odious Methods, fall, as it were, into a bottomless Pit, where it disappears, without ever filling it: Whether the chief Profit be to the Farmers; or that a Tax hurts another; or that the People, loaded so many Ways, dwindle down and lose Courage: or that the Funds which produce the new Taxes come too late, and are pre-engaged by Borrowings; or that the Assurance of never wanting such Resources, lead into Expences which always surpass them; or in fine, that *(k)* God, justly enraged against these unjust Measures, strikes them with his Curse, and makes all the Fruit that was expected from them vanish.

XI. This Curse begins by the Farmers, who are commonly Squanderers, Voluptuous and Epicures, hastening to enjoy what Death or often rather the Prince, can take away; knowing no other Use for their unjust Riches, but building magnificent Furniture, and sumptuous living; setting this Example to Men who ought to be ashamed of imitating them, and who nevertheless follow them as a good Pattern: thus corrupting the whole Nation with the Desire of Riches, and the only Use that Pleasure makes of them; infecting it with the Commerce of Usury and the Interest which several People have in their Proceedings.

XII. But this Curse, which from the Farmers passes to the Body of the State, affects the Prince.

(k) Qui mercedes congregavit, misit eas in sacculum pertusum. . . . respexistis ad amplius, & ecce factum est minus, & intulistis in domum, & exustavi illud, *says the Lord by the prophet Haggii*, chap. i. v. 6 & 9.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 49

Prince yet more sensibly, who (*l*) still continues in a State of Disorder, who sees his Debts increase for all his great Revenues (*m*), who is still forc'd to borrow a-new, and load himself with Rents, which he knows he cannot pay; and who, refusing to open his Eyes, in order to see where he can find a proper Expedient for the Disorder of his Affairs, embarrasses them more and more, in forcing himself to satisfy Passions which are infinite, and consequently above all the Revenues of a State, tho' it were as spacious as the whole Earth, because they will be always necessarily limited.

XIII. One sometimes thinks then of seeking for those Riches in the Farmers, which are to be seen no where else; and of squeezing the (*n*) Sponges, to use the Phrase of an Emperor (*o*), to make them discharge the Juice of the State, which they had suck'd up: This Conduct is just; and (*p*) the Publick is generally satisfied with it; not that it is the better for it, but because it sees with Pleasure those Men return to Indigence who were born in it, and comforts it self with seeing them rob'd of what they had taken from it.

E

XIV.

(*l*) Num quid est causæ, cur aliis principibus, cum multa raperent, defuerint omnia; tibi, cum tam multa largiaris, & nihil auferas, omnia supersint? *Paneg. Traj.* p. 121.

(*m*) Ille, (*that is Julian the Apostate*) plurima reperit, & exhausit omnia: Iste, (*that is, the Emperor Valentine the younger*) nihil invenit, & omnibus abundavit. *S. Ambr. de obitu Valentiniani*, N. 21.

(*n*) Procuratoribus vulgò pro spongiis dicebatur uti (*Vespasian*) quod quasi & ficcos madefaceret, & exprimeret humentes. *Sueton.* c. 16.

(*o*) Justissimum visum est inde repeti pecuniam, ubi inopiæ causa erat. *Tacit. L. 1. Hist.* p. 314.

(*p*) Grande gaudium, quod tam pauperas, forent quibus donasset Nero, quam quibus abstulisset. *Idem ibid.*

50 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

XIV. But such a Resource is but a transitory Comfort, and does not reach the Origin of the Evil. The Restitution is not made where the Theft was committed. The Provinces and Families do not feel the Juice of the Sponges return to the Places from whence they had suck'd it up. What the Farmers have ruin'd, remain in the same Condition ; what is taken from them abolishes none of the Taxes which they have given the Plan of ; and of which they have been the Exactors.

XV. Besides they have had the Precaution to put their Fortunes under others Names, and only let a moderate Revenue appear, to conceal in foreign Countries, what they have carried away from their own.

XVI. (*q*) Those amongst them who deserve most to be examin'd, and who know well that they deserve it, never fail procuring themselves a powerful Protection against what may happen. They are rich enough to buy it, and too cunning not to employ a (*r*) part of their Riches to secure the rest. This Protection is not what can be expected from a single Person ; for the Life of one Man is too uncertain. It touches and concerns sometimes all the People who have Interest at Court ; and thus it seldom happens that the heavy Taxes fall upon the most guilty, or that they do any Thing else than load the Unfortunate, less prudent according to the Age, or less able to pay Protectors so dear as is requisite.

XVII.

(*q*) *Pessimus quisque diffidentia, presentium mutationem pavens, adversus publicum odium privatam gratiam præparat : unde nulla innocentiae cura, sed vitae impunitatis. Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 330.*

(*r*) *Qui multa rapuerit, says the Emperor Alexander Severus, pauca suffragatoribus dederit, salvus erit. in ej. vita, p. 211.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 51

XVII. These miserable Creatures, when they come to be distressed, represent to the Minister who condemns them, that they have done nothing contrary to Law, that they have follow'd the Decrees of Council which authoriz'd their Proceedings, and which they have observ'd all the Conditions of: But the Minister little affected with their Remonstrances, thinks he does them a Favour in allowing them whereon to live, and is convinc'd within himself, that in strict Justice he might reduce them to their primitive State.

XVIII. He shews by this Conduct what one ought to think of these Laws and Decisions, which he formerly so much cried up the Authority of. It ought to be respected by the People who had no other lawful way of opposing it, 'tis what is not dubious: But does this Authority put the Prince's Conscience in Safety? Does it make that of the Minister so? This is what the Prince and the Minister ought to doubt of, with Reason, and the Examination they make of the Farmers, which this Authority should justify, is a prejudic'd Evil.

XIX. But let Men, to whatever degree of Power they are rais'd, hearken to him who shall judge their Laws, and who is willing that they should not be ignorant of this Condemnation (s), *Woe unto them, says he, by his Prophet, that decree unrighteous Decrees, and that write Grievousness which they have prescribed: To turn aside the Needy from Judgment, and to take away the Right from the Poor of my People, that Widows may be their Prey, and that they may rob the Fatherless. And what will ye do in the Day of Visitation, and in the Desolation which shall come*

E 2

from

(s) *Iſa.* ch. x. v. 1, 2, 3.

52 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

from far? To whom will ye flee for Help? and where will ye leave your Glory?

XX. There is no need of a Commentary for this. It is to those who have the Right of making Laws, and imposing Taxes, that God speaks. He addresses himself rather to the Princes, than those who give them bad Counsel. It relates to the Laws dressed with all the Formalities, deliberated in Council, writ with Maturity and Reflection, published according to Custom; and not violent Manifesto's; and yet how are they fulminated against by him, who knows the Design and End of them, and is the Father of the People whom they oppress?

XXI. (t) *As for my People, Children are their Oppressors*; Says he by the same Prophet: *What mean ye*, continues he, addressing himself to the hard Exactors, *that ye beat my People to Pieces, and grind the Face of the Poor? Saith the Lord God of Hosts.* One sees in these few Words what tenderness he has for his Children inhumanly used, and what Indignation for those who spoil and oppress them.

XXII. But here is something stronger, and I know not what can be able to intimidate Princes, who think every thing lawful for them, and look upon all the Estates of their Subjects as acquired for them, if the reproaches which God makes against them by another Prophet does not fill them with Terror: (v) *And I said, Hear, I pray you, O heads of Jacob, and ye Princes of the House of Israel; Is it not for you to know Judgment? Who hate the good and love the Evil, who pluck off their Skin from off them, and their Flesh from off their Bones. Who also eat the Flesh of my People, and flay their Skin from off them, and they break their*

(t) *Isa. C. III. v. 12. & 15.*

(v) *Michæ. C. III. v. 1, 2, 3.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 53

their Bones, and chop them in pieces, as for the Pot, and as Flesh within the Caldron. Then shall they cry unto the Lord, but he will not hear them; he will even hide his Face from them at that time, as they behaved themselves ill in their doings.

XXIII. It is to the Princes and Chiefs of the People that God speaks, to those that had the sovereign Authority; to those to whom Justice was intrusted, and who were charged by the Divine Providence to render it to the People. He makes them accountable for all the Exactions and new Inventions of loading their Subjects. He looks upon them alone as blameable for all the Violences, because it is their Duty to suppress them, and as it is under their Name that they have been exercised. He calls the Taxes, which they have coloured with vain Pretexts, barbarous Cruelties. He considers them as wild Beasts who feed upon Blood and Slaughter. He has them in horror, not only as the Murderers of their Brethren, but as Men who have broken their Bones, and devoured their Flesh. And he ends these Reproaches by threatening to treat them as they have done their Brethren, and punish their Inhumanity with an eternal refusal of his Mercy.

XXIV. These terrible Words ought to disperse all the false Reasons with which Princes and their Ministers endeavour to justify the excessive Taxes wherewith they load the People. God tells them how he regards them: And if he is so terrifying now when he is obliged to use our Expressions and Ideas to make himself understood, what will it be when his Justice shall immediately reproach those Violences it detests?

XXV. The Necessities of the State can never Authorise them, tho' it requires extraordinary Succours. It is never allowable to crush the Poor and Weak. The Burthen must be proportion'd

54 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

to their Strength. All just Means must be used, and the Prince reduce himself to plain Necessaries. The Rich must contribute to the common Wants according to their Wealth. After this every thing that would cause the People to perish and reduce them to the State in which God has just now painted them must be thought impracticable and impossible.

XXVI. (x) *Hear this I pray you, says a Prophet on God's Part, ye heads of the House of Jacob, and Princes of the House of Israel, that abhor Judgments and pervert Equity. They build up Zion with Blood, and Jerusalem with Iniquity. You fortify the Capitol of the State, to place it above Insult: You prepare for a Siege: You provide against the Misfortunes of an approaching War: But do you believe you shall succeed in it by loading the People with excessive Impositions? It is with their Blood that you build the Citadel of Sion: It is by guilt that you raise the Walls of Jerusalem. It is to call the Misfortunes publick to pretend to turn them aside by such Means. I will not preserve a City cemented with the Blood of my People: (y) Therefore shall Zion for your sake be plowed as a Field, and Jerusalem shall become Heaps, and the Mountain of the House, as the high Places of the Forest.*

XXVII. And surely what is there in a Nation that can claim the assistance of God, if the People are trod under Foot, and if the unjust govern; if the one suffers what they would not do from Enemies; and if the others exercise Violence, which the Enemies would not commit, if they were Master? What worse could the People fear, if the Country was without Defence? And what is the Defence of the State, in regard to them, when

all

(x) *Michææ. C. III. v. 9. & 10.*

(y) *Ibid. v. 12.*

all is taken away, and, according to Scripture Terms, they take off the skin and break the Bones?

XXVIII. What Idea have Foreigners of a Kingdom, where the Heart of it is more frightful than if its Frontiers had been forced by Enemies, who had a design of settling in it, and not to ravage it by their inroads? What do they think of the Prince who governs it? How shameful is the Compassion they have for his Subjects? What prejudice does the fear of its being subdued bring upon him? How does it cement the Union of his Enemies, and how does it weaken that of the Allies, and even of the natural Subjects.

XXIX. The Remedy for all these Evils, is to follow a quite contrary Course, to apply himself to gain the Confidence of the People by a mild and equitable Treatment, to deliver them from the fear of new Impositions, (z) in not listening to such Projects or Designs; and to shut the Mouths of the Farmers, and take from them all hopes of ravaging his State, under pretence of giving him Assistance for which they would dearly repay themselves with their own Hands; (a) to look upon these Harpies as publick Robbers, and as his Enemies as well as those of his People; to banish them as an avaritious, cruel, bloody Nation; which lives upon Rapin and Spoil, to make an infinite Distinction between the inventors of new Taxes, and the Farmers of the ancient Revenue of the State, to consider and protect these when they are faithful, and according to St. John's Precept to the Publicans, content themselves with what is appointed them: But to exclude those for ever, who
are

(z) Ad tuas aures, cum cæteris omnibus, tum vel maxime avaris, obstructus est aditus. Postquam non est cui suadeatur, qui suadeant non sunt. *Paneg. Traj. p. 121.*

(a) Procul à se & à subditis exitiosam hanc pestem amoliatur, ut princeps bonus bonis imperet, virtutisque contra æmulationem inducat, in quâ ipse Rex, & certator, & certaminis arbiter esse debet. *Synef. de Regno p. 28.*

56 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

are only wise to do Evil, and watch to oppress their Brethren.

XXX. The Prince out of Bounty and Justice will put himself in their Place, who owe him the Taxes. He will examine if they bear the ancient ones with Difficulty ; and he will say with the (b) young *Valentinian*, so justly praised by St. *Ambrose* ; How could they bear new Taxes, when they cannot pay the old ones ?

XXXI. He will inform himself by sure Hands of the State of the Provinces. He will send secret Visitors into them, unknown to the Governors and Intendants. He will send second ones unknown to the first, to assure himself of the Truth by the conformity of their Accounts ; and he will not doubt of the Publick's being overloaded, if he perceives by this Means the Cities unpeopled, the Towns and Villages deserted, many of the Houses in ruin ; that the greatest Part of the Inhabitants are ill clothed, that the good Labourers are scarce, that the Lands are of little Value, and that the Boroughs and small Towns have a melancholy and ruinous Aspect.

XXXII. He will by this Knowledge resolve to Remedy the publick Evils by all sorts of Means, instead of augmenting them by new Exactions. He will hope that God will renew for him what he has done for (c) some Princes, some of whom did

(b) *Quid de amore provinciarum loquer, vel quo eos ipse complectebatur, vel qui ab iis consultori suo rependebatur, quibus nihil unquam indici passus est ? Præterita, inquit, non queunt solvere, nova poterunt sustinere ?*

(c) *Nulli civium quidquam ademit : abstinuit alieno, si quis unquam : ac ne concessas quidem ac solitas collationes suscepit, & tamen nemine ante se munificentia minor. l'Emp. Tite, Sust. C. 7.*

We read the same thing concerning the Emperors Antoninus Pius, M. Aurelius, Alexander Severus. We have seen what Pliny says of Trajan : Tibi, cum tam multa largiaris, & nihil auferas omnia supersunt. And what St. Ambrose says of Valentinian : Nihil invenit, omnibus abundavit.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 57


did not even know him, and that by his Blessing he will give him greater ease in discharging the Duties of the State, greater abundance for exercising Liberality, more glory and grandeur both at Home and Abroad by his Clemency and Justice, than if he had greater Treasures, but more unlawfully acquired.

XXXIII. He will taste an innocent Joy, in thinking of that with which he fills the Hearts of his Subjects. He will see them content and quiet every one in his Family, every one under his Vine, and under his Fig Tree. He will know that they depend upon Care, and scrupulous Fidelity. He shall receive the Portion of their Substance, and what they esteem most valuable, which they will offer him as a proof of their Respect and Love: (d) and he shall not see the Tears and Blood of the People sacrificed by the Farmers run into his Treasures, but free Effusions, sanctified by the Piety of his Children, and (e) the thanks which he himself shall render to him who is the Source and end of All.

(d) *Ærarium, non jam spoliarium civium, cruentarum que prædarum sævum receptaculum, Paneg. Traj. p. 108.*

(e) Thine, O Lord, is the Greatness, and the Power, and the Glory, and the Victory, and the Majesty; for all that is in the Heaven and in the Earth is thine; thine is the Kingdom, O Lord, and thou art exalted as head above all. 1 *Chron. c. xxix. v. 11.*





CHAPTER XXI.

Lawful Expedients for defending the State, and providing for its Necessities, without having recourse to new Impositions: What must be done if they become unavoidable.

ARTICLE I.

Lawful Expedients for defending the State without new Impositions.

THE first Expedient for being without new Impositions, is carefully to preserve the ancient Revenues, and hinder the Sources to be turned away from them.

II. (*f*) Nero in the beginning of his Reign, touched with the complaints of the People against the Licence and Rigour of those who received the Imposts settled upon the Carriages and Merchandise, formed a design of abolishing all the Duties of Entry and Export, of forcing all the Merchandise, of leaving the Commerce absolutely free, and of obliging Mankind by so magnificent a Gift. But the Senate, after having greatly praised so generous a disinterestedness, represented to this young Prince

(*f*) Crebris populi flagitationibus, immodestiam publicanorum arguentis, dubitavit Nero an cuncta vectigalia omitti juberet, idque pulcherrimum donum generi mortalium daret; sed impetum ejus, multum prius laudatâ magnitudine animi, retinere senatores, dissolutionem Imperii docendo, si fructus, quibus respublica sustineretur, diminuerentur. Quippe sublatis portoriis, sequens ut Tributorum abolitio expostularetur. . . temperandas planè publicanorum cupidines, ne per tot annos sine querelâ toleratæ, novis acerbitatibus ad invidiam verterent. Tacit. l. 13. Annal. p. 252.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 59

Prince, that to suppress the Revenues necessary for a State's Defence, would be to shake its Foundations, and ruin it : But the abolition of the Duties upon Carriages and Merchandise would prepare for that of other Taxes, laid upon the Lands or upon Persons : That it was just to moderate the the pretensions of the publick Receivers, and to hinder them from making the ancient Duties odious by Innovations, which had been paid till then without murmuring ; but that it was necessary, in retrenching the Abuses, to preserve the good of the Prince, which was likewise that of the Republick.

III. This was a very wise Advice. It is more inconvenient to lose the ancient Funds, than to load the People excessively ; for one can lighten the Burthen when he pleases ; but it is hard to re-establish Duties that have been dropt, and besides, the two Extremities of an excessive Indulgence and Severity reunite, because the State cannot subsist, but by the Expences it must find by new Impositions, when the ancient ones are abolished ; and the Experience one has in being too open, makes him in the End become too close and reserved.

IV. What the Avarice of the Receivers adds to the Taxes must be reduced, they must be equalled by a just Re-division, they must not be exacted in a cruel Manner, as has been said elsewhere : But the ancient Patrimony ought to be dear to the Prince. He should neglect none of it, he should allow none of it to be usurped. (g) He should bestow none of it upon
any

(g) *The bad Conduct of Vitellius, justly blamed by the Historian.* His Tributa dimittere, alios immunitatibus juvare, denique nullâ in posterum curâ lacerare Imperia, apud sapientes cessâ habebantur, quæ neque dari, neque accipi salvâ Republicâ poterant. *Tacit. l. 3. Hist. p. 383.*

60 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

any, and should have for a Maxim, never to grant Immunities without limitation and just Reason, which have relation to the publick Good, rather than the Advantage of private Persons.

Second
Expedient V. After this first Care, the Prince should have Farmers general, who are understanding, faithful, laborious, solvent, who do not buy the Farm of the Ministers, preferable to others who would take it at a higher Rate, and who do not by the same Methods obtain Diminutions founded upon Pretences rather than the Truth.

Third
Expedient VI. But precautions in this Point will be useless, if the Ministers who value the Farms are not honest and disinterested; for no one dares present himself without their leave, nor raise the Price upon Persons whom they protect, nor discover the Collusion, because it may be hard to prove it, and one greatly exposes himself, by becoming a Defamer: Likewise all depends upon the choice of the Ministers; and there it must be begun.

Fourth
Expedient VII. Besides the Fidelity of the Ministers, which ought to be above all suspicion, it is of great Consequence that they have Oeconomy, and know the value of Things, the time of laying in Stores, the Country from which they come, the manner of preserving them, and for what exchanges they may be had, without always using ready Money. It is incredible what immense Sums an understanding Person may save to the Prince, and nevertheless serve him more usefully than a great many others. A Man of this Character forms others, distinguishes them, places every one according to his Talent, and thus it happens, that whereas every thing that concerns the Prince is commonly done in a negligent Manner, with waste unseasonably, and with Loss; every

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 61

every thing on the contrary is done with exactness, seasonably, and at little Expence.

VIII. If the Prince's Domain is not alienated, it is the Estate that ought to be most valued by him, because it is the most Independent, the most Lawful and the most Ancient. It was formerly the chief Revenue of the Kings. It was upon this they laid the Burthen of their personal Expence, and that of their Household. It was the source of their Bounties and Charities. It was the rich and innocent Treasure, whence St. *Lewis* and the other Princes took wherewith to build and endow so many Monasteries and Churches, the Foundations of which are Proofs of their Liberalities, that they were not raised upon the Publick, but were a part of their Inheritance, and the Fruit of their Oeconomy as well as of their Piety.

IX. Since Taxes have become common, this ancient Patrimony has been neglected. As it was divided in several Parcels, and scattered over all the Provinces, it has been thought hard to manage, and the taste for it lost, because it required too much Care. They determined therefore to sell it, and almost always at an under Value. The Sums which have been got for it have never been employed in other Funds; and the Prince finds himself stripp'd of the Riches of his Ancestors, without any amends for so great a Loss.

X. This Fault, the Consequences of which are much greater than perhaps are imagined, should affect a Prince who understands the Value (b) of so free and just an Estate. He should endeavour to enter into it again, as soon as the State of his Affairs will

(b) Congiarum das de tuo, alimenta de tuo: sciunt dari tibi quod nemini præceptum. *Paneg. Traj. p. 87.*

62 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

will allow him to reimburse the Possessors. In the mean time, he should jealously preserve what remains of it. Chuse faithful Men to take care of it, and account for it before an Intendant General ; and place his Glory in not exceeding, if possible, in his personal Expences, those Revenues which cost his Subjects nothing ; and even to bring a part of his Liberalities and Charities within them.

Sixth Expedient. XI. In reducing himself within these narrow Bounds, the Prince should make a Law for himself, (*i*) absolutely to retrench all useless Expences ; to buy nothing superfluous ; to allow nothing to a vain Curiosity ; to place his Glory in reducing his Wants ; to make himself honoured by a royal Simplicity ; to reform every thing that serves only for Luxury and Pleasure ; (*k*) not to let himself be puffed up with a false Idea of Magnificence, always indigent, and often unjust ; to remember that he should set an Example, and that he authorises Profusion, if he goes beyond the Bounds of Necessity ; that he is not condemned to be a Slave to Pleasure by being placed on the Throne ; that he is a King, but not a King of Vanity and Pleasures ; that in his Condition he is a Christian, and subject to the Rules of the Gospel ; and that he would be inexcusable if he were less abstemious and moderate than several infidel Princes, who, being Masters of the whole World, placed their Glory in governing it right, and in reducing their personal Expences to very little.

XII.

(*i*) Ante omnes enitebatur ne quid otiosum vel emeret aliquando, vel pasceret. *This is said of the Emperor Adrian, one of the ablest Princes the Romans have had. It is only imitating him in this Point, to have few Wants. Spart. in his Life.*
p. 129.

(*k*) Bono Principi ubinam tantis pecuniis opus est ? cum neque insolenti animi fastu sumptuosa opera molliatur. *Synes. de Regno. p. 27.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 63

XII. Unless these Notions are deeply rooted in the Prince's Heart, the most immense Revenues will not suffice him. If he loves Pageantry; if he thinks himself greater than another because he expends more; if he comprehends the vast Extent of his Palace and Gardens, as making part of his personal Merit; if he thinks that Frugality and Temperance debase him; if he will keep more Officers than he is able; if he will restrain himself in nothing; if he has other Passions but that of making his People happy; if he places his Glory in any thing else besides his Duty, all the Schemes he can form for comforting his People, or setting his Finances in order, will be to no purpose.

XIII. There will be Moments wherein he will be touched for the publick Misery, and order the Taxes to be diminished; but this will be always with the secret Condition, that every thing belonging to him have the same Splendour, and that all his Desires be equally satisfied; and as this will be utterly impossible, if the Taxes do not continue the same, they will be immediately imposed again, and even augmented with several others. A Minister will speak at these Moments of a transitory Bounty, and will represent the Disorder of the Finances: but he will be surpris'd that the next Minute should deface all, and that if he continues to represent the Wants of the State, instead of satisfying those of the Prince, he will not only be unlistned to, but his Place will be appointed for another, at least if he does not become more complaisant.

XIV. It is then the Prince who ought to speak to himself, and prescribe the same Limits to himself which Necessity does. It is he who ought to say to himself what none will do with an intire Freedom, that the publick Expences, which are unavoidable and absolutely necessary for the State,
amount

64 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

amount to very great Sums, and are taken out of a part of the Goods of the Poor, who waste themselves in Labour, and want Neecessaries; that the superfluous Expences, which take place after the necessary ones, that fall upon the miserable Remains which the first had spared; that these idle Expences, which only serve for Luxury and Pleasure, must be compared with the Substance squeezed out of the Marrow and Bones of the Poor, crushed under the Pressure; and that it is a strange Inhumanity to waste in frivolous things, what is for Bread and Life to an infinite number of Families, and to make ones self a delicious Bath in their Blood and Tears.

Seventh Expedient. XV. When a Prince has well perceived all the Horror of such a Conduct, he takes care not to lavish for others what he is firmly resolved to refuse himself. He does not load the State with a number of useless Pensions, which cannot be raised upon the People, but after the lawful Expences, which have already drained them. He does not heap upon avaritious and (*l*) idle Courtiers what should serve to pay his Troops, and reward old Officers, cover'd over with Wounds. He does not grant to Ladies who are rich, or would have always been so if they had had Oeconomy, Sums which they sacrifice to Vanity. He does not add excessive and superfluous Presents to Fortunes which are already considerable. He who is an Enemy to Luxury does not furnish wherewith to entertain it in others, and (*m*) he does not give the Bowels of the Citizens to satisfy

(*l*) *Sibi ignavi, nobis graves, said the Emperor Tiberius. Tacit. l. 2. Annal. p. 56.*

(*m*) *The Emperor Alexander Severus said: Malum pupilum esse Imperatorem, qui ex visceribus provincialium homines non necessarios, nec Reipublicæ utiles, pasceret. In ejus vit. p. 209.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 65

satisfy the Passions of those whom nothing can suffice.

XVI. He is convinced (*n*) that it is a shameful Lavishness, and a Proof of Weakness to ruin his State to enrich Men who are of no Service to it.

XVII. I think it not only Cruelty but a dishonourable Lowness, for the Prince to sacrifice the most innocent and virtuous of his Subject, to the Avarice of those who have no other Merit but that of always asking and receiving.

XVIII. He compares those who pay the Taxes with those who are continually craving at his Hands. On one side, he considers the Republic and its pressing Necessities; on the other, these insatiable Courtiers. He compares them with Numbers of worthy People whom he cannot assist, though well deserving his Care. He compares them with whole Provinces ruin'd by Famine, Inundation, or by being the Seat of War, and which He cannot relieve, how greatly soever they move him to Compassion: He will reproach himself as guilty of a crying Injustice, if he heaps his profuse Liberalities on useless Persons whilst he is forced to leave Evils and Wants, which pierce him with Grief, without any Redress.

XIX. He knows that there are but few lawful Ways of filling the publick Treasury: (*o*) that one puts himself under a Necessity of having Recourse to violent and criminal Means, in the Judgment even of infidel Princes, if he drains himself by excessive

(*n*) *Salaria multis subtrahit, quos otiosos videbat accipere, dicens, nihil esse sordidius, imò crudelius, quàm si Rempublicam ii arrodarent, qui nihil in eam suo labore conferrent. The Emperor Antonius Pius, in his Life, p. 138.*

(*o*) *Ærarium si ambitione exhauriatur, per scelera supplendum erit: said the Emperor Tiberius. Tacit. l. 2. Annal. p. 56.*

66 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

cessive Bounties: and that, (*p*) not to become unjust, he must be more attentive in preserving than in amassing, because otherwise he becomes cruel for having been imprudent.

Eighth Expedient. XX. After having suppressed the useless Pensions, and the Presents granted to People without Merit, he lays it down as a Rule to measure all Favours and Assistance by the true Wants. His Design is not to load any body with Riches; but not to suffer Men who serve the State usefully to be in Want and Misery. He will not have one to engross what is due to several. He will not run in debt by becoming liberal. He will have his Favours be real, and not vain Promises. He will be sure of what Fund he has, before fixing any thing upon it: and he loves better to give less, and to do it surely. But the chief Maxim is, That Justice go before Favours; that the Publick be preferred to the Private; and that the Finances be not disordered by an Inclination of doing pleasure.

XXI. There are Princes who take little concern in Sums which they do not see, and who easily grant considerable Rents and Pensions, because it only requires a Stroke of a Pen to do it, whereas if these Liberalities were done in ready Money or Jewels, they would appear more important, and be more thought of. A diligent and wise Prince does not act so. An Order is the same thing to him as a present Sum. He knows what he gives, as if he counted it out; and he always sees the Consequences of a Liberality, as well as the Treasurer whom he order to deliver it.

XXII.

(*p*) Ad aurum colligendum attentus, ad servandum cautus, ad inveniendum sollicitus, sed sine cujusquam excidio. *Lemprius in vit. Alexandri Severi*, p. 218.

INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.* 67

XXII. After the Suppression of certain Pensions, and the Reduction of others, the Prince examines if the State is not loaded with double Offices: if a Province does not pay, at the same time, the Appointments of a Governor, and those of the Commandant, who is in his Place: if it is not so with several Cities and Ports: if it is not so with several Employments, which one has the Title and Income of, and another does the Duties, with almost equal pay with the other.

Ninth
Expedient.

XXIII. He looks upon these double Employments as Abuses, and reduces all to Unity without regarding the Reasons which serve as a Pretence for the multiplying of Officers, and the Doubling their pay.

XXIV. These Reasons are of two sorts; the one taken from Politicks, the other founded upon Favour. One is afraid that a Governor be too powerful; there is no real Authority left to him in his Government; and another who has the Confidence of the Court, but not the Title, commands there in his Place: it would be much better not to separate these two Things, but to chuse a Person who reunites them, in deserving the Trust, and in being incapable of abusing it.

XXV. With regard to Favour, the Pretence is yet less specious: he will enrich a Courtier in giving him a Government, provided he is peaceable, and give the Business to a Person who is in Favour, without any other View than the doing pleasure to two private Persons at the Expence of the Publick. An able Prince strikes out one of the two, and sometimes both, to put a Man of Merit in their Place, who may be deserving of the Rewards annexed to his Employment.

68 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

Tenth
Expedient.

XXVI. If the Prince is in Peace he keeps no Troops but what are necessary for him. He computes what they cost the State, and compares their Expence with his ordinary Funds and common Revenue. All that is above appears to him insupportable, and in Peace he shuns putting himself out of a Condition to find Resources to support a War, if at any time he happens to be forced into one. This Fault is often committed, of consuming beforehand what ought to have been reserved for another time. One continues armed when he has no Enemies: and he cannot pay his Troops when he has an important War in hand. It is not that a Prince should ever expose himself to be surprized, in disbanding too many Troops: but there is a Medium between Imprudence, and an excessive Precaution.

Eleventh
Expedient.

XXVII. When the Prince is applying himself to put his Finances in order and settle his Revenues, he carefully shuns entering into any War, either for himself or his Allies: for it is impossible to regulate his Expence when he is in War: but he does not shew the Dislike he has to it, for fear of drawing it upon him; and he is not the fiercer for having his Affairs regulated: but he is really less unquiet and more courageous.

Twelfth
Expedient.

XXVIII. It is not only War that he shuns, whilst he labours to regulate his Finances; it is every new Enterprize in general; every Building either for himself or the Publick; every Design that would run him into any Expence. He follows his Scheme and Plan to the end, without quitting it. He shews both in publick and private that he has it at heart. He looks upon his Ministers Application in clearing, and setting in order, whatever is part of his Estate

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 69

as an important Service, and he is not pleased but when they shew him that his Revenues surpass his necessary Expences in the time of Peace.

ARTICLE II.

These Expedients are sufficient for the Wants of the State.

I. The Prince then passes from this perplexing Care to another as just, but not so troublesome. He thinks of freeing the State of the Charges that are most burthensome to it; of reimbursing the Rents settled at too high a Rate: of giving up the Offices erected without any other Necessity but that of having Money, of disengaging the Domain alienated at an Under-price, and clearing all his Revenue; so that it may be employ'd for the publick Good, according to its first Appointment.

II. When he is arrived at this happy State, (q) he looks upon his Riches as for the use of all those who want them, not through their own fault, but by Misfortunes; and he becomes still a greater Oeconomist for himself, because he finds that it affords him the Pleasure of relieving all the wants of his Subjects.

III. He begins by the Nobility, not those who are idle, or have ruined themselves by Profusion and Luxury, but those (r) who are full of Honour and Courage, and would be able to serve the State well if they were encouraged. (s) He draws illustrious

(q) Ut honestam innocentium paupertatem levavit, ita prodigos & ob flagitia egentes movit senatu, aut sponte cedere passus est. *Tibere dans Tacit. L. 2. Annal, p. 61.*

(r) Equites Romanos; quos pauperes & innocentes vidit, sponte ditavit. *l'Empe. eur Adrien dans sa vie p. 133.*

(s) Divitiis nullius invidit, pauperes juvit. Honoratos, quos pauperes verè, non per luxuriam, aut simulationem, vidit, semper multis commodis auxit. *Alexandre Severe dans sa vie p. 217.*

70 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

illustrious Names out of obscurity. He frees virtuous Parents reduced to Straits, of a part of their Family ; and he does not wait till they represent their Condition. He has sure ways of knowing it, and he has a List of all those who are worthy of his Notice.

IV. From thence he goes to the Poor, whose Protector and Father he well knows that he is. He contributs by different Means to relieve them out of Misery, and he is strongly persuaded that nothing unpeoples States so much as the little Care which is taken of the poor Families ; that (t) it is on the Prince's Account, and in confidence of his Bounty, that so many Fathers who are in Want, educate their Children, and that the Divine Providence charges him with them in a particular Manner, and obliges him to adopt them.

V. His tendernefs for them awakes chiefly in publick Calamities, because their Number then encreases, and that of Persons capable of assisting them diminishes.

VI. (v) In a bad Year he buys Corn, which he distributes gratis to those who have nothing, and at a moderate Price to those who have little.

VII. (x) He sends to the Places where Inundations have made great Ravages, where burning has consumed several Houses, where the Hail has destroyed the Harvest, where the inroads of Enemies have done great Destruction,
in

(t) *Pauperibus educandis una ratio est bonus princeps, Paneg. Traj. p. 86.*

(v) *Frumentum in annonæ difficultatibus, sæpè levissimo, interdum nullo pretio, viritim admensus est l'Empereur Auguste Suet. C. 41.*

Vini, olei & tritici penuriam per æratii sui damna, emendo & gratis populo dando, sedavit: cela est dit de l'Emp. Antonin le Pieux Jul. Cap. dans sa vie p. 139.

(x) *Plurimas per totum orbem civitates, terræ motu aut incendio afflictas, restituit in melius. l'Emp. Vespasien dans Suet. C. 17.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 71

in a Word, over all, where Divine Justice gives him room to exercise his Mercy, he there sends considerable Sums, and faithful Distributors, who make the Evil be forgot, or at least make it supportable; and (y) he adds to this succour a Compassion and Tendernefs, more valuable, without comparifon, and more capable of comforting the Unfortunate, than all the Bounties that he beftows upon them.

VIII. He has always Funds in Referve to repair the publick Loffes. He expects them as unavoidable Accidents; and like a good Father of a Family, fets a part as in Truft, wherewith to fupply the barren Year, and the retardment of his Revenues.

IX. When a Province is not in a Condition to pay the ordinary Taxes, and he cannot affift it fo effectually as he would defire, he comforts it, (z) in difcharging it of all, or of a part of the Impositions which it ought to bear. He then gives it what he does not exact, and he does not make this liberality odious in throwing upon the other Provinces what he cannot get from the unfortunate one.

X. Independant of the publick Calamities, he examines what Advantage he can procure to his Subjects, in affifting them, and not in keeping them idle. (a) He encourages the Manufactures in fome manner contributing to them. He leaves a Part of his Revenues in the Hands of an able and good Citizen, to make Work for the Poor;

(b) to

(y) *The Emperor Titus in the publick Calamities: Non modo principis follicitudinem, fed & parentis affectum unicum preftitit, nunc confolando per edicta, nunc opitulando quare- nus fuppeteret facultas: Great Praise, and very worthy of a Prince. Suet. C. 8-*

(z) *Publicis fumptibus. vexatis, publica munera remittet. Synes. de Regno. p. 27.*

(a) *Veftigalia civitatibus ad proprias fabricas deputavit. l'Emp. Alex. Severe aans Lamprid. p. 212.*

72 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

(*b*) to employ them for the use and establishment of the Town, to repair the Pavement, the Fountains and the Walls of it, (*c*) to hinder Works useful to the Publick from falling to Ruin; to compleat others which were begun, but have been left off for want of Funds.

XI. He does not do things in many Places at the same time; but in order, and with Oeconomy, in beginning by the most pressing, and continuing in the Provinces and Cities, as his Revenues allow him, and as he finds faithful Men who are worthy of his Confidence, and who love the Publick well enough to deserve to serve it under his Orders.

XII. He is glad (*d*) not to build for himself, in order to be able to repair his Kingdom, to free it from that exterior Melancholly which the Misery has rendered as it were general; and to give the Cities an Air of Commodiousness and Satisfaction, which may do honour to his Conduct: But he does not let the Palaces which his Predecessors have built at a great Expence, go to ruin. He neglects none of them, and he carefully keeps up what will last without great Charges, which he does not care for sacrificing to Shew alone, and to useles Wonders.

XIII. He is watchful of every Occasion of doing good; in (*e*) timing a Favour right; in
comforting

(*b*) *Magnum hoc tuum, non erga homines modò, sed erga tecta ipsa meritum, sistere ruinas, solitudinem pellere, ingentia opera, eodem quo extructa sunt animo, ab interitu vindicare* Paneg. Traj. p. 146.

(*c*) *Idem tam parens in ædificando, quàm diligens in tuendo... quàm magnificus in publicum est.* Ibid. 147. & 148.

(*d*) *A Burning having consumed a great Part of Rome, Tiberius ordered it to be re-built at his Expence: Quod damnum Cæsar ad gloriam vertit, exsolutis domuum & insularum pretiis... tanto acceptius in vulgum, quantò modicus privatis ædificationibus.* Tacit. L. 6. Annal. p. 161.

(*e*) *Erogandæ per honesta pecuniæ cupiens.* Tibere se.
Tacit. L. 1. Annal. p. 37.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 73

comforting the People who bear their Affliction with Dignity ; in aiding Persons who are readier to conceal their Wants than to publish them ; in (f) shewing that he does not think himself powerful, rich or happy, but in as far as he can make others feel it by his own Bounty : But in never impoverishing himself, and in not putting himself to the Necessity of exacting too much from his People, for having had the Indiscretion of giving them too much.

ARTICLE III.

What must be done when new Impositions are necessary.

I. He may nevertheless, for all his Wisdom and Precautions, be drawn into Expences which exceed his ordinary Funds. It is hard for him always to shun War. It is not in his Power to put an End to it when he will. It does not depend upon him to moderate the Sums necessary to support it ; and if it continues any considerable Time, it drains and exceeds all his Revenues.

II. One cannot then advise him, for his Resource, to follow the Example of (g) *Marcus Aurelius*, who being in War, for Fear of loading the State with a new Subsidy, made all his valuable Furniture be sold publickly, together with all the curious and rare Things which

one

(f) Dies nunquam transiit, quin aliquid mansuetum, civile, pium faceret, sed ita ut ætarium non everteret. *Alexander Severus ex Lamprid. p. 217.*

(g) Quum ad hoc bellum omne ætarium exhausisset suum, neque in animum induceret, ut extra ordinem provincialibus aliquid imperaret, in foro Trajani auctionem ornamentorum Imperialium fecit, vendiditque aurea pocula, & christallina, & marillina, vasa etiam regia, & vestem uxoriam serciam & auratam, gemmasque etiam multas quas in repositorio sanctiore Adriani repererat. *Jul. Cap. in ej. vit. p. 145.*

74 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

one of his Predecessors had collected into a rich Treasure ; and all the Empress's Jewels and even to her Cloaths. There are Circumstances wherein the Prince ought to sacrifice many valuable but useless Things to the publick Good ; but in that as in other Cases there must be a great deal of Prudence, not to strip himself upon one Occasion, of what would be a Resource in others. Besides it is not just that the Prince alone bear the Load of a War which concerns the whole State ; and it is enough (*b*) to bring the People to concur in it chearfully, that they be informed of the Goodness of the Cause which they defend, and of the Reasons which make new Impositions necessary.

III. They deprive themselves of a great Advantage, if they disdain to interest the People in the Motives of the War, and are contented with loading them with new Taxes, without shewing them that it is with Regret, and that Necessity alone determines them to it.

IV. There is nothing which the People are not capable of when one puts Confidence in them, and seems to admit them into the publick Councils. Then they animate themselves to their own Defence, and enter zealously into all the Sentiments of a Prince who will prove their Justice to them : But if one seems not to value their Approbation, and to want nothing but their Riches, they forsake the Prince's Interest as if it was different from theirs, they murmur against all new Impositions, and they are more hurt by the

(*i*)

(*b*) Ad supplenda exercitus damna, certavere Gallie, Hispaniæ, Italiæ, quod cuique promptum, arma, equos, aurum. offerentes, quorum laudato studio Germanicus, armis modò & equis ad bellum sumptis, propriâ pecuniâ militem juvit. Tacit. L. 1. *Annal.* p. 35.

(i) Prefaces with which one endeavours to colour every Edict to them, and where one alledges foreign and unprobable Motives, instead of speaking plainly, and acknowledging the Wants of the State.

V. The most natural Manner of settling new Taxes upon the People, is to make them be accepted of by the States assembled; to leave them the Care of imposing them upon Funds that will be the least chargeable to the Publick; and to allow them to chuse faithful Persons who content themselves with very moderate Taxations for the Recovery of them, and who are diligent and assiduous, but Enemies to hard and violent Measures.

VI. If the Custom of assembling the States is abolish'd in certain Provinces, they must examine in Council what the States ought to have considered if they had been conven'd; enter into the Particulars of the Provinces; see what they can bear; upon what it can be fix'd; and how it can be levy'd with little Charges, and by whom.

VII. Above all, the Farmers must be removed, and none employ'd but Persons known already for their Probity, and the Prince's ordinary Farmers us'd for the Recovery of the new Taxes.

VIII. But the most important Condition, is to be exactly faithful to his Word in suppressing them, as soon as the Wants which made them be imposed shall cease.

IX. It cannot be imagined how much it is the Prince's Interest to seek no Shifts or Pretences in that Matter. He has the whole Confidence,

(i) Nihil mihi videtur frigidius, nihil ineptius, quam lex cura prologo. *Senec Epist.* xciv. p. 594.

76 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

dence of his Subjects, if he is sincere ; but he loses it and his Reputation together, if he is not exact to a Scruple. The People accept of any Contribution, if it is but for a limited Time, and if they are certain of it : But the smallest Tax frightens them, with Reason, if they think it perpetual. They are not so unjust as to refuse extraordinary Succour in a pressing Want: But they are concern'd, with Justice, that the Want being over, the extraordinary Charge becomes a continual Yoke.

X. It has given *Lewis XII.* King of *France*, the Name of Father of the People, though he was almost always in War, and had made great Levies of Men and Money, because all the extraordinary Tributes were abolished, as soon as he was allow'd to lay down his Arms. It will be the same with all Kings who will pursue the same Conduct. They will find in their Subjects a Zeal for their Service, and that they are prepar'd to undertake and suffer every Thing for their Interest, that nothing can make them relent, if they religiously observe their Promises, and if they prove by their Fidelity in suppressing the new Taxes, that they exact them only in Necessity, that they consent with Pain to establish them, and that they abolish them with Joy.

XI. They will render this Proof compleat, in taking part themselves in the Condition of the People ; in depriving themselves with more Severity of the Things which only serve for Pleasure ; in retrenching all Expences which are not unavoidable ; in making all the Works begun for the Publick Good, which can be suspended, to cease ; in testifying that they feel and partake of the Trouble of their Subjects, and that they themselves are in an uneasy Situation, till they shall have it in their Power to comfort them.

XII.

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 77

XII. Thus they will persuade the People, they are more jealous than themselves of their Rest, more attentive for their Weal, and more taken up about their Interest. They will establish the principal Resource of the State in their Affection. They will bring their Kingdoms into Reputation amongst Foreigners, as govern'd by Princes entirely beloved, and as fill'd with Subjects prepar'd to undertake and suffer every Thing in their Quarrel; and thus they hinder many foreign Wars, and many secret Enterprizes, of which the publick Discontent is often the Occasion and Pretence.



C H A P. XII.

War is sometimes necessary, and consequently by just. In a doubtful Case the Prepossession is for the Prince. What makes War unjust. Consequences of such an Injustice. The Prince ought to love Peace: He should be arm'd to preserve it.

ARTICLE I.

War is sometimes necessary, and consequently just.

I. **I**F all Princes were equitable, or if there were a Tribunal in this Life where their Claims might be examin'd, there would be no Room for War, or it would be unjust: But Princes are subject to like Passions with other Men, and they have no superior upon Earth who can take Cognizance of their Differences,
and

78 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

and end them by Law ; that it is by their Arms they do themselves Justice ; and Strength is the only Remedy for the Oppression.

II. He who suffers it when he can repel it, wants not only Heart and Prudence, but likewise Justice. He ought to hinder an Usurper from troubling the Quiet of the State ; stop him upon the Frontiers ; attack him even in his Country ; vanquish and disarm him. He is King for that. And as his People ought to expose themselves for him, on his Side he ought to expose himself for his People.

III. Religion, for as much as it is inclin'd to Clemency, is not contrary to this natural Duty, but adds a new Obligation, out of the Respect due to the Law of God, who charges the Prince with the Protection of all those whom he has entrusted to him, and who will ask an Account of their Liberty, Estates and Lives, and of their Honour, as well as of his Worship and Temples.

IV. Thus the Armies which serve as Barriers to the State, and who fight for its Security, stand in place of the Laws which the Enemy have despised : They take Revenge on them for this Disdain, and they execute its Orders (*k*). Every Soldier is its Defender as well as the Minister : And instead of looking upon him as an Homicide, he must be respected as full of Zeal against Injustice and Violence, and a Victim for the publick Good.

V. Likewise

(*k*) Sciebat (*St. John Baptist*) milites non esse homicidas, sed ministros legis, & non ultores injuriarum suarum, sed salutis publicæ defensores. *S. August. L. 22. Contra Faustum. Ep. 74.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 79

V. Likewise, (l) according to St. *Augustin's* Observation, when the Soldiers who came to the Baptism of St. *John*, ask'd him what they should do to be saved, the holy Fore-runner does not tell them to lay down their Arms and quit the Service; but not to commit any Violence, to do wrong to no Body, and to be contented with their Wages; whereas he should have commanded them (m) to quit their Arms, renounce their Profession, and abandon the Prince, not to think of any Thing but their Salvation, if the Condition they were in had been an Obstacle to it.

VI. The Church, guided by the same Spirit which animated the Divine Harbinger, in asking Peace of God, likewise asks him for Courage and Strength for the Troops who fight against the Enemies of the publick Quiet: and it looks upon Cowardice, not only as a temporal Misfortune, but as a Crime which exposes the innocent and weak to Violence, and which is almost as inexcusable as Treachery (n). *We ask of God for Princes, said Tertullian, in the Name of all the Christians, whose Apologist he was, a long Life, a sure and peaceable Reign, a Family established in Union, uncorruptible Servants and Officers, vigorous Armies, faithful Senators, virtuous Subjects,*

a

(l) Si Christiana disciplina omnia bella culparet, hoc potius militibus, consilium salutis petentibus, in Evangelio diceretur, ut abjicerent arma, seque omnino militiæ subtraherent. Dictum est autem eis, ueminem concusseritis, nulli calumniam feceritis, sufficiat vobis stipendium vestrum. *S. August.* Ep. 138. ad Marcellinum, n. 15.

(m) Non ait, cingulum solvite, arma projicite, regem vestrum deserite, ut possitis domino militare. *S. August. in Psalm. cxviii. Serm. 31. n. 1.*

(n) Oramus pro omnibus Imperatoribus, vitam illis prolixam, imperium securum, domum tutam, exercitus fortes, senatum fidelem, populum probum, orbem quietum, & quæcunque hominis & Cæsaris vota sunt. *Tertul. Apolo. Cap. 30.*

80 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

a Peace as extensive as the Universe: In a Word, all that concerns the Prince, with respect to himself or the State. Almost all these Blessings depend on the Valour and Steadiness of the military People; and for this Reason Tertulian places their invincible Attachment to the Prince in the heart of all that the Church asked for Emperors.

ARTICLE II.

In a Doubtfulness of the Wars being just, the Prepossession is for the Prince.

I. It is not always evident if the War be just. The Disputes between Princes are sometimes like what happen between private Persons, where the Right is doubtful, and where it is hard to discern, which side Justice is upon: But on these Occasions the Prepossession should be in favour of the Prince; and his Subjects ought to serve him with Zeal and Warmth, without diving too much into the Reasons that are either favourable or contrary to his Pretensions.

II. Private Persons are not Judges of these great Differences, of which the true Motives are often those which appear the least; the decisive Reasons of which are sometimes covered with an affected Silence; and all the Circumstances of which must be known to make an equitable Judgment of it.

III. The Prince is Master, either to inform the Publick, or to conceal his Reasons from it: To discover them fully or suppress some of them; and in all these Cases, if the Doubt remains, one should think that he knows nothing of it, that he has not been called to the Council; and that he is not Warrant for the Resolutions taken there,
be-

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 81

because it is not his Duty to examine the Motives, and to give Judgment upon their Equity.

IV. Those who have already taken up Arms, have only to obey. Those who are not in the Service, may engage themselves in it. It is their Hands that are asked, and not their Reflections : And (o) St. *Augustin* assures them that the Prince may be guilty in the Sight of God, but that they are innocent in executing his Orders.

V. There would, in Effect, be great Inconveniences in making private Persons Judges of these sort of Affairs. The Opinions would be infinitely divided. The Armies would be full of weak and fickle Counsels ; the Principle of Courage would be shaken ; the least Danger would raise Astonishment, and the State would remain expos'd as a Prey, upon an ill understood Delicacy upon a War's being more or less lawful, which Victory only can determine.

VI. (p) God who governs Mankind with an infinite Wisdom, has separated the Duties of the Prince from those of the Army. He orders the Prince to examine well the Justness of the War ; and the Army to vanquish or die. The Head ought to think ; but there is only Execution and Vigour expected from the Arm.

G

VI.

(o) Vir justus, si forte sub Rege, homine etiam sacrilego, militet, rectè potest, illo jubente, bellare, civicae pacis ordinem servans. Cui quod jubetur, vel non esse contra præceptum certum est, vel utrum sit, certum non est ; ita ut fortasse reum regem faciat iniquitas imperandi, innocentem autem militem ostendat ordo serviendi. *S. August. L. 22. contra Faustum Ep. 75.*

(p) Interest quibus causis quibusque autoribus homines gerenda bella suscipiant. . . . Ordo naturalis hoc posuit, ut suscipiendi belli autoritas atque consilium penes principem sit : exequendi autem jussa bellica ministerium milites debeant paci salutique communi. *S. August. ibid.*

82 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

VI. On such Occasions, neither the Religion nor Virtue of the Prince must be examin'd into, The Christians obey'd the idolatrous and vicious Emperors with as much Fidelity as they afterwards did *Constantine* and *Theodosius*. They look'd upon them as Chiefs of the Republick, and as having received from God the Sword to defend it; and they shut their Eyes upon the rest. They distinguished between the Prince and the private Person, and did not confound his Authority with his personal Qualities. (q) When the Emperor *Julian* dishonoured himself by his Apostacy, the Christians continued to fill his Armies. They continued faithful to him, for all his Perfidy. They detested his Crime, but respected the Power that God had given him, and without sharing in his Idolatry, they march'd at his Command against the Nations that were at War with him; and they did it to obey God himself, whom this impious Man had renounced.

VII. Thus it ought to be with regard to all lawful Princes, who are not Usurpers. If they are just, equitable and virtuous, one obeys them with the greater Pleasure; but if they have the Misfortune to be vicious Men, and even out of the Church, one does not obey them the less faithfully, in all Things where Piety does not suffer, and one exposes his Life for their Defence, and for that of the State, with as much Merit as if they were ever so virtuous.

AR-

(q) *Milites Christiani servierunt Imperatori infideli (Juliano;) ubi veniebat ad causam Christi, non agnoscebant nisi illum qui in cœlo erat... quando autem dicebat, producite aciem, ite contra illam gentem, statim obtemperabant. Distinguebant dominum æternum à domino temporali; & tamen subditi erant propter dominum æternum etiam domino temporali. S. August. Enarr. in Psal. 125.*

ARTICLE III.

What makes War unjust.

I. I have on purpose distinguish'd between lawful Princes and Usurpers : Because nothing is due to these last ; the Wars they undertake are unjust ; and in contributing to them one renders himself guilty of all the Crimes which are the Consequences of them. It is true that the Usurpation may not be evident, and that it may be colour'd by specious Pretences, capable of deceiving their natural Subjects ; and then the Probability is an Excuse for them . But when it is a visible Revolt, or a private Person who without Authority takes up Arms, it is plain that his Party is but a Faction, and that all those who follow him are very criminal.

II. The War is then publicly unjust, and nobody can be deceiv'd in it : But it is sometimes so in a more private Manner ; and the Prince alone bears the Iniquity of it, or shares it with his Council, whilst his Armies are innocent.

III. It is unjust when he brings it on by his Fault, and refuses the just Conditions that are propos'd to him ; when he can shun it, and do himself the Justice which is due to him by gentler Means (r) : When he undertakes it out of the single Desire of humbling a neighbouring Prince, whose Glory and Power excite his Jealousy ; when he seeks only for Vengeance, and the cruel Satisfaction of shedding the Blood of his Enemies, even when he is led into it only out of a Motive

G 2

of

(r) Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, implacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido domi- nandi ; & si quæ similia, hæc sunt quæ in bellis jure culpantur, S. August. L. 22. contra Faustum, n. 74.

84 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

of extending his Conquests, or acquiring a vain Reputation, or rendering himself terrible to his Neighbours ; when he can give no other Reasons for it but those which he would condemn, if he himself was attacked ; when it is contrary to the Law of God, whatever Pretence one endeavours to cover it with before Men : for it is before the Tribunal of God himself that the War ought to be approv'd of. In vain the Council, in vain the Leaders of the State justify it, if God condemns it ; and consequently the Prince must never think himself secure, but where his Right is incontestable, his Intentions upright, his Love of Peace demonstrated beyond Dispute ; and that the Occasion of taking Arms, is either in his own Defence, or the only possible Means of obtaining Redress.

ARTICLE IV.

The Consequences of such Injustice.

I. The Crimes in which he involves himself by engaging in an unjust War, are innumerable ; and it is of the last Importance, that he be made sensible, in what Horror they ought to be held. 'Tis he alone who sheds the Blood of all who are sacrificed to his ambition, or other Passions. 'Tis he who plunges the Dagger into the Hearts of his Subjects. He alone is the Murderer of all such as perish in the Troops of his Enemies. The mutual Slaughter is plac'd to his Account. The whole Torrent of Blood, shed on both sides, will be demanded at his Hands. At the heavenly Tribunal he will stand guilty of all the fatal Consequences of War, the Waste, the Ravages committed by both Parties, the Rapine and Dis-

Disorders, not to be prevented by the most vigilant and exact Generals.

II. This hideous Load of Crimes and Iniquities will overwhelm him ; to counterpoise this Deluge of Blood, these Burnings, these Desolations and Cruelties spread over Town and Country, will be placed in the opposite Scale, some, I know not what, frivolous Passion, which the wretched Prince sought to satisfy by such monstrous Methods : The Balance will be held in the Hand of a just, God, who severely condemns a simple Murderer, and has enjoined the Prince to punish such with Rigour ; and who has put the Sword into his Hand, that he may controul the Passions of others, far from allowing him to employ it in Complaisance to his own.

III. What Idea would such a Prince entertain of a Man who by a Power equal to his Barbarity, should out of a Frolick, put to Death one Citizen after another ; should pitch upon his most faithful Servants, as the properest Victims ; who should order some Houses, perhaps a whole Village or Town, to be set on fire for his Diversion ; or should think it an agreeable Amusement to lay a Country waste. In such a Case, he cannot avoid punishing the Miscreant, his Indignation would rise at the inhuman Pastimes of such a Brute, who should divert himself at the Expence of the Lives and Fortunes of those Men, he ought to protect.

IV. But this is only a slight Sketch of what he does himself : for where is the Proportion between whole Armies sacrificed to his Vanity, and some Citizens sacrificed to the Cruelty of the Barbarian ? What are some Houses burnt down in different Places, in comparison of whole Cities destroy'd ? What Value ought one to put upon some Fields,

86 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

the Harvest of which has been ruined, when he thinks of Provinces, where Fire and Sword have laid all desolate?

ARTICLE V.

The Prince ought to love Peace.

I. A Prince who rightly understands these frightful Truths, (s) does not engage rashly in a War which he can shun. He does not place his Glory in over-coming Enemies whom he might have had for Allies. He does not reckon himself happy for being become formidable to his Neighbours, whose Confidence he has lost in disturbing them, and whom he has filled with Suspicions and Hatred by his Conduct towards them.

II. He prefers Peace to all the Glory of Victory. He loves better to interest his Neighbours in Happiness, than to inspire them with Jealousy. He finds himself more honoured in being the Arbitrator and Judge in their Differences than in uniting them against him, for fear of a common Oppression. He leaves to Princes without Friendship and Fidelity, the sad Advantage of not being loved by any body. He looks upon it as a Misfortune to himself, to be under the Necessity of contributing to that of another; and since Peace is the end he would arrive at, he is not so imprudent as to give up the Peace which he
en-

(s) Belligerate, & perdomitis gentibus dilatare regnum, malis videtur felicitas, bonis necessitas. Sed quia pejus esset ut injuriosi justioribus dominarentur, ideo non incongruè dicitur etiam ista felicitas: sed procul dubio felicitas major est vicinum bonum habere concordem, quàm vicinum malum subjugare bellantem. Mala vota sunt optare, habere quem oderis vel quem timeas, ut possit esse quem vincas. S. *August. l. 4. de Civit. Dei Cap. 15.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 87

enjoys, in hopes of attaining it by a War, the Danger of which is commonly more certain than the Success.

III. One knows when he engages in it : but what Prince can answer for the Issue of it ? Who is able to put an end to it when he pleases ? Who knows all the Incidents that may happen in it, all the Enemies it may draw upon him, the Success of all the Sieges or Battles which may be the Consequences of it ?

IV. It is easier to give ones self up to his Passion, than to regulate that of others : (1) to despise his Enemies than to vanquish them : to league them against him than to separate them : to be fierce than happy : and haughtily to take a sudden Resolution than to execute it.

V. It is not from Ambition or the Desire of Vengeance that wholesome Counsels proceed. (u) The Passions cannot deliberate. They are unruly and precipitate ; and they are only capable of confining the Mind, and depriving it of the Knowledge of every thing that should deserve Reflection.

VI. Neither are useful Advices to be expected from Flattery, when they are about undertaking a War. A Prince should distrust all those who only applaud him, without representing the Dangers and Consequences to him : on the contrary, carefully harken to all that People of Sincerity observe to him of the present, and foretell him of Futurity. Their Difficulties may be groundless ; but he hazards nothing in hearing them ; and if they be real, it would be too late to see them, when it should be time for acting.

G 4

VII.

(1) *Contemnendis, quam cavendis hostibus melior. Tacit. l. 4. Hist. p. 418.*

(u) *Barbaris cunctatio servilis : statim exequi regium videtur. Tacit. l. 6. Annal. p. 156.*

88 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

VII. A Prince must join all his Views and Reflections to determine himself clearly about a Thing of so great Consequence, and an Event so doubtful as War (x.) He should think of every thing, in order not to be surprized with any thing afterwards; and besides that he must expect several unforeseen Accidents, able to disconcert all his Measures, if the Divine Providence does not bless his Designs, and every Moment supply what is wanting to human Wisdom. It is upon his Protection he ought to depend, and it is to deserve it that he ought to take so many Precautions, not to throw himself into an unnecessary War.

ARTICLE VI.

The Prince should be armed to preserve himself in Peace.

I. Amongst these Precautions I do not place those which Fear suggests: it is unworthy of assisting at the Council of a Prince who deliberates out of Wisdom, and not out of Timidity; out of a Desire of doing nothing contrary to Justice, and not out of Weakness.

II. He does violence to his own warlike Inclination and Courage, in preferring Peace; and he is always ready to fight, even at the time when he takes all possible Care of having no Enemies, or making them enter again into their Duty, without using Violence or Arms.

III. He unites two Dispositions which appear contrary, and which nevertheless lend each other

a

(x) Cunctator naturâ, & cui cauta potius consilia cum ratione, quam propera ex casu placeant. *Tacit. l. 2. Hist. p. 344.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 89

a mutual Succour. (y) He loves Peace : but he is ready to preserve himself in it by War. (z) He makes himself no Enemies : but he fears none of them. (a) He does not attack ; but whoever will attack him, will find him invincible.

IV. He intimidates his Neighbours, though he lives well with them. He respects them though he manages them. He holds out one pacifick Hand to them, and shews them the other armed. He has good Troops, well disciplined, well paid, commanded by good Officers who have Age and Experience, attached to their Prince by the straitest Ties, retained with trouble in Rest contrary to their Ardour, and burning with Zeal to signalize their Courage by great Actions. He has strong Places and well fortified. He has Magazines and Arsenals well filled. His Treasury is in a good Condition. His People are ready to furnish him extraordinary Succours with Joy. It is known that he is entirely beloved by them. It is well understood that other Princes who are in his Alliance, and who know his Valour and Merit, will espouse his Interest as soon as he shall be attacked. All this keeps the most Unquiet in awe, and it is the formidable Preparation of War, which preserves Peace, and which serves him as a Shield and Defence.

V. He must only take care, as has been elsewhere observed, not to over-load the State with too great a number of Troops in the time of Peace, in carrying the Precautions too far. It is enough
to

(y) In pace bellum meditetur. *Theophildet. Inst. Reg. 2. p. c. 23.*

(z) Non times bella, non provocas. *Paneg. Traj. p. 65.*

(a) Bellicosus quidem, omnium maximè pacificus fuerit, soli enim illi pacem colere licet, qui laceffantes ulcisci potest. *Synes. ad Imper. Arcad. de Reg. p. 26.*

90 INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE, &c.

to keep up the old Corps, reduced in a just Proportion to the publick Wants ; to keep a great many Officers, especially those who have Experience and Age ; and by this Means to be always ready to form a new Army in a little time, which by the Mixture of ancient Troops, and the Conduct of ancient Officers, to whom one will give the new Companies and new Regiments, will be much the same with those who have seen Fire, and whom Dangers have made warlike.



C H A P.



C H A P. XXIII.

What must be thought of the Glory of Conquerors. What Conquests are just : How the conquered Nations must be treated.

ARTICLE I.

What must be thought of the Glory of Conquerors.

I. **W**HAT I understand here by the Name of Conquerors, is conform to the Idea that all the World have formed of them. They are Men who think of extending their Empire if they were born Kings, or who desire to acquire one if they are not Sovereigns ; who are fond of the Glory produced by Arms, and who find nothing greater than to subject other Princes ; who bear, with pain, that any one should be equal with them, or greater than they ; who do not limit their Designs and Pretentions but by the Inability of going so far as their Desires ; who would be the Masters of all, and keep all the World in Dependance, if no body resist them ; and who have an Ambition yet more extensive than the Universe.

II. These Men only think of vanquishing, and are not very scrupulous about the Pretences of the War. They think they have done all, when they have succeeded ; and because no body is able to hinder them from conquering, they persuade themselves

92 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

selves likewise that no body (*b*) has a Right to ask them an Account of the Victory.

III. They look upon the common Rules of Justice, (*c*) as Laws only binding upon private Persons, and which only take place in trifling Disputes. They do not think that Sovereigns, or extraordinary Men, whose Acts cannot be confined to an ordinary Condition, should be subject to them: And they find even a sort of Lowness in examining, if it be just that Princes more valiant and more skilled in War than others should become their Masters; such an Examination, according to them, not being proper, but to debase the Royal Majesty, and to reduce it to the same Trouble and Constraint with private Persons.

IV. They begin by their Neighbours, with whom the Occasions of a Rupture are more ordinary, and whose States are more advantageously situated for them. Afterwards under divers Pretences, they attack the Provinces, to which they have approached by these first Conquests. Whoever will preserve their Liberty, becomes their Enemy. One must submit to become their Ally. (*d*) If he is rich, he excites their Avarice: if the Country is poor it raises their Ambition. It carries them even beyond Seas. It agitates and disquiets them as long as there are Nations who refuse

(*b*) *Victoriæ rationem non reddi; said Civilis, Chief of the Revolters against the Romans. Tacit. l. 4. Hist. p. 398.*

(*c*) *Id in summâ fortunâ æquius quod validius: & sua retinere, privatæ domûs: de alienis certare, regiam laudem esse: said Tiridates, preparing himself for the Conquest of Armenia. Tacit. l. 15. Annal p. 263.*

(*d*) *Raptores orbis, postquàm cuncta vastantibus defuere terræ, & mare scrutantur: si locuples hostis est, avari; si pauper, ambitiosi: auferre, trucidare, rapere falsis nominibus Imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant; said a General of the Caledonians, speaking of the Romans, in Tacitus his Life of Agricol. p. 462.*

safe their Yoke. It carries them even to destroy all that makes Resistance; and when they have converted the Provinces into Desarts, in ruining the Cities and killing the Men, they give this Revenge the Name of Peace.

V. There is need of but little Equity for condemning so strange a Conduct, and for deploring the Blindness which has made those be look'd upon as great Men, who were publick Enemies to Mankind, who could not bear Regularity and Peace; who despised all Justice; who reckoned the Law of Nature as nothing; who sacrificed a Million of Mens Lives to Ambition; who placed their Glory in destroying all; who reigned as (e) the Wolves and Lions would do if they were Masters; who used their Power like Torrents and Burnings, in carrying Desolation over all; who knew no other Right than Strength, and (f) who believed themselves happy in making others miserable.

VI. The Darknes of Paganism has not hinder'd several from seeing that there was nothing great in these Conquerors, but their Passions and the Excess of their Injustice. (g) They triumphed, said they, over their Enemies, and were Slaves to their Lust. (h) It is not so much *Alexander* that commanded the *Macedonians*, as a furious Ambition that led *Alexander* captive. (i) *Marius* seemed to be the General

(e) Quæ alia vita esset, si leones, ursique regnarent? Hæc divina potentia est, gregatim ac publicè servare: multos autem occidere, & indiscretos, incendii ac ruinæ potentia est. *Senec. l. 1. de Clem. c. 26.*

(f) Non est quòd credas quemquam fieri alienâ infelicitate felicem. *Idem. ibidem.*

(g) Hi, ut vincerent hostem, cupiditate victi sunt. *Senec. Ep. 94.*

(h) Agebat infelicem Alexandrum furor aliena devastandi. *Ibid.*

(i) *Marius* exercitum, *Marium* ducebat ambitio. *Ibid.*

94 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

General of the Troops: but he only obey'd the Passion of Governing. (*k*) *Pompey* was in pursuit of a vain Grandeur, in over-running *Europe* and *Asia*. He followed a Shadow which deceived him, though he cover'd himself with the Pretence of the publick Good; and if his Fever had not been so ardent he would have had less violent Commotions.

VII. But what made he by these Commotions? (*l*) Or where ended the Madness of *Alexander*? What remained to those who wanted to have had every thing? They have been their whole Lives unquiet. They have been tormented by Desires which enflamed instead of calming them. They died in pursuit of what they wanted, without finding a solid Joy in what they had acquired by all sorts of Means. They have looked upon themselves as indigent and unfortunate, because all that they had ravaged bore no Proportion to the intense Hunger which devoured them; and they have been the first and last Victims to their Passions, which have agitated them yet more than the World which they have troubled.

VIII. But this is what merits the least Attention. They deserved more than others to experience the violent Agitations of their Fury, and to be yet more unhappy under the Tyranny of their Passions, than the Nations whose Tyrants they became. What deserves Reflection, or rather Indignation and Horror, is the enormous Injustice

(*k*) Ne Cn. quidem Pompeio externa bella aut domestica. virtus aut ratio suadebat, sed insanus amor magnitudinis falsa, *Ibid.*

(*l*) Quid interest quot eripuerit regna *Alexander*, quot dederit, quantum terrarum tributo premat? Tantum illi deest, quantum cupit. Nec hoc *Alexandri* tantum vitium fuit, sed omnium quos fortuna irritavit implendo. *Senec. l. 7. de Beneficiis, c. 2 & 3.*

justice of their Designs, and the infinite number of Crimes which have served them as means of executing them.

IX. For in strict Truth, (*m*) what are the usurped Empires? What are the Kingdoms acquired without any Right, if not Robberies? What is taken upon the Highway has not a more unjust Origin, nor a more odious Title. The Violence is equal on both Sides; the Possession is the same. The Robber is Master of his Booty, as the Usurper is of his Province or Kingdom: The Motives and Means are alike. Strength and Violence are in both the only Laws. Impunity alone holds Place of Authority; and the difference of the Things usurped is only fit to make the Robber looked upon as less guilty.

X. But (*n*) to make the Thing more plain, it is only to conduct a Robber to the Throne, by the success of his Crimes. He begins to make himself formidable, in associating to himself Men as unjust as their Leader, but full of Courage, and able to undertake any thing. His Numbers increase, and put him in a Condition of taking the Field. He surprises one City. He besieges another. He becomes Master of one Province, and afterwards of several. In fine his Estate is a Kingdom; and then he takes the Title of King. Does such Success hinder his being a Robber, and his old Crimes from deserving Punishment, his last usurpations from being as unjust as the first, him from being a Miscreant placed on the Throne, and from

(*m*) Remotâ justitiâ quid sunt Regna, nisi magna latrocinia? quia & ipsa latrocinia quid sunt, nisi parva regna? *S. Aug. L. 4. de Civit. Dei C. 4.*

(*n*) Latrocinium si in tantum perditorum hominum accessibus crescit, ut & loca teneat, civitates occupet, populos subjuget, evidentius regni nomen assumit, quod ei jam in manifesto confert, non adempta cupiditas, sed addita impunitas *Idem. Ibid.*

96 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

from being a very wicked Man, tho' become a Conqueror?

XI. All these Thoughts are St. *Augustin's*, who, to give them a new Force, uses the Answer that a Corsair made to *Alexander*, who asked him, by what authority he troubled the Commerce, and disturbed the Sea? I do it, said he, with an intrepid Freedom, by the same Right that you think you have of troubling the Universe. But because I do it with a little Ship, I am called a Pirate and a Robber, whereas you are called an Emperor for doing it with a great Fleet.

XII. This Answer was without Reply; and it covers those with Confusion who exercise the profession of Robbers with great Expence and Shew; and who gild with the specious Name of Conquests, Usurpations which deserve no other than that of Stealth and Rapin.

XIII. *Alexander* and the Corsair judged rightly of each other. The one was struck with the injustice of a private Person, who, to satisfy his Avarice, pillaged the Merchants; and the other looked upon himself as less guilty than him, who to satisfy his Ambition, usurped whole Kingdoms, and troubled all the Universe.

XIV. It is by such Ideas, as the guilty themselves furnish us with, that we must correct the Impression which the unjust Praises of some Historians, and the Sentiments of several Persons, seduced by the Image of a false Grandeur, make upon the Minds of some Princes. They must always place a Highwayman and a Conqueror upon the same Level, if this last has no other Reasons to justify

(o) *Eleganter & verâciter Alexandro illi magno quidam comprehensus pirata respondit: nam cum Rex hominem interrogasset, quid ei videretur ut mare haberet infestum? Ille iiberâ contumaciâ, quod tibi, inquit, ut orbem terrarum. Sed quia id ego exiguo navigio facio, latro vocor; quia tu magnâ classe, Imperator, S. Aug. loc. citato.*

justify himself than what a Robber would alledge. They must never judge of an Enterprize by the Success, but by the fixed Rules of Justice. The Crime must always appear shameful to them; tho' unpunished, tho' applauded by the Age, tho' placed upon the Throne, and holding Virtue under its Feet. They must always remember what has been said in the third and fourth Articles of the preceeding Chapter against unjust Wars, and understand that the chief Misfortune is, to make the Power which they have received from God, to maintain Order, Fidelity, and Peace, subservient to Ambition.

XV. But as it is hard fully to destroy the Prejudices that have secret Root in the Corruption of the Heart, and which are entertained by the false Maxims of the People, it is of Consequence narrowly to consider the wise Conduct of a Prince, who pursues Glory by Justice, and the unquiet Life of another who deceives himself about true Glory, and about the Means of acquiring it. In comparing them I shall use the Method and Expressions of one of the greatest Men the Church has had.

XVI. (p) Let us not lose our selves, says St. *Augustin*, in vain Ideas, which have nothing but Wind and Emptiness: Let us not be stunn'd with great Words, and with the magnificent Names of Provinces, Nations, and Kingdoms; we cannot rightly judge of two Kings of different

H

Cha-

(p) Hoc ut facilius dijudicetur, non vanescamus inani ventositate jactati, atque obtendamus intentionis aciem altionis vocabulis rerum, cum audimus populos, regna, provincias: sed duos constituamus homines: (nam singulus quisque homo ut in sermone una littera, ita quasi elementum est civitatis & Regni) quorum duorum hominum, pauperem unum, vel potius mediocre, alium prædivitem cogitemus; sed divitem timoribus anxium, moeroribus tabescentem, cupiditate flagrantem, nunquam securum, semper inquietum, perpetuis inimicitarum

Characters, the one of whom loves Peace and Justice, and the other War and Conquests, but in examining two private Men, whose Inclinations are almost like those of these two Princes. The difference of their Conditions is nothing ; for what a Letter is in Discourse, a Citizen is in a City, and in a Kingdom ; and the Means of judging right of all is to know every Party well. Let us suppose that one of these two Men is Poor, or that he has an ordinary Fortune, and that the other is very rich ; that the Rich is agitated by continual Fears, eat up with Chagrin, tormented by his Desires, never easy, always unquiet, never without Processes and Disputes, augmenting indeed very considerably his Fortune by these Means ; but adding, at the same time to the Cares that consume him, new unquietudes, which spread a Bitterness over all that he has, and all that he makes : Whereas he who has the moderate Estate, finds himself happy in his mediocrity, because he can confine his Wants and Desires to what he has, he is dear and valuable to his Family ; he lives in Peace and perfect Understanding with his Relations, Friends and Neighbours ; he is full of Religion and Piety ; he only thinks of obliging and doing Pleasure ; he enjoys perfect Health, which his frugality preserves ; he is chaste, and an Enemy to all Passions contrary to the Purity and

Tranquilitatem contentionibus anhelantem, augmentem sanè his miseris patrimonium suum in immensum modum, atque illi augmentis curas quoque amarissimas aggerentem : mediocrem verò illum, re familiari parvâ atque succinctâ sibi sufficientem, carissimum suis, cum cognatis, vicinis, amicis, dulcissima pace gaudentem, pietate religiosum, benignum mente, sanum corpore, vitâ parcum, moribus castum, conscientiâ securum : nescio utrum quispiam ita desipiat, ut audeat dubitare quem præferat. Ut ergo in his duobus hominibus, ita in duabus familiis, ita in duobus populis, ita in duobus Regnis regula sequitur æquitatis, quâ vigilanter adhibitâ, facili videbimus ubi habitet vanitas, & ubi felicitas, *S. August. L. 4. de Civit. Dei C. 3.*

Tranquility of the Conscience, of which, at all times, he experiences the Quiet and Repose. I do not know if any one can be unreasonable to such an excess, as hesitate to prefer the Condition of this last, to that of the rich Man ; and then I desire him to judge of two Families as he judges of these two Men. That he observe the same Rule, in comparing two Nations or two Kingdoms ; and he will in following always the same Equity and the same Light, see how much Vanity and Illusion there is in the pretended glory of a Conqueror, and on the contrary, how much real Happiness there is, both for the Prince and his State, when he governs it with a spirit of Wisdom and Moderation.

XVII. But in the Parallel which *St. Augustin* makes, and in all that has been hitherto said, it is supposed that an unquiet Prince really aggrandises his State by Conquests : Whereas it very often happens that he only makes useless Efforts, and that he ruins his Subjects, without being able to extend the Bounds of his Empire. He undertakes unfortunate Wars, which drain his Kingdom of Men and Money ; which destroy the Commerce, and likewise the Arts and Sciences. He raises the jealousy and distrust of the neighbouring Princes, who unite to repress his Ambition, who oblige him to defend himself instead of attacking them, and who endeavour to reduce him to such a Condition, that he cannot intimidate them. He is forced to buy the Peace which he himself had disturbed, and to restore usurped Places for it, and to raze others which he had fortified at an immense Expence. He is obliged to pass the last Years of his Life in War, instead of the rest which he then promised himself. It becomes more general and more vigorous, when he is wearied of it, and when it is well known that he desires to terminate

100 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

minate it, even on shameful Conditions. One begins to despise him when he is no more in a Condition to despise others. One asks more from him than he has taken. They will take away his ancient Inheritance from him, to make him repent of his Usurpations ; and in a sad old Age he experiences the truth of the Imprecations which the Scripture pronounces against Princes, who imagine themselves to be great, because they are proud and unjust : (q) To one of them it says, *Wo to thee that spoilest, and thou wast not spoiled, and dealest treacherously, and they dealt not treacherously with thee : When thou shalt cease to spoil, thou shalt be spoiled ; and when thou shalt make an end to deal treacherously, they shall deal treacherously with thee.*

XVIII. The pompous Idea that a Prince endeavoured to give of himself then disappears. He is insulted when he is no more feared ; and he is forced to suffer what is loudly said of him, which is observed by a Prophet : (r) *Is this the Man that made the Earth to tremble, that did shake Kingdoms ? That made the World as a Wilderness, and destroyed the Cities thereof ?*

XIX. It is shameful for Pride and Fierceness to end thus by humiliation : but that which is unknown to Man, and reserved for another State, an eternal Confusion ; is a strange counter-balance to the false Glory of Conquerors.

XX. But to examine only what we are here Witnesses of, without carrying our Views any farther, it is a great Misfortune for a State to be governed by a Prince who desires to aggrandise himself by all sorts of Means ; who observes no Fidelity in Treaties ; who continues no longer in Peace than he is constrained to it ; who is jealous

(q) *Isai. c. xxxiii. v. 1.*

(r) *Isai. c. xiv. v. 16. & 17.*

INSTITUTION *of* a PRINCE. 101

of the Happiness of others ; who is always ready to sacrifice their Interest to his own, and who makes all his Neighbours his Enemies.

XXI. It is the direct contrary Conduct which constitutes the real Strength of the State, and a wise Prince ought to apply himself to remove the Distrust of the others in never undertaking but what is just ; in religiously observing Treaties ; in declaring himself an Enemy to Artifice ; in seeking, with pleasure, the Happiness and Tranquillity of his Neighbours, and in preserving the same Sentiments of Justice and Goodness of them which he desires they may have of him.

XXII. I know it is thought that Princes and Republicks are governed only by Motives of Interest, and that they look upon good Understanding but as a Politick.

XXIII. I allow it is commonly so ; but why should not one join a superior Motive of Equity, or even of Goodness, to Policy ? Is one less prudent for being just ? Is he the more exposed to Envy, because he is free of it ? Is he less attentive to his own Interest, because he is not an Enemy to the Happiness of others ? Has he less Elevation and Grandeur, because he will usurp nothing, not only out of Ignorance or Fear, but likewise out of a Sentiment of Nobleness and Virtue ?

XXIV. Of what Consequence is it to a great Prince, that the others have less pure Dispositions with regard to him ; and that they only live well with him out of political and interested Views ? Will he be ashamed to surpass them in Justice, and in Greatness of Soul ? And will he renounce the solid Advantage which he has over them, because they agree to yield it to him.

XXV. One may be assured, on the contrary, that if he knows to preserve so noble a Distinction,

102 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE,

and to prove on important Occasions, that he may be depended upon; (s) his neighbouring Princes will place their Honour in imitating his Conduct, and in acting by Sentiments as pure as his; and in place of Motives of an interested Policy, he will have the Glory of substituting amongst them, Views more grand and more worthy of their Elevation: for Weakness and Indolence are here out of the Question. It is concerning a Greatness of Soul which knows to defend its Estate without desiring that of another, and which fears God but not Men.

ARTICLE II.

What Conquests are just.

I. A Prince, such as I suppose him, may become a Conqueror with a just Title: and the most just of all, is when he is obliged to conquer his own State, possess'd by an Usurper, or in arms against their lawful Sovereign. He ought to know what he is born, and what is due to him; and it would be a shameful Cowardice, if he prefer'd the Love of Rest to a necessary War; or if he ended it without being established in all his Rights, or if he debased his Dignity, in submitting to dishonouring Terms.

II. He can likewise make just Conquests in the State of a neighbouring Prince who has wrongfully declared War against him; who has thrown him into great Expences, who has ruined a part of his Country, and who owes him a just Compensation
for

(s) Tantùm autoritatis apud exteras gentes nemo habuit. (*This is said of the Emperor Antoninus Pius.*) Cùm semper amaverit pacem, eo usque ut Scipionis sententiam frequentâret, quâ ille dicebat: malle se unum civem servare, quàm mille hostes occidere. *Jul. Capit. in ejus vit. p. 139.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 103

for all these Damages. He must only observe that the Conquests stand in place of an exact Restitution, and that they do not much exceed it.

III. He may even remain Master of a whole Province, or of a great State, when he cannot force the Prince, or the publick Council, to live in peace with him, and to observe the Treaties that have been agreed to. Otherwise he must be always in war, and leave an unquiet Prince, or a restless Republick, wherewith to make it eternal. One begins, its true, by more supportable Punishments : he keeps Places ; he razes others ; but if these Chastisements are not sufficient, he at last keeps all that he has conquered ; and he is well authorised by Justice to do it, though the Jealousy of other Princes often put a Stop to it, and obliges him to restore what he might have lawfully kept.

ARTICLE III.

In what Manner the conquered Nations must be used.

I. When new Cities or new Provinces are united to the Body of the State by Treaties, which confirm the Possession of them, he must endeavour to make them forget their former Masters, and their former Enemies, in making no Distinction between them and natural Subjects ; in religiously observing all that has been promised them ; in not imposing any new Tax upon them, discharging them even of a part of the old ones if they were excessive ; preserving great Equity in all Things in regard to them ; interesting them in Commerce ; making them find Advantage in their new Condition ; giving them very wise and very moderate, as well as very watchful Governors ; leaving no Troops

to take care of them but what are necessary ; not shewing them by an Excess of Precaution, that he distrusts them, and not learning them to be so by such an Example.

II. The Emperor *Claudius*, in an excellent Discourse which he made to the Senate, to justify the Privilege of *Roman* Citizens which he had granted to the People of *Gaul*, judiciously observed, That (t) what had lost the Republicks of *Lacedæmon*, and *Athens*, was the extreme great Difference that they made between the Citizens and the conquered Nations, always treating the last as Foreigners, keeping them separte from all, and so never interesting them in the publick Good : whereas the Founder of *Rome*, by a Politick much better understood, had incorporated the Nations which he had vanquished into the number of Citizens, and had received them as Members of the State, admitted to all the Priviledges of natural Subjects, and interested in defending the very City which they had attack'd, in the same day wherein he had fought them as Enemies.

III. It was chiefly by this Means, that the greatest of all the Empires made one Body, of which all the Parts were connected much more by Affection than Fear. The *Romans* had Colonies in the Countries ; and the People of all the Provinces were admitted to the Government of the State, without any Difference almost being made between them and the Vanquishers. (u) The
Gauls

(t) Quid aliud exitio Lacædæmoniis & Atheniensibus fuit, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant ? At Conditor noster Romulus tantum sapientiâ valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit. *Tacit. l. 11. Annal. p. 176.*

(u) Cætera in communi sita sunt, said Cerealis, General of the Roman Army, to those of Treves and Langres, ipsi plerumque legionibus nostris præsidetis, ipsi has aliasque Provincias regitis, nihil separatum, clausumve. *Tacit. l. 4. Hist. p. 419.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 105

Gauls were full of Consular Families. The Civil and Military Offices were equally filled either by *Romans* or by Men of the Country: and according to *St. Augustin's* Observation, one would scarcely distinguish at *Carthage*, if it was free or vanquished; all being in common amongst its Citizens and those of *Rome*, and the Government being equal for both.

IV. This is the Example which he must follow: severe and haughty Measures are only fit to keep up a dangerous Division, which breaks forth on the first Occasion. Good Usage, on the contrary, makes the Prince be loved, interests People to the Government, effaces the old Impressions; and as the conquered Nations serve commonly as a Frontier, their Fidelity becomes a more sure and firm Barrier than all the Ramparts.





CHAPTER XXVI.

On what Occasion a Prince ought to command his Army in Person. Observations on the Conduct which he ought to observe when he commands it.

ARTICLE I.

On what Occasions the Prince ought to command his Army in Person.

I. **W**HEN the Children of *Israel* asked a King of *Samuel*, they did it in Terms which shew'd, that under this Name they understood, a Judge in Peace, and a General in War. (x) And they said; *Nay, but we will have a King over us: that we also may be like all the Nations, and that our King may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our Battles.*

II. This is, in effect, one of the Duties of the Prince, to expose himself for the State, which is his Family and his Flock, and to be prepared to give his Life for the Defence of Religion and publick Liberty: but this Duty becomes less pressing when the Necessity is less evident; and it absolutely ceases when strong Reasons oblige the Prince to preserve himself for the Good of his People, and to trust his Armies to his Lieutenants.

III. (y)

(x) 1 Sam. c. viii. v. 20.

III. (y) When the State is vigorously attack'd, and when the whole is in danger, the Prince ought to appear. Terms then are Signs of Weakness; the common Danger ought to make all others be forgot. The Troops must make the last Efforts; and it is commonly the Presence of the Prince which excites them to it.

IV. When he has a Rival and Competitor who disputes his Right with him, and who is even in possession of a part of his State, he ought not to be satisfied with opposing him by his Generals: he ought to march in Person, and shew his Subjects he is worthy to command them.

V. This Obligation becomes yet stronger when his Rival is at the Head of his Army: for there would be an Indecency, and even a sort of Shame, in trusting his Lieutenants with the Justice of his Cause, whilst he, whom he treats as an Usurper, exposes himself in a more doubtful one; but independantly of this Circumstance, a Prince whose Throne is ill established, and who sees his Subjects divided between him and his Competitor, ought not to leave the Decision of such an important Quarrel to others, he must be seen Sword in Hand lest one doubt what he is.

VI. There is more reason for his marching at the Head of his Troops, (z) when all is disputed, and he is obliged to conquer his own Inheritance.

It

(y) Si status Imperii, aut salus Galliarum in discrimen verteretur, debuisset Cæsarem in acie stare. . . . Ipse Lugduni vim fortunamque Principatus à proximo ostentaret, nec parvis periculis immixtus, & majoribus non defuturus. *It was the wise Advice which Mucian, General of Vespasian's Troops, gave to Domitian, who had a mind to command the Army that was in Gaul. Tacit. l. 4. Hist. p. 423.*

(z) *It is chiefly on these Occasions that the Advice of the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenetus takes place: Bella per se gerat: ipso præsens omnibus, cunctaque coram intuens. Theophilact. Instit. Reg. p. 2. c. 22.*

108 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

It would be unworthy of him to remain at ease whilst brave People are slaughter'd for him : and he would strengthen the Rebels in discouraging his own Soldiers, if he indolently expected Victory without making some Advances.

VII. But when the Prince is well settled, and that it is not his Right to the Kingdom which is disputed ; when the War is either weakly carried on, or in a Country at a distance from the Place where he has his chief Residence ; when it can be conducted by able and authoriz'd Generals, (a) there seems to be more Wisdom in remaining in the Center of the State, to preserve good Order, and keep all the Provinces in their Duty ; and trust an Army to Generals which ought only to act upon the Frontiers, or which is even in a Condition to penetrate into the Enemy's Country.

VIII. (b) He saves a great deal of Expences, which are unavoidable when the Prince marches himself in Person. He excites less Jealousy of the Neighbours, who fear a warlike Prince, and easily suspect him of being enterprising. He gives less Activity and Heat to a War, which must not be exasperated, and which must be pushed on with Vigour when the Prince has the Conduct of it. He less exposes his Reputation, which is valuable to the State, and which he ought not easily to do, and he shuns giving Relief to the Enemy's Generals in comparing himself with them, and equaling

(a) Non omittere caput rerum, neque se, remque publicam in casum dare. . . Majestâte salvâ, cui major è longinquo reverentia. *Tiberius in Tacit. l. 1. Annal. p. 26.*

(b) Nec ullas expeditiones obit, dicens gravem esse provincialibus comitatum Principis, etiam nimis parci : & tamen ingenti autoritate apud omnes gentes fuit, quum in urbe propterea federet & undique nuntios medius, utpote citius posset accipere. *This is of Antoninus Pius, a very wise Prince. Jul. Capit. in ej. vit. p. 139.*

qualing them in some measure to the Royal Majesty, without any necessity.

IX. (c) But at all times, and even at those when the War appears of little Importance, the Prince is always ready to depart, and yet without shewing such a Disposition, and without ordering any new Expence for it. He knows that unforeseen Accidents may make great Changes in the best concerted Designs, and that expeditious Remedies are the best: and he does not look upon it as a great Affair, to approach to the Frontier, when he is not expected, or even to put himself at the Head of his Troops, discouraged by bad Success, or dispersed by the Loss of a Battle.

ARTICLE II.

Observations upon the Conduct which the Prince should have when he commands his Army in Person.

I. When the Prince thinks proper to command his Army in Person, he retrenches all the Expenses which would only serve for vain Shew, and not contribute any ways to the Victory. He thinks of giving a Luster to the Royal Majesty by good Conduct and Valour; and he reduces all Magnificence to a warlike Preparation; where every thing is necessary and serious, and inspires with Respect and Fear.

II. He has not a great Detachment of the Army for his Guards, which only weakens it and marks too much Precaution in the Prince. He chuses his Post very near the Camp, and it is his whole Army which is his principal Security.

III.

(c) Nec parvis periculis immixtus, & majoribus non defuturus. *Ex Tacit. ut sup.*

110 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

III. He does not allow the Officers to run into superfluous Expences in Equipages, which ruin them without any Benefit, consume the necessary Forage, multiply the uselefs Mouths, heighten the Price of Provisions, engage several People to imitate an Example which they cannot support, and draws an Humiliation upon brave People who are either poor or modest, which they do not deserve.

VI. (*d*) The Prince banishes every thing that has the Air of Voluptuousness, (*e*) Affectation and Softness, out of the Camp: all Enquiries after uselefs Commodities: (*f*) every thing which serves to effeminate Men of Spirit; that benumbs the Courage and makes Labour be feared: all that attaches to the Senses and to Life, and inspires the Desire of preserving one's self rather than the State.

V. He expressly prohibits the general Officers having Tables deliciously served. He will have them be plentiful, but military, that they be fit for subaltern Officers who want them, and that they be not reduced to a small Number of voluptuous People, who may do without them.

VI. He is the first who sets this Example (*g*); his Table has nothing rare nor exquisite; it is good but plain, and every thing there has a noble Mo-

(*d*) Degenerat à labore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum. *Tacit. l. 2. Hist. p. 355.*

(*e*) Delicata omnia undique summovebat. *The Emperor Adrian's Life. p. 129.*

(*f*) Ne quam occasionem corrigendi disciplinam prætermitteret, (*the Emperor Vespasian*) adolescentulum fragrantem unguento, cum sibi pro impetratâ Præfecturâ gratias ageret, nutu aspernatus, voce etiam gravissimâ increpuit: maluissem allium oboluisse; litterasque revocavit. *Suet. c. 8. An Example truly worthy to be observed.*

(*g*) Nullum circa hospitia fastidium: annonaque cæteris. *Traj. Paneg. p. 72.*

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE. III

Modesty, which instructs the Officer and comforts the Soldier.

VII. He knows (*b*) that great Emperors gloried in eating the same Bread with the Army, and and satisfying themselves with as plain Nourishment. They made their Table be plac'd under a Tent with the sides of it turned up, in order that the Troops, and especially the Officers, might see the Prince's Frugality, and might not be ashamed to imitate it.

VIII. They thus gain'd the Hearts of their Soldiers (*i*), whom they did not disdain to resemble; and with a noble Fierceness they disdain'd all that had an Air of Littleness and Dependence upon the Senses, as unworthy of a General employ'd with important Cares, and who marched to Victory.

IX. By this they made themselves formidable to their Enemies, whom this sort of military Rusticity astonished: And it is observed that one of these Emperors so intimidated the King of *Persia's* Ambassadors, by the Disdain he had for Luxury, that they brought their Master to conclude Peace with him. They found him upon the Frontier, taking his Repast in a Tent open upon all sides (*k*), his Purple Robe thrown upon the

(*b*) In procinctu atque in expeditionibus apertis papilionibus prandit atque cœnavit; quum militarem cibum cunctis videns atque gaudentibus fumeret. *The Emperor Alexander Severus* in ejus vitâ, p. 219.

(*i*) Vespasianus acer militiæ . . . cibo fortuito, veste habitusque vix a gregario milite discrepans, *Tacit. L. 2. Hist.* p. 339.

(*k*) Purpurea vestis humi per herbam jacebat: cibus autem erat pridianum ex pisces elixis pulmentum, inque his frusta quædam porcinarum carniū . . . ni saperet, campum omnem intra lunare spatium Carini † capite fore nudiore, simulque detracto pileo caput ostendit, nihilo Galea jacente villosius. *Synes. de Regno.* p. 18.

† It is probable his Name was Probus and not Carinus.

112 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

the Grass, having nothing before him but a Dish that had been dressed over Night, and like that of the Soldiers. This preparation was very different from the Luxury of the *Persians*. But this Prince finding himself honour'd by such Plainness, and being more fierce for it, charged the Ambassadors who saw him in this Condition, to tell their Master, that if he did not soon come to Reason; all his Country should be as naked as the bald Head of him who charged them with such an Order, and in saying that he lifted up a little Cap to shew them his. The Success was such as I have said, and the *Persians* had Reason to love such a Prince better for an Ally than an Enemy.

X. It is neither necessary, nor prudent, according to the Customs that have prevail'd, for the Prince to imitate such Examples in their Severity; but it is his Interest absolutely to banish Luxury out of his Army; to repress (*l*) the foolish Ambition of those who think to distinguish themselves by a false Politeness, and (*m*) by the Study of all that enervates and softens Men; to shame (*n*) the Profusions which consume in a few Months, what would serve for several Years, and to understand that his own Conduct is infinitely a greater Censure than his Discourses.

XI. He will do the same with regard to the Magnificence of Dress and Furniture, too much of which is a Charge to the Army. He will
look

(*l*) Ambitione stolidâ luxuriosos apparatus conviviorum & irritamenta libidinum, ut instrumenta belli mercantur. *Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 336.*

(*m*) Vitellius ventre & gulâ sibi ipsi hostis, *Tacit. L. 2. Hist. p. 346.*

(*n*) Paulatim discessum ad delinimenta vitiorum balnea & conviviorum elegantiam, idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset. *Tacit. vit. Agric. p. 459.*

look upon Gold and Silver spread upon useless Things to no purpose, as a Loss. He will testify openly that he is displeased with this vain Splendor, and in place of one's making his court to him by it, he incurs his Disdain. He will declare that he will have Men and not dressed Women; that it is Iron that becomes Warriors, and not Gold (*o*), which can neither cover them nor defend them, and that (*p*) it is to draw on the Enemy, and not to repell them, to expose a rich Prey to their View.

XII. On the contrary, he will esteem and recommend the care of the Arms, Horses, Tents, and every thing that is necessary against Cold and Rain. He will value an Officer that is well mounted, a Man who will not complain of any Thing in his Duty, but who will grant nothing to Vanity or Pleasure; a common Soldier that is diligent, and loves his Trade: But all who are not in this Way will hurt him; and he will have nothing, either in his Person or in his Equipages, which is not suitable to a Prince who is an Enemy to Shew and false Glory; and who cannot bear either in War or elsewhere, what does not conduce to the End, and is only vain Ostentation.

XIII. (*q*) *Vespasian*, one of the best Heads the Romans had, was scarce to be distinguish'd from a Soldier by his Dress: And the Emperor *Adrian* who understood military Discipline, and commanded

I

ded

(*o*) Ne terreat vanus aspectus, & auri fulgor atque argenti, quod neque tegit, neque vulnerat. *Tacit. vit. Agricol. p. 322.*

(*p*) *Pharfamenes King of the Iberians, before the Battle with the Medes: Horridam suorum aciem, picta auro Medorum agmina: hinc viros, inde prædam ostendebat. Tacit. L. 6. Annal. p. 157.*

(*q*) *Veste habituque vix à gregatio milite discrepans. Tacit. L. 2. Hist. p. 339.*

114 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

ded an Army better than any body else (*r*), often affected to dress not only in a modest but very plain Manner, he wore a Belt without Gold or Embroidery; he tied his imperial Robe with a plain Hook, which had neither Pearls nor Diamonds; and his finest Sword had but an Ivory handle. Thus he marched a-foot, at the Head of the Legions, even to twenty Miles a day.

XIV. The Prince will imitate such Examples, with the Discernment and Prudence which are agreeable to our Age; and will observe a just Medium between the two Extremities, of shining too much, or of degrading himself. The chief is, that he have a great Authority, and consequently he ought to do nothing which diminishes it.

XV. He ought rigorously to require that the Companies and Battalions be compleat. The Prince is often deceived when he is absent. The Commissaries and Inspectors have Methods, because they are not without Interest and without Views; and nothing supplies for the Master's Eye. But when he is present they cannot dissemble with him, if he is exact; and it is one of the chief Reasons that can make him take the Command of the Army, or at least to come near the Frontier to review it, and hinder one from increasing his Troops upon Paper, and the State from being charged with real Expences for imaginary Men.

XVI. He often out of his Goodness, (*s*) sees the Provision Bread, to judge if it is such as he has order'd it, and if the Commissaries for Victualing with-

(*r*) Exemplo virtutis suæ cæteros adhortatus, quum etiam vicena millia pedibus armatus ambularet. Vestem humillimam frequenter acciperet, sine auro balteum sumeret, sine gemmis fibulus stringeret, capulo vix eburneo spatham clauderet, *Spart. in ejus vit. p. 129.*

(*s*) Annonam militum diligenter inspexit. *The Emperor Alex. Severus, b. 209.*

with-hold any of it. They dare not fail in it, if they know that he is concerned about the Soldiers Interest : But if he refers it to them, either their Negligence or Avarice will make the Troops suffer a great deal, will cause them to murmur, and on a critical Juncture will leave them in Want. It should be the same for the (t) cloathing and shoeing. An Army is discouraged when it wants them. Desertions become frequent, and they who remain are without Vigour. The Prince who knows the Consequences of these Evils, takes care to prevent them ; and this Account is not unworthy of him, even when he has charged Commissaries with it : because their Exactness depends upon his Attention.

XVII. He will enquire himself into the Manner in which sick Soldiers are used in the Hospitals of the Army ; and he will have an Account given him of it by Officers of Distinction, incapable of disguising the Truth from him : But to be well informed of it (v), he will visit them himself, tho' seldom, and always at a Time when he is not expected. Great Princes look'd upon this Care as of Importance (x). They went in Person to see the sick Soldiers, either in their Tents, or in the Quarter of the Camp appointed for their Abode. They gave this Proof of their Goodness to the least as well as the others. They provided them Carriages in the March, if they

I 2

were

(t) Ille singulos manipulos adiit, vestes & calceamenta perpexit. *The Emperor Probus. Vopisc. p. 291.*

(v) Ægros milites in hospitiiis suis videbat. *The Emperor Adrian, loco citato.*

(x) Ægrotantes ipse visitavit per tentoria milites, etiam ultimos, & carpentis vexit, & omnibus necessariis adjuvit ; & si forte gravius laborassent, per civitates & agros patribus familias hominibus, & sanctioribus matronis eos distribuebat, reddens impendia quæ fecissent ; siue convalescent illi, seu perissent. *The Emperor Alexander Severus in ejus vit. p. 219.*

were able to follow ; but if they could not be transported, they recommended them to the care of the Inhabitants of the Towns or of the Country, who had Lodging or Subsistence, and to charitable Matrons, to whom they gave their Advances whether the Soldiers died or recovered. They even prevented their Sickness, in comforting them in long Marches, when they begun to be weak ; and some of them carried the Thing so far, that they loved rather to deprive themselves of a Carriage on purpose to yield it to them, saying (y), that the Preservation of the State depended more upon that of the Soldiers than that of the General.

XVIII. This was to exceed : But it is certain that it is a great Inconveniency that the sick or drooping Soldiers should be neglected to the Degree that they commonly are ; that those who farm the Hospitals of the Army should be so little affected with their Wants ; that the Lives of so many Men should be reckon'd of so little Consequence ; and that one should love better to get bad Recruits at a great Expence, than to preserve Soldiers already accusom'd to War, and sometimes even subaltern Officers of great Merit, at less Charges.

XIX. The Prince should (z) find himself free and easy in the midst of his Troops ; live there with more Openness and Freedom than in his Palace ; animate every body with a Joy and Serenity that inspire Courage (a). Shew himself to the Soldiers with an Air of Goodness and Familiarity which

ex-

(y) Dicens milites se magis servare quam seipsum, quod salus publica in his esset. *Idem. p. 218.*

(z) Post amicos Principis, milites secundi quasi amici. *Synes. de Reg. p. 12.*

(a) Imperator non raro spectandum se militibus præbens, ad excitandam in militibus benevolentiam, eamque firmissimam, præcipuam vim habet. *Synes. de Reg. ibid.*

excites their Affection and Zeal ; and reward them by Testimonies which cost so little to so great a Mind, for the Disposition they are in of shedding their Blood for his Service.

XX. He ought to study and take Pleasure in knowing all the Officers ; in knowing their Merit, their Birth, their Services, the Occasions wherein they have been wounded. A Word which shews his Attention and Remembrance, is of great Value and often of great Effect.

XXI. (b) It would be even to be wished that the common Soldier was not unknown to him, and that he could distinguish the Name or the Countenance of all, when he visits the Ranks and disposes the Army for a Day of Battle. One cannot comprehend (c) what Effect a Word, an Air of Goodness, a Look of the Prince can have even upon the most vulgar Minds, [when going to engage, and with what Ardour an ordinary Man runs upon Danger, when he thinks he is not unknown to his King, and that he will be pleas'd with his Courage.

XXII. I know the Memory is not sufficient for such a prodigious Variety of Names : But here it is not so much an Effect of Memory as of Goodness (d), one easily retains the Idea of the Countenances, even when the Names escape. One supplies the rest with Airs of Affability. He does not know every body ; he names some of them, and that is enough to persuade all the others, that they are neither unknown nor indiffe-

I 3

rent

(b) Ad militum strenuitatem plurimum momenti habet, si ne gregarii quidem milites Imperatori sint ignoti. *Synes. de Reg. p. 13.*

(c) Quisnam sanguini pepercerit qui se à Rege audierit commendatum, *Idem. p. 14.*

(d) De militum ætatibus judicabat, (the Emperor Adrian) agebatque ut sibi semper noti essent, & eorum numeros sciretur, *in his Life, p. 129.*

118 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

rent to him. After all, the Soldiers are the Hands and Arms of the Prince; and (e) it is not honourable in him to be ignorant of those who give their Life for him, whilst the meanest Artift knows so exactly the Name of all the Instruments he uses.

XXIII. The Prince must know how to diversify into an Infinity of Ways, the Favours of a Look, of a Smile, of an Air, of a Gesture, of a Word, of a Tone of Voice, and proportion them to the different sorts of Merit and Service which he would reward by those obliging Manners.

XXIV. He ought above all to distinguish Valour, when it is joined to Prudence: And his principal Attention ought to be to place Men of this Character, and to advance them, without their having need to employ other Means for that End, but the continuing to do well.

XXV. Though the Prince lives in the midst of the Troops with an easy and calm Air, he ought to be inwardly full of Cares and Reflections: To be attentive to all the Enemy's Motions; and to be advertis'd of them not only by Spies and Deserters, People upon whom little ought to be depended, but by Parties commanded by understanding and intrepid Men, who do not relate what Fear makes them see, but what they have really seen, in approaching very near to the Enemy, and carrying off Prisoners from them.

XXVI.

(e) Is ridiculus est, qui suæ artis instrumenta nesciat: & Rex ipse, quonam pacto militibus peritè velut instrumentis utetur, nisi ea ipsa cognoscat? *Idem. p. 14.*

Milites suos sic ubique scivit, (*the Emperor Alexander Severus*) ut in cubiculo haberet breves, & numerum, & tempora militantium, semperque cum solus esset, & rationes eorum, & numerum, & dignitates, & stipendia rescenseret: ut esset ad omnia instructissimus, *in his Life, p. 212.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 119

XXVI. (f) The Prince before putting himself at the Head of his Army must have a Plan for the whole Campaign, which he has concerted with the ablest of his Council. He must have endeavoured to foresee what the Enemy is in a Condition of undertaking, and the Means of hindering it. He must not wait for every Moment to take a Resolution, and determine himself by Starts; having nothing concerted; not knowing the Danger of Delays, nor the Importance of a ready Execution; not being push'd but by his Lieutenant Generals, or not regulating his Designs but upon every March of the Enemies Army; not knowing to take Advantage of any Thing, nor Profit by the Faults of others, and (g) not remembering that he is General but because Orders are ask'd of him, and they depend upon his Will.

XXVII. But besides the Measures wisely concerted, and the general Views of a great Captain, he should observe all the Steps of the Enemy; conjecture what they conceal by what they show; endeavour to disturb them by Motions which keep them in Awe; and oblige them to defend themselves by harrassing them, instead of contenting himself to parry their Stroke.

XXVIII. It is nevertheless of great Consequence to the Prince's Reputation, that he do not fatigue the Troops by useless Motions; that he do not appear unquiet, uncertain, divided by

I 4

con-

(f) Ignarus militiæ, improvidus consilii, quis ordo agminis, quæ ratio explorandi, quantus trahendo, urgendove bello modus, *Tacitus speaking of Vitellius, L. 3. Hist. p. 383.*

Non alloquio, exercitioque militem firmare, non in ore vulgi agere, sed umbraculis hortorum abditus. *Idem de eodem, p. 378.*

(g) Si principem eum fuisse, cætera non meminissent, ipse oblivisceretur. *Idem de eodem, p. 336.*

contrary Thoughts; that he do not change the Orders that are given suddenly, and without any one's seeing the Reason of it; and that he inspire the Army with a true Confidence in his Conduct by the Tranquillity it will always see him in, and by the uniform Course of his Designs.

XXIX. He should carefully avoid shewing any Sadness, Perplexity, Hurry or Surprise in his Countenance. He must keep all these Sentiments in his Breast, if he is concern'd with them: And he should accustom himself to repress them so severely, that the least Marks cannot discover them to an Army, who should see nothing but Firmness and Resolution in him who commands it.

XXX. He will always be present in the Time of Battle, and (*b*) will despise all the weak Counsels which Men little touch'd with his true Glory will give him. If he should retire when his Presence is most necessary, he would shew little Spirit, and would take it away from others: For he would need a great Detachment for his Guard, which would weaken his Army. Many Officers under various Pretences, would press in to accompany the Prince, and be overjoyed to free themselves from Danger, without dishonouring themselves. Those who remain'd would look upon themselves as abandon'd by the others, and as sacrific'd by a Prince who would not even deign to be witness to their Death: And they would
feebly

(*b*) Postquam pugnari placitum, interesse pugnae Imperatorem (*Otho against the Army of Vitellius*) an seponi melius foret, dubitavere. Idem illi deterioris consilii autores (*who had advised to come quickly to an Agreement*) perpulere ut Brixillum concederet, ac dubiis praeliorum exemptus, summæ rerum & Imperii seipsum reservaret. Is primus dies Othonianæ partes afflixit: namque cum ipso Prætorianorum Cohortium equitumque valida manus discessit, & remanentium fractus animus. *Tacit. L. 2. Hist. p. 347.*

feebly dispute the Victory which their secret Discouragement had already taken away the Hopes of.

XXXI. The Danger must be common, and nobody free from it, if one has a mind that the Troops should not be alarm'd. Courage is infinitely rarer than is thought. It depends upon Example, the Desire of being observed, the Fear of dishonouring one's self, the Inability of doing but as others, the Equality of the Danger; and when these great Motives are taken away or weaken'd by the Retreat of the Prince and a part of the Army, a small Number remain firm, and all the rest, either do not fight, or make themselves be kill'd out of Fear, or openly take to flight.

XXXII. The Prince then will put his Army in Array, will give his Orders to his Generals, and mark out their Posts to them; he will shew himself worthy to be the Soul and Chief of so many brave Men, ready to die for him; and as he is their General he will do all the Offices of it: But he will likewise remember that there is an extreme Difference between a General and a common Soldier. He will not expose himself but as suitable for a Prince: As the Head and not as the Hand; as he who ought to give Orders, and not as those who ought to execute them.

XXXIII. True Valour does not think of shewing it self, and takes no care of its Reputation. Courage when it is great, is calm and cool. It is not agitated. Does not look if it has Witnesses. Is not in Pain about one's doing it Justice. It spares itself where it must, and exposes it self where it is necessary. It sees all, and thinks of all; and to be in a Condition to remedy all, it does not throw it self rashly into a Danger wherein it can be over-whelm'd.

XXXIV.

122 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

XXXIV. When the Prince has not this Steadiness not to be astonished with any thing, and that even Danger awakes he ought not to take the Command of the Army. He may otherwise have great Qualities; but nothing can make up for Courage in a General, and (i) the more he endeavours to shew the Appearance of it, when he has not the Reality, the more he discovers his Fear.

XXXV. It is impossible for the Prince to bear all the Fatigues annexed to a General's Place, if he is not accusom'd to it, and does not put himself early above a thousand Wants and Dependencies, which usually attend the Condition of Princes. He will take care of his Health but will not neglect the rest (k). He will often shew himself on horseback, and will banish every other less warlike Conveniency out of the Army. He will exercise himself to march a-foot, and will thus visit some neighbouring Posts (l). He will see the Soldiers work in the Trenches, when he thinks proper, and will animate them by his Presence.

XXXVI. He will think of those (m) Roman Emperors of old, who march'd a-foot and heavily arm'd

(i) *Quantò magis occultare & abdere pavorem nitebantur, manifestius pavidi. Tacit. L. 2. Hist. p. 336.*

(k) *Cum equite equitabit, & cum pedite decurret, & cum armato armatus incedet, unumquemque operum communi-
one in vivam societatem amicitiamque pelliciens, ne cavillator si dum commilitones vocabit. Synes. de Reg. p. 120.*

(l) *Titus General of the Army, who besieged Jerusalem, Comitate & alloquiis officia provocans: ac plerumque in opere, in agmine, gregario militi mixtus, incorrupto ducis honore. Tacit. L. 5. Hist. p. 424.*

(m) *Vespasianus acer militiæ anteire agmen, locum castris capere, noctu diuque consilio, ac, si res posceret, manu hostibus obniti. Tacit. L. 2. Hist. p. 339.*

arm'd, at the head of the Legions ; who (n) suffered Heat and Cold ; who lay hardly, and who shared in common Labours, without losing any of their Authority, but becoming more respected by this (n) military Simplicity. The Prince will not imitate them but as long as the Goodness and Strength of his Constitution will allow him. But it is necessary that he be inur'd to Fatigue against a Day of Battle, and important Occasions, and for Campaigns which are often very hard ; and (p) that he does not soon yield to the Fatigue annexed to his Employment.

XXXVII. It would be proper, that after the Example of the greatest Princes, he mark'd the Camp himself ; that he judg'd of its Security and Conveniency ; that he order'd the necessary Works to put it above being insulted ; that he foresaw how long they would stay there, and exactly to what Time ; and how one would come out of it without exposing himself to Danger. This Part is essential to a General, and he must not without Necessity depend upon another.

XXXVIII. (q) The Prince ought to do nothing in the Sight of the Army that is not worthy of such a Place. Every thing in his Conduct must appear great, premeditated, serious, and conform to the Importance of the Office he is charg'd with.

He

(n) Homines populares & militares, qui sepius in mediâ acie sub dio agerent, humique dormirent, neque minùs laboris ferrent. *Synes. de Reg. p. 15.*

(o) Sole adusti, reliquoque in cultu sine ullo artificio simplices. *Synes. de Reg. p. 16.*

(p) Trajan, carrying the Legions into Germany, Spain and Italy. Non vehiculum unquam, non equum respexisti. *Paneg. Traj.*

The Emperor Adrian, Etiam vicena millia pedibus, armatus ambulabat. Spart. in his Life, p. 129.

(q) Cæteris mortalibus in eo stare consilia, quid sibi conducere putent : Principum diversam esse sortem, quibus præcipue rerum ad famam dirigenda. *Tacit. L. 4. Annal. p. 123.*

He ought to banish the Pleasures and Diversions which would interrupt the Cares that an immense Account occasions, and which besides would be little suitable to a Prince who looks upon the Danger of his Army as present, and who knows that perhaps in some Days his most faithful Servants will be sacrificed in his Sight for his Defence.

XXXIX. Victory, even when it costs little Blood, is a tragical Spectacle for a Prince who loves all his Subjects, and more as yet those who give their Life for his Service : But he has sometimes the Grief to be witness to a great deal of Bloodshed, and to reap no Fruits from it.

XL. It is on such an Occasion that all the Virtues of the Prince ought to appear in great Lustre : His Courage invincible in the midst of his Losses ; his Wisdom to remedy it (r) ; his Bounty to comfort his Troops ; his Justice to recompence those who have shew'd most Resolution ; his Compassion for the wounded (s) ; his Liberality to assist them, and to give to others a Part of what they have lost. One knows then what the Prince is : And in such a Misfortune where all the false Virtues vanish, one sees by those which remain, if the Prince had a solid Grandeur, or if he had only the Appearance of it.

C H A P.

(r) *Ut cladis memoriam comitate leniret, circumire faucios, facta singulorum extollere ; vulnera intuens, alium spe, alium gloriâ, cunctos alloquio & cura, sibi & prælio firmabat. This is said of Germanicus, after the bad Success of a Battle. Tacit. L. 1. Annal. p. 35.*

(s) *Addidit munificentiam, quantum quis damni professus erat exsolvendo. The same Germanicus after another Misfortune. Tacit. L. 2. Annal. p. 50.*



CHAPTER XV.

There is a great Obligation upon the Prince to make the military People observe strict Discipline, both amongst themselves, and with Regard to his other Subjects. Means which he ought to use.

ARTICLE I.

The Prince ought to make a strict Discipline to be observed in the military People.

I. THE Strength of a State consists in the military People ; but without an exact Discipline they cannot defend the State, and are only fit to ruin it.

II. This exact Discipline is nothing else, than a faithful Observation of Order ; and Order is establish'd upon the Laws, as these are upon Justice.

III. Military Discipline has two Relations : The first regards the Subjects of the Prince, of whom the Soldiery are the Protection and Defence ; and the second regards the Soldiery themselves, who are connected together by certain Duties. It is upon the Prince that this double Discipline depends, which makes the Repose and Security of the Kingdom ; and consequently there is a great Obligation upon him to make them both be very exactly observed.

AR-

126 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

ARTICLE II.

First, with regard to his other Subjects.

I. I begin with the military Discipline, which regards the Subjects of the State.

II. It is plain that (*t*) it is a Disorder contrary to the Law of Nature, that Troops appointed to protect all those who do not bear Arms, to defend the Weak. to keep the Labourers and Trades People in Security, should behave themselves, with respect to them, as their Enemies; that they should be paid by the State and live in it licentiously, that they have received Arms to hinder Foreign Violence, and that they use them to exercise a more unjust one against their Brethren, and that the Prince, who Fights for his Subjects, and who ought to expose his Life to defend their Liberty and Property, abandons them to the discretion of those whom he has assembled for no other End but to assist him in succouring them.

III. He must forget all at once who he is, what his Subjects are to him, who his Soldiers are, for what end he Arms and Pays them, what Account he shall give of their Conduct, to allow in (*v*) them any thing contrary to Justice and the Publick Good.

IV. That Account which God will one Day ask of him, ought to give him a real Uneasiness:
For

(*t*) Primum ergo militibus imperandum, ut civibus & rusticis parcant, nam ut civitatis terræque comoda tueatur Rex, & propugnat, & milites conscribit. *Synes. de Reg. p. 27.*

(*v*) A signis neminem abesse patiebatur. (*the Emp. Alex. Severus.*) Si quis de viâ in alicujus possessionem deflexisset, pro qualitate loci, aut fustibus subjiebatur, aut condemnationi: aut si hæc omnia transiret, dignitas hominis gravissimis contumeliis; cum diceret: visne hoc in agro tuo fieri, quod alteri facis? Rien n'est plus digne d'être imité qu'une telle conduite, & rien n'est plus juste que le motif sur lequel elle est fondée. p. 220.

For on the one Hand he is infinite, and on the other it will not be exacted according to the Abuses that have prevailed, nor upon the false Maxims with which one here flatters Princes. He is answerable for all that he can hinder; and with a little Application he might hinder all Disorders, The Subordination in the Troops is such, that when the Prince is in earnest about a Thing, it is punctually obey'd. The Generals and all the other Officers depend upon his Choice, and he ought to chuse them just and upright. The Commanders answer for the Subalterns, and one might in descending by degrees even to the lowest Employments, have such a watchfulness over a common Soldier, as to keep him in his Duty, or make him return to it if he goes out of it.

V. I cannot forbear relating upon this Subject a Letter which the Emperor *Aurelian*, when he was only General of the *Roman* Army writ to an Officer. (x) “ If you will become a Colonel, “ says he, or rather if you have a Mind not to “ lose your Head, restrain the Hands of your Soldiers; that none steal a Chicken, that they “ touch not a Sheep; that in passing through the “ Vineyards none take a Grape; that none of them “ spoil the Corn; that none exact from any “ Person whatsoever, either Wood, Oil, or Salt; “ that every one be content with his Provision; “ if they pretend to any thing more, it is from “ the Enemy they ought to take it, and not “ from their Brethren, and thus feed upon their “ Tears; that every Soldier be in Place of Ser-
“ vant

(x) Si vis Tribunus esse, imò si vis vivere, manus militum contine. Nemo pullum alienum rapiat: ovem nemo contingat: uvam nullus auferat: segetem nemo deterat: oleum, fal, lignum, nemo exigat. Annonâ suâ contentus sit: de prædâ hostis, non de lacrymis provincialium habeat. Alter alteri quasi servus obsequatur, a medicis gratis curentur, in hospitibus castè se gerant. *Vopisc. in vit. Alexand. p. 273.*

128 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

“ want to his Comrade, (without exacting Services of any Citizen :) that the Physicians and Surgeons of the Army attend them gratis, when they are Sick; (and that there be no pretence for making them give what is not their due,) and that they behave themselves chastly in the Houses where they are lodged.

VI. This is an admirable Detail and what a General should enter into, who knows his Duty, and will be obeyed; and which shews a Prince what he ought and can do in a more elevated Station. That the Orders be given to Captains, as *Aurelian* gave them to a Man who was no higher; that they be given in as precise and absolute a Manner, and that a punctual and literal Obedience be rewarded; that he punish severely upon the Officer the licentiousness of the Soldier; and in a little time he will see the Troops under such Discipline, that they will be as regular and modest as the other Citizens, that they will be the admiration of the Provinces, where they are quartered or pass through.

VII. We have a wonderful Example of it in History; and the Prince should be glad to see it here (y) “ The Emperor *Alexander Severus* going to War against the *Parthians*, leading his Army in Person from *Italy* to the Frontiers of *Persia* had established such Discipline amongst his Troops, that one would have taken his Soldiers for so many Senators. The Colonels marched on Foot at the head of their Corps.
“ The

(y) Cùm tantus ac talis Imperator domi ac foris esset, inivit Parthicam expeditionem, quam tantâ disciplinâ, tanta reverentiâ sui egit, ut non milites, sed Senatores transire viderentur. Quâcunque iter legiones faciebant, Tribuni accincti, Centuriones verecundi, milites amabiles erant, Ipsum verò ob hæc tot & tanta bona Provinciales ut Deum suscipiebant. Jam verò ipsi milites juvenem Imperatorem sic amabant, ut fratrem, ut filium, ut parentem. *Lamprid. in ejus vitâ. p. 219.*

“ The Captains had a modesty upon their Countenance; the Soldiers were amiable. The Prince who conducted them was received over all as Deity, whose bounty influenced all who saw him; and the whole Army had so respectful and tender Sentiments for him, that it reunited in his Person, all that one owes to a Brother, a Son and a Father.

VIII. It is certain nothing draws so many Blessings and Praises upon a Prince from the People, as the Care of making his Troops live in exact Discipline; that all the Provinces are forward in contributing to their Subsistence and Passage, when they occasion no Disorder; and that the Prince at the same time is never more absolute, nor more beloved by the Military People than when he orders them what is necessary, and suffers in them no injustice.

IX. But this last Article depends upon the First. The Troops must be paid in order to be regulated; and the Payments must not be deferred, to take away all pretence of Disorders; for delays have as pernicious an Effect as a Refusal; and the Soldier accustomed to pillage when he was in Want, continues to do it when the Want is over.

X. And upon this the Prince ought to be pleased to have some Advice. The first; not to satisfy himself with ordering that the Troops be paid; but to know upon what footing their Pay is established; if this Fund be ready, and if it be sufficient; otherwise the general Orders are of little Effect.

XI. The second to inform himself, if his Orders are executed; if the Treasurers furnish the Sums in time, if their Clerks are punctual and faithful; if they exact no deductions of the Officers; if they do not make them buy their exactness. It is necessary that the Prince have Men

130 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE.*

unknown, but full of Probity, who in every Quarter the Troops are in, may advertise him of all, and that their Advice does not come by the Secretary of War.

XII. The third is, that he be informed (z) if the Officer keep nothing from the Soldier, if the Colonel does Justice to the Captains; if the superior Officers put no Tax upon what is due to the Subalterns; for Corruption easily introduces itself over all; and there are no Pretences with which Avarice has not the Address to cover itself.

XIII. The Fourth is to put so just a Proportion between the Pay, or Rights attributed to the Officers and their real Wants, that they can do their Duty without exceeding what they are allowed; which ought to be understood likewise of the common Soldier, to whom the same Justice is due.

XIV. This Article is of very great Consequence, and I should stop a little here to clear it up.

XV. The Ordinances which regulate what is due to the Sea and Land Troops, and to their Officers, are Publick; the Prohibitions of neglecting them are rigorous: All that is over is treated as Theft, and besides Restitution, is liable to great Troubles.

XVI. In the mean time it is all full of Outlets; and when one enters into a detail of what is observed, he scarce sees any Ordinance guarded. The Superior or Subaltern pretends that if one followed them to the Letter, the Service would become impossible; that the Companies would fall, and afterwards the Regiments, and that the private Persons would ruin themselves, without being

(z) *Nec patiebatur quidquam Tribunal à milite accipere*
The Emperor Adrian. p. 129.

ing able to discharge their Duties. The Admirals and Sea Captains hold the same Language as the Land Officers ; and by a Connection which makes almost all those who are in Authority, accomplices, the Commissaries, Intendants, Governors, and Ministers dissemble, or even authorise in Secret, what is forbid in Publick, without any ones being able to discharge the Conscience of others by loading his own ; and without any things appearing clear in the midst of all these doubts, but the breach of the Laws which are in Vigour according to Appearances, and despised in reality.

XVII. It is said that the Prince's Ministers know it ; but they are not to dispence with the Laws, since they have only Authority to make them be observed. It is added, that the Prince himself is informed of it, and that he dissembles it ; and if it be so, one does not see why he leaves Ordonances to subsist, the Execution of which he judges impossible ; or why he dissembles Prevarication against just Ordonances, the Observation of which is easy.

XVIII. Such a Conduct is only proper to discredit the most holy Laws, in confounding them with those that one makes a Shew of supporting, and abandons in Secret. It fills all Consciences with doubts and uncertainties ; it accustoms Men to confound Light and darkness ; what is allowed and what is forbid. It infects all Conditions with a sort of Leprosie, which they communicate to one another ; and by coloured abuses, with which the Prince is little affected, it prepares to the most manifest injustices, when it hopes they shall be unknown to him.

XIX. To remedy these Disorders, which have fatal Consequences in this Life, and much more so in the next ; he must examine a-new what is

132 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

justly, due to every Soldier and Officer, when he is in the Field, or in Garrison, or in Winter Quarters; he must fix it; and not allow any thing more to be granted without an exprefs Permission, obtained upon good Reasons, and limited as to Times and Persons.

ARTICLE III.

The Prince ought to make Military People observe an exact Discipline amongst themselves.

I. When the Troops are paid, and there is no Licentiousness suffered amongst them with regard to the natural Subjects of the Prince, he must apply himself to preserve or re-establish the Military Discipline, which makes their chief Strength.

II. This Discipline consists in certain Duties, such as Obedience, Exactness in Military Officers, Labour, the Use of Arms, and every thing that is a Consequence of these general Duties.

III. It is easy to let this Discipline sink, even when it has been carried to the greatest Severity. (a) A little Softness in the Prince, in the Minister, or in the General, will do the Business; a little Complaisance for an Officer who is not very exact; an Over-looking some Absences; the Impunity of certain Faults; a false Mildness, incapable of resisting Solicitations and Prayers; and a dangerous Error, which makes one believe, that what is in order will be always so, and that the Discipline of Troops supports it self.

IV. There is nothing more false than this Illusion, and, on the contrary, nothing is more ready to happen than Inattentiveness and Disorder, when one

(a) Tacitus, speaking of a mild but unsteady General: *Cari-
tatem paraverit loco auctoritatis. Vit. Agric. p. 456.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 133

one gives over resisting the natural Bent which the Military People have to it. It is not only the common Soldier that abuses an indiscreet Easiness; it is the Officer and even the superior one, who is no more ashamed of his Faults when they are not attended to.

V. The Companies are then neglected, defective, full of bad Men. (b) The Colonels are taken up about their Pleasure, and little about their Duty: The general Officers are slow in going to the Army; seek for Pretences to prolong their Absence; think themselves happy in not being present when they should have been at the Head of a Brigade, or even commanding a part of the Army; and advancing themselves as much under a weak Ministry, where Cowardice becomes so general, that it excludes no body from Rewards, appointed for Courage and great Actions. What I represent here is no vain Chimæra. It is but a few Years since Experience has shewn *Europe* the Truth of it; and a wise Prince ought to profit by the Faults of others, which are Lessons for him.

VI. If the Military Discipline is sunk, he puts a General at the Head of Troops who is able to re-establish it; he gives him Officers for Lieutenants who are well acquainted with the Infantry and Cavalry; who know what weakens or supports both the one and the other: who are inexorable when it concerns the Service; who are attended to at Court, and for that Reason feared in the Army; who only spare the weak, (c) who give Example

K 3

them.

(b) *Legiones, pace longâ segnes, munia Romanorum æger rimè tolerabant. The Soldiers and Officers sine galeis, sine loriceis, nitidi & quæstuosi, militiâ per oppida expletâ. Tacit. l. 13 Annal. p. 226.*

(c) *Corbulo (a great General of the Romans, commanding the Legions in Syria) cultu levi, capite inteſto (even in Winter) in agmine, in laboribus frequens aſſeſſe; laudem ſtrenuis, flatum invalidis, exemplum omnibus oſtendere. Tacit. ibid.*

134 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

themselves, which authorises their Discourse, and which mitigates what they command.

VII. Their Pleasure must be their Duty: they must not be amused by any frivolous Passion: they must love Exercise and Labour, and upon Occasions a little warm, animate all by their Activity, and by the Manner in which they themselves obey general Orders: but above all (*d*) they must apply themselves to exercise the Troops, to accustom them to Order, to give them a Steadiness at Sight of the Enemy, by sham Battles: to make them march close, to make them ready and obedient to the least Signal; and that (*e*) they punish heinous Crimes in such a manner as to intimidate every body; but shun maiming and Death as much as possible.

VIII. (*f*) Severity succeeds better than Softness in War, provided the Soldiers have Necessaries. Even the Officer wants to be treated with a little Rigour. The Brave do their Duty the better, when they have not the Shagreen to see those who fail in it as well used as them, and sometimes even more consider'd. The others are animated by Example or retained through Fear; and they imagine they love their Business, and have Inclination to it, when they are not allow'd to separate their Fortune

(*d*) Cassius (*a Roman General*) quantum sine bello debatur, revocare priscum morem; exercere legiones; curâ, provisu, agere perinde ac si hostis adesset. *Tacit. l. 12. Annal. p. 189.*

(*e*) Qui signa reliquerat, statim capite pœnas luebat, Idque usu salubre, & misericordiâ melius apparuit: quippe pauciores illa castra deseruere quàm ea in quibus ignoscebatur. *There is a Medium between the two Extremes of Indulgence and Death, and this is commonly what must be observed. Tacit. l. 13. Annal. p. 227.*

(*f*) Amor militum erga Probum (*it is he who was Emperor*) ingens fuit: neque enim unquam passus est peccare militem. *Vopis. in his Life. p. 291.*

tune from their Duty. In general, Troops managed with a little Haughtiness are the better for it, provided it does not proceed from Fierceness but Exactness ; and that the Commander be a resolute, but not a boasting, whimsical, or severe Man.

IX. But it will be useless to put Men of Thought and Experience in certain Places, if the Regiments are commanded by young People, who are scarce out of the Academy, and who are allow'd to buy the Command annexed to certain Offices. No serious Application can be expected from an Age when the Passions are lively and the Reflections rare. When such a one might be capable of them he would be yet without Experience, and the Mind alone does not comprehend what use must teach it. Besides he has no Character, and consequently not the Confidence of the Troops. Upon an important Occasion he can neither command nor obey. He is astonished and confounded at so unusual a Sight, which makes an Impression upon the most resolute: and it has been seen in Battles, the Memory of which is still fresh, how useless the Number of Troops are, when they are commanded by an Imprudent Youth who sees nothing but the Dangers.

X. The essential Maxim is, not to trust the Authority but to a ripe Age, and to a proved Capacity. (g) The ablest Princes formerly chose their Captains from amongst the best of the Soldiers. They never raised any to the Rank of Colonels but Men who had long Experience and Valour. They knew that all depended on the Chiefs: that all follow when they are well led ; and that one marches to Danger without being concerned at it when he

K 4

is

(g) Nulli vicem, nisi robusto & bonæ famæ dabat: nec Tribunum nisi plenâ barbâ faciebat, aut ejus ætatis, quæ prudentiâ & annis Tribunatus robur implet. *The Emperor Adrian in Spart. p. 129.*

136 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

is full of Confidence in his Guides: and (b) the most understanding People have attributed the Decay of Discipline, and of the Empire, to the little Care that was taken in the latter Times to give the Command of the Army to Men of an advanced Age, but yet full of Fire and Vigour.

XI. There must be another Maxim join'd to this I have established, which is a Consequence of it. To grant nothing but to Merit, and to refuse every thing to Favour. For (i) there is nothing that discourages Military People more, even those who love their Prince and State, than to see Rewards which they have deserv'd go to others, and to be witness to the Progress of those who shun Dangers, whilst they themselves continue to be exposed to no purpose. Those who have less Patience quit the Service before the Time: the others continue in it with a Dislike to it, and barely acquit themselves of their Duty; and whilst Favour loads indifferent Subjects with Riches, and Chagrin damps Men of Merit, the Army comes to Ruin, and Discipline dwindles to nothing.

XII. I don't speak of those who always complain, tho' they have seldom Cause; who think they deserve all that the others obtain, and cannot bear that Men who have a little less Service, and a great deal more Capacity be preferred to them; Age alone and Murmuring are weak Means of advancing; but I speak of a great Number of honest People, (k) little known, and ill rewarded, who
only

(b) Rem Romanam nihil ita corruptum quam quod negotiis nullus præsit senex vegetus. *Theophil. Instit. Reg. 2 part. c. 23.*

(i) Cecidisse in irritum labores, si præmia periculorum soli assequantur qui periculis non affuerunt. *Tacit. l. 3. Hist. p. 383.*

(k) Exceptus brevi sculo, & nullo sermone, turbæ servientium immixtus est. *Agricola after great Exploits in England. Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 465.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 137

only make their Court in serving well, and who would be worthy of filling up the important Places, if Merit was sufficient to obtain them.

XIII. It is to these I desire the Prince may be attentive, if he has a mind to re-establish Discipline amongst the Troops, and animate every one to do his Duty. The Emulation will become general, and the Ardour communicate it self from one to another, when it is known (*l*) that nothing escapes him; that he is equally inform'd of Exactness and Negligence of good and bad Conduct, and (*m*) that he dispences Favours not as they are solicited, but as one applies himself to deserve them.

XIV. As Princes are confin'd in their Rewards, they ought not only to shun lavishing them upon Persons who are unworthy; but should likewise make them rare, and preserve all their Value even when they grant them to Merit. In War, Honour is in more esteem than any thing else, tho' one likewise thinks of Interest: what becomes common is despised; and one is rather comforted not to obtain what is rare, than content to have it with a great many others whom he little esteems.

XV. Thus numerous Promotions are contrary to Military Discipline, which subsists by the Desire of a Reward shewn for a long time, and which slackens by the Easiness of obtaining it. The Promises must not be false; but they must be deferred. The Labour must not be useless; but it must be compleat, and have its Measure.

XVI.

(*l*) *Milites suos sic ubique scivit, ut in cubiculo haberet breves, & esset ad omnia instructissimus. Alexand. Sever.*

(*m*) *The Emperor Adrian: Tribunos, non favor militum, sed justitia commendabat.*

Non studiis privatis, nec ex commendatione aut precibus Centurionum, sed optimum quemque fidelissimum putate. *Agri- cola in Tacit.*

138 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

XVI. An excellent Method for re-establishing Military Discipline, and supporting it, would be to form the young Nobility early to the Service, and afterwards for Commanding: for the whole Order depends upon the Chiefs, who are almost all out of the best Families. They commonly lose their first Years, without having any other View than that of making some Campaignes, of taking date early, of having a Right by being long in the Employments, and of advancing themselves either by Money or Favour, without adhering to their Professions out of noble Motives, and without qualifying themselves for Posts the Times push'd them to, or that Favour made them attain.

XVII. It would be very necessary for them to have higher Views, and to be recommended to General Officers of particular Merit, who would teach them to instruct themselves in every thing, to profit from all that they saw; to prepare themselves for Command by Obedience, Application, Reflections, the Knowledge of Places, of Men, of Troops, and all the Particulars on which the Conduct of an Army, and the Success of Interprises depend.

XVIII. The Testimony of General Officers should be consider'd in all Promotions, and for these Reasons should be very sincere and exact: and it is not so difficult as is thought, to establish such Rules, when the Prince undertakes it, and is happy enough to have Chiefs worthy of entring into such a Design, and of supporting him.

XIX. I ought, in order to encourage the Prince to it, represent to him the Conduct of a Great Man, who may serve as a Patern to all the Nobility of his State. “ (n) *Agricola*, so famous for the

(n) Nec Agricola licenter, more juvenum, qui militiam in lasciviam vertunt, titulum Tribunatus & inscitiam retulit, sed

“ the great Actions which he performed in Eng-
 “ land, and by the Life which his Son-in-Law
 “ Tacitus has writ of him, took a different Course
 “ from the young People, who commonly go in-
 “ to the Army out of a Spirit of Libertinism, and
 “ return from it with the Title of Colonel, but
 “ with as little Capacity as if they had never ser-
 “ ved. He apply’d seriously to know the Coun-
 “ tries where the War was carried on ; to deserve
 “ the Esteem of the Army ; to get Instruction
 “ from those who had Knowledge and Experi-
 “ ence ; and to seek out all those who distinguish-
 “ ed themselves by Merit. He did not out of
 “ Vanity ask dangerous Commissions, and he re-
 “ fused none out of Fear. He consider’d atten-
 “ tively all that pass’d, and took a warm Concern
 “ in it, either for the common Defence, or the
 “ Honour of Victory : for though he had not
 “ the Conduct of the Army, nor any share in the
 “ Council, he made Reflections upon all ; and
 “ taking advantage both for his Instruction and
 “ Use of what the Generals did, he animated him-
 “ self by the Desire of imitating them, and ac-
 “ quiring great Glory by Arms, though Merit
 “ was then odious, and a great Reputation was a
 “ great Danger. He retain’d nevertheless his Ac-
 “ tivity, and moderated his Ardour, for fear it
 “ should

sed noscere provinciam, nosci exercitui, discere à peritis, se-
 qui optimos, nihil appetere ob jactationem, nihil ob formidi-
 nem recusare, simulque anxius & intentus agere. . . . de salute,
 mox de victoriâ certavere : quæ cuncta, etsi consiliis ductuque
 alterius agebantur, artem, & usum, & stimulos addidere ju-
 veni ; intravitque animum militaris gloriæ cupido, ingrata tem-
 poribus, quibus sinistra erga eminentes interpretatio, nec minus
 periculum ex maguâ famâ, quàm ex malâ : temperavit vim su-
 am, ardoremque compescuit, ne cresceret. Peritus obsequi,
 eruditusque utilia honestis miscere. . . . virtute in obsequendo,
 verecundiâ in prædicando, extra invidiam, nec extra gloriam
 erat. Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 454 & 455.

140 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE.

“ should carry him too far. He apply’d to obey
“ properly, and to fill up the Intervals that were
“ left him, by Studies and Occupations equally
“ useful and honourable. He was satisfy’d with
“ doing well when he was commanded, and did
“ not speak of what he had done. Thus he join’d
“ Modesty to Valour, and in shunning Envy he
“ acquired great Glory.”

XX. This is what the Prince should desire for many young Lords, who would become the Glory and Strength of the State, if they follow’d so good an Example, and would support Military Discipline with more Success than either Regulations or Punishments.

XXI. One ought to inspire the very common Soldiers with Love and Zeal for Order, in inspiring them with it for their native Country, their Citizens, and Honour. They are the first at every thing, when they are sensible of Glory, and govern’d by Motives superior to their Education and ordinary Lowness. They are then grave, moderate, calm, obedient, laborious; and turning all their Strength against the Enemy, they have respect for their Officers and Affection for their Brethren.

XXII. This Character, which is look’d upon as a fine Idea, but impracticable, was very common amongst the *Roman* Troops in the Republick, and under the Emperors who had the necessary Qualities to conduct them. And it would not be impossible for the Prince to inspire his Army with the same Sentiments, if the Officers were well chose; if the Soldiers were carefully instructed; if instead of engaging them by Artifice and Violence, they were made to esteem their Condition; if one kept their Word to them, in discharging them at the promised Time; if they had not so frightful an Idea of their Profession given them, in dragging Soldiers loaded with Chains, and bathed in their
Tears,

Tears, to serve them for Recruits. This melancholy Sight is only fit to make them desert and fly; and it is to ruin the Discipline of an Army, to fill it with frightened Men, torn away from their Families, and already vanquished before seeing their Enemies.

XXIII. (o) The Romans look'd upon the Care they had in exercising their Troops by hard Labours, and not allowing their Soldiers to be idle, as a Means of obtaining Discipline. Their Camp was always fortified, though the Abode was to be short; and when they were not employ'd in War, they were used for great Works, to drain Marshes, to convey Water by Aqueducts, to mend public Roads, to build Bridges, Temples and Portico's: Such Things were necessary for employing the Legions; several of which were join'd in one Camp, and continued always seperated from the Towns; but Experience has shewn that there is great Danger in leaving large Bodies of Troops in one Place, in the Time of Peace; and thus the Necessity of Labour to prevent Seditions, and the Conveniency of applying them in that Way have ceased. It would nevertheless be very useful, that the numerous Garrisons were not idle: But the Labours must not occasion Sicknefs, and the Soldiers must be engag'd to it by an Augmentation of their Pay or some other Bait. It is certain the more a Soldier is accusom'd to Labour and Trouble, military Discipline is the less hard, and he obeys more easily when he is used always to it.

XXIV.

(o) Milites otiosos esse nunquam est passus: Pontes, templa, porticusque, basilicas, labore militum struxit; ora fluminum multa patefecit, plaudes plerasque siccavit, atque in his segetes agrosque constituit. *This is said of the Emperor Probus, but it was likewise the Custom of the Roman Generals, as is otherwise known. Vopisc. p. 291.*

XXIV. It is sometimes necessary and always useful, that the Prince have foreign Troops in pay. They are in greater Number in the Beginning of his Reign; but they diminish as he establishes his Authority and Power: And when he is in Peace and well assured of the Fidelity of his Subjects, he maintains some foreign Regiments, only to keep up Discipline amongst his own Troops by Emulation and Example. This Comparison awakens the Jealousy of the natural Subjects, and a Nation is better when it fears the Censure of another.

XXV. A last Means for establishing an exact Fidelity in the Troops, is that they be limited: For it is scarce possible to provide against every thing in immense Armies; and whatever the General's Capacity may be, a great many Things necessarily escape him in an extraordinary Number of Particulars.

XXVI. I know there are Wars where one is oblig'd to engage different Enemies in several Places, and that their numerous Armies oblige one to oppose them with equal ones, or even superior: But such Necessities must be rare; and a wise Prince's first care is, not to draw upon himself several Enemies at the same time; to prevent their Leagues; to separate them before they make great Efforts against him, and always to put some Power in his Interest who is able to keep them in Respect. If he observes what has been (p) said upon the just Motives of the War, and upon the Means of obtaining the Confidence of the neighbouring Princes, he will have no Difficulty in keeping several of them in his Alliance: And when he neither excites Jealousies nor makes Conquests, he will rarely have use for these prodigious Armies which are hard to be manag'd, and

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE. 143

and the Motions of which cannot be so well concerted and so regular as a strict Discipline requires.

XXVII. Besides it is known by ancient and modern History, that the greatest Warriors have not reckon'd upon numerous Armies, but have rather look'd upon them as unweildy ; and that they have executed the greatest Enterprises with Troops almost always inferior in number to those of their Enemies, but more warlike and better disciplin'd.

XXVIII. It is to these two Points that he must apply. The rest is more for Ostentation than Effect ; for it is never but a part of a great Army which acts, and serves as a Show to the other : Whereas an Army of which the Chief governs all the Motions, and which is compos'd of People who know well to command and to obey, and who have the same View, commonly gain the Victory ; according to that remarkable Speech of the *Roman* Senate, applauding the Triumph of *Alexander Severus*. (q) *Whoever knows to establish Order and Discipline in his Army, knows to vanquish and triumph.*

(q) *Ille vincit, qui milites regit. Lamprid. in vit. Alex. Severi, p. 221.*



C H A P.



CHAPTER XXVIII.

It is the Prince's Duty and Interest not to trust the Government of the Provinces, and that of the strong Places, but to Men of great Merit. He ought likewise not to chuse Ambassadors, but such as can worthily support the Character of it. Qualities necessary for each.

ARTICLE I.

It is the Prince's Duty and Interest not to trust the Government of the Provinces but to Men of great Merit.

I. **T**O no purpose would all the Reason reside in the head, if the Arms and Hands failed. The best and ablest Prince will have but Thoughts and Desires if he does not Execute them by Men to whom he communicates the Motion as well as the Authority.

II. Men are Assistant according as their Service is extended. They represent him where he is not. They go where he cannot. They see what he cannot discern, and in obeying him the first they contribute to make all the others do so.

III. It would be losing time to spend it in shewing the Prince how much it is his Interest that Men act by his Motives, and have as pure Intentions as his. He sees all at once, that it is the duty of the Head to conduct the Hand, and that if he should chuse Men incapable of execut-
ing

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 145

ing his Orders, either out of Weakness or Negligence, or even because they are Enemies to them, he would reverse the whole natural Order, and Fight against his own Inclinations.

IV. It is likewise unnecessary to shew him what Account he takes upon himself, if he trusts the conduct of the Provinces to Men, who neither have the necessary Zeal, Probity, Disinterestedness or Wisdom. The most plain and natural Light is enough to convince him that he is answerable for his Choice, and that he is surety for all the Consequences of an indiscreet easiness.

ARTICLE II.

Observations upon the Governments. Qualities of the Governors of a Province.

I. There are States where the Governors of the Provinces are but Commissions for a Time; and there are some of them where they are perpetual. I understand here by the name of Provinces, the different Parts which compose the Body of a Monarchy; and do not consider, if in former Ages these Parts have separately made a whole, and bore the name of Kingdoms.

II. The Custom of establishing Governors in them for a limited time, is more conform to the Rules of Policy. It leaves the Prince more Authority, and the Governors less, who may be recalled without noise, if their Conduct is bad. It is more proper for forming great Men for the Ministry, in sending them from one Province to another, and in giving them more Knowledge in publick Affairs. He lays Employments more open to Merit, in limiting them to the Time, and not to the Persons, and in dividing amongst several, who succeed one another, what the long
L. Life

146 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

Life of a single Person would take away from them, if Governments were perpetual.

III. It is of Consequence then that the Prince makes no attempt upon this Custom, if it is established; and it would be even to be wish'd that he could substitute it to the other, in the Countries where this last prevailed.

IV. Nevertheless it must not be thought that Governments reduced to simple Commissions, be without Inconveniencies. The short term which limits them, may excite the Avarice of the Governors, and of all those who have any share in their Authority. They haste to enrich themselves when they have only a limited time wherein to do it. (r) The Relations and Servants hasten to take advantage of a Reign which is to last but for a little: And a Province has thus the Misfortune to become the Prey of the Governors, who come starved, and who, after being satiated, abandon it to the Thirst and Rapaciousness of another.

V. But the Inconveniencies which are certainly to be feared are not inevitable. The Prince may, and ought to chuse disinterested Governors; severely punish those who have not been honest; appoint faithful superintendants unknown to them, who may advertise him; and on one Hand, testify so much love for the People, and on the other, so much hatred for Avarice, that one may fear either his Goodness or his Wrath.

VI. It is dangerous to trust the Government of maritime Provinces to Persons already very powerful, tho' sure and faithful. They must not be exposed to the Temptation of not being so but as long as they please; and an able Prince never grants Favours, which may become the Subject of just uneasiness to him.

VII.

(r) *Servorum manus subitis avidas, & tanquam apud senem festinantes. Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 309.*

VII. For the same Reason he will never give a Lord of his Court a new Authority, in a Province where he has a great Estate and Interest already; especially if those of his Family have pretended any right to it. It is a Fault to awaken these old Notions, and an Imprudence to fortify his Servant against himself.

VIII. It ought to be an inviolable Rule never to grant the Governors of a Province, the particular Government of any strong Place, situated in their District, and not to entrust it to any of their Relations or Friends, whilst the whole Province obeys them.

IX. It is likewise a wholesome Maxim, to send none but very well proved People into distant Governments, whose whole Interest depends upon the Prince, and who cannot support themselves but by Fidelity.

X. It is another, not to leave them there, but as long as the Publick Interest requires it; not only recalling them at junctures when their Presence is necessary; but likewise not suffering them to make themselves necessary on purpose, and that they may not have Successors. This is what a wise Policy prescribes; but the most difficult is to find Men to whom the Provinces may be trusted, and whose Merit answers to their Employment.

XI. An ancient Emperor, worthy in this to be an Example to others, had such a fear of deceiving himself in a choice of such Consequence, that after having taken all the Precautions possible to be assured of the Integrity and Probity of those whom he thought of sending into the Provinces as Governors or Intendants, (s) he publicly placarded

L 2

(s) Ubi aliquos voluisset vel Rectores Provinciis dare, vel Praepositos facere, vel Procuratores ordinare, nomina eorum proponebat, hortans populum, ut si quis quid haberet criminis,

148 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

carded their Names, desiring every Body to reveal what they knew of their present or past Conduct ; adding that it would be shameful for a Prince not to have as much exactness in the choice of Persons to whom he trusts the Lives and Estates of his Subjects, as the Christians had in the Choice of their Bishops and Priests, whom they did not ordain till after a publick Enquiry. The darkness of a false Religion concealed from this Emperor, the Sublimity of the Christian Priesthood ; but in his very darkness, he judged soundly of the Interest the Nations have of being govern'd by Men who are irreprehensible, and whose Virtue is universally respected.

XII. I should not dare propose the re-establishment of such an Information, of which there remains now but a faint Shadow, both for secular Dignities and the Episcopal, and which is reduced to a mere Formality ; but I well know that most of those who are placed would be excluded, if they who know them well were allowed to give an Account of what they know.

XIII. Ambition which succeeds to the Passions of Youth, does not stifle them, but is satisfy'd with covering and suspending them. One becomes more circumspect at a certain Age, without becoming better. He takes what appearances of Virtue he has use for, but the Vices remain, and when he has got his aim, the Mask drops off, and Nature shews itself. Men who are thought sedate and diligent whilst they had hopes of any thing,

probaret manifestis rebus, dicebatque grave esse, cum id Christiani & Judæi (on confondoit souvent alors les Chrétiens avec les Juifs) facerent in prædicandis Sacerdotibus qui ordinandi sunt, non fieri in Provinciarum Rectoribus, quibus & fortunæ hominum committerentur, & capita. *In vita Alexand. Sever. p. 218.*

(t) Dilatæ voluptates, dissimulatæ luxuriæ, & cuncta ad decorem composita ; eoque plus formidinis afferunt falsæ virtutes & vitia reditura. *Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 329.*

thing, are given up to their Amusements and Pleasures, when they have obtained their Desires. They were thought disinterested, they are covetous ; they were thought just, and they are protectors of injustice.

XIV. One would not have been deceived in it, if he would have gone back a little higher than the time when Artifice has disguised it ; for the past was a Prediction of the future ; and one should expect that the Authority would make all appear which had done so before it was desired.

XV. It is harder to judge of those in whom one sees no decisive Good, and of whom he can only be convinced by the Trial. (v) There are some whom one distrusts that succeed, and do wonders : As on the contrary there are others, of whom there was a great deal expected, and whose Employments discover their weakness. Business raises some and confounds others. A large Theater animates the first : The second cannot bear so great a Light. He must take advantage of this Proof, to push on the one, and make the others retire.

XVI. It is a very valuable Character for a Governor (*) to be equal to the Business, tho' he be not superior to it ; to have what is requisite for the Government of a Province, tho' he have no other Qualities than those necessary for that Office. A Prince must value those wise Genius's which have nothing very bright, but have Application and Prudence ; one is generally better pleased with them, than with others, who with more Spirit and Fire have less justness in their Designs and Thoughts,

L 3

less

(v) Non ex rumore statuendum. multos in Provinciis contra quam spes aut metus de illis fuerit, egisse ; excitari quosdam ad meliorem, magnitudine rerum, hebescere alios. *Tiberius dans Tacite L. 3. Annal. p. 101.*

(*) Maximis Provinciis per quatuor & viginti annos popæus Sabinus impositus, nullam ob eximiam artem, sed buòd pat negotiis, neque supra erat. *Tacit. L. 6. Annal. p. 160.*

150 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

less love for Labour, and less Patience and Sedateness to examine Affairs before undertaking them.

XVII. He must not confound the Men of Sense and Reason, tho' a little heavy, and of a more confined Genius than some others, with those who (y) remain in a sort of medium between Vice and Virtue, who have none of the Faults of private Persons nor any of the Qualities of Publick ones. These last seem worthy of a great Place before they are put in it ; but as soon as they are, one sees they are not fit for it. It is not so with those who fill them with Success, tho' they want great Talents. These are good Genius's and not ordinary ones. The Publick has no use for what they want, and the Provinces are happy and easy under their Conduct.

XVIII. The Prince ought nevertheless to desire something more, to distinguish and value it, if he finds it. He has need of being assisted by Men who join to Prudence and Maturity, great Views, noble Sentiments and great Qualities for the publick Government. A narrow Mind has but narrow Views. A Province entirely employs and fills it ; it must likewise be peaceable ; and that he be charged to keep Order in it, and not to re-establish it. The whole State requires something more extensive and more eminent. The stormy Provinces want a Governor of great Capacity ; those which are at a distance or full of Abuses, or in a Condition of taking Advantage of the wisdom or knowledge of a Superiour, likewise require that he have extraordinary Talents ; and (z) the Prince

(y) *Ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus : major privato virtus, dum privatus fuit ; & omnium consensu capax Imperii, nisi imperasset ; Cetera est de Galba. Tacit. L. 1. Hist. p. 323.*

(z) *Id morum Tiberii fuit, continuare Imperia : neque reemes virtutes secti abatur. & rursus vitia oderat : ex optantipiculum sibi, p à pessimis dedecus publicam metuebat. in mtiis L. 1. Annal. 40.*

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 151

Prince when he finds such, should not be jealous of them, but think himself happy that Providence gives him Assistants so worthy of supplying his Presence in the Provinces, and so proper for concurring with him in the Publick Good.

XIX. It is true their Fidelity should be Proof against every Thing; this I look upon as the Foundation of their Merit: And I reckon all the Qualities not only as nothing, but as a great Misfortune, of which a respectful Attachment for the Prince, and love for his People are not the Foundation.

XX. Disinterestedness should be join'd to Fidelity; and a Governour's House should be so pure, that it be free not only from all Corruption, but likewise from all Suspicion. All the Officers and Servants should be like their Master. Faults upon this Point are not such as one pardons or dissembles. All presents are banish'd. All access to Sollicitation and Favour is shut up.

XXI. It necessary that the Governor desire to be beloved of the People and endeavour to please them; (a) but he ought not to flatter them, in favouring their Passions, or leaving Abuses unpunish'd, nor gain them by his Profusions and Expences, By his Employment he is the publick Censor of Vice, and he ought by his Example to authorise Virtue. He ought to think himself happy, if he can be beloved by all, in acquitting himself of these Duties; but he ought not to be less regular or less firm, if he cannot shun displeasing those who love Licentiousness. It is easy to please

L 4 the

(a) *Some Governors affected to please by too popular Methods, that the Province might send Deputies to the Prince to thank him for having given them such Thanks were forbid. Laus falsa & precibus expressa perinde cohibeantur, quàm malitiâ, quàm crudelitas. Plura sæpè peccantur dum demeremur, quàm cum offendimus. Quædam imò virtutes odio sunt. Inviçtus adversum gratiam animus, Tacit, L. 15. Annal. p. 269.*

the People in being like them. It is easy to hurt them in disagreeing with their Manners: The great Art is to please them in making them better, and to attract them to him without going to them.

XXII. One may succeed in it, by doing them real Services on certain Occasions; testifying in all Things a sincere Affection for them; never using Authority but in Season; never acting with haughtiness, and never shewing humour, inequality of Temper or Passion; forgetting his Rank as far as decency requires it, opposing the unjust Desires and Innovations of the Farmers; declaring himself an Enemy to Monopolies, and to all the Privileges which ruin a Province to enrich a private Person, assisting the Poor as much as he is able; distinguishing and protecting Merit in all Conditions, shewing great respect for Religion, and attaching all those to him whose Merit appears most perfect; and taking away all the Rudeness and Severity from his Office which he can do without debasing it.

XXIII. It is hard if such a Governor be not beloved by many, and respected by all, I am only afraid that the Idea may appear too perfect to be put in Practice, and I am therefore to make it more real, in proposing an Example, where, excepting sincere Piety, which Paganism did not know, many of the Talents which I have observed are to be found. It is of a Man who had been first Governor of *Aquitania*, and afterwards of *England*; and who in both Provinces, had had the Administration of Justice and the command of the Army.

XXIV. This was his Conduct in his first Government. (b) When he presided in the Assembly

(b) *Ubi Conventus & Judicia poscerent, gravis, intentus, severus, & sæpius misericors ubi officiis satisfactum: nulla ultra potestatis persona, nec illi, aut facilitas auctoritatem, aut seve-*

bly where Justice was Administred he filled the Office with Dignity. He was attentive and serious, sometimes severe out of Necessity, and more commonly indulgent out of Inclination; but when he had discharged this Office, he retained nothing of the Man of State, or of the Governor; and he knew so well how to mix what he owed to his Employment, and what he owed to Society, that his affability did not weaken his Authority, and his severe Gravity did not make him less amiable. His Integrity and the Distance he kept from every thing that could be able to corrupt him, was beyond all Expression, and yet below his other Virtues, which were the Principle of so pure and disinterested a Conduct, as had no need of being supported by Praises, and was far from seeking them by Affectation and Artifice.

XXV. In his second Government, where they were all in Arms, and where he was obliged to bring them to their Duty by Prudence and Force, (c) he perceiv'd that Arms were not the best pal Means to bring back those People, whose Cha-

acter

ritas amorem diminuit. Integritatem atque abstinentiam in tanto viro referre, injuria virtutum fuerit: ne famam quidem, cui etiam sæpe boni indulgent, ostentanda virtute, aut per artem, quæsit, *Tacit. in vit. Agricol. p. 455.*

(c) Animorum Provinciæ prudens, simulque doctus per aliena experimenta, parùm profici armis, si injuriæ sequerentur, causas bellorum statuit exscindere. A se suisque orsus, primam domum suam coercuit, quod plerisque haud minùs arduum est, quàm Provinciam regere. Nihil per libertos servosque publicæ rei: non studiis privatis, nec ex commendatione aut precibus Centurionum milites ascire, sed optimum quemque fidelissimum putare: omnia scire, non omnia exequi. Parvis peccatis veniam, magnis severitatem commodare, nec pœnâ semper, sed sæpius pœnitentiâ contentus esse: officiis & administrationibus potius non peccaturos, quàm damnare cùm peccassent: frumenti & tributorum auctionem æqualitate munerum mollire, circumcisis quæ in quæstum reperta, ipso tributo graviùs tolerabantur... quod omnibus in promptu etat, paucis luerosum fiebat. *Tacit. ibid. p. 458.* Hæc primo præterit anno. *Ibid.*

rafter he perfectly knew; but that to put an end to the War, he must take away the Causes of it. He begun by himself and his Household, putting his Officers and Servants in Order; in that doing as difficult a Thing even as the right governing a Province. He neither gave nor allowed any of his freed Men or People to take any Share in the Publick Affairs. He granted nothing to Party, Recommendations or Prayers; and even when he raised a Soldier to the first degree of Authority, he only regarded the Worth which he knew him to have, and not the design his Captain had in advancing him; having for a Maxim, that the bravest are the most faithful. He was informed of every thing, but he sometimes dissembled his Knowledge. He pardon'd the little Faults, but punished the great ones with Severity when it was necessary; for when the Repentance was great, he was satisfied without going further, and he chose those so well who were to fill the Commissions and Employments, that he was not obliged to divest them of them, and to punish them. He took away the greatest Hardships of the Taxes, in making the Division of them equal, and suppressing all that the avaritiousness of the Receivers had added to them. He abolished the Monopolies as contrary to publick Liberty, in confining to a small number of People, the Profit which many should have a right of making; and which is admirable, he employ'd only one Year in settling so many good things, and putting an end to so many Evils. This proves on one Hand, the extreme Difference betwixt a great Man and an ordinary one; and on the other what a Governor can do, whose Views answer to his good Intentions, and whose Heart is as good as his Understanding.

XXVI. (d) It is juſt that a Man, otherwiſe ſo diſtinguiſh'd, be ſo likewiſe by the Affection and Eſteem of the Prince, who ſhould not be afraid of debaſing himſelf, in giving him publick Teſtimonies of it, where the ordinary Meaſures and Decorum will not be ſo ſtrictly obſerv'd; becauſe one will ſee that the Juſtice due to great Merit, ought to be regulated by Cuſtom.

ARTICLE III.

Qualities of the Governors of ſtrong Places.

I. It is not neceſſary that the Governors of ſtrong Places have the ſame Qualities as the Governors of a Province; but they ought to have great ones: for the Places entrusted to them are the Key of the State. They are its Ramparts and Strength; and the greater Conſequence they are of, the more he muſt aſſure himſelf of thoſe who have the keeping of them.

II. They ought to be choſe of a ripe Age, and after many Years Service; of great Courage whereof they have given publick Proofs: of great Capacity for all that relates to the general Command, and of an equal Application for the minuteſt Particulars: ſkill'd in Fortifications, and in a Condition to judge of the Counſels of the Engineers: underſtanding the Troops well, both Infantry and Cavalry: knowing the Theory and Practice of the Artillery: capable of making himſelf be belov'd and fear'd by the Garriſon; having the Eſteem of the Officer and the Confidence of the Soldier, and making them all obſerve a ſtrict Diſcipline. Per-
fectly

(d) Præſides Provinciarum, quos verè, non factionibus, laudari competit, & in itineribus ſecum ſemper in vehiculo habuit, & muneribus adjuvit. *The Emperor Alexander Severus, in his Life. p 212.*

156 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

fectly instructed in the Manner of attacking and defending Places: active, vigilant, distrusting himself in every thing, not out of an useless Unquietude, but a wise Precaution; not slackening in his necessary Cares, even when he is in peace; sober, and an Enemy to all Excess: chaste out of Duty and for Example, and to shun Snares and Surprises: determin'd to dare and suffer all to preserve to the Prince, and the State, the Places that are trusted to his Fidelity and Valour: not satisfying himself in this by the simple Motives of Honour, but being supported by Views of Religion and Conscience, which are the true Source of Courage and Fidelity.

III. It is very right for them to be attentive in filling their Places with all sorts of war-like Stores, and other Provisions, and that they do not depend upon the Secretary of War's Care for it: that they grant with Difficulty that any thing be taken from them, which is necessary for their Defence; and that they be allow'd immediately to make their humble Remonstrances to the Prince upon this Subject, that he may give Orders concerning it after having heard all. Without these Precautions it sometimes happens that a whole Frontier is stripp'd, to furnish a Siege, or an Enterprize, which the Minister has at heart, and one leaves good Places exposed to the Enemy, without foreseeing the Consequences of such a dangerous Imprudence, and this remembers me to give the Prince some Reflections upon strong Places, which perhaps he will use.

ARTICLE IV.

Observations upon strong Places.

I. It is of the highest Consequence not easily to undertake the fortifying of new Places, because
the

INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c. 157

the Expence of it is immense; they often excite the Jealousy of the neighbouring States, and become the Source of a long War, which sometimes ends by a Treaty, the principal Article of which is their Demolition.

II. There is consequently more Security in fortifying those well which one has already, and supplying what is wanting in the old Fortifications by new Works.

III. As the Manner of besieging Places is extremely chang'd, and that a numerous Artillery soon reduces those which are not succour'd, it seems that all the small Places, which are defended by Morasses or Water, which extend their out-Works, ought to be reckon'd but a weak Barrier; and that it is better to fortify the great Towns, which cannot be besieged but by a numerous Army, which shews a large Front and opposes the Enemy's Fire with another, which for a great while is superior to it, and which is easier succour'd when the Army of the Besiegers is weaken'd by several Losses.

IV. It seems unnecessary for the strong Places to be multiply'd so as to leave scarce any free Passage betwixt them. This Enclosure cannot be every where equally strong: and when once the Breach has been made in it, a Place taken serves to make the Siege of another: whereas the same Inconveniency does not happen, when the Neighbourhood is less lock'd up. It is true, the Inroads of the Enemy are then a little more to be feared: but there are other Ways to stop them.

V. The essential Point is, not to load himself by supporting a great many Places which require great Expence, and which after having drained the State for many Years when they have not been necessary, cannot be defended on an important Occasion, because they want every thing.

VI.

158 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

VI. A long War consumes the Provisions, and the Treasury which should serve to renew them: Thus the best Places perish by what the Prince had not foreseen. The Ramparts are excellent; but the Soldiers are ill paid: the Artillery is useless for want of Powder; the Arms are bad, and there is not a sufficient Number of them; the Magazines are drain'd: and brave People give up a Place that was thought impregnable, because they are not in a Condition to defend it; whereas Places without Character are able to resist an Army when they are well fortify'd.

VII. It is to this then which he must apply himself, and to be always in a Condition to fortify Garison-Places well, he must proportion this Expence to that which the Kingdom can always support.

ARTICLE V.

Choice of the Ambassadors. Their Qualities.

I. There Remains a last Article which relates to Ambassadors; and I reduce it to three Heads: the Motives the Prince has in sending them; the Quality which they ought to have; the Consideration which they deserve when they have them.

II. I do not enter into the particular Views that every Prince may have, in making his Ambassador reside at the-Court of another Prince. They are secret, different in a thousand Ways, and useless for my Design. I satisfy my self with consulting Reason, laying aside every thing else: and I think in consulting it, I may maintain, that the lawful Motives which determine a Prince to send his Ambassadors to foreign Courts, are reduced to Prudence, Friendship, and Negotiations.

III.

INSTITUTION *of a* PRINCE, &c. 159

III. The Prince should be inform'd of all that passes out of the Kingdom, which has any Relation to himself, his Allies, his Enemies, and those who have taken no Side. An able Ambassador may discover at one Court what is conceal'd from his Master at another. He may even learn that there are Designs form'd against his Service at the Court where he resides. His Advice is then of great Use; and it is prudent to have faithful and understanding Men over all, who may prevent Conspiracies and Surprises.

IV. The Desire of entertaining a good Understanding with the other Princes, is a Motive yet more lawful, and more worthy of a great King, who loves Peace, is free of Jealousy, and truly interests himself in the Happiness of the other Sovereigns, whom he looks upon as Brethren. A wise and able Ambassador may contribute greatly to keep up the Union, in preventing Suspicions on both Sides, in clearing up Mistakes, in remedying slight Discontents, which would have great Consequences if they were neglected.

V. In fine, an Ambassador is a Man of Trust for Treaties and Negotiations; and when he has Dexterity and Understanding, he is a useful Mediator betwixt two Princes, one of whom is his Master, and the other esteems him much.

VI. It is easy to see by this alone, that the Qualities of an Ambassador ought to be great, and that the Faults of a Man in this Character are of high Importance.

VII. He ought to be very wise, moderate, secret, attentive, learned in History, especially that of his own Country and that where he is sent, understanding Decorums in general, and particularly those which serve as a Rule in the Court where he resides; full of Dignity, but an Enemy to false Glory: supporting his Character with Nobleness,
but

160 INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.*

but not being upon the Punctilio, or delicate out of season, shunning to expose himself, and never answering a violent Proceeding by Violence; reserving all to his Master, who is his Judge, and not engaging him indiscreetly in his Quarrels by hurrying to do himself Justice: always remembering the Majesty of the Prince whom he represents; but not forgetting him to whom he is sent: and never making Comparisons between them, which are not pardonable even when there is Ground for them.

VIII. In the Memorials which he presents to the Ministers, and in the Letters which he writes to them, he should put nothing which is not maturely deliberated upon, and of which he has not seen all the Consequences. He should reckon upon nothing but the Force of his Reasons; shew nothing but Justice; never answer with Roughness to Memorials which are not respectful enough, but going always to the Bottom, and not obscuring Right by Clouds of Wrath and Passion; never threaten, if his Master does not order it; deferr it even then, and soften it, in case he is left at Liberty; remember that one rarely intimidates those whom one threatens, but admonishes them to take so sure Precautions, that they themselves may become terrible.

IX. It is necessary for an Ambassador to have a good deal of Spirit and Penetration: but when he piques himself upon it, it is a Proof that he wants it. There is nothing more despicable, nor more odious, than a Man who believes he sees more than others; and one almost always succeeds in deceiving him, either in making him privately give false Advice, or in affecting to conceal from him, what one does but with a Design that he may know it, and covering in Reality by these frivolous Mysteries, Affairs of Importance, which he
cannot

cannot come to know but when it is not in his Power to hinder them.

X. It is likewise an essential Quality in an Ambassador, to be attentive and vigilant, and to form Connections with Persons capable of informing him of every thing, but he must take care not to make himself a Spy, and not to turn away the honestest People from him, whilst he listens to obscure Persons, for whose empty Conjectures and false Advice he pays dearly. He must love Probity and Fidelity in others, and endeavour to deserve their Confidence by honest Means. An Ambassador who is esteem'd, and worthy of having Friends, finds sure ones, who, without failing in what they owe to their Prince or their native Country, shew him by Words which he knows how to use, what mercenary Souls would never inform him of: and the Means of obtaining this important Service, is to be known for a Man of impenetrable Secrecy, and of such Circumspection for his Friends, that he never exposes them to the least Uneasiness for what he learns by their Means.

XI. It is useful for an Ambassador to have Connections with Men who share in the Ministry in other Courts. He sometimes receives very certain and circumstantial Accounts of what is carefully conceal'd from him at the Court where he resides: and then he exposes no body in the Use that he makes of them, because they who give them have a Right and Liberty of doing it.

XII. But to conduct himself right in all that, he must have acquir'd a great Knowledge of Men, and be capable of discerning well what they are: for otherwise one commits a great many Faults in thinking to be very prudent, and hearkens to what he should despise, whilst he rejects what would deserve a serious Attention.

162 INSTITUTION of a PRINCE, &c.

XIII. When an Ambassador writes to his Master or his Ministers, he must not think of writing fine Letters, or shewing his Capacity. He is but an ordinary Politician when he would pass for a deep one. There must be nothing but Truth and Exactness in these Letters; nothing exaggerated; nor any thing mix'd with Doubts; the Facts plainly related; the Conjectures suppressed; Orders waited for; and when he is oblig'd to tell his Thoughts, support them with solid Reasons, but without concealing any of those which are against them.

XIV. It is for the Sovereign's Dignity, that his Ambassador appear with a certain Splendor: but the Ambassador must not love this Pomp, which is for the People and not for him, and (e) which is excusable only because the Weakness of Men makes it necessary, few People being capable of discerning great Merit when it is alone; and, that the outward Appearance does not debase his Idea to the Judgment of the Senses.

XV. It is a Fault then, and even a Proof that (f) the Ambassador is little, when he runs into Expences, and that he imagines himself to be the greater for being more magnificent; and yet it is almost the general Taste, whoever has an Estate and consents to ruin himself, thinks he is proper for an Embassy. At the Court itself, the other Qualities are little examin'd into; and so little is depended upon them, that the Ambassador is commonly for nothing but Shew, and the most Important Affairs pass through another Channel.

XVI. I think a Prince has great Interest in rightly chusing those who represent him in foreign Courts,

(e) Plerisque, magnos viros per ambitionem æstimare, mos est. *Tacit. vit. Agricol. p. 465.*

(f) Mirum dictu, ut sit omnis (illorum) virtus velut extra ipsos. *Tacit. L. 2. Hist. p. 332.*

INSTITUTION *of a PRINCE, &c.* 163

Courts, where one judges often of him and the whole Nation by them ; and he ought not to charge any with such a Character but those whose extraordinary Qualities can draw them Respect and Veneration.

XVII. When he has found such as them, he should know their Worth ; keep them long in Employment ; value their Advice ; assist them with extraordinary Helps, if they are not rich ; take care of their Families, if they have any, and repair the Loss their Absence makes them suffer ; and when their Age requires Rest, recall them to consult with them at home, and (g) do them great Honour, in requiring little Labour of them.

(g) *Otium cum dignitate.*

F I N I S.

28 SEP 60



INDEX



INDEX

TO THE

SECOND VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.

- ARTICLE I. **A** *Sure compendious Way of teaching a Prince his Duties.* p.262
- II. *The first Duty of a Prince is to love his People.* 265
- III. *How a Prince ought to love his People.* 269
- IV. *How much it is his Interest to love his People.* 272

CHAPTER II.

- I. *A Prince ought to have an exact Knowledge of his Kingdom, and make a right Use of that Knowledge.* 275
- II. *The Means of doing it.* 281

CHAPTER III.

- I. *One of the most important Duties of a Prince is to distribute Justice.* 286
- II. *The Obligation of a Prince to distribute Justice is personal.* 291
- III. *The Rules that a Prince ought to observe to acquit himself of his Duty.* ibid.

CHAPTER IV.

A Continuation of the same Subject. 300

CHAP-

I N D E X.

CHAPTER V.

- I. *A Prince is answerable for the Judges who distribute Justice in his Name.* p. 306
- II. *The Qualities a Judge ought to have.* 313
- III. *The Difficulty of the Choice, and the Way to succeed in it.* 318
- IV. *A Prince ought to enquire into their Conduct, and how he may be inform'd of it.* 323

CHAPTER VI.

- I. *The Venality of Magistratical Officers is repugnant to Justice.* 327
- II. *It is the Duty of a Prince to apply a Remedy to this Venality.* 336
- III. *The excessive Expence of Justice is a great Disorder.* 339
- IV. *A Prince is oblig'd to diminish these excessive Expences.* 342

CHAPTER VII.

- I. *A Prince ought to maintain the ancient Laws.* 344
- II. *Rules to be observ'd in establishing new Laws.* 348

CHAPTER VIII.

- I. *A Prince ought to govern his People with Wisdom, and according to the Laws.* 357
- II. *He ought not to confound arbitrary Power with sovereign Authority.* 359
- III. *He ought to know what seduces into confounding these two different things, and to avoid it.* 365

CHAPTER IX.

- I. *A Prince, that he may govern wisely, ought to govern by his Council.* 372
- II. *The Qualities of those he ought to consult.* 374
- III. *The Methods a Prince ought to use in choosing his Council.* 381
- IV. *What Use the Prince ought to make of those who compose his Council.* 385

CHAP.

I N D E X.

C H A P T E R X.

- I. *A wise Prince has no Favourite.* Page 392
- II. *A wise Prince never grants any thing upon Sollicitation.* 399
- III. *A wise Prince severely punishes those who put their Interest to Sale, and receive Money for Solicitations.* 402
- IV. *A wise Prince gives Women no Share in the Government.* 406

C H A P T E R XI.

- I. *A prudent and skillful Prince has no prime Minister.* 410
- II. *The Life of a Prince is serious, requires Care and Labour.* 417

C H A P T E R XII.

- I. *A Prince ought to employ all lawful Methods to enrich his Kingdom.* 420
- II. *One of the first Methods is to protect Agriculture.* 410
- III. *A second is to facilitate the bringing up of Flocks.* 430

C H A P T E R XIII.

- I. *A Prince ought to favour Commerce, and first Home-Trade.* 433
- II. *Secondly, Commerce with other Nations.* 437
- III. *He should attend to the Manufactures.* 440

C H A P T E R XIV.

- I. *Usury is forbid by the Law of God.* 445
- II. *It is contrary to the Interest of a Prince.* 447
- III. *It is contrary to the publick Good.* 451
- IV. *It is destructive of Agriculture.* 456
- V. *It is injurious to Trade.* 459

C H A P T E R XV.

- I. *The Prince ought to inspire his Subjects with a Love to all the Virtues on which the Happiness of a State depends.* 464
 - II. *What these Virtues are.* 467
- The

I N D E X.

- III. *The Means a Prince ought to employ to render the Virtues amiable.* Page 488

C H A P T E R XVI.

- I. *One of the most effectual Ways to render a People virtuous, is the good Example of the Prince.* 485
 II. *How the Example of the Prince may have a greater Effect.* 491
 III. *The Conduct of those about the Prince ought not to weaken the Impression of his own good Example.* 495

The Pages from this Place begin again, occasion'd by a Mistake in dividing the Volumes.

C H A P T E R XVII.

- I. *The Prince's Attention to reward Merit and punish Vice, is the most effectual Means of rendering a Nation virtuous.* 1
 II. *It is his Interest to do it.* 5
 III. *It is also for the Interest of the State.* 11
 IV. *Rules to be observ'd in rewarding Merit.* 13
 V. *Rules to be observ'd in punishing Vice.* 16
 VI. *The Happiness of a Kingdom where Merit alone is honour'd, and in Authority.* 18

C H A P T E R XVIII.

- I. *A Prince ought to protect the Arts and Sciences.* 20
 II. *To oppose Ignorance.* 22
 III. *To know the Causes and Consequences of Ignorance.* 26
 IV. *To find out Remedies for it.* 30
 V. *Of the Arts in particular.* 31

C H A P T E R XIX.

- I. *The Prince ought to defend his People. His Revenue is the chief Means of doing it.* 33
 II. *He ought to know his Revenue perfectly.* 35

C H A P T E R XX.

- The Justice and Necessity of limiting the Taxes, and delivering the State out of the Hands of the Farmers of the Revenues.* 44

C H A P.

INDEX.

CHAPTER XXI.

- I. *Lawful Expedients for defending the State, and providing for its Necessities, without new Impositions.* p.58
- II. *These Expedients are sufficient for the Wants of the State.* 69
- III. *What must be done when new Impositions are necessary* 73

CHAPTER XXII.

- I. *War is sometimes necessary, and consequently just.* 77
- II. *When the Justice of it is doubtful, the Prepossession is for the Prince.* 80
- III. *What makes War unjust.* 83
- VI. *The Consequence of such Injustice* 84
- V. *The Prince ought to love Peace.* 88
- VI. *He should be arm'd to preserve himself in Peace.* 88

CHAPTER XXIII.

- I. *What must be thought of the Glory of Conquerors.* 96
- II. *What Conquests are just.* 102
- III. *In what Manner the conquer'd Nations must be us'd.* 103

CHAPTER XXIV.

- I. *On what Occasions the Prince ought to command his Army in Person.* 106
- II. *What Conduct he should observe when he commands it.*

CHAPTER XXV.

- I. *The Prince ought to make a strict Discipline be observ'd amongst the military People.* 125
- II *First, With regard to his other Subjects.* 126
- I. *Secondly, amongst themselves.*

CHAPTER XXVI.

- I. *It is the Prince's Duty and Interest not to trust the Government of the Provinces but to Men of great Merit.* 144
- II. *Observations upon the Governments, Qualities of Governors.* 145

F I N I S.